

JOHN P. WYNNE
116
THEORIES of
AN EDUCATION
INTRO- DUC- TION
DUCTION
TO THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF EDUCATION

A full and impartial analysis of the historical, philosophical, psychological, and social foundations of all important theories of education influential today, with their application to curriculum, method, and administration.

THEORIES OF EDUCATION

An Introduction to the Foundations of Education

JOHN P. WYNNE


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
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Theories of Education



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


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EDUCATION

*An Introduction to the
Foundations of Education*

John P. Wynne

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*To All Concerned with relating
Theory and Practice*

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Editor's Foreword

Those who are acquainted with the field of educational philosophy are well aware of the scholarly solidity of the writings of Dr. John P. Wynne. He has long been a recognized authority in the field, and the present book will enhance his standing. It is the product of lifelong experience, of deep study, and of extended labor. Writing and rewriting have preceded publication. This, the final product, is the distillation of a lifetime—an astutely perceptive presentation and appraisal of today's thinking on the ends, ways, and means of the American educational enterprise.

Dr. Wynne's treatment, however, has not been limited to presentation and appraisal. It includes also background and foreground for each proposal—cultural conditions, philosophic presuppositions, and logical implications in terms of educational practice. The author's first concern is always authentic portrayal—to present each view as sympathetically as would a proponent. To that end he has wherever possible submitted his treatment of each philosophy to a leading representative of the view under consideration, for criticism and corrective suggestions. Hence, this book is one of the best available means, short of recourse to original sources, for becoming acquainted with extant educational philosophies.

Although there are other books—some fairly recent—that try to serve the same purpose as this one, the distinctiveness of this book would seem to be (1) its extensive and systematic coverage of the field, (2) its adequacy of treatment of each view, (3) its inclusion of the findings of many recent studies, particularly of older views, and (4) its avoidance of subservience to the author's own synthesis. Complete "objectivity" is not claimed, for the author does not assume that to be possible; but, by letting his own views stand as portrayed elsewhere, the author avoids the effect of overshadowing that would be hardly avoidable otherwise. We consider this a significant book.

ERNEST E. BAYLES

Preface

This book is the outgrowth of a period of some thirty years' teaching courses in philosophy of education and in the general foundations of education. It is designed to serve two purposes. The *first* is related to the current misinterpretation of the actual doctrines of influential pioneer thinkers in the field of professional education, and the *second* is related to the recent pressure on the foundations subjects—the history of education, the psychological foundations of education, the philosophical foundations of education, and the social foundations of education. Recent attacks on professional education call for a reexamination of theories of education with a view to presenting them as their originators conceived them and not as uninformed propagandists and proponents of conflicting theories interpret them. The pressure of academic subjects on professional education on the one hand, and the consequent pressure of the immediately practical professional education courses on theoretical education courses on the other, are drastically reducing the time for the foundations subjects.

To promote the first purpose of this study, the original writings of the founders of all theories here considered have been reexamined, and recent scholarly research on the older theories has been analyzed. An effort has been made to give an accurate account of the actual beliefs of the founders of the various theories, rather than an account of the pseudo-beliefs which educational propa-

gandists and biased proponents of other theories have attributed to them, to the confusion of both the public and the teaching profession. When thus considered, the contrasts among different theories are not so sharply drawn as is usually supposed. Their similarities often seem more striking than their differences.

To promote the second purpose, the accounts of the different theories are arranged in a semihistorical order, and the philosophical and psychological foundations, the practical implications, and the cultural background of each theory are analyzed as fully as space permits. The first two sections in each chapter are based mainly on the writings of the proponents of the theory, and the third section, which is a kind of cultural evaluation, reflects the perspective found in the history of civilization. Such an organization provides for a synthesis of much of the materials usually found in the various foundations subjects, and points the way to the development of what has been called an "interdisciplinary" or general course in the foundations of education. It should therefore meet the minimum requirements of courses in philosophy of education that give special attention to the historical and social factors; of courses in the social foundations that stress the psychological and philosophical foundations; and of those courses in all foundations subjects that emphasize the relation of educational theory and school practice. It also indicates a way to incorporate in foundations courses much of what is usually included in other professional education subjects, and thereby to economize time and improve instruction in both.

For the most part, the theories here considered are limited to those whose originators or founders have definitely distinguished them from other theories, and have made reasonably clear both their philosophical assumptions and their practical implications. With these criteria in mind, the theories have been selected without prejudice to others.

For the analyses of the theories that constitute this book the author *alone* is fully responsible, and yet he is greatly indebted to many publishers and individuals. Proper recognition of publishers is given in the specific references, but especial credit and thanks are due the following who have kindly granted permission to quote from their books: P. F. Collier & Sons, the Crowell-Collier Pub-

lishing Company; Harper & Row, Publishers; D. C. Heath and Company; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.; the Council for Basic Education, by permission of Atlantic-Little, Brown & Company; Paul Reynolds & Son, for the William James estate, Longmans, Green & Co. (courtesy of David McKay Company, Inc.); The Macmillan Company; Prentice-Hall, Inc.; G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Certain individuals have read portions of the manuscript and most of them offered constructive suggestions. They deserve special recognition and appreciation: William E. Drake, University of Texas, read Chapters 1 and 3; Kurt Leidecker, Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia, Chapter 2; William H. Kilpatrick and John L. Childs, both Professors Emeriti, Teachers College of Columbia University, Chapters 4, 6, and 7; Richard E. Brooks, Longwood College, Chapter 5; Louise Antz, New York University, and Franklin H. McNutt, Woman's College of the University of North Carolina, Chapter 8; John W. Donohue, S.J., Fordham University, and Charles E. Butler, Longwood College, Chapter 9; Francis Butler Simkins, Longwood College, Chapter 10; Theodore Brameld, Boston University, the descriptive part of Chapter 11; Harry S. Broudy, University of Illinois, portions of Chapter 12; and Rinaldo C. Simonini, Longwood College, Chapter 12.

Finally, a few have been immediately and directly interested in the study. In the summer of 1961, Professor Francis W. Brush of the University of Denver read the preliminary edition of the entire manuscript and discussed with me various alternatives relative to its organization. During the past two years Professor Floyd Swertfeger of Longwood College has invited me to discuss with his classes several chapters, especially those dealing with recent theories. Professor Ernest E. Bayles, University of Kansas, took time to read the preliminary edition, as well as the final version, of the manuscript and make criticisms that led to considerable improvement in the book. To these three I am particularly grateful. But above all, I am indebted to my wife, Alice Curry Wynne, whose sympathetic patience and critical insight through all stages of the study have made it a thoroughly cooperative enterprise.

JOHN P. WYNNE

Farmville, Virginia
January, 1963

Theories of Education

The Formal-Discipline Theory

1

That people forget much—perhaps most—of what they learn is a fact of common experience. That past learning—even of things that have been forgotten—affects future conduct and subsequent experience is a general belief. Common sense often explains different kinds of mental activities by reference to the operation of hypothetical powers or faculties of the mind that are not directly observable. From this point of view, intellectual activities are performed by intellectual powers, such as perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning; affective and emotional activities are performed by the power of feeling or affection; and voluntary activities are performed by the power of will or conation. Through their own activities the different mental powers exercise themselves and become increasingly stronger as a result. The primary aim of education and the good life is the discipline, exercise, or development of the mental faculties. Such discipline is formal in that the growth or development of any faculty depends on its own effort rather than on the kind of subject matter with which it deals. This theory of education is, therefore, generally known as formal discipline.

Although theoretically dead, formal discipline is practically very much alive. Scarcely any recognized student of education subscribes

to it. Nevertheless, it still operates in the practices of our schools and colleges. It is often implicit in the selection and organization of subject matter and in methods of teaching, as well as in projected programs of school reform. It is implicit in programs of teacher education that require students preparing to teach general science in the high school to take courses in every science except general science, and students preparing to teach social problems in the high school to take courses in every kind of subject in the social sciences except social problems. It is also implicit in the current movement to identify the curriculum for prospective elementary teachers with that for prospective high school teachers, and also to identify the curriculum for prospective high school teachers with the academic requirements for prospective research workers and members of other professions. It is implicit in much of the current criticism directed toward schools because they do not always restrict the educational activities of pupils to learning the formal aspects of traditional academic subjects.

It is therefore exceedingly important that members of the teaching profession understand the philosophical foundations, the practical implications, and the cultural background of the theory of formal discipline. Only by so doing can they understand much that still goes on in the schools and colleges, much of the criticism of current educational theory and practice, and such projected educational reforms as stem from the historical doctrines and applications of the theory of formal discipline.

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical foundations of the theory of formal discipline are to be found in ordinary common sense, which is sometimes known as naïve realism. But the theory is not dependent on naïve realism alone. Some find support for it in what is known as the scholastic philosophy in which the faculties are conceived as forms of the activities of a metaphysical soul; others find support in the philosophy of Descartes, which divides the world sharply into two substances, mind and matter; and still others in representative realism as developed by John Locke. But all this does not mean that advo-

cates of formal discipline interpret the philosophy in which they purport to find support. With this qualification in mind, we shall consider briefly (1) naïve realism; (2) scholastic realism; (3) Cartesian dualism; and (4) representative realism.

NAÏVE REALISM

Naïve realism refers to a common attitude toward the nature of the world and man and their relation to each other prior to any critical analysis of the assumptions it involves. Even primitive man makes some kind of distinction between the spiritual and the physical world. The spirit is somehow embodied in all things and accounts for their activities. Everything has some kind of spiritual soul that cannot be directly perceived under ordinary circumstances. The human soul is conceived as different from that of other living things in that it is more complex and independent.

To the average person today in the most enlightened nations of the world, nothing seems simpler than the distinction between mind and matter. The two are simply facts of consciousness, conceived as a manifestation of mind that is common to all mankind, whereas the body seems to be a part of the physical world. The mind thinks, feels, and wills. It knows things directly just as they are. Perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, feeling, and willing, or any other mental activity however defined, is attributed to the operation of its correlative mental power that is a constituent of a metaphysical mind or soul. The mental processes consist of the direct action of their respective metaphysical powers. According to the idea of formal discipline, the mental powers are strengthened through the process of exercising them directly on the materials of the objective world. For instance, in knowing, the intellectual powers, including perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning, are strengthened through the exercise involved in dealing directly with materials supplied by the environment.

SCHOLASTIC REALISM

Despite frequent denials that the scholastics ever conceived faculties as metaphysical entities, recognized students of education have found a basis for formal discipline in scholastic realism. It represents a development of the realism of Plato and Aristotle. In this philoso-

every existing object of experience consists of the embodiment of a pre-existing form in an appropriate unit of matter. The pre-existing forms embodied in living things are called souls. The particular form embodied in the human individual is called a rational soul and includes the lower vegetative and sensitive souls embodied in other living things.

In the philosophy of Aristotle every particular thing in the world of experience consists of a combination of form and matter. However, the forms that are embodied in particular things do not exist in isolation and separation from matter. They exist only in things. The soul of man, like the forms of the inanimate world and the souls of plants and animals, is found only in individual human beings. It differs from other forms and other souls in that it is rational. Man is a rational animal. The acquisition of knowledge is not therefore a process of recalling forms perceived in a prior existence, as with Plato, but is a process of appropriating forms directly from sensory objects, involving perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning. Objects of knowledge consist of the integration of conceptions inherent in the mind and their correlative forms inherent in things.

In the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as it is often interpreted, learning consists of the operations of the metaphysical powers of the soul. According to Plato, it consists primarily in the contemplation of reason on images of the forms embodied in the soul and initiated by the things of the experienced world. According to Aristotle, it consists in integrating the forms embodied in particular things with the conceptions embodied in the rational soul. But in either case learning involves the operation of metaphysical powers, and nothing is clearer than that such powers may be strengthened through exercise.

In response to changing conditions that developed in the later Middle Ages, St. Thomas very successfully synthesized the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with Christianity. In his philosophy, as in that of Aristotle, every individual thing in the world consists of a combination of form and matter. The forms of plants, which are called souls, differ from those of inorganic things in that they are vegetative. The forms of animals, also called souls, are both vegetative and sensitive. The forms of men, likewise called souls, are rational as well as vegetative and sensitive. The acquisition of natural

knowledge as contrasted with supernatural knowledge is of two kinds—direct and indirect. Direct knowing consists in integrating the essences or forms embodied in things with the rational soul embodied in the individual. Indirect knowing consists in making logical deductions from direct knowledge. The mental processes involved in learning or knowing are attributed to the operation of the faculties or powers of the rational soul assisted by the faculties or powers of the sensitive soul. When the human soul is thus conceived, nothing seems more reasonable to advocates of formal discipline than that the mental faculties of the soul are strengthened through exercise in the acquisition of knowledge.

CARTESIAN DUALISM

The philosophical foundation for the theory of formal discipline is generally attributed to a new movement in philosophy initiated in the seventeenth century by René Descartes. Because of the new conceptions he introduced in the theories of reality, mind, and knowledge, he has been called the father of modern philosophy. In order to indicate the meaning of these conceptions, we shall compare them briefly with those of the scholastic tradition, which they were designed to replace.

In the scholastic tradition the external world of things was conceived as a composition of matter and form. The two logical realms of matter and form were distinct but they were combined in every sensory object of the existing world. In the movement initiated by Descartes the dualism of reality or existence as conceived in the philosophy of Plato and St. Augustine was converted into *two* realities. According to this attitude matter is no less a reality than mind, and these henceforth replace the historical categories of form and soul in philosophy and psychology. Mind as one element of ultimate reality is spiritual and unextended; matter as the other element of ultimate reality is physical and extended. Mind is found only in man himself. The human body, the inorganic world, and even the organic world below man are composed of matter only, and lack any unifying agency corresponding to the forms and souls of the scholastic tradition. With regard to man two fundamental categories of existence—mind and matter, soul and body—are accepted as facts so clear that they cannot be doubted. In contrast to soul and body, which in

the scholastic tradition are integrated in a composite individual, mind and body in Cartesianism are separate and distinct.

The recognition of two kinds of ultimate reality, and of mind and body as two distinct entities, involves a new conception of knowledge. According to Plato, knowing is a process of reviving in experience conceptions which are already inherent in the mind; according to Aristotle, it is a process of appropriating forms which are embodied in things; and, according to St. Thomas, it consists in abstracting the essences of things and integrating them with the rational soul. But when mind is taken to be separate and distinct not only from the body but also from the external world, the classical realism of the past is outmoded. There is no identity or correspondence between the reality of mind and the reality of matter. It is logically as impossible for the mind to deal with a physical world which has lost its forms and essences as it is for mental processes to interact with the nervous system.

According to classical rationalism, there are certain ideas or principles innate in the mind. They are general principles or conceptions reminiscent of the universal ideas, also called objects of knowledge, in the philosophy of Plato. They differ from the forms or ideas of Plato in two respects. First of all, the forms of Plato are the only realities, and the mind as a form has no difficulty in dealing with other forms having the same metaphysical character. But in modern philosophical dualism beginning with Descartes, both the physical world and the mental world are equally real. The mind can know mental realities, but it can never directly know physical realities. The sense organs can deal with the physical world just as reason can deal with concepts or rational principles. But knowledge of the sensory world and rational knowledge of the mind somehow have to be integrated if the physical world is ever to be known.

To account for such a combination it was assumed in accordance with the Christian faith that God made both the mind of man and the world experienced. He brought into existence not only the mental but also the physical world. Although the physical world is real and is independent of the mental world, it was constructed by a rational God on a rational basis. Therefore, the same rational principles that control the nature and order of the physical world are embodied in the human mind. Consequently, the primary objects of

knowledge with which knowing begins are to be found in mind itself. They are revealed through rational intuition. The facts of sensory experience do not provide knowledge; they provide at most the occasion for its development through the operations of reasoning. Such knowledge is immediate or direct, as compared with mediate or indirect knowledge derived from it. The mental processes involved in the acquisition of knowledge in classical rationalism, developed by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz during the seventeenth century, are conceived as operations of the metaphysical powers of mind. The logical implication is that such powers are strengthened through their exercise in knowing. If the powers involved in intellectual activities are strengthened, apparently the powers of feeling and willing must be also strengthened in the same way.

REPRESENTATIVE REALISM

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, John Locke, an English philosopher, took as his point of departure the sensory horn of the Cartesian epistemological dilemma, and initiated another movement in modern philosophy known as classical empiricism. He held that the ideas which the rationalists had considered innate could not be innate and could be acquired through experience. Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, insisted that all ideas ever found in the mind are derived from sensation or introspection. Although Locke rejected both mind substances and physical substances as direct disclosures of consciousness, he considered them necessary assumptions. To account for the cohesion of sensory qualities into objective patterns of perceived objects, a necessary assumption is a physical substance in which they inhere. To account for mental activities perceived through introspection—which Locke called reflection—the assumption of a mental substance is also necessary. An individual physical object thus consists of an underlying metaphysical substance together with the physical properties that are perceived as qualities. Likewise an individual mind consists of an underlying metaphysical mental substance together with its mental faculties whose operations are perceived in introspection as mental processes.

Like the classical rationalists, Locke recognized two kinds of knowledge—direct or immediate and indirect or mediate. Whereas for the rationalists immediate knowledge consists of innate principles

or ideas revealed by reason, for Locke it consists of impressions or ideas directly disclosed through observation and introspection. Whereas for the rationalists mediate or indirect knowledge consists of ideas and principles derived deductively from the innate ideas and principles that reason discloses, for Locke it consists of general principles or ideas derived inductively from sense impressions, together with such further general principles and ideas as may be deductively derived from them. But in classical empiricism, unlike both naïve realism and Cartesian dualism, the mental processes do not deal directly with physical objects in perception. The objects of direct knowing consist of impressions that are imprinted on the mind through observation and introspection. The impressions thus passively received are at best representative of the objects observed. Only those impressions are true which represent objects as they actually are.

But Locke, no less than the naïve realists, the neo-scholastics, and the classical rationalists, referred to the mental processes as faculties. Like the neo-scholastics, too, he thought of the faculties as functions of the soul or forms of its activity and not as separate metaphysical entities. Still it cannot be denied that he, along with the others, has been understood to lend psychological and philosophical support to the theory of formal discipline, when learning is broadly conceived to include affection and conation as well as cognition.

Whether one agrees with Monroe and Graves that Locke was a proponent of formal discipline in the broad sense, or with Eby and Arrowood that he rejected it in both theory and practice, there can be little doubt that those who have sought to maintain obsolete subject matter for purposes of general training (along with their critics) claimed to find justification in Locke as they did in the scholastics and the classical rationalists. In fact, if they had not, the recent argument of educational historians that neither the classical empiricists nor the scholastics support this theory of education would be without foundation. If proponents of formal discipline and their critics had not looked to both schools for psychological and philosophical support, there would be no point in denying the charge. After all, there can be no doubt that the formal discipline theory of education is a historical fact and a current educational force. In periods of cul-

tural conflict, whether correctly or incorrectly, educational critics usually interpret available philosophical and psychological beliefs in such a way as to support their own practical proposals—positive or negative. Certain advocates and critics of formal discipline are no exception.

Implications and Applications

Historically, the principles which the theory of formal discipline implies have been not only defined and elaborated but also constantly and systematically applied to school practice over a period of many years. We now know what the intellectual leaders of the movement thought should be done, and we also know what actually has been done. The logical implications and the practical applications of the theory are readily available for study and analysis. In both theory and practice the idea of the formal exercise of the mental powers often determines the aims of education, the subject matter of the curriculum, and the methods of teaching.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

The inclusive and ultimate end of education and the good life is a well disciplined mind. The number of aims recognized depends upon the number of faculties imputed to the mind of the individual. When analyzed into its more important aspects corresponding to the faculties thus attributed to the mind, education's inclusive aim generally signifies the development of six faculties: the intellectual faculties of perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning, together with the faculty of feeling and the faculty of will. Physical development is typically neglected and physical activity is considered an obstacle to mental development, either to be eliminated insofar as possible, or to be tolerated as a necessary relief rather than encouraged for its own sake. Of course, there is no uniform set of aims that is universally adopted because of the variation in the number of faculties recognized. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that a balanced development of the different faculties is desirable.

SUBJECT MATTER

The classification of school subjects and the selection and arrangement of subject matter are designed to facilitate formal mental exercise. The type of subject matter used as a basis of the curriculum corresponds closely to the different faculties to be developed through exercise. Historically, the school subjects have often been classified on the basis of the psychological aspects of the mind to which they are supposed to correspond. For instance, some subjects, such as mathematics and grammar, correspond to intellect; some, like the fine arts, correspond to feeling; and still others, such as religion, morals, and government, correspond to the will. Consequently, in the formal discipline policy and program, the subject matter corresponding to each faculty is considered peculiarly suited for use in exercising it. Of course, it is quite clear that different types of subject matter of learning are to be found in any of the established subjects. Still, some are especially suited to the development of some faculties and others to the development of others, for each subject places primary emphasis on some particular type of material.

According to the theory of formal discipline the different types of subject matter should be properly balanced in order to provide for the development of each faculty proportionately to the development of other faculties. Certain subjects therefore are conceived as peculiarly adapted to the training of certain faculties—reasoning, feeling, or will. Moreover, different aspects of any subject may be especially adapted to the training of different faculties. For instance, a subject which is primarily adapted to training the reason contains elements that are useful in training the powers of observation, memory, or imagination, or even in training the powers of feeling and willing.

In the arrangement of specific subjects as well as of the different aspects of subjects, consideration, therefore, is given to the emergence and maturation of the faculties. A limited number of subjects is quite sufficient. The subject matter represented in the formal discipline program is thus very narrow and restricted. On the basis of this theory the inclusion of more subjects than are necessary to provide a balanced and well-rounded training of the different faculties cannot be logically justified. One subject of any given type is as

good as another, and the introduction of any new subject—expansion of the curriculum—is therefore almost impossible to justify.

The formal aspects of subjects are emphasized because they are the very ones that supply the effective training of the different faculties. For instance, such subjects as the classical languages, mathematics, grammar, and rhetoric are particularly qualified to discipline the intellectual powers. But special attention must be given to the more formal aspects of these subjects. The same ends may also be served in other subjects by placing emphasis on their more formal aspects. Even in elementary-school subjects, attention must be given to formal observation and memory work. Just what things are observed or memorized makes no difference. The main consideration is that whatever can be observed and memorized should be observed and memorized. Such things are to be given special attention, not because of their social utility or personal significance, but because of the opportunities they provide for mental exercise.

Emphasis in all subjects is always on form and never on content. In foreign languages, emphasis is on syntax, grammar, and construction rather than on development of meaning and an understanding of other cultures. In mathematics, emphasis is on rules of operation and formal examples rather than on practical problems. In the vernacular language, emphasis is on parsing, diagramming, and defining parts of speech rather than on written and oral communication. Corresponding emphasis on form is given in all subjects such as art, music, geography, and history. Even in nature study or elementary science, attention may be devoted almost exclusively to formal observation and to abstract definition and classification.

Grade placement, particularly in elementary school, is based on the supposed natural growth or development of the faculties. Since the power of perception is supposed to develop first, the material which provides opportunity for observation is placed first in the program. Since the faculty of memory is supposed to be developed next in order, material for the use of this faculty comes next in the prescribed curriculum. Since, according to the natural development of the faculties, imagination emerges next, the material useful in training imagination follows. Finally, materials are provided for training the power of reason, which, in the course of natural development, is the last of the intellectual faculties to emerge.

The arguments for such a systematic arrangement of subject matter, corresponding to the "natural" development of the faculties, are of two kinds. As already suggested, a faculty can be best exercised only on the materials corresponding to it. Consequently, when a faculty first emerges, it should have available subject matter especially adapted to it. Otherwise, its exercise would be delayed. On the negative side, if the proper materials are not available, the faculty itself may atrophy or decline in power for lack of exercise. Then we might have what is known as arrested development, a condition that is by all means to be avoided. But arrested development may also occur from trying to exercise a power which has not yet emerged. It is occasioned also by underworking an existing faculty or overworking a faculty on materials not adequately adapted to it.

METHODS OF TEACHING

Finally, according to the formal-discipline theory, method, broadly conceived as a life process or the educative process, consists primarily in exercising the faculties of the mind. Only such procedures, devices, or techniques of learning and teaching are acceptable as contribute effectively to this all-inclusive end. Traditional procedures known as the book method, the writing method, the lecture method, and the question method, have all been used to serve the ends of formal mental exercise. The object lesson as a procedure to be used in object teaching was also intended as a means of exercising the faculties.

According to some authorities the object lesson was simply another device or technique for teaching a particular kind of subject matter, obtainable only through observation and manipulation of concrete sensory objects. When thus conceived, an object lesson was considered only another device or technique for training the sensory powers, such as sight, taste, smell, hearing, and touch. Other authorities, more philosophically inclined, conceived objects broadly to include not only concrete sensory objects but the impressions made by these objects on the mind. For instance, not only may an apple be conceived as an object, but the shape of an apple may also be conceived as an object of perception. Shape is thus an object of observation. Likewise, abstract conceptions such as honesty, truthfulness, and justice may be conceived as objects of reasoning or

understanding. In consequence, an object lesson becomes a general procedure to be universally applied in the training not only of sensory faculties but of other faculties as well.

When the object lesson was thus broadly conceived, the historical general procedures, such as talking, writing, reading, and questioning, were understood as contributory devices or techniques to be used in the more inclusive procedure of the object lesson. The curriculum was thus conceived in terms of objects ranging from the most concrete observations of sense to the most abstract conceptions of reason; and the pattern of the object lesson was construed as the general method of teaching the whole curriculum. In the program of formal discipline, therefore, the object lesson, whether narrowly or broadly understood, was considered primarily as a means of exercising the faculties of the mind rather than as a means of acquiring subject matter considered personally interesting and socially useful. Likewise, the final criterion of any procedure was its effectiveness in exercising the mind or some faculty of the mind.

Cultural Conditions

The development of a philosophy does not mean that it will be deliberately and extensively applied to social institutions. Much depends upon the condition of the institutions themselves. As long as everything runs smoothly and there is no pressure from without or disturbance from within, current practices supply their own justification and do not require the support of any theory that has been or may be intellectually developed. As has been pointed out, there was sufficient foundation in naïve realism and scholastic realism for the development of a theory of formal discipline even before the days of Descartes. Cartesian dualism and Locke's representative realism, however much they differed from the realism of common sense and scholasticism, still recognized the mind as a substantial metaphysical entity of faculties explanatory of mental processes. Although they contributed much to a more sophisticated understanding of the ideas of a metaphysical psychology and a realistic epistemology, they do not in and of themselves account for the theory of formal discipline. Their main contribution consisted in providing for its

more effective propagation and systematic application when cultural conditions became ripe for it.

As a matter of fact, the theory of formal discipline had for centuries had some place in human thought but it was not recognized as the inclusive and ultimate aim of education and was not fully exploited until long after the days of Descartes. The conditions responsible for its universalization and systematic application had been gradually accumulating since the Middle Ages. For hundreds of years, people thought that human welfare depended upon the mastery, by an intellectual elite, of the culture found only in the ancient classics. It was believed that the best available information in all fields of human experience had been preserved in the ancient languages. Scholars continued to write in Latin, the language also of the heads of both church and state. Consequently, a knowledge of Latin was prerequisite to scholarly achievement in any field. It was the basic subject of the Latin grammar school which itself was the gateway to the university and the learned professions.

With the gradual passing of the Middle Ages, men became interested in matters to which the ancients had given little attention. Soon the rising merchant classes, engaged in commerce with similar groups in other countries, wanted to speak and write living foreign languages. They also began to learn bookkeeping and shorthand. They became interested in having the fine arts contribute to production of goods saleable in foreign markets. They were becoming interested also in geography and history as means toward understanding peoples with whom they had commercial relations. In consequence of colonization, they had become interested in surveying and engineering. They therefore advocated courses in practical subjects which the traditional schools were not equipped to offer, and they began to establish separate schools where such courses could be provided. Many academies in this country were founded for the purpose of providing an education which could not be secured in the traditional Latin grammar schools.

The demand for a different kind of education from that available was steadily increasing. More and more individuals who had not had the advantages of the traditional education were rising to positions of influence. Young people who expected to enter expanding occupations in the business and industrial world were not inclined to

spend a long time studying the classics whose practical use was far from obvious. They filled the new emerging academies; they sought instruction from private individuals; and they accepted employment in business and industry with the expectation of developing the abilities required for advancement while working. Some of these more practical-minded young people were even making their way into the learned professions of medicine, law, and the ministry. Not only was the enrollment of the traditional Latin grammar schools declining, but young men who did not have a classical education were securing positions of leadership in state and church as well as in business and industry. As a matter of course, these fields had heretofore been preempted for the youth of the aristocracy who had the means and the leisure to secure a classical education consisting of the ancient languages, mathematics, and rhetoric. The sons of the newly rich and even of the common man were competing with the sons of the traditional aristocracy for positions of distinction even in the learned professions.

The leading representatives of the aristocratic class were sensitive to such competition from outsiders. Teachers in the traditional schools, colleges, and universities were also sensitive to the competition of teachers in the academies and other private agencies of instruction. The intellectual leaders of the aristocratic class were eager to protect their way of life and their way of education from the competition of these outsiders. A philosophy of education was needed that would not only confirm the belief of the educated classes in the superiority of their way of life and education but would also convince the people, even the members of the rising merchant class themselves, of its superiority. They gradually came to realize that, in established systems of philosophy, especially in Cartesian dualism, they had the foundation for the educational theory required. Their representatives in the fields of philosophy and education thus defined the theory of formal discipline, stated it in terms that most people could readily understand, and applied it systematically to all levels of schooling.

The foundations and implications of the theory of formal discipline were easy to explain. Most people, the educated and the uneducated alike, recognized the distinction between mind and matter. Some had learned it in the school, others in the church, and still

others had acquired it quite unconsciously in a multiplicity of ways. It was quite in accord with the common sense of the times to think of the different mental activities as the operation of metaphysical faculties or powers of the mind. When it was pointed out by the intellectuals that the ultimate happiness as well as vocational success of the individual depended upon strengthening the faculties of his mind, nothing could seem more reasonable. Just as the muscles of the body are strengthened by physical exercise, it was only by mental exercise that the faculties of the mind could be strengthened. The analogy between physical training and mental training was easily elaborated still further. The more strenuous the exercise, the more effective the training. Mental development, whether in schools or outside them, was thus independent of subject matter. One subject was as effective as another. Consequently, in practical programs the fewer subjects, the better. Since the classical traditional subjects were already available in the schools, there was no reason why any new subject should be introduced.

The only possible argument that could be effective in advocating introduction of a new subject was that it should supply superior mental exercise. The more practical-minded leaders tried to have new subjects introduced and even sought to show that new subjects would afford superior mental training. But the theory held that any well organized subject could supply such training equally well. The traditional subjects were certainly well organized, and thus the expense of introducing a new subject was almost sure to be prohibitive. Nevertheless, people who were interested continued to muster arguments to justify including the more practical subjects in educational programs.

It then became as difficult to dislodge old subject matter as it was to introduce new. A subject or a part of a subject may have been introduced to serve some useful social function that no longer existed. But as soon as a subject or a part of a subject lost its social usefulness, it was almost certain to be justified on the basis of its hypothetical disciplinary value. One could almost say that in practice, according to the theory, subject matter increased in disciplinary value as its social usefulness declined. The gates of opportunity were all but closed to those who were interested in the so-called utilitarian education, and the effort of the rising merchant class to popularize

its ideals of morality and social reform through the schools was all but futile. Whatever success the proponents of the new way of life and the new education may have had was due to such personal influence as could be exerted by particular individuals in spite of the prevailing formal-discipline theory. The proponents of new subjects and a new emphasis in all subjects had some success and came to occupy positions of influence in the community, especially as members of school boards. But since the introduction of any measures of reform had to be justified on the basis of a theory designed to maintain the status quo, the success of the reformers was at best spotty and irregular.

The formal-discipline theory of education and its underlying philosophy were used to maintain a way of life and education that had been challenged by the demands of changing conditions. The standards of direction that controlled the minds of men were actually embodied in a narrow range of materials. Theoretically, the manner in which things were done was more important than the things themselves. But in practice the educational materials supplied the actual standards of direction. The school curriculum and the school organization provided for the indoctrination of children and youth with ideas and beliefs favorable to the ruling class. Even with its special emphasis on method, the theory of formal discipline served to justify the use of the old materials and the development of outdated ideas and beliefs in the minds of the young.

Concluding Comments

There are good and sufficient reasons for beginning an historical account of educational theories with a description of formal discipline. To begin with a systematic account of any of the older theories is unnecessary because in all essential respects they are included in more recent versions to be considered in subsequent chapters. Although the theory of formal discipline is philosophically and psychologically obsolete, it still affects school practices. Moreover, in any systematic account of the more recent theories reference is often made to the theory of formal discipline. Few psychologists and philosophers today recognize metaphysical mental faculties as

an adequate explanation of the mental processes of thinking, feeling, and acting, or a metaphysical dualism which such explanations assume. Still, their own explanations of the mental processes and the relationship of mind and body are more intelligible to the reader who is familiar with the theory of formal discipline. Furthermore, some of the most perplexing problems in recent theories of education are more meaningful to the reader who understands the philosophical foundations of formal discipline and its influence on school practices. Therefore, the difficulties in its theoretical assumptions and practical exemplifications are here indicated.

PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

Just as experimental psychologists reject metaphysical faculties as an explanation of the mental processes, so philosophers who recognize empirical evidence as fundamental to the establishment of theoretical conceptions reject the spiritual-substance theory of mind, which is a presupposition of the traditional faculty psychology. Neither David Hume nor William James was able to catch a single glimpse of any metaphysical mind resembling that which some historical philosophers considered a self-evident fact of immediate consciousness common to all men.

John Locke rejected the belief that the existence of a metaphysical substance of any kind was a self-evident fact of consciousness. To explain the fusion of sensory qualities into perceived objects, however, he considered a metaphysical physical substance a necessary assumption, and to explain the mental processes he considered a metaphysical mind substance another necessary assumption. But William Berkeley held that such a physical substance failed to explain what it purported to explain and was therefore unnecessary. David Hume went a step further and stated, on the same grounds, that a mind substance was also unnecessary.

Furthermore, any such metaphysical dualism as that proposed by Descartes, accepted by Locke, but rejected by later empiricists poses an insoluble mind-body problem. As a matter of empirical fact, mind and body are somehow related. At least, some of the things that affect the body also affect the mental processes, and one's mental condition often affects one's physical condition. But according to the Cartesian dualism, mind and body are in theory separate and distinct

substances that are in every respect antithetical. Ever since the days of Descartes, philosophers have recognized the problem and have done their best to show how these theoretically incompatible mind and body substances influence each other. Of those who accept the Cartesian dualism in any form, some propose as a solution what is known as the principle of interactionism and others propose what is known as the principle of parallelism.

Those who subscribe to interactionism are apparently confronted with insuperable difficulties. To this theory of the mind-body relationship there are at least three objections. First, with respect to their origin both mind and body have a final cause. They are either self-caused or caused by something else. If there are two final causes—one mental and one physical—then there must be two gods. If there is one God that is neither matter nor mind, in the last analysis there are not just two substances but three. On the other hand, if the mental and the physical are combined in God, there is only one substance.

Second, logically, if mind and matter are completely independent, they cannot be related because in being related they are alike to the degree that they have something in common. Moreover, whatever this relation may be, it must either be physical or mental or partly both.

Third, scientifically, interactionism stands condemned by a recognized law of physics known as the law of the conservation of energy according to which the total physical energy of the world can be neither increased nor decreased. If the body, which is physical, could in any way affect the mind, which is spiritual, it must transfer some of the energy of the physical world to the spiritual world. On the other hand, if the mind could affect the body, it must transfer some of the energy of the mental world to the physical world. In the one case, the total of physical energy would be decreased, and in the other it would be increased.

According to those who subscribe to parallelism, mental events and bodily events, although they are in no way connected, are so correlated that mind and body work together effectively. They explain such a correlation in one of three ways. According to one explanation known as occasionalism, God exercises direct control over both series of events and thus keeps them working in harmony.

Such a conception is unacceptable to modern man, who cannot impute to an all-wise and all-powerful God the construction of a world of nature that could not run itself without His eternal vigilance. It has been said that God may have made man in His own image, but man certainly makes God in his own image. Consequently, men who emphasize technical efficiency cannot believe God could be so totally inefficient as to make a world in which He has to exercise constant oversight of the activities of every human being.

According to another explanation known as preestablished harmony, God has so coordinated the mind and body of each individual that they work together in harmony. Such a theory has never seemed satisfactory to men who believe in human freedoms. If both mind and body are so constructed that they have to do whatever they do, human conduct is predetermined and there is no place for choice and responsibility. What is to be will be, and there is nothing we can do about it. Such a theory seems to reject the empirical sense of freedom to which most people are committed.

According to an explanation attributed to Leibniz, mind and body are connected by a plastic medium which is partly physical and partly mental. It is not difficult to see that the physical elements and the mental elements constituting such a medium are as disparate and isolated as are the mind and body themselves. As Sir William Hamilton noted, such a medium itself needs a medium.

As a matter of fact, in strict logic there is no way by which God can thus control mental and bodily events without depriving them of their fundamental and independent reality which, according to the theory, they possess. Neither mind nor matter that is controlled by an outside agency and is powerless to exert influence itself can be a fundamental entity. The proposition that physical and mental events are controlled by some other agency seems to abandon parallelism and dualism, both of which it purports to explain.

The epistemological problem of the relation of mind to physical objects in knowing is no less embarrassing to proponents of the metaphysical dualism basal to formal discipline than is the psychological problem of the relationship between mind and body. According to this theory, the mind is no less isolated from the world of physical objects than it is from the body. As everyone must admit, knowing does occur and knowledge does exist. These empirical facts

are difficult to explain when mind and the objective world are conceived as qualitatively distinct entities. By definition, it is impossible for a spiritual mind to know directly physical objects, as the uncritical naïve realists assume. This fact the more critical Cartesian dualists admit. As a way of overcoming the difficulty, some of the rationalists like Descartes propose that mind secures through perception copies of the objects it knows. Only a little reflection indicates that the knower is unable to compare any given copy with its object, for the copy is all that he has in his possession. He cannot therefore distinguish a true copy from a false one. To avoid this difficulty, some empiricists like Locke simply assert that sensory impressions are representatives rather than copies of their objects in knowing. But it is no less difficult to tell whether an idea represents its object truly than it is to tell whether it copies it correctly. As a matter of fact, errors do occur. Since neither the copy theory of the rationalists nor the representative theory of the empiricists can explain how true ideas may be distinguished from the false, both theories break down.

On the axiological side, as already indicated, the primary end of the good life consists theoretically in the development of the powers of the mind. As a matter of fact, however, wherever the theory of formal discipline is applied, the real end is to be found in the culture—in school terms, the content and organization of subject matter. Such an end consists of the conceptions, beliefs, and ideals that are embodied in traditional subjects of study and the qualities of personality developed in the learning process. The values with which children and youth are blindly indoctrinated are not subjected to criticism because attention is directed solely to formal development of the powers of the mind.

But the final blow to the conception of a permanently enduring metaphysical substance has been delivered by modern physics. While William James and John Dewey were developing the notion that change is a universal and primary trait of all empirical existence, modern physicists came to the conclusion that the world of nature consists of a concatenation of events: that is, every physical object is an event embodied in a context of other events.

At first sight such a conclusion of physics does not seem to have any bearing on the conception of mind. Only a little reflection, how-

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ever, on the historical development of the spiritual-substance conception of mind is sufficient to indicate that abandonment of the conception of a material substance in the physical sciences necessitates abandonment of a mental substance in psychology and philosophy. In the history of human culture the physical world has been conceived as a material substance and the mind as a spiritual substance. In the early days of modern science the objects of the physical world were still conceived as substances in which perceived qualities inhere. Consequently, mind had to be conceived as a substance also. Otherwise it could not be compared with the physical world, and the mind of the individual could not be compared with his body.

Historically, mind and matter are correlative conceptions. They are correlative no less in the scholastic philosophy than in the Cartesian. In scholasticism, mind as the form of the body and matter as the material of the body are correlative substances. The Cartesian conception of mind as a substance clearly reflects the demand of the religious and cultural tradition for a conception of mind that is correlative and comparable with the conception of matter in the physical sciences of the period. Therefore, when modern physics defines the objects of the physical world in terms of events, mind must also be defined in terms of events. Otherwise, mind has no meaning. Just as two different kinds of substances have been compared in the past, so two different kinds of events may now be compared. A world of mental substances cannot be compared with a physical world of events. All things are events; those with certain qualities are physical and those with certain other qualities are mental. The conception of reality in terms of spiritual and physical substances is therefore now obsolete together with the metaphysical faculties basal to the theory of formal discipline.

The limitation of the foregoing critical examination of philosophical dualism to a consideration of Cartesianism seems justified for good and sufficient reasons. The dualism of Locke is properly conceived as a form of Cartesianism and subject to the same criticism. Cartesian dualism itself may be taken as a more sophisticated and critical naïve realism. Neo-scholastic educational philosophers purport to reject formal discipline as a general theory of education. Finally, scholastic philosophy will be given attention in subsequent chapters.

EXEMPLIFICATIONS IN PRACTICE

In practice the theory of formal discipline retards the equalization of educational opportunity. The American people have accepted the general proposition that "all the children of all the people" should be provided an equal educational opportunity. Such a principle is, of course, formal in that it is capable of various interpretations. According to the theory of formal discipline, it means giving every individual an opportunity to pursue the same courses in the same way subject only to the extent of his capacities.

From this point of view the same program that is desirable for some is desirable for all. In times past, the program provided was limited mainly to such traditional subjects as Greek, Latin, mathematics, and rhetoric in the secondary school and mainly to the formal aspects of the three R's in the elementary school. Only for practical reasons and over the protests of the proponents of formal discipline could other subjects be incorporated in the curriculum of either the high school or the elementary school. Even when such subjects as modern languages, history, the natural sciences, and literature were admitted to the curriculum of the secondary school and such subjects as nature study, history, geography, music, and art were admitted to the curriculum of the elementary school, instruction in them was limited to their formal and technical aspects, due partly to the influence of the formal-discipline theory. Such emphasis was designed primarily to train the faculties of the mind rather than to prepare young people to deal effectively with practical social conditions.

All pupils were required to pursue the same program in which nothing was taught solely because of its personal significance and social usefulness. Many quit school as soon as they could. Nevertheless, the proponents of formal discipline congratulated themselves on providing equal educational opportunity for all. However, as any competent student of education now realizes, the privilege of doing what one cannot do or is indisposed to do is no opportunity at all. Even on the basis of the equality of educational opportunity as a principle, equality as a fact was denied the vast majority of young people.

At present, practices which only the theory of formal discipline can justify serve to limit equality of opportunity on all educational

levels. Instead of providing a rich and varied program in which each individual may engage in activities meaningful and significant for him, many members of the teaching profession are inclined to follow the course of least resistance and require all pupils on all educational levels to pursue the same programs. Because of compulsory education laws, young pupils are no longer permitted to withdraw from school. They must remain and make the best of a meaningless existence. Many of them seek self-expression in various forms of rebellion against the whole social order and join the ranks of the increasing army of juvenile delinquents. Many who are stimulated in one way or another to endure through the high school do not go any further. A large percentage of the most capable high school graduates are not even interested in acquiring a college education.

Many members of the teaching profession fully understand the situation. They believe that the principle of equality of educational opportunity implies that all normal high school graduates should have the privilege of a general education on the college level, consisting of activities in which they are interested and in which they can succeed. But the proponents of a neo-formal discipline, often in positions of superior authority and influence, by insisting on a fixed formal program, are excluding from college those students who are either unable or unwilling to engage in activities which for them are meaningless and useless. Such students are debarred from further education in three ways: some are eliminated through college admission requirements; some who are admitted quit because of lack of interest or capacity; and many others, even the most capable, have no inclination to subject themselves to the formal requirements of the traditional college. The theory of formal discipline justifies the current tendency of the academic fraternity on the college level to neglect its responsibility for curriculum improvement and better teaching by "admitting only those students who can survive virtually any kind of educational treatment."¹

If the neo-formal disciplinarians have their way on the lower levels, all younger children will be compelled to endure to the end whatever the sacrifice may be to them or the cost to society. On

¹ Donald P. Cottrell, "Some Clues to Quality in Teacher Education," Address before the American Association of School Administrators, Atlantic City, February 16, 1960.

the higher levels only those will be provided further educational opportunity who are qualified to pursue a prescribed program that is to many no opportunity at all.

PRINCIPLES OF METHOD

When most broadly conceived, method—often spelled with a capital letter—has reference to the way people are treated. Principles of method vary with one's conception of education and the good life. They may be stated either as the qualities of the process of experience or as personality traits—qualities of personality—which are the cumulative effect of qualities of the process of experience. Although proponents of the formal discipline theory placed primary emphasis on method conceived as the effect of qualities of the process of experience, in practice they emphasized subject matter. For instance, in theory they often insisted that for the purpose of exercising the faculties one subject is as effective as another. If this were true, there could be no reason for changing subject matter requirements, regardless of what they were. Consequently, preference was always given to traditional subjects.

By implication, then, the standard of direction was, as a matter of fact, to be found in the subject matter selected in advance without reference to the needs, interests, and abilities of students. In practice the theory of formal discipline placed special emphasis on the personality traits of conformity and of blind obedience to external requirements. It would have been difficult to find any proponents of formal discipline advocating the cultivation of self-reliance, independence, initiative, responsibility, and cooperation, which the spokesmen for the rising middle class continually idealized. They preferred to have children and youth do as they were told even at the price of breaking their wills. In this respect they differed fundamentally from proponents of most other theories of education and the good life.

They had little or nothing to say in regard to socialization, which has been given special emphasis by proponents of many other theories. Nevertheless, in practice they did not neglect it. The ideas and beliefs of the upper class were embodied in the narrow range of traditional subject matter which consistency with the theory of formal discipline implied. The same subject matter that was used

to strengthen the mind also served the purpose of indoctrination. Therefore, the quality of doctrinaire sociality as a principle of method is a fundamental implication of the formal-discipline theory. On the other hand, proponents of the more recent theories of education either reject indoctrination or at least openly try to distinguish good from bad indoctrination.

Almost without exception, proponents of formal discipline have explicitly idealized effort as a principle of method. By effort they meant the strain of consciousness involved in attending to an uninteresting object. But the subject matter to which the attention of students was directed in line with the theory of formal discipline often lacked interest. Moreover, according to this theory the mental faculties could be strengthened only by exercise—the more strenuous the exercise, the more effective the training, and the more effort exerted in fixing attention on an uninteresting object, the more strenuous the exercise. The proponents of this theory usually supported the principle of effort thus conceived and opposed the principle of interest supported by proponents of more recent theories.

Whether conceived as personality traits or qualities of the process of experience, the principles of creativity, originality, and freedom, which are now given much attention in professional education, had no place in the theory of formal discipline. When the educative process is conceived in terms of the exercise of the mental faculties, there is no room for self-expression, which creativity and originality involve, or for choice among alternatives, which freedom involves.

But most proponents of this theory of education did recognize the problem of balance or integration, which was as familiar to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks as it is to us. Like proponents of most other theories, they considered integration as a personality trait to be achieved rather than as a quality of the process of experience to be had. It was the result of the harmonious development of the faculties through the proper distribution of exercise, rather than integrative unity conceived as a quality of particular experiences.

SELECTED READINGS

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The Natural-Perfection Theory

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Educational theories, like philosophies, may be conceived either as a body of beliefs derived through a process of critical, logical reasoning or as uncriticized attitudes applicable to educational problems. The first are sets of consistent principles that are the educational equivalents of philosophies in that they assume defensible reasoned beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value. They are generally believed to be of two kinds—those that have support in classical philosophies and those that have support in unorthodox philosophies. Both kinds are considered in this study. The second are loosely related sets of principles or doctrines which may or may not have intellectual support in one or more of the reasoned educational theories. The latter range all the way from extreme conservatism on the right to extreme radicalism on the left, with many gradations between. Those to the right of center are now usually called educational authoritarianism, while those on the left are called educational laissez faire. These two distinctions, however they may be designated, have been increasingly recognized in recent years.

The organization of the Progressive Education Association in 1919, by implication at least, distinguished between the kind of education advocated by the Progressives and conservative education

to which others lent their support. In 1925 the Research Division of the National Educational Association listed in two parallel columns the "opposite poles of educational theory," calling one the "theory of repression" and the other the "theory of expression." Under each nine different statements were listed, each corresponding to some aspect of school practice.¹ Since then the Progressives have attributed to other groups such authoritarian beliefs as these:

That education is formation from without rather than development from within;

That it prepares for adult life without regard to present living;

That it is the function of the school to transmit the social inheritance of the race rather than to satisfy pupil needs, interests, desires, and purposes, and to secure the mastery of facts and skills for future rather than present use;

That the function of method is the economical acquisition of subject matter prescribed in advance rather than the cultivation of desirable qualities of personality, and the indoctrination of the pupil with accepted social ideals and beliefs;

That subject matter is more important than method, and knowledge is more important than other aspects of experience;

That in organization the school should be isolated from rather than an integral part of community life;

That the curriculum activities should be limited to the acquisition of specific ends authoritatively determined in advance;

That discipline is a condition of effective instruction to be externally imposed by the teacher and the school.

Some of the laissez-faire beliefs that other groups have attributed to the Progressives are as follows:

That education is development from within rather than formation from without;

¹ Research Division of the National Education Association, "Opposite Poles in Educational Theory," *Research Bulletin*, 3, Nos. 4 and 5 (1925), 115.

That it is the satisfaction of immediate needs, interests, and desires rather than preparation for future social demands;

That it is spontaneous self-expression;

That the curriculum should consist of self-initiated activities of the pupils in which they engage with pleasure and satisfaction;

That method is more important than subject matter, involving freedom of action and self-expression to which the acquisition of subject matter is purely incidental;

That the school should cultivate discontent and dissatisfaction with the existing social order rather than promote adjustment to its demands;

That the method of discipline is to allow the pupils to do as they please.

The Progressives usually claim that the authoritarians find intellectual support in the reasoned educational theories that correspond to the classical philosophies beginning with Plato and Aristotle. Their opponents usually claim that the Progressives find intellectual support for laissez-faire doctrines in unorthodox philosophies from Heraclitus and the Sophists to Bergson and the existentialists. Most of the theories considered in this book are educational equivalents of the classical philosophies because they have been more systematically applied to school problems than have the unorthodox philosophies. With the exception of Rousseau, most originators of unorthodox philosophies prior to James and Dewey did not state them in terms of education. It may be possible to find support for educational laissez-faire doctrines in the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Emerson, Bergson, the psychoanalysts, and the existentialists. But for the most part, Rousseau, James, Dewey, and Kilpatrick have borne the brunt of the attack which critics of Progressive Education have directed at the philosophic foundations of the laissez-faire doctrines. This chapter will be devoted to an account of Rousseau's theory; and subsequent chapters will deal with the theories developed by the other three.

Rousseau and the Rousseau Tradition

In the Rousseau tradition the inclusive and ultimate aim of education and the good life is the natural development of the primitive propensities of the individual. The standard of direction historically is to be found in primitive man, and logically in the original tendencies of the individual. In the new interpretation of Rousseau which scholarly research has now made available, the aim of education and the good life is such development of the original tendencies and powers of the individual as will lead to natural perfection. The standard of direction, therefore, is to be found historically in the future rather than in the past, and logically in moral freedom rather than in the freedom of direct self-expression. For convenience of reference, therefore, these two forms of natural development are here designated, respectively, as the natural-unfoldment theory and the natural-perfection theory.

Doubtless, the natural-unfoldment theory in the Rousseau tradition has exerted more influence on education than has the natural-perfection theory of more recent research on Rousseau. But there is little doubt that the natural-perfection theory is a more reliable account of the real meaning of Rousseau's ideas and beliefs. Therefore, the reporter cannot afford to neglect either interpretation; but the fact that the former is better known justifies placing the main emphasis on the latter. Consequently, we shall first give a brief summary of the natural-perfection theory confirmed by research, and by way of comparison bring in important elements of the natural unfoldment theory in the latter part of the chapter.²

Those who accept the natural-perfection theory as true to Rousseau's conception of education and the good life consider his re-

² Our analysis of the natural-perfection theory is based mainly on a new look at Rousseau's discourse on the arts and sciences, the discourse on inequality, the *New Héloïse*, the *Social Contract*, and the *Emile*, in the light of such scholarly studies as Ernst Cassirer, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*; F. C. Green, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Critical Study of his Life and Writings*; Charles William Hendel, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralists*; and Ernest Hunter Wright, *The Meaning of Rousseau*. The student who is unfamiliar with Rousseau's works will profit from reading *Emile* and the *Social Contract*, and the student familiar with the Rousseau tradition will find recent Rousseau studies rewarding.

ligious, political, and educational principles all of a piece and the logical elaboration of a single moral ideal. To understand Rousseau's call for a return to nature we must look to the Greek tradition to which Plato and Aristotle subscribed rather than to the myth of the "noble savage." Of this tradition Lamprecht says: "The good of anything is to be found in the most fully developed form of that thing."³

If we provide for a man every condition which the fullest realization or actualization of his natural tendencies requires, he will become a better man in that he will develop in accord with his own innate principle; he will become a natural man. On the other hand, if we provide conditions which distort his own innate principle, he will then become an unnatural man. There are thus two kinds of art, whether political, educational, or religious—the natural art and the unnatural art. The unnatural art hinders and the natural art helps man to perfect his own inherent nature.

One condition which the natural art should provide is freedom. There are three kinds of freedom—the freedom of independence, civil liberty, and moral freedom. In the freedom of independence everyone does what he pleases insofar as he can. Such freedom is proper only for the savage or the infant. For the perfection of human nature civil liberty is indispensable. It is the freedom which the social contract provides. It exists wherever any group of men engage in the conscious pursuit of a common purpose. It involves the loss of the freedom of independence, which is dependent only on the laws of things. Civil liberty, which is dependent on the laws of man, makes any act a duty. In this kind of freedom the rights of each are fixed and the power of the whole group renders them secure. The freedom of civil liberty consists in the assured freedom to do what all consider right.⁴

³ Sterling P. Lamprecht, *Our Philosophical Traditions*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, p. 234.

⁴ Because Rousseau's educational and political designs are so integrally related, a few excerpts bearing on this relation are here cited.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, New York, Putnam, 1893, pp. 21-22: "Each of us gives in common his person and all his force under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."

Charles W. Hendel, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralists*, London, Oxford Uni-

In the promotion of natural perfection as the all-inclusive aim of education and the good life, it is the function of politics to provide the conditions of civil liberty; the function of religion to provide the sanctions of faith required for the perfect performance of duty; and the function of education to keep the growing man in the path which nature has prescribed for him at every stage of his development. Since the present study is limited to educational theories, any consideration of Rousseau's political and religious designs is only incidental to their bearing on education. After a summary analysis of the philosophical foundations of his natural-perfection theory, we shall consider his design for the education of the typical or representative man.

versity Press, 1934, Vol. II, p. 186: "It need not be supposed that the clauses of such a contract are actually enunciated—they are simply those understandings which are 'everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized.'"

George H. Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. 19-20: "The values which lie behind the organization of the institutions of the community must be universal values; and insofar as the will of individuals confirms these values and makes them the basis of those institutions, it is what Rousseau called a *volonté générale*. This principle does not go back to a simple rule of majorities . . . we find it in what is called 'public opinion' . . . When there is an effective public opinion, one that really expresses the attitude of everyone in the community, one recognizes it as one that has and will have authority . . . What is essential is the assumption that men are sufficiently enlightened to recognize that their own volitions in great social matters will be identical with those of others who are so enlightened that when one wills such things as property, enlightenment, and security, these things will be recognized as public ends which are also the ends of the individual. As a result of this, the individual will will for himself what is good for others."

Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Tr. Peter Gay, New York, Columbia University Press, 1954, pp. 123-125. ". . . from the outset Rousseau used the word and the concept 'society' in a double sense. He distinguished most sharply between the empirical and the ideal form of society—between what it is under present conditions and what it *can* and in the future *ought* to be. . . . The society of his day was not ready for this plan . . . This society will never change if it is not confronted with a categorical duty. . . . This spiritual and ethical decay the educational plan of *Emile* desires to prevent. It places the pupil outside society in order to protect him from infection and to let him find and go his *own way*. . . . No matter what we may think of this fundamental Rousseauist conception as a system (of education), one thing is certain: between it and the rest of Rousseau's work there is no discrepancy whatever. At this point, pedagogy and politics, ethics and religious philosophy fully interlock; they are but developments and applications of a single principle."

Philosophical Foundations

The public usually considered Rousseau one of the group of philosophers among whom he lived and worked, but he himself did not claim to be one of them any more than Socrates claimed to be one of the Sophists. In spite of any objections he may have had to philosophy as such and to the French *philosophes* of his time, his own contribution to philosophy is the most notable and most original of the French Enlightenment.⁵ Although he seldom wrote systematically, as was the custom of philosophers, he recognized his responsibility for making his philosophic presuppositions explicit. This he did more systematically in the *Profession of a Savoyard Vicar* than anywhere else. But if we recall that Rousseau included the *Profession* as well as a summary of the *Social Contract* in his treatise on education, *Emile*, it seems clear that the philosophic presupposition of his religious faith is the same as that of his political and educational faith. Each of them is an aspect of the more inclusive concept of education and the good life which we have designated as the natural-perfection theory. Therefore, without neglecting obvious philosophical assumptions and even explicit statements in other connections, particularly in the *Moral Letters*, we have relied mainly on the *Profession* which contains Rousseau's most explicit statement of his mature philosophic beliefs.

He clearly rejected the belief of the classical empiricists that primary knowledge consists of the mere product of sensations, as well as the belief of the classical rationalists that it is the revelation of reason. In so doing he reached a state of universal doubt analogous to that of Descartes. But whereas for Descartes universal doubt was an intellectual necessity, for Rousseau it was a very disagreeable state; for him complete skepticism was intolerable. The Vicar confessed:

I cannot comprehend how any man can be sincerely a skeptic on principle. Such philosophers either do not exist or they are certainly the most miserable of men. To be in doubt about things which it is important for us to know is a situation too perplexing for the human mind; it cannot

⁵ Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

long support such incertitudes; for it will, in spite of itself, determine one way or the other.⁶

In such a situation he confined his philosophy to "the love of truth" and adopted "the simple and easy rule of common sense" as his method of research. He re-examined all the knowledge he possessed, resolved to admit as evident everything to which he could not "in the sincerity of my heart refuse to assent, to admit also as true all that seemed to have necessary connection with it, and to leave everything else as uncertain, without either rejecting or admitting, being determined not to trouble myself about clearing up any point which did not tend to utility in practice."⁷

BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

This very resolution led him first of all to examine the belief in his own existence. Although he could not say for sure whether he had a distinct sense of it, or only knew it from his various sensations, he nevertheless concluded, "I know that I exist and have sensation. This is a truth so striking that I am compelled to acquiesce in it."⁸ For Rousseau, therefore, the knowledge of the self or self-consciousness was a sentiment, an internal sense, or a belief he could not refuse to accept, even when he could not explain it in terms of sensation or reason or any combination of these.

His belief in the existence of an external world he justified in this way:

My sensations are all internal, as they make me sensible of my own existence; but the cause of them is external and independent, as they affect me without my consent, and do not depend upon my will for their production or annihilation. I conceive very clearly, therefore, that the sensation which is internal, and its cause or object which is external, are not one and the same thing.⁹

Other things existed, therefore, outside of himself, because the objects of his sensations were certainly not parts of himself—even if they should be "nothing but ideas."

⁶ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar* (Harvard Classics), New York, Collier, 1910, Vol. 34, p. 247.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

Everything that he perceived out of himself and that acted upon his senses Rousseau called matter, and those portions of matter which he conceived as united in independent beings he called bodies. In accord with his rule of common sense he rejected as insignificant the issue as to the ultimate nature of bodies, which seemed very important to both idealists and materialists. Nevertheless, he had, he thought, "acquired as certain knowledge of the existence of the universe as of my own."¹⁰

After establishing the belief in his own existence and in that of other things, Rousseau proceeded in the same way to establish the characteristics of himself and those of other things. Since sensations are passively received rather than actively acquired, perception is passive. On the other hand, judgment involving the comparison of sensations or meanings of sensations is not only active but involves intelligence. He concluded, therefore, that he not only existed but that he was an active and intelligent being. Since he called everything perceptible to his senses matter, he then deduced "all its essential properties from those sensible qualities, which cause it to be perceptible and which are inseparable from it." He concluded that, since matter could be conceived at rest, motion could not be essential to it. He then inferred further that neither motion nor rest is essential to matter but that motion, being an action, is clearly the effect of cause, of which rest is only the absence. "When nothing acts on matter, it does not move; it is equally indifferent to motion and rest; its natural state, therefore, is to be at rest."¹¹

Nevertheless, in bodies Rousseau perceived "two kinds of motion—that is, a mechanical or communicative motion, and a spontaneous or voluntary one. In the first case, the moving cause is out of the body moved, and in the last, exists within it." Still this does not mean that Rousseau considered as spontaneous the motion of machines, such as watches, or of natural substances, such as liquids, and their immediate causes, such as heat. By analogy he thought the movements of animals might be considered spontaneous. He could not doubt that there was such a thing as spontaneous motion, because "I feel it. I will to move my arm and accordingly, it moves without the intervention of any other immediate cause. It is in vain to attempt to

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

reason me out of this sentiment: It is more powerful than any rational evidence. You might as well attempt to convince me that I do not exist.”¹²

Rousseau's understanding would not acquiesce in the notion that the visible universe which is composed of inanimate matter could of itself either move or produce any kind of motion. Yet it is in motion, and its movements are “all regular, uniform, and subjected to constant laws.”¹³ For him, therefore, the world was not a “huge self-moving animal but receives its motions from some foreign cause which we do not perceive; but I am so strongly persuaded within myself of the existence of this cause,” he said, that it was impossible for him to observe the apparent orderly movement of sun and earth without conceiving their cause. For him the first cause of motion did not reside in matter; the actions and reactions of the powers of nature were mainly effects; the final cause must consist of some volition. “Inanimate bodies have no action but motion; and there can be no real action without volition. Such is my first principle. I believe, therefore, that a Will gives motion to the universe, and animates all nature. This is my first article of faith.”¹⁴

Rousseau was unable to say “in what manner volition is productive of physical and corporeal action. . . . I experience within myself that it is productive of it. . . . The Will is known by its effects and not by its essence. . . . To conceive matter producing motion would be evidently to conceive an effect without a cause. . . . It is no more possible for me to conceive how the will moves the body, than how the sensations affect the soul.”¹⁵ Unlike both idealists and materialists, Rousseau considered the means of integration incomprehensible. He admitted the obscurity of the principle he had laid down; but he insisted that it was intelligible and contained “nothing repugnant to reason or observation”—a fact which, as he showed, was more than could be said for materialism.¹⁶

Just as from matter being put in motion he discovered a Will as the first active cause, so from the subjugation of matter to certain

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

regular laws of nature he discovered an Intelligence. As the existence of a powerful Will was his first principle and article of faith, so the existence of a supreme Intelligence was his second. The unity of the Will and the Intelligence in a single Being implies also Goodness. These are the three attributes of God.

With his first two principles established, the Vicar, speaking for Rousseau, proceeded to apply his simple rule of common sense to the place of man in the scale of being. He showed that by virtue of his will man had more power over other things than they had over him; that by virtue of his intelligence he alone of created beings was able to survey the whole world system to which he belonged; and that by virtue of his free will, conscience, and reason, he was a moral being responsible for all the real evil in the world. He showed further that because of his freedom man could do either good or bad, and that because of the limitations on his freedom he was unable to interrupt the overall plan of the universe, which was good. He added, too, that the evil which actually exists in the world was entirely a human product of the misuse of human freedom and had nothing to do with the universe, which was perfect; and that the only real evils were moral; physical evils were only products of the imagination.

In the *Profession* Rousseau attributed the chaos of the moral world as contrasted with the order of the rest of nature to the conflict of two "distinct principles" operating in man:

The one raising him to the study of eternal truths, the love of justice and moral beauty . . . the other debasing him even below himself, subjecting him to the slavery of sense, the tyranny of the passions, and exciting these to counteract every noble and generous sentiment inspired by the former. . . .

"I concluded" he went on, "that man is not one simple and individual substance. I will and I will not; I perceive myself at once free and a slave; I see what is good, I admire it, and yet I do the evil: I am active when I listen to my reason, and passive when hurried away by my passion; while my greatest uneasiness is to find, when fallen under temptations, that I had the power of resisting them."¹⁷

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

To account for the presence of conflicting experiences which introspection revealed, the Vicar raised the question of the ultimate substance of man. "By the word substance I mean, in general, a being possessed of some quality, abstracted from all particular secondary modifications."¹⁸ There were, he concluded, as many different substances as there were such incompatible primitive qualities. Corresponding to the world of sensation, which includes the body, seat of the passions, is matter, which is inert and passive; corresponding to will and judgment, which are active, is the soul, which is spiritual. Man is therefore a free agent capable of willing anything except what is harmful to him, and he is therefore animated by an immaterial substance. This was Rousseau's third principle or article of faith: it completed the formal statement of his beliefs about reality from which all the others could be deduced.

The foregoing summary covers the Vicar's account of his philosophizing, in which he dealt with the main philosophical problems. When this account is supplemented by suggestions from other sources, it is possible to make a formal statement of Rousseau's belief on those philosophical issues to which our educational philosophers usually devote considerable attention.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BELIEFS

As we might expect, Rousseau adopted the dominant psychology of his day to which both Cartesians and scholastics subscribed. According to this psychology every mental activity, whether conceived as intellectual, voluntary, affective, instinctive, or sentimental, was the work of some metaphysical power or faculty of the mind or soul.¹⁹ Thus there were as many different faculties as there were different distinguishable kinds of activity. The faculties of individuals might vary in strength, but they were potentially common to every member of the human species, and though potentially present at birth, they did not all emerge and develop at the same time. At any age individuals differed from one another because of variation in the strength of their faculties. For Rousseau, child psychology

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

¹⁹ Modern Aristotelians and Thomists hold that faculties are powers of the soul's activity rather than independent metaphysical powers which they attribute to the Cartesians; but the general reader does not make this distinction.

was different from adult psychology, and the psychology for any period in human growth and development was different from that of any other period. With this idea in mind, he recognized the practical significance of determining the faculties characteristic of the growing individual at different age levels.

To facilitate distinguishing the different periods of natural development Rousseau made use of another idea familiar to his generation—that the human race had passed through several stages of development. The question was often raised as to what the next stage would be like. According to some, the childhood, adolescence, and maturity of the race had been achieved and the stage of decline had already approached, while according to others the emergence of reason enabled mankind to reconstruct social institutions in accord with nature and thus begin a new period of progress such as the world had not yet seen.

Such an idea enabled Rousseau in imagination to define the cultural stages in the historical development of the race as it advanced from barbarism to civilization and to utilize the stages as a source of suggestion in defining the stages of individual development from birth to maturity. Apparently he anticipated the later belief in recapitulation which the theory of evolution suggested. He distinguished four different periods in the development of the individual analogous to the historical stages in the development of the race. In terms of recent psychology the period of infancy was roughly from one to five years; the period of childhood, from five to twelve years; the period of preadolescence, from twelve to fifteen years; and the period of adolescence, from fifteen to eighteen years. To each period he attributed the emergence and development of certain faculties or powers. If it is understood that these periods represented only rough distinctions which may be earlier for some individuals and later for others, we may call the first period the age of simple feeling and sensation; the second, the age of "common sense," judgment, sympathy, and curiosity; the third, the age of reason; and the fourth, the age of the passions.

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

To provide an understanding of Rousseau's epistemology or beliefs about knowledge, one need do little more than make explicit

what the Vicar said on the subject in the development of his ontological principles already considered. It was customary during the eighteenth century to distinguish between immediate, direct, or primary knowledge and mediate, indirect, or secondary knowledge. Primary knowledge was conceived as the first principle from which, through logical operations, secondary knowledge was to be derived. Both classical empiricists and classical rationalists were considered rationalists in the broad sense as contrasted with irrationalists. From the standpoint of rationalism in the broad sense, which would perhaps better be called intellectualism, Rousseau was a proponent of irrationalism. The classical empiricists took as their starting point in the establishment of primary knowledge the data provided by the senses. They were logically committed to the belief that first principles were the product of sensations although some, like Locke, were not always consistent in dealing with this problem. The classical rationalists—that is, rationalists in the narrow sense—were committed to the belief that primary knowledge was a disclosure or revelation of reason.

Rousseau showed in various connections that he rejected intellectualism—rationalism in the broad sense—in both forms. As the Vicar indicated, reliable first principles could not be derived from the mere combination of sense materials or revealed directly by reason. He therefore decided to give up the hair-splitting in which both groups of intellectualist philosophers were constantly engaged and adopt as his philosophy the love of truth. Consequently, he abandoned the method of the rationalists and that of the empiricists and adopted as his method of research what he called the simple rule of common sense.

Adoption of this rule led Rousseau to take his own existence as self-evident, as did Descartes, although he would probably have phrased the idea, "I feel, therefore I am," rather than "I think, therefore I am." But as Wright puts it, "The phrases are very much like two names for the same thing, and with a common denominator may both mean 'I have consciousness, therefore I am.'"²⁰

An analysis of the rule of common sense shows that Rousseau clearly distinguished immediate or direct knowledge, which he con-

²⁰ Ernest H. Wright, *The Meaning of Rousseau*, London, Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 158.

sidered primary, from mediate or indirect knowledge, which he considered secondary. As to the derivation of secondary from primary knowledge, he adopted the same canons of logic as had other philosophers since Aristotle.

With regard to the foundation of primary, immediate, or direct knowledge, however, there is little doubt that Rousseau was breaking new ground in the philosophy of the time, if not in the whole history of philosophy. The only knowledge in his possession that he would admit as true would be restricted to that which he could not sincerely reject. The matter of personal satisfaction or annoyance was entirely irrelevant. Moreover, in the elaboration of his resolution he demonstrated beyond all question that his decisions as to ideas he could not refuse to accept were not based on their immediate personal appeal. He would assent only to what he could not deny after he had exhausted his resources in an honest effort to justify intellectually its rejection. Only those of his ideas that could survive such an intellectual ordeal he considered first principles: that is, primary, immediate, and direct knowledge from which other knowledge might be derived through logical operations. These were the first principles which he substituted for the abstractions from sensations and the revelations of reason which the intellectualists of the time had to offer.

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

The foundations of Rousseau's axiology or beliefs about value are to be found in his conceptions of nature, reality, and knowledge which have already been considered. The roots of the good—that is, positive values—are to be found in the nature of the universe as a whole. This universe is perfect because the God of power, intelligence, and goodness made it so; and it is also completely determined and not subject to modification in consequence of purely human ends. The bad—that is, negative values—is due entirely to man.

According to Rousseau, man knows by his feeling that he is an active being and therefore free to choose either the good or the bad, and that he often chooses the bad. Also, the ill that man does returns upon himself without changing anything in the system of the world, without even preventing the human species from perpetuating itself

despite the evil. Man commits evil when he abuses the freedom of action with which he is divinely endowed. Of the two kinds of evil usually recognized—physical and moral—physical ills such as pain and death would not be felt as evil apart from human vices, and moral evil is man's own doing.

Man was made, however, to do the good. He is endowed by nature with the instinct of self-love which limits his effort to the satisfaction of his needs and with the sympathetic tendency which renders him sensitive to the needs of others. The sentiment of conscience, which is the product of the interaction of self-love and sympathy, compels him to love the good. Only when reason fails to listen to the voice of conscience and takes spurious needs for the needs of self-preservation, is self-love perverted into the love of self, selfishness, or pride, which is the one sin from which all other human vices are derived. When reason restricts activities to the satisfaction of the real ends of self-love and heeds the voice of conscience which always loves the good, the ultimate end of the good life is assured.

On the lowest level of human freedom man is independent and limits his effort to the satisfaction of the real needs of self-love. At a higher stage of natural development man conforms to the general Will of the *Social Contract* and enjoys certain values in return for his cooperation in rendering secure the same values for his fellows. This is the end of natural development under the law and paves the way for achievement of the good life in the ideal society—natural perfection or moral freedom. Then duty under the law will have become virtue. It involves contentment, happiness, and commitment to beauty, truth, and goodness, and any ideals which the heart and conscience find good. A natural religious faith, as the Vicar defined it, is not only an indispensable sanction in the realization of all other values but is also a good in itself for which there is no other defensible substitute.

Implications and Applications

In the *Emile*, Rousseau explained his design for implementing in the field of education what we have called the natural-perfection

theory. Although he submitted his plan as only provisional, to stimulate others to provide better ones, it nevertheless is an important source of practical suggestions even today. In this section we shall indicate briefly and concisely the main aspects of his design as defined in the *Emile* and interpreted by recent Rousseau research scholars. In order to capture the spirit of Rousseau for contemporary members of the teaching profession, our discussion will focus on educational aims, curriculum development, and educational administration—topics with which teachers and students of education are vitally concerned. Readers who find our account unusual or strange might re-examine the first four books of the *Emile* and consult one or more of the recent books on Rousseau and his works.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

In the light of evidence provided by recent scholarly studies, Rousseau's theory of natural perfection as the end of the good life is the aim not only of education but of government and religion as well. In the promotion of this all-inclusive aim, education is charged with the responsibility of keeping Emile on the right track from birth to maturity. To do so, his tutor must know what should not be done as well as what should be done. Therefore the aims which it is the peculiar function of education to serve at each level of natural development have negative as well as positive aspects.

For the guidance of the tutor the aims for each of the four age-levels are included in Rousseau's educational design. In the discussion, however, aims are not separated from curriculum and administration, but we here formulate them separately. At the end of the period of infancy Emile will increasingly do more for himself and demand less from others, for he will have been permitted to use what little strength he has and will have been supplied with the strength required to meet his real needs; and his whims and fancies will have been ignored.

During the period of childhood, of those facts that Emile can master, and of the simple ideas he can form with his present powers, he will learn only those that he perceives to be useful. He will become an expert in his little world without any knowledge of the principles and laws that control it. He will become as self-reliant

and self-sufficient as his existing powers make possible. At the end of the period he will be healthy, vigorous, fearless, contented, frank, and confident without vanity and insolence. He will be truthful, clear, and direct in speech; obliging, and expecting others to be obliging, without catering to them; and purposeful and skillful in shaping means to his ends. In all proper matters for his age he will be a leader and recognized as such by his fellows.

At the end of the preadolescent period Emile will be capable of facing his problems in the light of reason; and he will be free from pride and the vices it generates and from common prejudices about the world of man. He will have some understanding of such parts of the social world as seem useful to him and as will stimulate him to fit into it. He will develop the capacity of self-control in that he will do what he perceives to be useful whether it is immediately appealing to him or not.

If the educational aims of the earlier levels have been properly met, at the beginning of adolescence Emile, because of his negative education, will be free of prejudice about the social order, and his reason will be able to deal not only with social problems but with even the strongest of the passions that come upon him at this time. Because of the gradual increase in his general sensibility he now has the feeling as well as the reasoning of a man. Since the period of adolescence is the culminating stage of natural human growth and development, its primary aim is the perfection of personality for which all that has gone before was, in the mind of the tutor but not in the mind of Emile, preparatory. This requires that he should be free from the common prejudices, that he should understand the world of man now that he has found his place in it, and that he should achieve morality insofar as he is content with the place he has found.

The period of adolescence also requires the mutual support of understanding and sympathy. When Emile has achieved such social understanding and morality, he will then be ready to live in a republic where man is both sovereign and subject, and even to participate in the establishment of such a society as that described in the *Social Contract*. He will have a religious faith that is an indispensable sanction to moral endeavor and provides inspiration for which there is no other defensible substitute.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

When the curriculum is conceived as the activities of pupils under the direction of the school, the selection of these activities is an important feature of curriculum development. But since Emile is the representative or typical man, the design for him is much more limited than for others in particular situations, such as Poland. In selecting curriculum activities for him his tutor will therefore neglect all specialized education and that part of general education which the peculiar cultural conditions at any time and place require.

For Emile's curriculum the tutor will, therefore, approve in each period of natural development only those activities which he considers desirable for any boy at any time or place. During the first period, Emile's curriculum activities will be such as will use the little strength he has in doing what he can to meet his real needs which are clearly distinguishable from his whims and fancies that are to be ignored. In the second period he will engage in only such activities as he himself perceives to be useful, whether he or the tutor proposes them. In the third period his natural curiosity will stimulate him to investigate things about him. Those he perceives to be useful he will study.

The criterion of usefulness thus understood will be observed also in selecting his studies of the social order, which, because of his emerging passions and increasing reason, he will investigate. In the fourth and culminating period he will engage in those studies and activities requiring the cooperation of reason, that now is approaching maturity, and sympathy, to which the sensibilities of approaching manhood give a new meaning. The criterion of utility emphasized on the lower levels is also applicable on this level, along with the additional criteria of reason and sympathy.

In the subject-matter requirements of Emile's curriculum all general fields of knowledge will be represented. Materials selected from the natural sciences, the social sciences, the humanities, including history and the fine arts, the practical arts, and ethics, metaphysics, and religion will be used. Those useful in the maintenance of health and the development of physical strength and vigor will be given special attention. Just which specific items of subject matter will be used from the different subject fields will depend upon the curricu-

lum activities selected at each of the four educational levels. Since these activities cannot be specifically determined in advance, no detailed requirements as to subject matter can be prescribed, but the tutor should always be looking ahead and planning tentative programs, activities, and studies.

On subject-matter placement as a feature of curriculum development, a few generalizations may be suggestive. During infancy and childhood subject matter will be derived primarily from direct experience in dealing with things rather than with the world of man. In the third period subject matter from the natural sciences, already introduced in the earlier periods, will be greatly extended, and materials from the social sciences will be introduced. Since *Emile* is now to be taught a trade, selections from the practical arts will be introduced. In the period of adolescence subject matter from the social sciences will be greatly increased, and selected materials from history, ethics, philosophy, and religion will be used. What we now call the three R's will be taught as the pupil needs them.

In *Emile's* curriculum design the feature of method is given special attention but no specific directions are prescribed as to particular devices and techniques of learning and teaching specific things. The many detailed procedures described in *Emile* are included to illustrate principles rather than to show the tutor what to do. When taken in this way, the fact that many of them are extremely artificial and impractical is unimportant.

Since the principles of method are fully elaborated in *Emile*, only some of the more important ones need be mentioned here. First of all, the real needs rather than artificial ones are as fundamental in the selection of the procedures as in the selection of activities and subject matter. Second, the quality of learning is more important than the quantity; it is better to learn a few things thoroughly than to half-learn many things. Third, direct experience is preferable to book learning, and research and discovery are preferable to formal instruction; the pupils learn more when the tutor teaches less. Fourth, the pupil should study only what he can understand and perceive to be useful. Fifth, when he cannot be shown the value of an activity, it should be deferred unless present necessity requires it. Finally, he should wish to do what he does rather than do what he wishes. Just as immediate liking in itself is an insufficient justification for any

course of action, so is immediate disliking an insufficient warrant for rejecting it.

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

In his educational design for Emile, Rousseau had nothing to say in regard to many of the complex problems of public school administration. But he did explicitly consider the problem of pupil discipline, and implicitly the problem of pupil progress, both of which are today of vital concern to members of the teaching profession. In any accurate, intelligible account of Rousseau's conception of pupil discipline it is necessary to note that Emile's tutor is in absolute control of the whole educational situation. Not only the boy but all the members of the household, including the nurse and the servants, are subject to his directions in all educational matters. His rules, regulations, and decisions are final in regard to what Emile may do or may not do; there can be no appeal to higher authority. Even in the period of infancy his instructions as to keeping Emile in the path which nature has prescribed for him must be strictly observed. "He is weak and we are strong," and it is natural for him to feel his weakness and our strength. But we must not abuse our strength or his weakness by either forcing him into submission because of our impatience or indulging him because of his cries. To do the former will give him his first lesson in servitude; to do the latter will give him his first lesson in domination. If we do both, he will sometimes behave like a slave and sometimes like a tyrant. To avoid both extremes we must not use either scolding or petting, for both lead to pride which is the root of all evil. We must urge him to use what little strength he has and also assist him in satisfying his real needs, ignoring his fancied needs.

As he grows older, we must continue to control him and at the same time extend his area of freedom. But it is important to recall that there are several different kinds of freedom—the freedom of the savage, the freedom of feeling (feeling free), intellectual freedom, and moral freedom. The freedom of the savage, which means doing as he pleases, would be fatal to Emile. Intellectual freedom is impossible before the age of reason and is also prerequisite to moral freedom. Therefore the only freedom that is both possible and desirable for him is the freedom of feeling—feeling free. The problem of dis-

cipline for the tutor, then, prior to the age of reason is not a matter of gaining control over the child, for he has had that from the beginning. It is rather a problem of maintaining the absolute control he already has and keeping Emile feeling free at one and the same time.

Emile does not now know the meaning of such words as *right*, *wrong*, *duty*, or *obedience*. It is the business of the tutor to prepare him for acquiring this kind of knowledge at the proper time. The tutor must, therefore, find some way of allowing him to feel free—a freedom appropriate to childhood—while he maintains firm control.

The proper standard of direction to be observed is that which an analysis of human dependence reveals. In the order of nature we are dependent upon things, and in the social order we are dependent also on man. The dependence on things about us is the law of nature, is absolute, and cannot be evaded. As Professor Wright says, "Just because we cannot dodge it in the smallest point we remain untroubled by it, and our full submission leaves us feeling free." The dependence on man, on the other hand, is variable and often open to evasion. "For it is in our nature," to quote Professor Wright again, "not to care about the stringent limits of the natural law but to resent the interference of an alien will." ²¹

We must try to keep the child who is subject to both kinds of dependence feeling free even though he is under our absolute control. To pursue Professor Wright's analysis further, "We may let our will control him in the simple manner of the things around him; then he will not dream of fretting at it or of feeling the less free for it. . . . In so far as we can wield a will as calm, impartial, and irrevocable as a law of nature, we shall have the child in full control and yet in freedom." ²²

Of course, all discipline is the function of reason. But since the tutor's reason is fully developed, he will occupy the seat of authority until nature herself arranges for the pupil to reason, and only then may he assume command. In the words of Professor Wright, "Nature will keep his reason for the latest of her gifts, or for the sort of product of the rest. We may hardly use it to produce the rest,

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

and must rely on other means.”²³ By making our methods of control conform to the laws of nature, our pupil will now have a freedom that is proper for a child and will prepare him for the freedom proper to a man when the time of discretion arrives.

Although Rousseau abhorred punishment, he recognized it as a necessity for Emile under extreme conditions. It is less difficult, he said, to forestall a vice than to uproot it; prevention is better than cure. The best way to prevent misbehavior is never to provide a motive for it—avoid demanding obedience under penalty, resorting to reason, or referring to duty, which the pupil cannot understand. We should hold him to his duty as we see it without giving him any reason until he can understand what it means. But after we have done our best, the pupil will on occasion misbehave and punishment will be necessary. It should then be administered without anger or pity and in such a way as to make him suffer the consequences of his misdeed and hate it. Such is the principle of natural punishment later popularized by Herbert Spencer, who apparently was unfamiliar with Rousseau’s doctrine.

Pupil progress as a feature of modern educational administration has reference to the rate of advancement of pupils from one age or grade level to another. French tutors of Rousseau’s day no less than American teachers of our day were confronted with the demands of their patrons for demonstrating the results of their educational programs in terms of achievement at different age levels. Parents then, as now, were primarily interested in facts and skills that could be easily exhibited. Philosophic students of education then, as now, were concerned with long term results conceived as personality traits whose presence or absence could not be so easily and immediately determined. Educators knew, too, that overemphasis on easily detected facts and skills might cause neglect of the intangible but more important personality traits. But for the most part, they were no more in communication with parents than are educational reformers today.

In his educational design for implementing the natural-perfection ideal of the good life Rousseau gave considerable attention to the

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

problem of pupil progress, although he did not use the term. His criticism of current procedures and proposals for reform were so expressed as to arouse the interest and concern of all. Nature, he said, determines the emergence and development of passions and faculties which in turn determine what can be done and what can be learned at each age level. Although it is possible to hasten the flowering of the passions, it is better to delay it. But it is not possible to accelerate the growth of the faculties of the mind. To force or entice the pupil to engage in studies beyond his intellectual powers will be at the expense of their full use at a later time, and will distort self-love into selfishness or pride. Therefore, prior to adolescence, which is the age of reason, *Emile* must be shielded from the study of mere symbols, from all history, fables, and abstract ideas, and even from the idea of God.

Consequently, *Emile* will seem retarded when compared with little sages who have been crammed with facts and ideas they do not understand. Nevertheless, he will have acquired qualities of personality and character that are far more important from the standpoint of the perfection of his nature, which is the ultimate ideal. Furthermore, Rousseau was not interested in comparing *Emile's* achievements with those of others whose tutors and parents were seeking different ends. He was not interested in showing him off at different age levels to gratify his parents' pride. It is the function of education to keep him in the course that nature has marked out for him, so that when he approaches manhood he will be ready for civil liberty. This freedom requires perfect obedience to duty and makes possible the achievement of moral freedom in which one's desires are identified with the good of all—natural perfection.

Cultural Conditions

The cultural conditions—domestic, economic, religious, and educational—out of which the theory of natural perfection emerged generated a state of mind that contributed to its wide influence and also to its apparent misrepresentation and condemnation. During the eighteenth century the population of France numbered between twenty-five and twenty-six million. Of these, all but a relative hand-

ful had sunk to an inconceivable level of poverty, suffering, and degradation. They were the common people. A small group of some 200,000 privileged nobles and clergy lived in luxury, idleness, and indolence. The income that made such a life possible for them was derived from the rents, taxes, and funds supplied by the millions of people who were barely able to exist after meeting their obligations to the superior class in control of the nation. At the same time there was gradually emerging a new class of entrepreneurs and artisans who were dissatisfied with their status in the social order and were striving for the improvement of economic and social practices.

This so-called middle class in France, as in other countries, was developing its intellectual spokesmen. Because of the activities of these intellectuals in opposing reason to faith, revelation, custom, and tradition, the age of Rousseau is known in history as the period of the Enlightenment. Because of the shift of authority from the arbitrary standards of immemorial tradition to the nature of man, it is also known as the period of revolution. Those who initiated the movement were called rationalists not because of their allegiance to classical rationalism as opposed to classical empiricism, but because they looked to reason rather than to irrational tradition for their standards of direction. Among the leaders of this group Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Grimm, and Rousseau are perhaps best known. Some of them cooperated in the preparation of an Encyclopedia designed to include all the available knowledge on all topics of human concern, and for this they were known as *Encyclopédistes*. Diderot and D'Alembert were the master-editors. These rationalists challenged the current economic, political, psychological, and educational beliefs in the name of reason, and approved only those that reason could support.

The upper classes had been challenged to justify the principles implicit in their policies, programs, and activities. The church, the state, and the whole social system were placed, at least intellectually, on the defensive. This rationalism was contagious and many individuals even among the upper classes looked upon the new movement with favor and lent it their support. As a result, there was a constant decline in religious faith and respect for government. But the current standards of imitation and conformity in morals, literature, art, and social customs were very little affected. Moreover, the problems that

most concerned the leaders of the Enlightenment were those whose solution would favor only the upper classes, and those whose solution might lighten the burden of the millions of people were usually neglected. The plight of the common people was of little interest to philosophers.

Although Rousseau was close to this intellectual group, he never saw eye to eye with them. He knew the needs of the common people, for he had experienced poverty. He knew the shallowness and inconsistencies of the organized religion of the age. He had had first-hand experience with the Presbyterians while he was a member of their church during his childhood, and with the Catholics during his adolescence and early manhood after he became a member of their church. He knew atheism from his association with atheists among the rationalists. He knew the pretense and artificiality of the upper classes and their insensitivity to the needs of the common people. He saw that existing economic arrangements, political institutions, and social customs could never be reformed by mere intellectuality and that neoclassical formality in social life, art, and literature continued to hold the human spirit in bondage. He was convinced that the welfare of the whole people required nothing less than a thorough and complete revolution in human thought. This revolution he initiated with the publication of his political, religious, and educational theories stated in such a form that they appealed to people everywhere, whatever their status in life might be.

The idea of a return to nature was in the air. The independent life of savages had long been idealized in literature. The state of primitive man was described as simple, free, and good as contrasted with the complex, artificial, formal, and downright immoral condition of civilized man. In the minds of many people the state of the "noble savage" became a standard on the basis of which the state of civilized man could be appraised and improved. Literary men in France as well as in other European countries were idealizing the life of the "noble savage" as a standard of perfection in criticizing the life of civilized man. The sympathy, freedom, and happiness of primitive man in a state of nature were the direct opposite of what they saw everywhere about them. In order to present his own

ideal Rousseau appealed to the goodness of man in a state of nature and redefined it in terms of a moral ideal under conditions of civilization. The passion and style with which he wrote appealed to people in all walks of life, and many who read his political, religious, and educational designs longed for a new social order and accepted his faith that it could soon be realized.

Conditions in Europe were ripe for political, religious, and economic reform. In the field of education, which is our primary concern in this study, the influences of Renaissance Humanism which made Greek and Latin literature the basis of culture; of a demand for a smattering of factual information stimulated by scientific discoveries of the seventeenth century; and of scholasticism which placed special emphasis on formal logic and ethics, were already obsolete. Rousseau attacked the system in all its aspects. In the words of Archer,

It [the system] was based on a theory that men were born bad, whereas they were born good. Physically, it tried to keep children from risks; they could only grow up healthy by running risks. It knew but two means of moral training—punishment and preaching—both of which ruined education. . . . Since Rousseau's time, willingness to adhere to first principles and to reject existing practices which could not be justified thereby has become possible.²⁴

Faith in education, that had been almost completely lost because of its poor results, was now revived. To quote Archer again: "Once more men began to believe that, if education had accomplished little, the fact was due not to any inherent limitations in its possibilities, but to the kind of education that had been tried."²⁵ Because of this new faith in education, one design after another from that day to this has been proposed by practical educational reformers on both the right and the left. Rousseau's conception of the good life, his design for its educational implementation, and its philosophic foundations we have already considered. We now turn to some of the objections that have been or may be raised to them.

²⁴ R. L. Archer, *Rousseau on Education*, London, Edward Arnold, 1928, pp. 2, 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Concluding Comments

The theory of education and the good life which recent scholars attribute to Rousseau has been called the natural-perfection theory to distinguish it from that of the Rousseau tradition, which has been called the natural-development theory. Because some knowledge of metaphysical dualism and faculty psychology is prerequisite to an understanding of the natural-perfection theory, our account of it follows the formal-discipline theory in which both are properly considered. It attributes to Rousseau responsibility for educational doctrines and supporting beliefs which recent Rousseau scholars find highly questionable, to say the least. It differs so much from the natural development theory that a few comments on the educational psychological, and philosophical beliefs that tradition attributes to Rousseau may be necessary here.

THE EDUCATIONAL BELIEFS

However much educational progressives and conservatives may differ in other respects, they subscribe to the traditional belief that Rousseau is partly responsible for the extreme pole of educational doctrine known as educational *laissez faire*. They find support in the Rousseau tradition according to which his theory of education and the good life is equivalent to the back-to-nature movement, or an idealization of his personal character.

The romantic idealization of primitive man in a state of nature as a standard for historical criticism and improvement of social institutions was common during Rousseau's time. According to its proponents, man in an original state of nature is good and perfect prior to the development of civilization. This romantic conception—that man is good until perverted—is in contrast to the traditional religious conception—that man is naturally bad until converted. According to the traditional conception, it is the function of the human arts of education, religion, and government to help the individual transform his nature. According to the new romantic conception, it is the function of the human arts to help him return to a state of purity that has been contaminated by the evil forces of civilization.

From this latter point of view, every individual is endowed with

the same primitive tendencies as were his forbears prior to civilization. These tendencies are good in themselves and supply the standards of direction in education, religion, and government. It is the function of human arts to remove all obstructions to the natural development of those original tendencies and to provide whatever conditions their direct expansion requires. Since Rousseau also called for a return to nature, many thought he meant that the elaboration, expansion, or unfoldment of primitive tendencies was the ultimate end of education and the good life. With the exception of Kant, most critics down to our own time have thus interpreted Rousseau. Such a belief is an important aspect of what may be called the Rousseau tradition.

Its logical implications for education seem obvious: the aims of organized education must consist of or contribute to the direct expansion or unfoldment of the original tendencies of the individual, however they may be designated; only such pupil activities, subject matter, and methods as contribute to the realization of these ends can be justified; the criterion of selection for both ends and means is found in the immediate needs, interests, and desires of the pupil without regard to future social demands; pupil achievement, whether conceived in terms of general personality traits or of knowledge, appreciations, and skills, is primarily incidental to the satisfaction of immediate ends consistent with original nature; the progress of pupils would be estimated in terms of their increasing interests, spontaneity, and freedom of action; and the discipline of pupils would be an incidental byproduct of their doing as they please. Therefore, it is small wonder that educational critics familiar with the Rousseau tradition have attributed to him theoretical support for laissez-faire educational principles and practices.

But the recent Rousseau scholars whose interpretation lends support to our account of the natural-perfection theory deny the validity of the foregoing Rousseau tradition. While they admit the possibility of such an interpretation, they reject as inadequate the method of study that has been responsible for it. It is, they think, the direct result of taking the part for the whole. There are, they admit, many passages in Rousseau's works, especially in *Emile*, which, if taken in isolation, suggest just such an interpretation of the return to nature and such laissez-faire implications as those described. But

they insist that these statements are a consequence of Rousseau's rhetoric and his informal style of writing in which ideas are presented just as they come rather than in a formal statement of principles. They may regret his failure to provide any single complete formulation of his philosophy and its implications, but are convinced that they are all aspects of a single conception.

Any interpretation of Rousseau's theory in general cannot be based upon isolated statements found in *Emile*, or even in the whole book itself without reference to his complete works. In the light of this fuller perspective the new interpreters are convinced that in the mind of Rousseau the ends of the good life lay in the future rather than in the past and in the perfection of human nature through education, politics, and religion. It is the responsibility of education to keep the pupil in the path that is natural for him in the light of a vision of moral perfection as an ideal in the future. Just as the end of the acorn is the perfect oak, so the end of the savage or the child is the perfect man. As has been said, to keep a pupil or the human race moving steadily toward natural perfection requires an educational design that cannot be derived from any state of primitive nature that might lend support to laissez-faire principles and practices.

Another way to find support for educational laissez faire in Rousseau's theory of education and the good life is to adopt a biographical approach to a study of his philosophy. Those who proceed in this way take his theory as an idealization of the kind of life he lived or wished to live. From his life as he himself described it in the *Confessions*, some critics get the impression that he tried to satisfy his immediate feelings and desires without regard to duty or social obligation; that is, he tried to do what he wanted to do and to refrain from doing what he did not want to do. They then conclude that the laissez-faire life he seemed to live or to like to live he idealized as the good life for all.²⁶

This use of the biographical or genetic method is a feature of the Rousseau tradition from Voltaire to Irving Babbitt. It confirms the identification of Rousseau's theory of the good life with the idealization of the life of primitive man in a state of nature. Whether Rous-

²⁶ One of the best statements of this attitude toward Rousseau's educational theory is to be found in Thomas Davidson, *Rousseau and Education According to Nature*, New York, Scribner's, 1898.

seau's theory of education and the good life is conceived as the idealization of the life of the savage or of his own life, the standards of direction are the same. They are to be found in his uncriticized feelings, impulses, and desires, and the implications for educational practice are essentially the same as those commonly attributed to proponents of educational *laissez faire* in recent years.

The new Rousseau interpreters condemn any use of the biographic form of the genetic method that would base the criticism of a philosophy on the character of the philosopher. They hold that the only way to ascertain what Rousseau meant by the good life and its practical implications is to study his complete philosophy and his practical designs. They admit that a study of a philosopher's life and character is necessary for a full understanding of his philosophy but no substitute for it. They consider Rousseau's life entirely irrelevant to his theory of the good life for humanity and condemn any *laissez faire* educational doctrines that may be attributed to him.²⁷

PSYCHOLOGICAL BELIEFS

In the elaboration of his own theory of education and the good life Rousseau found it necessary to assume some kind of explanation for instinctive and sentimental activities as well as for those of thinking, feeling, and willing. What he assumed was the traditional faculty psychology common to both Cartesians and scholastics. The nature of the activities and the things to be learned at each age level depended upon the presence or the absence, the strength or the weakness, of the different faculties at that stage.

According to some critics, this faculty psychology vitiates the entire educational design presented in *Emile*. In the light of our present knowledge of child growth and development such a judgment seems fully justified. Still, the significance of Rousseau's proposal does not depend upon the faculty psychology or any other psychology. His educational design was to illustrate the meaning of the principle that what the pupil should be required to do depends upon his natural development, and that it is erroneous to prescribe what should be done or learned at every age level. In the Preface to *Emile* Rousseau said:

²⁷ See Cassirer, *op. cit.*

The wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know, without asking what a child is capable of learning. They are always looking for the man in the child, without considering what he is before he becomes a man. It is to this study that I have chiefly devoted myself, so that if my method is fanciful and unsound, my observations may still be of service. I may be greatly mistaken as to what ought to be done, but I think I have clearly perceived the material which is to be worked upon. Begin thus by making a more careful study of your scholars, for it is clear that you know nothing about them; yet if you read this book with that end in view, I think you will find that it is not entirely useless.²⁸

We have found a better psychology and developed a better understanding of what pupils can do at different age levels. But the real lesson that Rousseau meant to teach is that there is always more to learn about our pupils, and that the educational program should be constantly reconstructed in the light of what has been learned about them.

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

In various connections Rousseau stressed the importance of feeling and impulse to the apparent discredit of reason. In the discourse on inequality he declared, "The man who meditates is a depraved animal." In his educational design he postponed intellectual education as long as possible. He held reason responsible for the existence of evil and moral decline. He said that in his own experience the little good he had done was due to his immediate response to impulse, and when he relied on reason he usually did wrong. Many people thought he found his moral standards in the satisfaction of his immediate desires. In literature he expressed feelings and ideas just as they came to him without regard to social propriety or personal consequences. In religion he found inspiration in direct communication with nature without reliance on established authority. In philosophy he took as his starting point, "I feel; therefore I am," in place of Descartes' "I think; therefore I am." The charge, therefore, that he was a proponent of irrationalism was inevitable.

In Rousseau's day most philosophers subscribed to intellectualism.

²⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. by Barbara Foxley, New York, Dutton, (1780) 1911, pp. 1-2.

Anti-intellectualism was therefore an unorthodox but not an unreasoned philosophy. As already noted, Rousseau recognized the traditional distinction between primary knowledge, which is immediate and direct, and secondary knowledge, which is mediate and indirect. With respect to secondary knowledge, that derived through deductive inference, Rousseau was as logical as the most confirmed intellectualist. But for him, feeling was just as important as intellect in the acquisition of primary knowledge. He would admit as evidence any ideas to which he felt he could not refuse assent. But for him, no idea or principle was true merely because he immediately felt that it was true. Before he would accept any idea or principle as true, he subjected it to critical analysis. Then he would accept it as true only to the extent to which he could not reject it "in the sincerity of his heart." Rousseau was an irrationalist only to the extent to which he recognized the factor of feeling as indispensable to the process of knowing.

Rousseau was apparently confronted with the same kind of dilemma which both Hume and Kant had to face. After exhausting the possibility of deriving certain primary knowledge from sensation, Hume concluded that nevertheless some things had to be accepted as true on the basis of what Santayana later called "animal faith." Since Kant could not demonstrate the intellectual disclosure of the nature of things through intellectual operations, he appealed to the moral will or conscience, which was felt rather than intellectually perceived, to justify belief in the reality of moral values. Rousseau, therefore, found justification for moral values in the general will of the social contract, which was the product of will and reason. Recent Rousseau scholars have therefore rejected the traditional belief that he was an irrationalist in a sense that is indefensible.

As Cassirer says:

The attempt to measure Rousseau's world of ideas by the traditional antithesis of "rationalism" and "irrationalism" results in equally ambiguous and uncertain judgments. That Rousseau turned away from the glorification of reason that prevailed in the circle of the French Encyclopedists, that he appealed, instead, to the deep forces of "feeling" and "conscience"—all this is undeniable. On the other hand, it was precisely this "irrationalist" who, at the height of his struggle against the *philosophes* and the spirit of the French Enlightenment, coined the phrase that the loftiest

ideas that man could form of the Deity were purely and exclusively grounded in reason. Furthermore, it was this "irrationalist" whom no less a man than Kant compared with Newton and called the Newton of the moral world.²⁹

The builders of the Rousseau tradition apparently were concerned less with a critical analysis of his beliefs than with the protection of their own interests. Rousseau rendered insecure many ideas and programs of the time. His educational doctrines challenged the current emphasis on the dead languages stemming from the Renaissance, on the accumulation of factual information stemming from the rise of modern science, and on formal logic and ethics stemming from scholasticism. His religious doctrines challenged the beliefs of both Catholics and Protestants in original sin and in secondhand faith (*fides implicata*), and his political doctrines challenged the divine right of kings. The dynamic and informal style of his writing challenged the existing static and formal character of pedagogy, literature, and the fine arts. The fact that he made the active self the starting point in philosophy challenged intellectualism in all its forms. Self-preservation was enough to arouse proponents of various traditional ideas and beliefs to make counterattacks. As a matter of fact, the Rousseau tradition is mainly a product of these counterattacks. Irrationalism, like many other elements of the Rousseau tradition, is based less upon an analysis of his beliefs than on ways and means of curbing his influence.

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²⁹ Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

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substance and then showed that it was not necessary to assume, as did Locke and Berkeley, a metaphysical mind substance to explain the mental processes. From this point of view, the mental activities, such as perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, feeling, and willing, could be accounted for on the basis of the operation of the traditional laws of association, such as contiguity in space and time, similarity, contrast, and recency.

On the epistemological side, objects of knowledge consist entirely of impressions supplied by the senses and their organization into general conceptions through the operation of the laws of association. Furthermore, in the process of knowing, the ideas that have already been acquired constitute the organs of knowledge in the acquisition of new ideas. All reality, including the knower, the process of knowing, and the objects of knowledge or things known, consists entirely of ideas themselves and their association.

How the empiricists came to such a conclusion is a long story that can be summarized here only briefly. The movement seems to have been initiated when Locke developed the theory of representative perception, according to which the knower never perceives objects directly but only the impressions made upon the mind in observation.

It is a well-known fact that a color-blind person sees colored objects as gray whereas a normal person sees the same objects as colored. We may say that the color-blind person is abnormal and does not see things as they are. If we admit this conclusion, we must admit also that something about the color-blind person prevents him from seeing objects as they are. If we admit that his structure prevents him from seeing things as they are, we are logically compelled to admit that something in the structure of the normal person enables him to see things as they are. If we admit that the structure of the individual affects the impressions he receives from the objective world, then we are logically forced to the conclusion that impressions are the product of our own mind rather than revelations of things of the objective world as they are in themselves. Now although the physical world may exist, we have no way of knowing that it exists or what may be its nature if it does exist. To assume that the existence of a physical substance in which mental impressions we know directly inhere in something else seems, to say the least, entirely worthless as an explanatory principle.

On the other hand, we do not know any more about a metaphysical mind and its metaphysical faculties than we know about a metaphysical physical substance. In the process of introspection we do observe directly certain ideas in operation. When they operate in one way, we call them memory; when they operate in another way, we call them imagination; and when they operate in another way, we call them reasoning. When they operate in still another way, we call them feeling; and when they operate in yet another way, we call them willing. But we do not and cannot directly observe any metaphysical faculties of the mind that perform these several kinds of operations. Consequently, any assumption of such a mind and such faculties that we do not know in order to explain the ideas in operation that we do know seems superfluous, to say the least. Therefore, the existence of a metaphysical mind substance as well as a metaphysical physical substance must be rejected as an unnecessary hypothesis.

In the historical development of the science of psychology, leaders in the field generally came to the same conclusion. The steps they followed may be briefly indicated. As a matter of fact, modern psychologists have never agreed that they are able to observe directly through introspection any operational mind substance on the basis of which such mental processes as feeling, willing, and thinking, including perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning, had in the past been explained. The mental phenomena themselves—activities—are all they have been able to observe. In their introspective studies modern psychologists confined themselves to an examination of the mental operations they could observe. Eventually they entirely neglected the historically recognized mind-substance of which they were unable to catch even a single glimpse. Nevertheless, they still tried to explain the mental processes they could observe and which, by general consent, were to be included in the subject-matter content of psychology as a subject of study.

In line with the historical development of classical empiricism, Herbart and the Herbartians still assumed the existence of mind as a metaphysical substance. But they considered it only as little more than a depository for mental impressions which were made upon it by the things of the outer world. Finally, attention was confined entirely to the operation of the impressions or ideas. To all intents

and purposes, these ideas in their combinations, associations, and collocations *were* the mind, and they alone were used to explain mental processes without reference to the original mind-substance. Self and mind were identified psychologically. The self was originated, developed, and organized out of ideas that were derived from sensory experience and mental operations. The enduring self or mind was conceived as the system of ideas that endured unconsciously from one experience to another, and consciousness was identified with the process of receiving impressions and organizing them into systems of ideas that had already been developed.

The new psychology consisting of the analysis and explanation of mental states is designated in different ways, depending upon the factors emphasized. When emphasis is placed by the individual upon direct observations of his own consciousness, it is called introspective psychology. In this respect it does not differ from faculty psychology, which is also introspective. When emphasis is placed upon the manner in which impressions and ideas are related so as to produce mental processes such as feeling, willing, thinking, and the like, it is known as association psychology, because the traditional laws governing the association of ideas,—the laws of similarity, contrast, and contiguity, for example—are used as explanatory principles.

The structural psychologists analyze mental phenomena in two ways. First, they distinguish the different kinds of elements constituting mental states. These elements consist of impressions directly derived from the senses, images of past impressions, and affective or emotional elements that accompany both impressions and images. Second, taking visual perception as a model, they distinguish, in the field of consciousness, three different levels, which they designate respectively as the focus, the margin, and the extra-margin.

The focus is the part of greatest clearness; the margin includes those aspects which gradually shade off from the focus; and the extra-margin is a secondary field consisting of memories, thoughts, and feelings that lie outside the primary field of focus and margin. The enduring mind or self which is constantly undergoing modification is identified with the extra-margin field of unconscious systems of ideas. The ideas that have already been acquired constitute the enduring mind and are often called the apperceiving masses. New ideas are incorporated into these masses through conscious activity.

Just what ideas can be learned at any given time depends upon the nature of the ideas already learned. Learning is thus a process of incorporating new ideas into systems of old ideas. And learning of the right kind consists in the acquisition of the right ideas in the right way. Learning or education is thus conceived as a process of apperception.

On the axiological side, the values that are to control the lives of men and be developed in the minds of the young are to be determined by those who are in control of educational policies and programs. Their quality is to be determined by the way they are acquired. The values that constitute also the ends and aims of education consist of the general conceptions to be developed in the mind of the individual. When emphasis is placed upon the content, such conceptions are considered ethical ideas. When emphasis is placed upon their quality, such conceptions are considered psychologically as interests.

Implications and Applications

Since education psychologically considered is identical with learning or experience, it, too, is a process of apperception. Therefore, normatively considered, education is a process of the right kind of apperception, which consists in appropriating the right ideas in the right way. The theory of apperception has, therefore, important implications for educational aims, subject matter, and methods of teaching.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Herbart conceived the general aims of education in two ways. He defined them ethically in terms of moral ideas and psychologically in terms of interests. He recognized the supreme significance of five general ideas and six general interests. The five ethical ideas—or content aims—that he considered of supreme importance are: inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, right, and justice.

Inner freedom as an idea of the individual signifies, in terms of society, the submission of one's self to the ideal state. Through this idea the individual overcomes the divided personality of which Saint

Paul complained. He recognizes the superior power and importance of something greater than himself. The state may be as far off as the New Jerusalem or as near as the government of the German nation which, in the imagination of the German leaders and the German people, came to be at least the symbol of an ideal state to which all owed allegiance. *Perfection* as an idea of the individual signifies, in terms of society, the advancement of the general culture. The individual must embody in himself the epitome of the culture of the race. This should, of course, include the cultural ideals of his own people. He should not only embody these conceptions but seek their advancement. This is the meaning of an idea in the Herbartian sense—it represents an organization of mental content that influences action. *Benevolence* as an idea of the individual signifies, in terms of society, participation in the achievement of good government and the common welfare. Such an aim certainly was at least consistent with, if not directly influenced by, the same social forces which affected the French reformers, Charlotais, Condorcet, and Talleyrand, and the American statesmen, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson. *Right* as an idea of the individual signifies, in terms of society, a law-abiding citizenship. This conception, like benevolence, seems to have been in accord with the demands of the governments that were later to develop. Political leaders everywhere saw the only hope of the success of national government in the capacity of the people to observe the laws of the community in their practical affairs. *Justice* or *equity* as an idea of the individual signifies, in terms of society, responsibility in meeting the demands of the law and in holding others to an equal responsibility. On this basis rewards and punishments prescribed by society are to be accepted. The system must be supported whether it affects one favorably or unfavorably. Punishment is necessary in all societies. The state and national governments find it necessary to apply some sort of penal code. They likewise have to provide certain rewards to those who serve the state in an official capacity. Such a conception was implicit in the general movement of the times for the establishment of a strong political state on the basis of the support and will of the people.¹

Anyone familiar with the changing conditions of Europe during

¹ Johann Friedrich Herbart, *The Application of Psychology of the Science of Education*, trans. by Beatrice Miller, New York, Scribner's, 1898, pp. xxxviii-xliii.

the nineteenth century will recognize the foregoing aims as the conceptions, convictions, and beliefs that supported the aspirations of the new nationalism which was developing in Europe, especially in Germany. They are the social ends which, according to Herbart, schools should promote. But they are not the only ends that can be promoted consistently with the theory of apperception. As a theory of the educative process, apperception was available for the development of any ideas which those in control of education might decide to develop.

As a matter of historical fact, social groups in all countries in which the Herbartians were influential did use this theory to justify the development of many ideas not included or even implied in the five ethical aims Herbart defined. According to his theory, general ideas rather than general discipline are the aims of education. Just what particular aims were actually emphasized was a question that those in positions of authority in the various countries decided for themselves. For example, whereas in Germany the ideas actually developed lent support to an autocratic regime, the ideas actually developed in the United States lent support to early liberalism in a democratic nation.

The six interests which Herbart considered method aims of education are the empirical interest, the speculative interest, the aesthetic interest, the sympathetic interest, the social interest, and the religious interest. According to Charles De Garmo, one of the leading American Herbartians, the first three are related to knowledge, and the last three arise from association with others. The *empirical* interest signifies the pleasure that pupils take in the things of direct experience in consequence of change and novelty that characterize them. The *speculative* interest signifies intellectual concern as to the underlying causes of things which seem problematical, dark, and mysterious. The *aesthetic* interest arises from the contemplation of an ideal through some sense media. The *sympathetic* interest is aroused by the "joy or sorrow of others." The *social* interest is characterized by participation in group and community occupations and activities. The *religious* interest is characteristic of the experiences involved in contemplating the meaning of the infinite.²

To understand the relationship of the ethical ideas or content

² Charles De Garmo, *Herbart and the Herbartians*, New York, Scribner's, 1896, pp. 57-66.

aims of education to the psychological interest or quality ends, one must understand the Herbartian conception of learning. According to this conception, intellect, feeling, and will are all aspects of ideas. To have an effect on conduct, an ethical idea must not only be known; it must also be agreeable or acceptable. To be experienced as agreeable, it must be adjusted to ideas already acquired. Ideas that constitute the general aims of education are ethical in content and positively interesting in quality. An interest is only an idea that has been harmonized with other ideas. The establishment of such harmony or agreement involves the operation of some feeling tone that signifies the presence of one or more of the recognized interests such as those defined by Herbart.

The development of a well-balanced and many-sided interest—the educational ideal of many Herbartians—means that in practice the feeling tones of all the different types of interests are adequately represented in the ethical ideas actually acquired. An adequately developed idea is also an enduring interest that will tend to abide even after its intellectual aspect has faded from memory. A well-balanced and many-sided interest consists not merely in the right general ideas but in the right general ideas that are learned in the right way. It includes interests as varied in quality and kind as the gamut of human experience can offer.

The foregoing interpretation represents an inadequate effort to recapture the conception of educational aims developed by the proponents of the apperception theory. In practice it apparently meant that teachers were to include the whole range of human interests in their selection of aims and to observe the principles of apperception in the process of developing them.

SUBJECT MATTER

The change in subject matter which the application of the apperception theory required was no less striking than the change in aims. When educational aims are conceived in terms of formal discipline, any kind of subject matter relevant to any human faculty will do. It is all but impossible on theoretical grounds to justify expansion of the curriculum. But when aims are expressed in ideas as various in quality as the field of human interests, subject matter in which such ideas are embodied is essential.

None of the important ideas and beliefs which the theory of apperception suggested in particular educational situations were embodied in the ancient languages or formal mathematics that constituted the core of the curriculum on higher levels, nor were they embodied in the formal aspects of arithmetic, grammar, and other subjects that, for the most part, constituted the basis of the curriculum on the elementary school level wherever the requirements of formal discipline were met. These new educational aims could be embodied in literature, history, geography, and the content of other subjects. The apperception theory thus justified the extension of the curriculum to include a wide variety of content and the elimination of other materials that did not embody conceptions which those in control of the schools wished to fix formally in the mind and heart of the school population. As a matter of historical record, the Herbartians lent support to the movement for a broader curriculum which, in response to practical conditions, had long been under way despite the retarding influence of the theory of formal discipline.

In consequence of their recognition of the significance of the unity of knowledge in promoting apprehension and interest, and of unity and consistency in mental life, the Herbartians gave special attention to the problem of organization. They emphasized the importance of the psychological organization of subject matter as compared with the logical organization characteristic of the traditional school curriculum. Subject-matter content was organized by specialists for the benefit of specialists in the advancement of the various fields of study; and psychological order meant that it should be organized in the way pupils learn. To facilitate such psychological organization, the Herbartians proposed the adoption of the ideas of cultural epochs and the association of subjects in planning courses of study for the elementary school.

According to the idea of cultural epochs, which had been repeatedly suggested in the history of human thought, there are definable parallel stages in the development of the individual and the race. The relatively short periods in the psychological development of the individual correspond to the relatively long period of racial development. The cultural materials produced by the race during any cultural era provided the proper subject matter for the corresponding age level of pupils in the elementary schools. For

instance, under the influence of the cultural epochs theory, children of the fourth grade might be assigned stories based on the Arthurian legends or encouraged to dress and play like Indians because they were at that stage of development—partly legendary and partly Indian. According to the cultural epochs idea, the interests and mental capacities of pupils at any stage of development were analogous to those of the cultural period which they were recapitulating.

The idea of coordination has reference to the independence and isolation of the different school subjects in the course of study. The subjects constituting the basis of the elementary school program in its historical development were isolated from one another. Moreover, such isolation and compartmentalization had the blessing of the proponents of formal discipline, who conceived the logical organization of the traditional subjects as essential to the adequate exercise of the faculties.

But the proponents of the apperception theory rejected the idea of faculties and formal discipline and emphasized interest and efficiency in action. Since they conceived interest in terms of the relationship of ideas and efficiency in terms of the application of ideas, they sought ways of breaking down the traditional isolation of subjects. They instituted two general forms of association known, respectively, as correlation and concentration.

In correlation the functionally related elements of two or more subjects during any school year were arranged for simultaneous study. For instance, the related elements of history, geography, and literature might be so placed in the program that they would be studied during the same given period—day, week, or month. In concentration, some one subject, like history, was taken as the core of the curriculum and analyzed into its divisions. Then elements of other subjects were selected and arranged in the program on the basis of their functional relation to the instructional divisions of the core subject. The idea of association as expressed in correlation and concentration was only the beginning of a movement that may not yet have run its course. It is the historical background of the fusion of subjects, broad fields, themes cutting through all subjects, and the core curriculum, all of which have been proposed or used as means of integration in curriculum development in recent years.

METHODS OF TEACHING

To complete the psychological organization of ideas and interests which the cultural epochs plan of grade placement and the plans of correlation and concentration were designed to facilitate, the Herbartians analyzed the apperception theory into a new general method of teaching. Herbart himself analyzed this conception of experiencing or learning into four steps which he called clearness, organization, system, and method. In *clearness* the individual absorbs or appropriates particular sense impressions derived from contacts with the environment. In *organization*, he organizes these impressions into more comprehensive wholes. In *system*, he integrates these comprehensive wholes into still more comprehensive wholes. In *method*, he interprets, on the basis of these systems, particular concrete cases.

The individual, as an example, acquires the conception of fruit in the following way. In Step 1 (clearness), he receives from an orange the impressions of sourness, sweetness, yellowness, roundness, and the like. In Step 2 (organization), he organizes these impressions into the percept of an orange. In like manner, he organizes other impressions received in Step 1 into the percept of apple, and still others into the percept of peach. In Step 3 (system), he generalizes the percepts of orange, apple, and peach into the concept of fruit. In Step 4 (method), he thinks of pear as fruit. In this way the individual builds up his experiences and educates himself. Such a pattern was thus proposed as a general method of experiencing to be used as a basis of teaching in all fields.³

Herbart's followers further defined this method of learning in terms of five steps of teaching. The first step, known as *preparation*, was devoted to preparing the minds of the students for the subject matter to be presented. The second step, *presentation*, was devoted to the presentation of detailed facts and principles. The third step, *comparison*, was devoted to comparing the different impressions and ideas. The fourth step, *generalization*, was devoted to drawing conclusions or generalizations on the basis of impressions and ideas presented and compared. The fifth step, *application*, was devoted

³ John P. Wynne, *General Method: Foundation and Application*, New York, Century, 1929, pp. 231-233.

to classifying the impressions and facts under generalizations developed in the previous step. The method was recognized as a formal pattern of teaching, and was known as the five formal steps.

Since the activities of the teacher were limited mainly to the recitation period, the pattern was eventually called the *five formal steps of the recitation*. Any conception to be developed was called a unit and the method through which it was acquired was also called a unit. Herbartians thus laid the foundation for the unit method and its conflicting interpretations in recent years. The new method, however designated, was thus available for indoctrinating "all the children of all the people" with the conceptions, interests, and beliefs of social groups that, for the time being, had control of the schools.

The teaching profession thus had in its possession for the first time a general method of teaching that could be used as a pattern of procedure in planning and teaching in all fields on all educational levels. Philosophical students of education also had a concrete suggestion as to a procedure they might use in defining any theory of the educative process in terms of a general method of learning and teaching. The normal schools used the pattern of the formal steps as a basis of learning, planning, and teaching procedures in their practice schools until well into the twentieth century. Educational philosophers, whatever their theories of the educative process, continued to analyze them into a logical sequence of learning and teaching steps. Some teachers and some students of education conceived each succeeding new set of steps as an all-inclusive general method to which all other devices and techniques were subsidiary and contributory. Others, however, conceived each new pattern of procedure as a general technique of limited application.

The confusion in educational method created by the broad and narrow interpretations of the general method has continued down to our own time and has manifested itself in many ways. Every new method, such as the problem method, the project method, and the unit method, has been conceived by some as a general all-inclusive procedure to which all other devices and techniques are subsidiary and contributory, and by others as a device or technique of limited application.

Cultural Conditions

The same economic, political, and social conditions supplied the cultural background for the development of the theories of both formal discipline and apperception, and both philosophies are relevant to the changing conditions of life that had been under way since the very beginning of the modern age. The early period of exploration and discovery in which the European nations participated, the religious reformation, subsequent developments in science and technology, the rise of the merchant class in Europe and America, and the political and industrial revolutions that followed provided a background for new ideas about religion, economics, government, and education. The new social classes that emerged sought to make whatever changes in social institutions their interests seemed to require. On the other hand, the introduction of such changes was resisted by the aristocratic and feudal classes whose favored position the established social order supported and maintained. Both groups thus undertook to develop and promote ideas and beliefs that favored their respective type of leadership. The conservatives favored the status quo in education because the ideas and beliefs developed in the traditional schools tended to support their position. When the progressives or liberals sought to introduce new subjects and new procedures, which for them the changing conditions of life seemed to demand, the conservatives exploited the theory of formal discipline, on the basis of which the old subjects and the old procedures could be justified irrespective of their declining practical significance. In spite of the persistent effort of the liberals to modify the school program in response to the new practical demands, throughout the nineteenth century, the conservatives were able to resist the change with a considerable degree of success. The liberals had managed to introduce many reforms in school programs on the basis of practical conditions that appealed to common sense people in particular situations. But it was always difficult for them to justify educational reforms that seemed to be inconsistent with the conservative doctrine of formal discipline, which conformed to the common sense conception of mind and learning.

Just as Adam Smith, in his celebrated masterpiece, *The Wealth*

of Nations (1776) had supplied the liberals with the theory that lent intellectual support to economic and political change, so in the next century Herbart and the Herbartians, in the conception of apperception, supplied them with a theory that lent support to educational change. But the systematic application of the apperception theory of education was long delayed. Although Herbart laid the foundation of it early in the nineteenth century, it was not fully exploited until the latter part of that century. Even though many educational reforms had been justified mainly on practical grounds, the liberal groups in both the industrial and the laboring classes welcomed this conception of education which, for the first time, placed the conservatives on the defensive. It strengthened their hand in the effort to indoctrinate children and youth with the economic, political, and moral ideas and beliefs favoring the new social arrangements that to a considerable extent were already in force. But its application was so long delayed that in psychology and philosophy there had already been laid the foundations on the basis of which it was soon to be discredited. Although Herbartian apperception established a theoretical basis for the reconstruction of education in line with the interests of the progressive and liberal classes, they failed to realize its possibilities until its underlying philosophy was about to be outmoded.

Nevertheless, the theory was still relevant to the educational and cultural conditions prevailing in this country and in many other parts of the world during the latter part of the nineteenth century. At that time a movement was under way for the inclusion of moral or character education in the schools. Since religious sectarianism had been debarred from the public schools in this country, many Americans thought that some kind of moral education was indispensable as a substitute. Moreover, teaching the young while in school the new moral ideas generated by the new conditions seemed, to the liberal groups, just simple common sense. Furthermore, at that time the aphorism of Socrates that knowledge is virtue was widely accepted. Education for morality was thus conceived in terms of an understanding of moral ideas such as honesty, truthfulness, and justice.

According to the apperception theory, the primary ends of education could best be defined in terms of general conceptions or ideas.

The new social classes had many conceptions which they wished the young to learn and accept. To them, the theory of apperception, which placed the primary emphasis on moral education, was very acceptable, and they wholeheartedly supported its adoption and systematic application in the expanding school systems.

Concluding Comments

This chapter is a summary account of the educational beliefs of Herbart and some of his followers; it is entitled *The Apperception Theory*, which in their own language is quite appropriate. They rejected the philosophical and psychological foundations of formal discipline, with which this theory is historically continuous and which the author of the natural-perfection theory in part adopted. Although the apperception theory is philosophically, psychologically, and sociologically obsolete, it is still historically and practically significant. Classical empiricism and association psychology, both of which Herbart and the Herbartians accepted, are now outmoded even as are classical rationalism and faculty psychology, both of which they rejected. Sociologically, it lent support to the principle of indoctrination, which was as relevant to the demands of the conservatives and the reactionaries as to those of the progressives and the radicals.

Nevertheless, historically Herbart and the Herbartians made many important contributions to educational theory. They stimulated the application of psychology to education and therefore the development of educational psychology as a distinct subject. Their recognition of particular ideas and the laws of association as explanatory of the mental processes is reflected in the conception of stimulus-response bonds and in the laws of stimulus and response characteristic of both the connectionist psychology and mechanical behaviorism. Although their explanation of interest in terms of the relation of ideas is now outdated, their emphasis on it as a necessary principle of learning remains a permanent contribution to educational theory. However outmoded their technique of correlation and concentration may now seem, the idea of relating different school subjects is still recognized as a fundamental consideration in

the field of curriculum development. Although the Herbartian steps of learning and teaching have degenerated into mechanical formalism and are no longer psychologically defensible, the idea of translating educational theories into patterns of logical steps has been applied by educational philosophers down to our own time.

Finally, in spite of the significant contribution of Herbart and the Herbartians to the general development of educational theory, both the idea and the technique of systematic indoctrination with social ideals and beliefs are objectionable to most educational philosophers. The Herbartians provided one of the first theories of education that enabled the merchant classes to justify philosophically and psychologically educational reforms in line with their economic and political aspirations. But when a social class comes into power, it becomes conservative and even reactionary in seeking to maintain the new status quo. The class that has control of the schools, it matters not what educational reforms changing conditions may require, is still inclined to continue indoctrinating the young with whatever ideas and beliefs support the maintenance of its favored position.

The earlier liberalism, to which the apperception theory made a distinct contribution, is itself obsolete in the sense that it was designed to improve the lot of a special group rather than the lot of all men. The new liberalism, dedicated to the improvement of the condition of men everywhere, cannot use the apperception theory to advantage because it is primarily a justification for transmitting pre-established beliefs rather than reconstructing them. It may serve the interests of either the conservatives, who wish to maintain the status quo, or those liberals who wish to improve the lot of special groups. It does not, however, provide for the continuous improvement of the lot of all men. Any theory of education that justifies the indoctrination of the young with fixed ideas and beliefs does not contribute effectively to the gradual improvement of the quality of human experience, which is an implicit if not an avowed social ideal of the new liberals, even those who advocate the immediate and direct reconstruction of existing culture.

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The Habit-Tendency Theory

4

It did not take the exposure of television rigging to convince qualified critics of the limitations of the prodigies whom the self-appointed critics of the public schools had hailed as products of the best possible kind of education. They were not surprised, however chagrined these irresponsible critics may have been or however disillusioned the public may have been. In spite of the idealization in many quarters of the recall of factual information, they have known all along that adequate learning is something qualitatively more substantial. Even before the day of radio and television, William James said, "Education cannot be better defined than by calling it the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior."¹ When so conceived, education can no longer be identified with mere information or even knowledge.

This concept of education we have designated the habit-tendency theory—habit, an abbreviation for the organization of acquired habits of conduct; and tendency, an abbreviation for the organization of acquired tendencies to behavior. In this first definition, James was thinking in psychological terms but, when he later limited it to

¹ William James, *Talks to Teachers*, New York, Holt, 1899, p. 28.

useful habits and tendencies, he was thinking in normative terms. The first definition indicates what all education must be, whether desirable or undesirable, and the second indicates what good education ought to be. These definitions, however, require further analysis and elaboration.

The psychological definition contains a number of important emphases that had previously been given very little attention. The term *habit* refers to action, behavior, or conduct; and the term *tendency* refers to ideas that work themselves out in action. The only ideas educationally important are those that are expressed in action and thus become habits. In a sense, then, both habits and ideas are tendencies to behavior, and any idea that is not potentially a tendency to behavior is educationally insignificant. But much less obvious in this sense is the term *acquired*. Are not all habits acquired?

In the usual sense, as contrasted with instincts, all habits are acquired, and as contrasted with innate ideas all knowledge is acquired. But James's theory of instincts makes such a qualification of habit necessary. According to him, instincts are themselves habits after the first response. The habits that are educationally important are acquired in the sense that they do not correspond one-to-one to instincts. Likewise, for him the ideas that are important for education have no relation to innate ideas with which some philosophers have endowed the human race.

In his normative theory of education, James qualified habits and tendencies in two ways. First, he explicitly emphasized the importance of selecting for development useful habits and ideas. For him all learning that is educationally important consists in the acquisition of habits and ideas; but to be desirable, they must be useful. Second, he also assumed by implication that they are foreseen ends for the teacher as well as for the student.

Philosophical Foundations

In his lectures on pedagogy, with the exception of his beliefs about mind, James did not explicitly relate his educational doctrines to his philosophical beliefs. When from time to time philosophical problems emerged in the course of his lectures, he did not state his

position on the ground that teachers were mainly concerned with the application of psychological principles. Just how such an attitude may be explained is open to question. Perhaps several considerations were involved.

In the first place, James had already developed his psychological principles and felt reasonably sure of their educational implications. In the second place, he was in the process of developing his philosophical beliefs and was not sure as to what his final position would be or what significance they might have for education. In the third place, he may have considered the discussion of psychological principles and their educational application more meaningful and useful to the members of his audience. Still, from the standpoint of present-day philosophical students of education, James's philosophical beliefs may be very important for an understanding of his theory of education and of other theories considered in later chapters. Furthermore, the very fact that in the course of his pedagogical discussion he called attention to philosophical problems, if only to pass them by, is in itself sufficient evidence that somehow the principles of education he was developing were not unrelated to philosophic presuppositions. For these reasons we shall state briefly what, in retrospect, seem to have been his main beliefs about mind, reality, knowledge, and value. But in doing so we are fully aware that an adequate understanding of them would require a study of the original sources as well as of some excellent commentaries on James's philosophy that are now available. We begin with a psychological description of mind because it seems to provide the best approach to his more philosophical works.

Nature of Mind

According to James, mind is a stream of thought broadly conceived to include every form of consciousness; that is to say, all forms of thinking, feeling, and willing. He says, "*The first fact for us then as psychologists, is thinking of some kind goes on.*" He used the word *think* for every form of consciousness. "If we could say in English 'it' thinks, as we say 'it' rains, or 'it' blows, we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As

we cannot, we must simply say that *thought goes on*.”²

The main problem of the psychologist is not to define the nature of the metaphysical structure underlying consciousness, but to define just how consciousness goes on. In other words, the stream of consciousness or thought, for all practical purposes, is the mind. As thus conceived, mind has five characteristics.

1. Every thought, whatever its form, is a part of some personal consciousness. There are no thoughts outside the consciousness of some particular individual. Furthermore, the thought of each individual consciousness is absolutely insulated from the thought of every other consciousness. There is no such thing as a general mind which includes individual minds. The term “mind” has reference only to individual minds.

2. “Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.” Every personal thought, whatever the extent of its duration, is now passing. Once passed it never returns. “No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before.” We never get the same bodily sensation twice. What we get twice is the same object. The fact that we do get the same object twice is often taken to mean that we get the same thought twice. Every state of consciousness has its physical correlate in the brain, and for an idea to occur again without modification it would have to occur the second time to an unmodified brain which, strictly speaking, is a physiological impossibility. What is true of sensation is true of more complex states also, for every thought we have, although similar to our other thoughts, is nevertheless unique; that is, it is different in some respect.

3. Thought within each personal consciousness is sensibly continuous. Unconsciousness is often produced by sleep, by anaesthetics, and by other means. The lapse of consciousness is known as a time gap. The states before and after time gaps in thought are not to be chopped up in bits. Thought is analogous to a river or a stream rather than a chain or a train. The mind, therefore, may be conceived as a “stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.” Even the ordinary interruptions and contrasts which characterize our changing experience are not real gaps in the stream of con-

² William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, Holt, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 224-225.

sciousness. There is a transition between one state and another, but no gaps, for the transition is as much a part of the stream as are the substantive parts. "The changes of the neurosis are never absolutely discontinuous, so must the successive psychoses shade gradually into each other although the *rate* of change may be much faster at one moment than at the next." When the rate is slow, we are aware of the objects of our thoughts in a comparatively restful and stable way. When the rate is raised, we are aware of a passage, a relation, a transition *from* it, or *between* it and something else. The different paces of parts characteristic of the stream of consciousness are like a bird's life, apparently made up of an alternation of flights and perchings. The resting places James called the substantive parts and the movements of flight he called the transitive parts. The transitive parts lead from one substantive part to another but, just as relationships exist, so do feelings exist to which these relations are known. Both substantive and transitive parts are equally real and continuous functions of the more inclusive stream of consciousness.

4. Thought is cognitive in that it deals with things independent of itself. It has the function of knowing. Since we cannot help supposing that many of our thoughts have the same objects as other people's thoughts, we cannot help believing in the existence of objects independent of ourselves. A knowing thought always has an object which may or may not discriminate itself. The object of any thought is not just an object or an existence, but everything that it thinks. Nevertheless, "however complex the object may be, the thought state is some individual's state of consciousness." For instance, the thought of a pack of cards is not just a thought of a pack of cards. It is of the-pack-of-cards-is-on-the-table. It is a single unit of thought and not a pack of ideas.

5. Thought is selective. "It is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses all the while it thinks." Such partiality is characteristic not only of attention in deliberation, but of every form of consciousness however defined. Through the process of selection the senses make for us out of a world devoid of distinctions a variegated world of many qualities. In perception, the mind selects out of all present sensations only such as are significant for us and then, out of all the associations

which those selected suggest, picks out only a very few to stand for the objects of reality. In the so-called higher thought processes involved in logical thinking, aesthetics, and ethics, the choice is all the more pronounced.

The mind is thus a continuous stream of personal consciousness that is constantly changing. Selecting interesting objects and selecting the interesting parts and rejecting the uninteresting parts of its objects, such a mind of which each of us is individually aware through introspection is correlative of neural processes in the brain which constitute its physiological conditions, although they do not supply the metaphysical or logical explanation. As a matter of fact, for purposes of psychology and apparently also for purposes of a theory of education, any metaphysical explanation of mind is considered unnecessary and superfluous. As James pointed out in his discussion of the Self, each present state of consciousness could do all the work which, in other theories of mind, had been attributed to some form of metaphysical structure.

In summarizing his discussion of the Self, James says:

the consciousness of the Self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as "I" can remember those which went before, know things they knew, and care paramently for certain ones among them as "Me," and appropriate to these the rest. This "Me" is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate; neither for psychological purposes need it be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the Transcendental Ego, viewed as "out of time." It is *thought* at each moment different from that of the last moment, but *appropriative* of the latter together with all the latter called its own. All the experiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis except that of the existence of the passing thoughts or states of mind.³

The mind in choosing directly what aspects of the object to which it will devote attention and what activities it will perform, determines indirectly the habits it will develop and thus what kind of character, self, or personality it will become. Life is thus a process of conscious experience and is identical with education in the broad-

³ William James, *Psychology: Briefer Course*, New York, Holt, 1892, p. 215.

est sense. Therefore, the good education of any individual consists of the deliberate acquisition of habits and ideas which are foreseen to be useful to him.⁴

NATURE OF REALITY

As a basis of his philosophizing, James adopted two general attitudes which he designated, respectively, as the pragmatic rule and radical empiricism. "The pragmatic rule is that the meaning of a concept may always be found, if not in some sensible particular which it directly designates, then in some particular difference in the course of human experience which its being true will make. . . . If two concepts lead you to infer the same particular consequence, then you may assume that they embody the same meaning under different names."⁵

Radical empiricism means that "the only things that should be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience;" that "the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experiences, neither no more so nor less so, than the things themselves;" and that "therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience."⁶ In another connection he says, "to be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, *the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.*"⁷

In line with the pragmatic rule and the doctrine of radical empiricism, James adopted Professor A. E. Taylor's definition of reality, and in regard to reality says, "The best definition I know is that which the pragmatic rule gives: (Taylor's definition) 'Anything is

⁴ James, *Talks to Teachers*, loc. cit.

⁵ William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1931, p. 60.

⁶ William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1927, pp. 12-13.

⁷ William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1938, p. 42.

real of which we find ourselves obliged to take into account in any way.' Concepts are thus as real as percepts, for we cannot live a moment without taking account of them. But the 'eternal' kind of being which they enjoy is inferior to the temporal kind."⁸ Although any world of reality independent of human experience is not included in his definition, he does not deny its existence. "Things of an unexperienceable nature," he says, "may exist *ad libitum*, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate."⁹

James recognized three kinds of reality: (1) the unexperienceable reality; (2) the reality of percepts and concepts; and (3) the reality of pure experience.

In accord with the postulate of radical empiricism that the "only things that should be subject to philosophic debate shall be in terms drawn from experience," he had to leave out of discussion whatever could not be experienced. Yet he not only admitted the possibility of such a transexperiential world, but seemed also to have intimations of its presence even if he could not define it. Apparently his belief in the reality of a finite God as a powerful moral force in the world and a source of strength in times of trouble was no more than a human ideal, but he nevertheless seemed to take it as a symbol of divine power that extends beyond the confines of experience.

But the superior reality is not merely the revelation of spiritual intuition or extrasensory percepts in which James believed, at least tentatively. Along with other pragmatists he seemed to consider it a presupposition of the logical extremities of human thought. In this connection he says:

However independent and ejective realities may be, we can talk about them, in framing our accounts of truth, only as so many objects believed-in. But the process of experience leads men so continually to supersede their older objects by newer ones which they find it more satisfactory to believe in, that the notion of an *absolute* reality inevitably arises as a *grenzbegriff*, equivalent to that of an object that shall never be superseded, and belief in which shall be *endgultig*. Cognitively we thus live under a sort of rule of three: as our private concepts represent the sense objects to which they lead us, these being public realities independent of the individual, so these sense-realities may, in turn, represent realities of a

⁸ James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 101.

⁹ James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. xii.

hypersensible order, electrons, mind-stuff, God, or what not, existing independently of all human thinkers. The notion of such final realities, knowledge of which would be absolute truth, is an outgrowth of our cognitive experience from which neither pragmatists nor anti-pragmatists escape. They form an inevitable regulative postulate in every one's thinking. Our notion of them is the most abundantly suggested and satisfied of all our beliefs, the last to suffer doubt. The difference is that our critics use this belief as their sole paradigm, and treat any one who talks of human realities as if he thought the notion of reality 'in itself' illegitimate.¹⁰

Among the human realities of which James spoke were included both concepts and percepts. As indicated earlier, they are both included in the pragmatic definition of reality as anything "of which we find ourselves obliged to take into account," and James believed that we constantly have to take both percepts and concepts into account.

In defining the "real," James considered that the "eternal" kind of being which concepts enjoy "is inferior to the temporal kind," because "it is so static and schematic and lacks so many characters which temporal reality possesses." Still, he held that "philosophy must thus recognize many realms of reality which mutually interpenetrate. The conceptual systems of mathematics, logic, aesthetics, ethics are such realms, each strung upon some peculiar form of relation and each differing from perceptual reality in that no one of them is history or happening displayed. Perceptual reality involves and contains all of these ideal systems, and vastly more besides."¹¹

According to James, a concept means always the same thing: "Change means always change, white always white, a circle always a circle. On this self-sameness of conceptual objects the static and 'eternal' character of our systems of ideal truth is based; for a relation, once perceived to obtain, must obtain always, between terms that do not alter." Again he says, "Applying, as usual, the pragmatic rule, we find that when we call two objects the same we mean either (a) that no difference can be found between them when compared, or (b) that we can substitute the one for the other in certain operations without changing the result." On this basis, for example, "'white'

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

¹¹ James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 101-102.

means a color quality of which the mind appoints the standard, and which it can decree to be there under all physical disguises. *That white is always the same white.*"

With regard to the relation of concepts and percepts, James says that "they are made of the same kind of stuff, and melt into each other when we handle them together;" that it is impossible to tell how much of what we perceive comes through the senses and how much through the apperceiving intellect; that "the universal and the particular parts of experience are literally immersed in each other, and both are indispensable;" that "the world we practically live in is one in which it is impossible, except by theoretic retrospection, to disentangle the contributions of intellect from those of sense;" that "perception prompts our thought, and thought in turn enriches our perception."¹²

However important James considered concepts, he nonetheless constantly reminded us that they are secondary and derivative. "Our conceptual systems are secondary and on the whole imperfect and ministerial forms of being." Only the "flux" of direct experience is absolutely real. "The full nature, as distinguished from the full amount, of reality, we now believe to be given only in the perceptual flux."¹³

Although James recognized both concepts and percepts as realities, he considered them both distinctions we make in a still more primordial human world, that of pure experience. In the last analysis the world of nature is neither physical nor mental, nor both together. The world of pure experience is qualitatively a monism, but it is neutral rather than either physical or spiritual. In the concept of pure experience, James overcame the dualism that plagued every step in his psychology, for in it he found a place for both the mental and the physical. Things are mental when they enter into one set of relations; and when they enter into another set of relations, things are physical.

In this connection James introduced his well-known illustration of the room in which he supposed his reader to be sitting. When considered in one way the room consists of "a collection of physical

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 102-108 *passim*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 113.

things cut out from an environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the same time it is just *those self-same things* which his mind, as we say, perceives." Then he says further, "the puzzle of how one identical room can be in two places is at bottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines. It can, if it be situated at their intersection; and similarly, if the 'pure experience' of the room were a place of intersection of two processes which connected it with different groups of associates, respectively, it could be counted twice over, as belonging to either group, and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it would remain all the time a numerically single thing."¹⁴ In one context the room is the reader's "field of consciousness," and in another it is "the room in which he sits." The room-experience thus enters simultaneously "the reader's biography" on the one hand and "the history of the house" on the other.¹⁵

Some of the more important doctrines, principles, or corollaries of James's world view which he called radical empiricism may, for convenience of discussion, be designated as (1) realism; (2) pluralism; and (3) indeterminism. Since he specifically emphasized their importance in many connections, we must not neglect them entirely even within the limitations of this study.

I. REALISM. Along with Dewey and Schiller, James was accused of subjectivism at the expense of realism. This charge he persistently denied. He affirmed his acceptance of a belief in the existence of an external world, the independence of the object in the knowing situation, and external relations, all of which realists generally considered fundamental principles. Since the external world has already been considered as one form of reality to which James subscribed little need be said here in regard to it.

Although he frequently asserted his belief in such a world, his answer to a question directed to him by W. P. Pitken is unequivocal and therefore sufficient. Pitkin's question was: "If experience is self-supporting (in any intelligible sense), does this fact preclude the possibility of (a) something not experienced and (b) action of ex-

¹⁴ James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 11, 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

perience upon a noumenon?" James answered thus: "Assuredly not the possibility of either—how could it? Yet in my opinion we should be wise not to *consider* any thing or action of that nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to what is experienced or, at least, experienceable."¹⁶ What radical empiricism required, then, was not rejection of a belief in a reality beyond experience, but rejection of such a world as a topic appropriate for philosophic discussion.

The philosophy of radical empiricism did not require James to deny the independence of the object in the knowing situation. This belief he affirmed time and again. In one connection he said "... the existence of the object, whenever the idea asserts it 'truly' is the only reason, in innumerable cases, why the idea does work successfully."¹⁷ Again, of Dewey he said, "His account of knowledge is not only absurd and meaningless unless independent existences be there of which our ideas take account and for the transformation of which they work."¹⁸ He said further, "Since the only realities we can talk about are such objects-believed-in, the pragmatist, whenever he says 'reality,' means in the first instance what may count for the man himself as a reality." Then he added that such a reality may be either a concrete sensible presence or an abstract relation.¹⁹ Referring to Dewey again he said, "Suffice it that he holds as firmly as I do to objects independent of our judgments."²⁰ In recognizing the independence of objects, however, he did not isolate them after the manner of classical philosophy. Idea and object were both parts of the same reality. On this point, James said, "The object, for me, is just as much one part of reality as the idea is another part."²¹ There was no chasm between them because the reality of which they were both a part was the reality of experience through which they could be connected.

The principle of external relations is as much an aspect of radical empiricism as of any recognized realism. According to James, it

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

¹⁷ James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. xv.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

represents the world "as a collection, some parts of which are conjunctively and others disjunctively related."²² With respect to given conjunctions taken at their face value he asserted that some of them are more intimate and some are more external. "When two terms are *similar*, their very natures enter into the relation."²³ Such relations he considered internal in that "being what they are, no matter where or when, the likeness never can be denied, if asserted."²⁴

On the other hand, relations of time and place are external. "Other relations, the *where* and the *when*, for example, seem adventitious. The sheet of paper may be 'off' or 'on' the table, for example; and in either case the relation involves only the outside of its terms." Although both terms contribute to the relation, "it is external in that the term's inner nature is irrelevant to it. . . . It is just because so many of the conjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology."²⁵ Although many other passages confirming the principle of external relation might be cited, these references seem sufficient, and we therefore turn to the doctrine of pluralism, which, according to James, the existence of so many external relations requires.

2. PLURALISM. In philosophy, ontology deals with the forms or kinds of reality, and cosmology deals with its ultimate character. James's philosophy is a pluralism as contrasted with absolutism, just as it is a neutral monism in contrast to dualism, idealism, and materialism. In defining his radical pluralism as he called it, James contrasted it with absolute idealistic monism, which was dominant in American universities during the period. The one he considered a form of empiricism and the other a form of rationalism. He thought both empiricists and rationalists were themselves part of the universe and shared the "same one deep concern for its destinies."²⁶ Absolute idealism and pluralism are both forms of the more intimate kind of spiritualism or pantheism as contrasted with materialism and theistic dualism.²⁷ Both pluralism and absolutism

²² James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 107.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁶ William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1912, p. 12.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

identify human substance with the divine substance. But whereas absolutism thinks that the said substance becomes fully divine only in the form of totality, and is not its real self in any form but the *all*-form, the pluralistic view which I prefer to adopt is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-form at all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it may remain outside of the largest combination of it ever made, and that a distributive form of reality, the *each*-form, is logically as acceptable and empirically as probable as the *all*-form commonly acquiesced in as so obviously the self-evident thing.²⁸

James compared the status of the human thinker in monism and pluralism in this way. For monistic idealism, the world is an all-inclusive fact for which there is no alternative. The fact is an absolute mind that makes the partial facts by thinking them. "To *be*, on this scheme, is, on the part of a finite thing, to be an object for the absolute; and on the part of the absolute it is to be the thinker of that assemblage of objects. . . . The absolute and the world have an identical content. The absolute is nothing but the knowledge of those objects; the objects are nothing but what the absolute knows. The world and the all-thinker thus compenetrates and soak each other up without residuum."²⁹

Nevertheless, a kind of pluralism breaks out in a formal sense. Taken collectively, the absolute is one universal known material and its objects or our finite selves are the same materials taken distributively. In such a world the absolute takes the finite self with everything else as perfect knowledge and the finite self takes himself to be without most of the other things. "Things true of the world in its finite aspect, then, are not true of it in its infinite capacity." With such a discrepancy between the two points of view there is a considerable bar to "intimacy between the divine and the human." The ways of man and the eternal are utterly unlike, and the intimacy so much desired by the human creature absolute idealism cannot supply.³⁰

As a remedy, James proposed pluralism, which he also called radical empiricism. According to radical empiricism or pluralism,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-40.

"the absolute sum-total of things may never be actually experienced or realized in that shape at all," and "a disseminated, distributed, or incompletely unified appearance is the only form that reality may yet have achieved."³¹ James considered pluralism as the each-form of pantheism or spiritualism as contrasted with the all-form of absolute idealism. Whereas the all-form "leaves us almost as much outside of the divine being as dualistic theism does, radical pluralism which holds to the each-form makes God "only one of the eaches" and thus "affords the higher degree of intimacy."³²

This is the thesis that James defended in the series of lectures to which we have referred as *A Pluralistic Universe*. Some of the main points he emphasized may be briefly indicated. First of all, he showed that monism no less than pluralism is an hypothesis rather than a necessary presupposition. Second, "a universe really connected loosely, after the pattern of our daily experience, is possible," and "for certain reasons it is the hypothesis to be preferred."³³ Third, God has environment, is a being in time, and is working out a history just like ourselves, and thus escapes the foreignness from all that is human.³⁴ Finally, "this great difference between absolutism and pluralism demands no difference in the universe's material content—it follows from a difference in the form alone. The all-form or monistic form makes the foreignness result, the each-form or pluralistic form leaves the intimacy undisturbed."³⁵ For a detailed account of the reasons for James's preference, the reader should consult the lectures themselves.

3. INDETERMINISM. James recognized indeterminism as one of the more important aspects of his radical empiricism and pluralism. As contrasted with determinism "which professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be," he asserted that indeterminism "says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily de-

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

termine what the others shall be." ³⁶ He found that indeterminism is preferable to determinism because it gives us more subjective satisfaction and is on the whole more rational.³⁷

In indeterminism, James found support for his belief in freedom and originality, but when properly understood, he preferred the terms *novelty* and *chance*. He found the idea of freedom unsatisfactory because it had been so eulogized that determinists as well as indeterminists insisted that "they alone are freedom's champions." ³⁸

"To some extent," he said, "the world *seems* genuinely additive: it may really be so. We cannot explain conceptually *how* genuine novelties can come; but if one did come we could experience *that* it came. We do, in fact, experience perceptual novelties all the while. . . . 'Free will' means nothing but real novelty." ³⁹ This conception of an unfinished and incomplete universe still in the making, James thought, was a basis for meliorism rather than either optimism or pessimism. From this standpoint, the world may be saved provided all its parts do their best, but it may even be partly or wholly lost.⁴⁰ The belief in novelty is sufficient to justify human faith, obligation, and effort. We ourselves may be the authors of genuine novelties.⁴¹

What the novelties may be, James considered a matter of chance. "That genuine novelties can occur means that from the point of view of what is already given, what comes may have to be treated as a matter of *chance*. We are led thus to ask. . . . 'In what manner does new being come? Is it through and through the consequence of the older being or is it a matter of chance so far as the older being goes? . . . Is it original in the strict sense of the word?'" ⁴²

James lent his unqualified support to the belief that new being is really original. He believed that the inability of philosophers to ex-

³⁶ William James, *The Will to Believe*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1905, p. 150.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

³⁹ James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 140-141.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁴² *Ibid.*

plain reality conceptually was sufficient to justify him in following the empirical method of "considering the parts rather than the whole, and imagining ourselves inside them perceptually. . . . If we take concrete perceptual experience, the question can be answered in only one way: 'The same returns not, save to bring the different.' Time keeps budding into new moments, every one of which presents a content which in its individuality never was before and will never be again. Of no concrete bit of experience was an exact duplicate ever framed." ⁴³

James thus rejected the determinist argument against real novelty, originality, and creativity based upon the traditional conceptions of cause and effect, gradual continuity, and the infinite, on the ground that they were meaningless. For the details of this lengthy discussion and the further justification for the adoption of radical empiricism, pluralism, and indeterminism the reader is referred to *Some Problems of Philosophy*.

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

James distinguished two kinds of knowledge—knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about. "What we are only acquainted with is only *present* to our minds; we *have* it, or the idea of it. But when we know about it, we do more than merely have it; we seem, as we think over its relations, to subject it to a sort of *treatment* and to *operate* upon it with our thought. The words *feeling* and *thought* give voice to the antithesis. Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thought do we know about them. Feelings are the germ and starting point of cognition, thoughts the developed tree." ⁴⁴

James was thinking of this "mere mental having or feeling of an object," which is knowing by acquaintance, when he said: "I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it." ⁴⁵ Through the knowledge of acquaintance, we have such facts as those mentioned,

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.

⁴⁴ James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, p. 222.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

but we cannot say anything at all about their inner nature. The process of knowing by acquaintance is feeling, intuition, having, or being rather than conceiving or judging. According to James, knowledge of acquaintance is prior to, more fundamental than, and necessary for, knowledge about. When there is no knowledge of acquaintance, there is nothing about which to know in any other way, and the situation is lacking in significance. However perfect our knowledge about things may be, there must "needs abide alongside of it and inextricably mixed in with it some acquaintance with *what* things all this knowledge is about."⁴⁶

Furthermore, knowledge by acquaintance is the indispensable medium through which communication is possible. To quote him fully:

What can save us at all and prevent us from flying asunder into a chaos of mutually repellent solipsisms? Through what can our several minds commune? Through nothing but the mutual resemblance of those of our perceptual feelings which have this power of modifying one another, *which are mere dumb knowledges-of-acquaintance*, and which must also resemble their realities or not know them aright at all. In such pieces of knowledge-of-acquaintance all our knowledge-about must end, and carry a sense of this possible termination as part of its content. These percepts, these *terminal*, these sensible things, these mere matters-of-acquaintance, are the only realities we ever directly know, and the whole history of our thought is the history of our substitution of one of them for another, and the reduction of the substitute to the status of a conceptual sign. Condemned though they be by some thinkers, these sensations are the mother-earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last limits, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the mind. To find such sensational *termini* should be our aim with all our higher thought. They end discussion; they destroy the false conceit of knowledge; and without them we are all at sea with each other's meaning. If two men act alike on a percept, they believe themselves to feel alike about it; if not, they may suspect they know it in differing ways. We can never be sure we understand each other till we are able to bring the matter to this test.⁴⁷

Finally, meaningful knowledge-about must terminate in knowledge-by-acquaintance. He expresses the idea in this way:

A percept knows whatever reality it directly or indirectly operates on

⁴⁶ James, *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

and resembles; a conceptual feeling, or thought knows a reality whenever it actually or potentially terminates in a percept that operates on, or resembles that reality, or is otherwise connected with it or with its context. The latter percept may be either sensation or sensorial idea; and when I say the thought must *terminate* in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be capable of leading up thereto—by way of practical experience, if the terminal feeling be a sensation; by way of logical or habitual suggestion, if it be only an image in the mind. . . . Beautiful is the flight of conceptual reason through the upper air of truth. No wonder philosophers are dazzled by it still, and no wonder they look with some disdain at the low earth of feeling from which the goddess launched herself aloft. But woe to her if she return not home to its acquaintance.⁴⁸

Although knowledge-about, which consists of conceptions and judgments, is secondary as compared with the knowledge of acquaintance, it is nevertheless the chief means of human progress and must not be neglected. James has this to say: "When direct acquaintance is lacking, 'knowledge-about' is the next best thing, and an acquaintance with what actually lies about the object, and is most closely related to it, puts such knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves and your anger, for example, are things in which my thought will never *perceptually* terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very brink, to the chromatic fringes, and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really next effects."⁴⁹

As compared with knowledge-by-acquaintance, which is direct and immediate, knowledge-about is indirect and mediate, a function of intellectual operations. But the mind as the stream of consciousness is not solely, or even primarily, intellectual in character. It involves feeling, both positive and negative, and action, both impulsive and volitional. In fact, the mind so conceived is affective, impulsive, and volitional through and through and is primarily cognitive or intellectual only on occasion. Furthermore, feeling and action provide the setting for reflection or knowing in the honorific sense. It is for the sake of feeling and willing, which are the more primitive and fundamental forms of consciousness, that such cognition occurs at all. The individual, conceived as a stream of consciousness, is always engaged in purposeful activity. "*The pursuance of*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33; 40-41.

⁴⁹ James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 73.

future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon." ⁵⁰

But by mentality James does not mean, as Charles W. Morris seems to take it, that cognition in the narrow sense of knowledge-about is present.⁵¹ He means only that the pursuit of ends is a primary function of all consciousness. This process of purposeful activity is not itself knowing in the honorific sense here under consideration, but it is an indispensable condition of such knowing. This kind of purposeful activity man shares with the lower animals. It is a mark or criterion of consciousness, not of cognition. Knowing in this sense occurs only when the pursuit of such activities meets with obstructions of one kind or another, and not always even then. One way—perhaps the best way—of surmounting an obstruction and continuing the activity is to think, reflect, or reason.

Cognition of this kind involves both a subject and an object. The knower or subject entertains an idea which is one part of reality conceived as a stream of pure experience about an object which is another part of this same reality. James says: "Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is *made*; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known." ⁵² But not all ideas lead to the object meant; not all ideas or beliefs are true: many of them are false.

James defined both meaning and criteria of truth in many ways. "Truth is a property of certain ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality." ⁵³ Up to this point he does not differ from other philosophers, but here agreement ends. According to the pragmatic rule he asks, granted an idea or belief

⁵⁰ James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, p. 8.

⁵¹ Charles W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932, pp. 286-287.

⁵² James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 57.

⁵³ James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. v.

to be true, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? What experiences (may) be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? How will the truth be realized? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" And then he proceeds to answer his own question: "*True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.* That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as." Then, elaborating still further he adds:

The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact, an event, a process, the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.

To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically. . . . Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will be true of that reality.

The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion, and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas.⁵⁴

In other connections he said that an idea or belief is true when it works, and that it works when the results are satisfactory. Of this working and these results he recognized two kinds. In one sense an idea works when it meets our expectations in terms of the facts observed. In another sense it works when it is useful and leads to personal satisfaction. Apparently then, for James, to be true an idea or a belief must meet two criteria. It must do what it purports to do

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. v-vi; vi-vii.

and be personally satisfying in practice or in imagination. If it meets only one of these criteria, say, personal satisfaction, it is not entirely true, but is nevertheless "in so far forth true."

NATURE OF VALUE

It may be literally true, as Lloyd Morris says, that James never wrote anything for publication on the subject of art and only one essay on the subject of ethics. Still, no one who makes a careful study of his complete works together with R. B. Perry's *Thought and Character of William James* can doubt that the problem of value was for him a primary concern in many, if not in all, of his philosophical reflections. One would feel reasonably certain, too, that James developed a fairly consistent attitude toward the main types of value that interest philosophers, made a fairly clear statement of the general nature of value, and provided a meaningful, if not a logically complete, definition of the good life. For convenience of reference, we shall organize our account of James's attitude toward the problem of value around these topics: (1) the value experiences; (2) the evaluation of values; and (3) the good life.

1. VALUE EXPERIENCES. In regard to the nature of value experiences, there are two main questions. First, how do value experiences differ from other kinds of experience? Second, what are the different kinds of value experiences? The answers that James gave, or at least suggested, will now be briefly indicated.

In regard to the first question, James said, "Man spontaneously *believes* and spontaneously *acts*. But as acts and beliefs multiply they grow inconsistent. To escape *bellum omnium contra omnes*, reasonable principles, fit for all to agree upon, must be sought. The search constitutes philosophy, which has two subdivisions: (1) science, the principles of *fact* or what *is*, whether good or bad; (2) ethics, what is good or bad, whether it *be* or *be not*. The principles of ethics are independent of those of science."⁵⁵ In another connection, he showed how value experiences, which he here called appreciation experiences, differ from other experiences. Consistently with his theory of pure experience, he rejected the belief that appreciation experiences are originally either objective or subjective,

⁵⁵ Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1935, Vol. 2, p. 263.

and considered them ambiguous in that they could be classified as either objective or subjective, depending upon one's interests or purposes at the time.

Wrote James:

Their ambiguity illustrates beautifully my central thesis that subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification. Classifications depend on our temporary purposes. For certain purposes it is convenient to take things in one set of relations, for other purposes in another set. In the two cases their contexts are apt to be different. In the case of our affectional experiences we have no permanent and steadfast purpose that obliges us to be consistent, so we find it easy to let them float ambiguously, sometimes classing them with our feelings, sometimes with mere physical realities, according to caprice or to the convenience of the moment.⁵⁶

Again he said that all our adjectives of worth are similarly ambiguous. For instance, we treat the preciousness of a diamond as a quality of the gem or as a feeling in our mind, or both, according to the temporary direction of our thought.⁵⁷ The net conclusion seems to be that the old issue of whether values are objective or subjective when conceived in terms of experience has become obsolete. Value experiences that are originally neither objective nor subjective can, for practical reasons, be considered either or both.

James recognized the special significance of at least three different kinds of value experiences: the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious. In the aesthetic experiences, feeling is dominant; in the moral the will to action is dominant; and in the religious, the sense of an unseen but personal supporting presence of a wider, more powerful superconsciousness is felt.

Although neither his lectures nor his writings deal with aesthetics, James was especially interested in the subject, and made an extensive study of the nature of pleasure and pain and also of art in our Western civilization. He had specialized training in the field of art, which earlier he had considered as a career, and was extremely sensitive to the quality of art objects as well as to the aesthetic aspects of the things of common experience.⁵⁸ From his use of the term

⁵⁶ James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 141-142.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

⁵⁸ Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-262.

appreciation and his diamond illustration mentioned above, it is evident that he meant to include the aesthetic factor in his explanation of value experiences. Although he recognized aesthetic quality as a distinct value experience, he was apparently never able to define any principle that could be intellectually warranted as a criterion of aesthetic value. He could not find any authoritative discussion that was satisfactory, and, as Perry says, "In spite of his artistic calling and the artistic seductions to which he was highly vulnerable, it was his steadfast opinion that the aesthetic experience is not to be either the whole of life or its highest moment."⁵⁹

On the other hand James subordinated, though "not without a struggle or without relapses," the aesthetic feeling to the moral will. As Perry says again, "James . . . was a 'motor.' It was an essential feature of his psychology furthermore, that emotion, being organic and sensory in its nature, was an unnatural terminus of mind. A completed cycle of conscious life will always culminate in action—feelings merely enjoyed lead to the atrophy of will."⁶⁰

Absolute idealistic philosophies, against which in many respects James's philosophy was a reaction and a protest, differed as to whether thought, feeling, or moral action should be given primary emphasis. Hegel and Bradley placed the primary emphasis on thought, Schelling and the Schlegels on feeling, and Fichte and Royce on moral action. Although James rejected the Absolute in all its forms, he, like his colleague Royce, emphasized action primarily. In his psychology, the complete cycle of consciousness ended in action, and without action it was not complete. In his interpretation of the reflex-arc concept he distinguished three phases or stages:

The structural unit of the nervous system is in act a triad, neither of whose elements has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists only for the sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the central process of reflection exists only for the sake of calling forth the final act. All action is thus *re-action* upon the outer world; and the middle stage of consideration or contemplation or thinking is only a place of transit, the bottom of a loop, both of whose ends have their point of application in the outer world. If it should ever have no roots in the outer

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

world, if it should ever happen that it led to no active measures, it would fail of its essential function.⁶¹

Although James's beliefs about religious values lie beyond the scope of this study, perhaps it should be noted here that he attached special importance to them. But, as in the case of aesthetics and ethics, the kind of values he had in mind he conceived in terms of individual human experience rather than in terms of abstract theological definitions. What keeps religion going, he thought, are "concrete religious experiences, connecting themselves with feeling and conduct that renew themselves *in saecula saeculorum* in the lives of humble, private men. . . . They are conversations with the unseen, voices and visions, responses to prayer, changes of heart, deliverances from fear, inflowings of help, assurances of support, whenever certain persons set their own internal attitude in certain appropriate ways."⁶² For an elaboration of his attitude toward religious values, the reader is referred to *The Will to Believe* and *Varieties of Religious Experiences*. Its further consideration in this study will be incidental to the account of James's criteria of value that follows.

2. EVALUATION OF VALUE. In line with the priority he placed on action in psychology and physiology, James said: "There are no non-moral goods."⁶³ Therefore, for him moral principles were also principles for use in the evaluation of "worths" in all fields. The fact that he considered behavior primary as compared with other aspects of experience, and moral values primary as compared with other values does not mean that he identified *prima facie* goods with real goods. For him mere immediate likings or dislikings were neither goods nor bads. They were subject to evaluation requiring recognition of some standards or criteria of value.

In an effort to develop the principles required, James distinguished the psychological, the metaphysical, and the casuistic questions of ethics which he thought should be kept separate.⁶⁴ The psychological question, which most disputants consider the only ethical question, he said, has to do with the origin of goods and bads. Although

⁶¹ James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 113-114.

⁶² Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

⁶³ James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 209.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

he recognized the relation of many of our ideals to pleasure and pain, he did not consider it sufficient to account for all of them. Purely inward forces, he thought, are also at work, and the higher and more penetrating ideals are less the effects of past experience than they are the causes of future experience.⁶⁵

The metaphysical question has to do with the meaning of "obligation," "good," and "bad." First of all, he says that the meaning of such words depends upon the existence of sentient life. "Physical facts simply *are* or are *not*; and neither when present or absent can they be supposed to make demands. If they do, they can only do so by having desires; and then they have ceased to be purely physical facts, and have become facts of conscious sensitivity. Goodness, badness, and obligation must be *realized* somewhere in order really to exist."⁶⁶ Ethical propositions apply only in a world where at least some sentient being exists. Nothing can be good or right except so far as some consciousness feels it to be good or thinks it to be right.⁶⁷ "The philosopher, therefore," said James, "who seeks to know which ideal ought to have supreme weight and which one ought to be subordinated, must trace the *ought* itself to the *de facto* constitution of some existing consciousness behind which, as one of the data of the universe, he as a purely ethical philosopher is unable to go. This consciousness must make the one ideal right by feeling it to be right, the other wrong by feeling it to be wrong."⁶⁸

But James, recognizing that the question of the ground of the obligation was still to be answered, said: "*We see not only that without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but that there is some obligation wherever there is a claim. Claim and obligation are, in fact, co-extensive terms; they cover each other exactly. . . . Every de facto claim creates in so far forth an obligation.*"⁶⁹ Any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make, James thought, ought to be satisfied "for its own sole sake." The only objection that could be "adduced" would be the existence of a conflicting demand of an-

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 185-189.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-192.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 193.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

other creature. "The only possible reason there can be why any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a phenomenon actually is desired. Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it *makes* itself valid by the fact that it exists at all." All obligations, he said, whether large or small, are personal demands.⁷⁰ *Good, bad, and obligation* mean "no absolute natures, independent of personal support. They are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living minds. . . . We on this terrestrial globe, so far as visible facts go . . . form an ethical republic here below."⁷¹

For James the casuistic question arose out of the multiplicity of conflicting ideals that exist in the world and about which no general consensus obtains. Any philosopher except the skeptic, according to James, is obligated to seek an impartial test.⁷² As a means of making such a test, James distinguished two methods. The first, which may be designated the essence method, has been followed by most ethical schools. Those who adopt this procedure assume, according to James, that the goodness of things consists in a common essence. "If it were found that all goods *quâ* goods contained a common essence, then the amount of this essence involved in any one good would show its rank in the scale of goodness, and order could be quickly made; for this essence would be *the* good upon which all thinkers were agreed, the relatively objective and universal good that the philosopher seeks."⁷³

Of the various essences that have been found and proposed as measures, James found that none had given general satisfaction. Of the various standards of goodness proposed, James considered the capacity to bring happiness the best on the whole. "But in order not to break down fatally," he thought, "this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses that never aim at happiness; so that after all, in seeking for a universal principle we inevitably are carried onward to the *most* universal principle—that *the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand*. The demand may be anything

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 195, 197-198.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

under the sun. . . . No single abstract principle can be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale." ⁷⁴

The second method of doing justice to the various moral demands may be called the concrete approach. Although theoretically "all demands as such are *prima facie* respectable, and the best imaginary world would be one in which *every* demand was gratified as soon as made," in such an ideal world the casuistic question would not arise. "But in this world of ours . . . the actually possible . . . is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a *pinch* between the ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined good. Every end of desire that presents itself appears exclusive of some other end of desire." ⁷⁵

In spite of the competing demands in the heart of each individual, those competing between one individual and others, and those competing between an individual and the social whole, James was perfectly clear as to the path of escape for the philosopher. He indicated the nature of the path in this form: "Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly can not be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as *many demands as we can*? That act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the *best whole*, in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions. In the casuistic scale, therefore, those ideals must be written highest which *prevail at the least cost*, or by whose realization the least possible number of other ends are destroyed." ⁷⁶

After summarizing James's search for a moral standard and a way of doing justice to various conflicting demands, Perry observes: "The principle is clear: value derives ultimately from the interest of the individual; and the social whole is justified by the inclusion

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

and reconciliation of its individual parts. Individualism is fundamental." ⁷⁷ With a brief account of the meaning and implications of the individualism for which James's ethics as well as his psychology and ontology supply a theoretical foundation, we shall close this discussion of value.

Some ten years after the lectures to which Perry refers, James justified his moral individualism in a popular address which he called "A Certain Blindness in Human Beings." In regard to this essay Perry notes that, in a letter to Mrs. Glendower Evans, James said, it (the essay) "is really the perception on which my whole individualistic philosophy is based." ⁷⁸ In this essay he used a number of concrete illustrations to show that it was impossible for any individual to perceive directly the values which seem most significant to other individuals. Here he was applying a principle which he had formulated in his *Principles of Psychology*. In referring to the individual minds in his classroom, he then said: "Each of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them. No thought ever comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law." ⁷⁹ With special reference to moral implications, Perry says: "He (James) insisted that the view of the outsider should be corrected by an imaginative understanding of the individual's experience and feeling. Then the aggregate life of man, otherwise monstrous, repetitive, and trivial, would take on an aspect of dignity and right diversity." ⁸⁰ In the Preface of *Talks to Teachers*, James wrote: "The facts and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in. There is no point of view absolutely public and universal. Private and uncommunicable perceptions always remain over, and the worst of it is that those who look for them from the outside never know *where*. The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality—is, at any rate, the outward tolerance of whatever is not itself intolerant." ⁸¹

⁷⁷ Perry, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 265.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.

⁷⁹ James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, p. 226.

⁸⁰ Perry, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 265.

⁸¹ James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. v.

Perry, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 266.

The belief in the unique value of every individual, for James at any rate, had many different practical implications. For him, as Perry comments, "The institutional life of men must necessarily be based upon their likenesses, but its purpose is to make room for their differences. It is what slips through the meshes of classification and resists organization that justifies either classification or organization." ⁸² In his comments on Thomas Davidson, James said, "Surely the individual, the person in the singular number, is the more fundamental phenomenon, and the social institution, of whatever grade, is but secondary and ministerial." ⁸³ Perry adds that, for James, "Men are worth loving, regardless of their high or low station in the world. And each individual may draw self-respect from the same source. Tolerance is an essential part of the same gospel. When one sees the inward value of other lives one acknowledges their right to exist, or even exults in their existence." ⁸⁴

This sort of individualism and the tolerance which it implies lend support to meliorism in which James's ethics and theology were combined. His radical empiricism held that the nature of the world is as it is experienced to be. Concrete evils no less than concrete goods abound. The world is not entirely good as the optimist believes, nor entirely bad as the pessimist believes. Furthermore, the world is still in the making, and each one of us has a role, however small, in what the future will become. The presence of evil in the world where the human heart longs for the good is sufficient to justify all of us in working for improvement. The living demands from us for the good lend support to the belief in the reality of a superior personal Power Who is also working for the good, Who needs our assistance as we need His, and who hears our call as we hear His.

3. THE GOOD LIFE. James was a many-sided individual. He was an artist, a scientist, and a philosopher. As a philosopher, he was a radical empiricist, a pluralist, a realist, and a mystic, all rolled into one. In his beliefs about values, he sought to do justice to every demand of every human being. Any systematic formulation of such an attitude toward value into a single definition of the good life, as

⁸² Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

⁸³ William James, *Memories and Studies*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1934, p. 102.

⁸⁴ Perry, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

James himself realized, is impossible to accomplish. But he did provide for us a meaningful, if not an entirely adequate, statement of his general attitude.

He defined this attitude in terms of a combination of ideal novelty and of the hardy virtues in this way: "We have seen the blindness and deadness to each other which are our natural inheritance; and, in spite of them, we have been led to acknowledge an inner meaning which passeth show, and which may be present in the lives of others where we least descry it. And now we are led to say that such inner meaning can be *complete* and *valid for us also*, only when the inner joy, courage, and endurance are joined with an ideal." ⁸⁵

For James an ideal had to be intellectually conceived and had to carry with it that "sort of outlook, uplift, and brightness that go with all intellectual facts." It must have novelty, at least for him whom the ideal grasps.⁸⁶ And then he adds: "It is . . . obvious that something more than the mere possession of ideals is required to make a life significant. . . . It must back its ideal visions with what the laborers have, the sterner stuff of manly virtue; it must multiply their sentimental surface by the dimension of the active will, if we are to have *depth*, if we are to have anything cubical and solid in the way of character." ⁸⁷

James did not relate this twofold definition of the good life to his definition of education in terms of habit or show how it could be applied in concrete situations. Nevertheless, the two definitions considered together may be very suggestive when we undertake to indicate the educational implications and applications of his philosophy.

Implications and Applications

The relationship between James's theory of the good life, conceived as a combination of ideal novelty and the hardy virtues, and his theory of education, conceived in terms of useful habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior, and their logical implications for

⁸⁵ James, *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 291-292.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

school practice has not yet been systematically defined and elaborated. His treatment of educational theory is confined largely to his pedagogical lectures, later published in *Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals*. Just what application of his philosophy to the different features of school practice he would have approved, we cannot be sure. Still, because of the recognized importance of its indirect influence on education, it should be interesting and profitable even now to consider what implications may be properly inferred from his philosophy, psychology, and general theories of education and the good life for educational aims, the school curriculum, and school administration. James's attitude toward education is much more inclusive than either of his definitions and, in considering these features of school practice, we call it the habit-tendency theory merely for convenience.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

From the standpoint of the habit-tendency theory, educational aims, when psychologically considered, are of two kinds—acquired habits of conduct and acquired tendencies to behavior. When normatively considered, such habits and tendencies must be useful. From this point of view, the questions to be asked are: First, what is the meaning of acquired habits and tendencies as compared with other psychological products of learning? Second, what is the meaning of usefulness as a criterion in the selection of desirable habits and tendencies?

Clearness as to the meaning of acquired habits and tendencies as compared with other habits and tendencies involves consideration of James's distinction between native and acquired reactions. According to James, "Man is an organism for reacting on impressions; his mind is there to help determine his reactions, and the purpose of his education is to make them numerous and perfect. *Our education means, in short, little more than a mass of possibilities of reaction, acquired at home, at school, or in the training of affairs.*" Then he states what he calls "a principle which underlies the whole process of acquisition and governs the entire activity of the teacher. It is this: *Every acquired reaction is, as a rule, either a complication grafted on a native reaction, or a substitute for a native reaction,*

which the same object originally tended to provoke.”⁸⁸ The reason for qualifying habits and tendencies with the term “acquired,” then, is that these substitutions and complications constituting the psychological ends of education are different from the habits and tendencies resulting from the direct expression of original impulses and tendencies.

But his distinction between habits and tendencies is important. The specific habits and skills that are mainly motor and can be directly and immediately applied in the process of acquiring them, he called habits. The general patterns of thought and feeling whose application must be deferred because of practical conditions, he called tendencies. For convenience of discussion, he usually referred to the former as habits and to the latter as ideas. For James, all ideas tend to work themselves out in behavior and thus become habits, but the only ideas fit to become educational aims are those whose practical application can be perceived in advance.

But as James was well aware, when normatively considered these habits and ideas are not all equally desirable. The criterion on the basis of which desirable habits were to be selected seems to have been personal utility, although we cannot always be sure about ideas. With regard to habit, he said, “All of our life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits—practical, emotional, and intellectual,—systematically organized for our weal or woe, and bearing us irresistibly toward our destiny, whatever the latter may be.”⁸⁹ Since we always thus tend to become bundles of habits under any circumstances, “it follows first of all that the teacher’s prime concern should be to ingrain into the pupil that assortment of habits that shall be most useful to him throughout life. Education is for behavior, and habits are the stuff of which behavior consists.”⁹⁰ The important point to note is that the utility which James had in mind is permanent utility for the student. It is personal rather than social utility, and long-term rather than short-term. As to tendencies to behavior, which he called ideas or conceptions, James said, “The process of education, taken in a large way, may be described as nothing but the process of acquiring ideas or conceptions, the best educated

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

mind being the mind which has the largest stock of them, ready to meet the largest possible variety of the emergencies in life."⁹¹

The main point to note here is that although James did not specifically refer to personal utility as the criterion of selection, as he did in the case of habits, perhaps he meant by readiness "to meet the largest possible variety of the emergencies of life" merely an elaboration of the idea of practical utility. Otherwise, we should have to interpret the statement to mean that, for James, one idea or conception is as good an aim as any other. In the light of the broader perspective which a study of his general philosophy provides, such an interpretation is unwarranted, and the same criterion is as applicable to ideas or conceptions as to habits.

As for the application of the utility criterion to the determination of aims conceived as habits and ideas, James did not supply us with any specific directions. The best we can do, then, is to rely on the suggestions to be found in various connections, especially in *Talks to Teachers*, and on the general perspective which a study of his psychology and philosophy provides. Apparently James simply took for granted that the school subjects constituting the curriculum were, on the whole, the products of social evolution and therefore relatively permanent. The essential or tool subjects he considered indispensable. Whatever habits and ideas were to be mastered should, therefore, be obvious to both teacher and student. But there were some general desirable habits and ideas whose importance was not so obvious. For instance, James urged teachers to keep before students the importance of habit, effort, relaxation, and methods of fixing and breaking habits. Both teachers and students might find his definition of the good life suggestive as to desirable habits and ideas to be acquired.

In the light of James's general philosophy, students on the whole longed to do good, at least for themselves. All they needed was information as to what things were good. In regard to most things, teachers were able to point out what would be personally most useful to them. Then, students in turn could be expected to accept the teacher's proposals as desirable aims, provided they were made in harmony with the development of native tendencies. Consistent

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

scientific movement overtook education. When James was delivering his lectures, most authors of professional textbooks for teachers, with the exception of the Herbartians who used the single-pattern form of organization, adopted the general devices-and-techniques form.

Since, as James said, his hearers relished intellectual technicalities least and cared most for concrete practical applications, he avoided the extreme logical analysis which the adoption of any one single-pattern procedure required. In defining learning-teaching procedures, he used a modified form of the general pattern organization together with that of general devices and techniques.

He formulated three general patterns of procedure, corresponding to the three psychological types of aims which he distinguished—the pattern for acquiring ideas or conceptions conceived as tendencies to behavior; the pattern of habit forming; and the pattern for the development of moral character. His pattern for acquiring ideas consists of three laws: the law of contiguity; the law of similarity; and the law of constellations. Further elaboration of this learning-teaching pattern does not seem called for here because, first, it is now obsolete, and second, the space at our disposal does not warrant it.⁹⁵

James defined the pattern of habit forming as if he were directly advising someone how to make or break any habit which he wished to develop or discard. This pattern comprised four laws or principles. The formulation below is an adaptation of James's analysis stated from the standpoint of the teacher. In acquiring a new habit or in leaving off an old, the teacher should encourage students to:

1. Launch themselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible.
2. Suffer *no* exception to occur until the new habit is firmly established.
3. Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution they make, and on every emotional prompting they may experience in the direction of the habit they aspire to form.
4. Keep the faculty of effort alive in themselves by a little gratuitous exercise each day.⁹⁶

An understanding of the pattern of moral action depends upon an understanding of the moral act. Reduced to its simplest terms, James

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-90.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-78.

said, a moral act consists in the effort of attention by which we hold fast to an idea that otherwise would be driven out of the mind by other psychological tendencies that are there. "To think . . . is the secret of will, just as it is the secret of memory." The pattern of the moral act on the part of students involves these three features: (a) the stock of ideas which the teacher furnishes; (b) the amount of voluntary attention which they can exert in holding to the right ideas however, unpalatable; and (c) the several habits of acting definitely on these latter for which they have been successfully trained.⁹⁷

Although James did not definitely and unequivocally say so, the logic of his whole educational theory as applied to the methods of teaching seems to indicate that, had he been systematically applying his philosophy to school practice, he would have combined these patterns into one which could properly be called the method of habit-forming and would be comparable to the Herbartian pattern of the formal steps. Justification for this conclusion is based on James's explicit statements and inferences from his general position. Of these statements only two need be mentioned. "Our thinking and feeling processes are also largely subject to the law of habit, and one result of this is a phenomenon which you all know under the name of 'the association of ideas.'" ⁹⁸ And later James said, "The teacher can formulate his function to himself . . . in terms of 'associations' as well as in terms of 'native and acquired reactions.' . . . When one thinks that our trains of associations, whatever they may be, normally issue in acquired reactions or behavior, one sees that in a general way the same mass of facts is covered by both formulas." ⁹⁹

Two inferences from James's general position point in the same direction. First, since he considered ideas as tendencies to behavior, they were for him "in so far forth" habits. Therefore, the method of acquiring ideas is fundamentally the same as that of forming habits. Second, the different factors involved in the moral act may properly be considered aspects of the laws of habit forming. The stock of ideas to which James referred is a product of the laws of association of ideas, and the habit of acting definitely on an idea is

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-188.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

subject to the laws of habit forming. The only item of the moral act not accounted for in the analysis up to this point is voluntary attention. The only thing the teacher of the school can do about voluntary attention, according to James's psychology, or should do about it, according to his ethics, is to assist students in developing the habit of keeping their attention focused on the act to be performed whether or not it has immediate personal appeal. The conclusion, therefore, seems fully warranted that the pattern of forming habits is a logical implication of the habit-tendency theory of education as an aspect of the philosophy of James.

As we have noted, James did not entirely neglect general devices and techniques, such as the lecture method, the question method, the book method, the object method, and the laboratory method, and the various means by which the teacher can secure and maintain interest and attention. These devices and techniques constituted the subject matter of method in professional courses and textbooks for teachers prior to the Herbartian application of the formal steps as *the* method of the recitation. In defining the patterns of forming habits, associating ideas, and acting morally; in commenting on the educational implications of instincts; and in indicating means of improving memory and maintaining attention, James made several practical suggestions in regard to the usefulness of some of the better known devices and techniques, especially object teaching. But he left open the question of the relationship of the general devices and techniques to the more inclusive general patterns of forming habits, associating ideas, and voluntary action. This question, authors and instructors in the field of general method have answered in different ways down to our own time. Some adopt as primary one general pattern of learning and teaching consisting of steps or stages, and treat general devices and techniques in their relationship to the different steps or stages of the general pattern.

Others adopt a purely eclectic attitude and treat not only the general devices and techniques but also all available general patterns as equal and coordinate in importance. For this confused situation in the field of general method, however, James was not responsible. As he pointed out in the Preface to *Talks to Teachers*, he was confining himself to the concrete application of general principles in which teachers were primarily interested, and not undertaking to define a

new all-inclusive pattern of learning and teaching. Nevertheless, he did suggest the possibility of developing a pattern that was more consistent with his philosophy and psychology than was that of the formal steps.

In the very first chapter in the *Talks*, he warned teachers not to expect too much from the study of psychological principles. "You make a great, a very great mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the mind's laws, is something from which you can deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate schoolroom use. Psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application, by using its originality."¹⁰⁰ But equally important is the fact that James almost invariably repeated the same warning in his comments on every principle and procedure in the whole series of lectures.

In closing this section, perhaps it should be said that James's attitude toward the application of principles and use of teaching procedures is probably of more lasting significance than any particular principle or procedure he defined. Such an attitude toward methods of teaching is only one aspect of a more inclusive attitude toward authoritative devices of all kinds, which has its foundation in his ethical indeterminism and individualism and in his more inclusive philosophy of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism.

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

James had very little to say about administrative problems, such as discipline, pupil placement, and school organization. But what he did say or imply in what he said about other features of school practice when considered in the light of his general theories of education and the good life and their underlying philosophy, school administrators might find very significant. Therefore, we shall close our discussion with a brief account of some of his suggestions, expressed or implied.

We begin with discipline. James said the fear of punishment has always been the great weapon of the teacher, and will always, of

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

course, retain some place in the conditions of the schoolroom. In commenting on love and the instinctive desire to please those we love, he said that the teacher who is loved by the pupils will obtain results which others find impossible.¹⁰¹ Again, he noted that when children are completely inhibited from doing a thing, they usually should be considered pathological rather than morally culpable, and should be dealt with tactfully so as to avoid strained situations involving a great deal of nervous wear and tear on both sides.¹⁰² Therefore, those in administrative control of educational situations should use whatever techniques and devices will facilitate the acquisition of "desirable habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior" and treat balking spells as temporary psychological conditions to be overcome by sympathy and understanding rather than by force and compulsion.

He said little or nothing in regard to pupil placement, but from his principles, of respect for individuality, of the relativity of devices and techniques, and of regard for both majority and minority values, it is obvious that no general fixed regulation or rule is universally applicable in making school, grade, section, or group assignments. However valid any fixed plan may seem to those in control, the extent to which it should be used depends upon its effects—both immediate and direct, distant and indirect—on the individuals and groups involved. The demands of all should be respected and counted in every situation, which is always different from every other situation. What should be done in concrete situations should be the responsibility of those who are in a position to judge best the whole effect of the decisions that are made.

In regard to the school system, James said: "The outward organization of education which we have in our United States, is perhaps, on the whole, the best organization that exists in any country."¹⁰³ He had in mind the diversity and flexibility of the state school systems and the opportunity for experimentation and competition they offer; the independence and cooperation of many colleges and universities and their organic relation to the lower school; the coeducation of the sexes; and the recitation system of institutional organization. The

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

diversity and flexibility which characterized the state school systems had support in the pluralism of James's radical empiricism and the individualism of his moral philosophy. The opportunity for experimentation and competition had support in pragmatism, in evolution, and in the instincts of rivalry and pugnacity. The recitation system found support in the instincts of imitation, emulation, ambition, pugnacity, and pride. "The most colossal improvement which recent years have seen in secondary education lies in the introduction of the manual training schools; not because they will give us a people more handy and practical for domestic life and better skilled in trades, but because they will give us citizens with an entirely different intellectual fibre."¹⁰⁴ Endorsement of this new emphasis in secondary education had support in the psychological and physiological principle of action as the completing stage of the cycle of consciousness and the final stage of the reflex arc. It also had support in the priority which James attributed to morality in the realm of human values.

James was definite in regard to the main function of both the college and the university graduate school. Addressing the Association of Alumnae at Radcliffe College in 1907, he said, "The best claim that a college education can possibly make on your respect, the best thing it can aspire to accomplish for you, is this: That it should *help you to know a good man* when you see him."¹⁰⁵ The function of the college so conceived, if effectively performed, would, he thought, provide for the improvement of leadership in public life on which democracy depends.

For the graduate school he said, "It would seem that to stimulate study, and to increase . . . the class of highly educated men in our country, is the only positive good, and consequently the sole direct end at which our graduate schools . . . should aim. If other results have developed they should be deemed secondary incidents, and if not desirable in themselves, they should be carefully guarded against."¹⁰⁶ If this is the aim of the graduate school, it should not interfere with the free development of talent, obstruct the natural play of supply and demand in the teaching profession, foster academic:

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁵ James, *Memories and Studies*, p. 309.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

snobbery, transfer accredited value from essential manhood to an outward badge, blight hopes and promote invidious sentiments, or divert the attention of aspiring youth from direct dealings with truth to the passing of examinations.¹⁰⁷ This conception of higher education seems to have the support of James's moral principles of respect for individuality and democratic responsibility.

Cultural Conditions

The educational theory and its underlying philosophy as developed by James had its counterpart in the cultural conditions of the period. Whether conceived in its educational aspects as the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior most useful to the individual, or in its axiological aspects as the marriage of ideal novelty and the heroic virtues, or in its psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical aspects, James's philosophy is the best available intellectual expression of a way of life that reached its peak in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century and came to an end with World War I.

Although James spent his childhood and youth in New York and Boston or in the cultural centers of Europe where his family lived much of the time and where he travelled for health and education, nevertheless his experiences were analogous to those of his countrymen who were carving a nation out of the wilderness. Like the earlier spokesmen for this pioneer way of life, James had absorbed the cultural ideals and beliefs of the European tradition since the Renaissance. Like them, too, he found this cultural tradition irrelevant to and compatible with the practical conditions of life that prevailed in the New World. Like them, he recognized freedom as an indispensable condition of moral action and realized that the new scientific knowledge required a readjustment of old values and that the industrial expansion following the Civil War made new demands upon the people.

In his own experience, the incompatibility of the old culture embodied in the genteel tradition which he observed at firsthand in

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

the intellectual centers of both Europe and America, and the intellectual demands which the new knowledge and the new conditions of life produced in his own mind and heart, brought him to the brink of despair. In his battle for mental wholeness, however, he achieved a victory that could not be attributed to medical science or to health resorts, but to his own individual moral determination and intellectual effort. In this conflict which lasted throughout the greater part of his youth and early manhood, he acquired insights that laid the foundation for the main features of his philosophy.

This battle, which was a result of the incompatibility of moral and religious traditions with scientific knowledge and practical conditions, was analogous to that which thoughtful people had to fight whether on the frontiers of the West or in the cultural centers of the East. Therefore, intellectual elaboration of the insights which he gained in his personal struggles "made sense" to all those who had similar experiences. As some commentators have observed, it is true that James never lived on the physical frontiers and never suffered the hardships which in his romantic moods he idealized. Still, he and many of his compatriots were engaged in the same kind of spiritual struggle.

Consequently, when he systematically stated his intellectual conclusions in a simple and direct style not found in philosophy since Socrates, he struck a responsive chord in the hearts and minds of those with similar spiritual experiences, however different the external conditions of their lives had been. They understood what he meant by standards of direction found in the future rather than in the past; by an open universe still in process of development; by the right to believe even in the absence of convincing evidence; by the reality of moral freedom and of chance; and by the sacredness of individuality.

Contemporaries may not have fully understood what he meant by "working" and "personal satisfaction" as criteria in the evaluation of propositions, beliefs, and philosophical systems. But such principles were at least meaningful to them in some intelligible sense. They may not have fully grasped the conception of mind as the stream of thought and the reality of the specious moment of pure experience, but they did have some understanding of the utility of mental processes, instincts, and habits, as James defined them. They

may not have understood just how the significance of life depends upon the marriage of ideal novelty and heroic virtues, but they could not doubt how the significance of ideals and heroism fitted their own experience. James said what many of his generation wanted to hear, in a way that appealed to them and at a time when the moral and religious tradition was losing its hold on the educated classes.

The prevailing cultural conditions in this country during the life of James emphasized the importance of the individual and his achievements. To the rank and file, it mattered not what mental capacities an individual might develop or what ideas he might acquire; the thing that counted most was his achievements in action. To them, men differed by nature in interest and capacity. Some, they thought, could do much and others could do very little, but all could lead happy lives provided they lived right; that is, did the right things.

But what an individual did was his own business. It was not the function of organized society, so most people thought, to develop an overall plan to bring happiness to the individual. The individual was responsible for working out his own destiny. Social institutions were as they should be. It was the responsibility of the individual to make his way in the world as he found it; he was responsible for his own actions.

This was the kind of individualism to which James's emphasis on individuality seemed to lend intellectual support. The sympathetic critics of a later day, however, could find in his more philosophical works a basis for more social responsibility on the part of organized society. But it was through his psychology and ethics rather than through his general philosophy that he appealed to the public.

In his psychology James emphasized the isolation of each personal consciousness from every other personal consciousness. In his ethics he stressed the blindness of every human being to the values cherished by other human beings. Such a psychology and ethics tended to support a hands-off policy on the part of government and organized social agencies. They justified the middle class beliefs in respect for individuality and personal freedom and also justified the existing lack of organized social effort for a unified welfare program.

In the conflict between Victorian ideals and the practical individualism of the period, many young persons found themselves habitu-

ally doing things that met with social disapproval. They had somehow, so they thought, developed bad habits. They wanted to get rid of the bad habits and to develop good ones.

In fact, society itself idealized certain forms of conduct and condemned others. With respect to the relationship between the sexes, certain forms of behavior were heartily approved and others sternly condemned. Organized religion everywhere condemned people for doing things which by nature they seemed almost compelled to do. There were rumblings of political and economic unrest prophetic of bigger things to come, but in general nonconformists were condemned by those in control of the church, the state, business, and industry. If an individual had not succeeded in life, it was his own fault. He had, so it was generally believed, the same opportunities that his more successful contemporaries had.

Under these circumstances the theory of habit forming had a strong appeal for many. Although the individual, so it was generally believed, knew what he ought to do, he did not always do it. Perhaps he could profit from learning what others considered good conduct, but for the most part he knew right from wrong. What he needed was some method of developing good behavior and of correcting the bad. The laws of habit formation based upon the stream-of-consciousness theory of mind supplied the pattern of procedure that seemed to be required. Those in positions of leadership must indicate what habits and tendencies of behavior they had found desirable, but the individual himself was responsible for projecting his own moral ends and realizing them through application of the laws of habit formation. Such laws were considered applicable in all social institutions and in all walks of life. However limited it may seem as a method of teaching others, perhaps no other general procedure ever outlined is so efficient in the hands of the individual in dealing with his own moral problems. For all those who wish to change by direct action their own conduct and behavior, it is as effective now as it ever was.

Concluding Comments

Justification for such extended treatment of the habit-tendency theory of education and the good life is to be found in the general

influence of James's psychological and philosophical principles rather than in its very limited systematic application to school practice. On the negative side James's destructive criticism of the foundations of existing theories contributed to their modification or abandonment. On the positive side the constructive influence of his own psychological and philosophical theories on other psychologists, philosophers, and students of education cannot be overestimated. His influence on the educational theories of Thorndike, H. H. Horne, the new realists, Dewey, Bode, and Kilpatrick is unmistakable. Furthermore, the very fact that James's educational theory and its supporting psychological and philosophical principles are usually neglected in courses and textbooks necessitates a few final comments on his treatment of the mind-body problem, his conceptions of meaning and truth, and his attitude toward social progress.

In his psychology, James shows that the traditional hypothesis of a separate metaphysical mind-substance is an unnecessary assumption in an empirical account of the Self and the mental processes, and demolishes the hypothesis of permanently enduring ideas common to classical empiricism as represented in Herbartian philosophy and psychology. Apparently for James, the fundamental structure of the Self must be found either in the stream of consciousness or in the nervous system that conditions it. For him the passing state of consciousness establishes a basis for explaining the permanent and enduring human individual. True, the momentary state passes, but it appropriates the state that has just passed, and it is in turn appropriated by the next succeeding state. Consciousness is constantly changing, but it is also continuous and thus contains an enduring aspect of each present state. Few recognized authorities today are willing to accept fleeting states of consciousness as the permanently enduring personality that the individual considers himself to be.

But in his more philosophical works James calls pure experience the only ultimate reality to be included in philosophical debate. This stream of pure experience is conceived as continuous, without break or breach, as is the stream of thought or consciousness in his psychology. But strictly speaking, it is neither physical nor mental, but neutral. Taken in one way it becomes a part of an historical sequence of events properly called physical; taken in another way it

becomes a part of another sequence of events properly called mental. Here James denies the existence of consciousness of a kind of stuff distinct from the rest of nature. To him consciousness is functional in two senses. It is functional in the symbolic sense when things represent, symbolize, or play the role of other things. It is functional also in the instrumental sense in that the different mental processes serve the needs of the organism just as do the various organs of the body.

From this point of view, James does not fully develop the functional conception of mind in either the symbolic or the instrumental sense, but he is certainly moving in both directions. The conclusion seems warranted that whatever might have been his final answer to the mind-body problem, he has avoided the traditional dualism as well as idealism and materialism, and has stimulated further study of the functional conception of mind.

Nothing in James's philosophy has been more confusing than his explanation of the nature of meaning and truth. Apparently this confusion is inherent in the pragmatic rule to which he subscribes. According to this rule the meaning of a concept may always be found either in some sensible particular which it designates or in some particular difference in the course of human experience which its being true will make. The first part clearly refers to the meaning of a concept and has nothing to do with the truth or value of a proposition, idea, or belief. The second part just as clearly has reference to both the meaning and the truth of propositions, ideas, and beliefs. As contrasted with the meaning of the concept in the first part of the rule, which is surely logical, the meaning in the second part may be either logical or psychological. However, logically the meaning would not add anything significant to that contained in the first clause, since a *sensible particular* and a *particular difference* would be essentially the same. But psychologically the particular difference might mean that a concept is meaningless unless it seems important to someone, and that it is true if it is personally satisfying.

James's adoption of workability as a criterion of the truth claims of propositions does not clarify the situation. In general, he recognizes two criteria of workability. To be true a proposition has to be personally important to somebody and to meet expectations in

practical application. If it meets the first criterion, James says it is true "in so far forth." To be fully true, it has by implication to satisfy both criteria.

In the light of later analyses of James's conceptions of meaning and truth, we are now able to recognize the difficulty of both James and his opponents. Unlike Peirce and Dewey, James is interested not only in the establishment of criteria for guidance in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, but also in the importance of philosophical systems to his fellow man. For him a philosophical system or belief is not worth studying if its being true does not make any personal difference in the experience of the student. The last part of the pragmatic rule and the criterion of personal satisfaction are applicable to philosophies and philosophical beliefs but not to scientific propositions.

In the light of historical perspective we can now see that James might have avoided some of the misunderstanding if he had distinguished clearly between meaning and truth, and between logical meaning and psychological meaning. But careful study of James's full account of meaning and truth shows that he does not consider personal satisfaction an adequate criterion of the truth claims of propositions. Moreover, it is difficult to find much to object to in his belief that philosophy as a subject of study might well be limited to a consideration of the systems and theories that make some particular difference in human experience. Although, for James, experience is intimately connected with nature and therefore includes impulse and feeling as well as thought, he considers the nonrational factor a condition rather than a criterion of intellectual operations.

James's social philosophy may be—in fact, has been—so interpreted as to lend support to laissez-faire policies and programs on the part of social institutions, including the school. In line with this interpretation some suggest, as does Merle Curti, that, whereas James's theory of social progress could contribute to democratic practices on the frontier, it would support aristocratic practices elsewhere. James does attribute human progress to the superior individuals and the superior intellectual tools which they create. He does urge all individuals to exert themselves with more energy than is customary because it is their duty to society. He does stress free competition among hypotheses as a policy, thus providing an opportunity for

superior individuals to contribute effectively to social progress.

The question naturally arises, then, as to whether or not James's later socialism is so incompatible with his avowed individualism as when taken at face value it seems to be. The answer appears to be that logically his philosophy is all of a piece, but it is so dynamic and flexible that it means different things in different situations. If attention is centered on the stream of thought defined in *Principles of Psychology*, the isolation of the individual from society seems to receive support. But James is constantly pointing out in his psychology and pedagogy that there are important philosophical problems still to be faced. Such a warning should, however, be assumed not to mean that he has no idea of what the answers would be, but that for practical purposes they have to be deferred.

When he comes to face these problems in later publications, he makes his position quite clear. He does not support extreme and laissez-faire individualism in politics, economics, and education any more than he does the policies and programs of the totalitarians who, like the proponents of rugged individualism, have selected for their own use some particular aspects of James's philosophy, neglecting the perspective as a whole.

When we consider his whole philosophical, psychological, and social outlook, James's individualism will intellectually justify perpetuating the social policies and programs of the rugged, and even atomized, individualism of his day as well as combating the various forms of totalitarian policies and programs of our day. For in the light of this broader perspective, every passing thought is not just an individual indecomposable unity in a continuous stream of consciousness. Every unitary moment of experience is analyzable into functional parts and integrated into still larger wholes or selves. A pure experience includes all that is given at any one moment. Within such an emergent present impulse of pure experience functional factors can be distinguished. The continuity of the "persisting pulses of thought" is due to an immanence of the pulses in each other. Moreover, these unitary experiences themselves do not merely succeed one another; they appropriate each other. They "compenetrate" and something of each pure experience is immanent in each other such pulse.

Furthermore, James's pluralism recognizes the necessity of con-

tinuity among the experiences of one individual with those of other individuals. Just as the single pulses of an individual experience compenetrates, so must the experiences of one individual compenetrates with those of other individuals. In the light of such an analysis the individual maintains his independence, but he is nevertheless a functional whole in a more inclusive functional whole. As Dewey points out, if the reader will recall what James says about the "Each-Form" which he adopts in contrast to the "All-Form" of reality which he rejects, he will note that "a thing may be connected, by intermediary things, with a thing with which it has no immediate essential connection. It is thus at all times in many possible connections which are not necessarily actualized at the moment. They depend upon which actual path of intermediation it may functionally run into. We still have a coherent world."¹⁰⁸

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The Human-Wants Theory

5

In the midst of conflicting opinions within and without the teaching profession with regard to what the school should do, some of us have always desired assurance as to both ends and means of education. Even before the close of the nineteenth century the achievements of science in the field of technology were spectacular. Already teachers were using the source materials from the new sciences—psychology and sociology—that were relevant to school problems. During the first quarter of the twentieth century some of the leading students of education undertook to make education itself a science rather than a mere art, as it had always been considered, and many of them were soon recognized as important figures in the field of professional education. Hence the meaning and significance of the scientific movement in education should certainly have a place in the general foundations of education.

The quantity of factual materials that these scientific students of education have produced in almost every phase of school practice is simply stupendous. A complete analysis in a book on the general foundations of education such as this is, of course, impossible. A brief synoptic account of the educational theory developed by Edward Lee Thorndike, one of the most brilliant of William James's

students and perhaps the outstanding leader of the movement, is sufficient to indicate its meaning and significance.

In his essay in honor of William James, in 1908, Thorndike expressed the belief that the world could increase in satisfyingness or decrease in annoyingness to the human species.¹ A little later he wrote, "The aim of existence should be to make our wants better and to satisfy them," and "the aims of education should then be: to make men want the right things and to make them better able so to control all the forces of nature and themselves that they can satisfy these wants." ² Consequently, this conception of education and the good life to whose analysis and application to school practice he and many other scientific students of education have devoted such considerable effort, cannot be better conveyed than by calling it the human-wants theory.

Analysis of the Good Life

"Improving and satisfying human wants" as the goal of education and the good life remained an ideal for Thorndike. In 1936 and again in 1940 he defined, explained, and defended what is his most systematic and detailed analysis of "The Goal of Social Effort." Therefore we shall summarize and use it here as a basis of orientation in the remaining sections of this chapter.

For purposes of illustration, in making the analysis Thorndike regards himself, as he asks the reader to regard himself, "as a scientific trustee for the human species who is making a rough bill of specifications which (1) will include the satisfactions possible for men today without imperiling the satisfactions of other men now and in the future, (2) will approximate to a reasonable harmony, or at least compromise, among conflicting wants, (3) would be approved by a substantial majority of human beings of, say, the next

¹ E. L. Thorndike, "A pragmatic substitute for free will," in *Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, in Honor of William James*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1908, pp. 588-589, by permission of R. L. Thorndike.

² E. L. Thorndike, *Education: A First Book*, New York, Macmillan, 1912, p. 11, by permission of R. L. Thorndike.

thousand years, as a good program for 1940 if each were omniscient and chose wisely in his own self interest, and (4) would be approved still more strongly if each chose wisely in the interest of his friends, or neighbors, or countrymen, and their descendants.”³

He then expresses the belief that if the reader who adopts this attitude would specify what he thinks are the objectives of the good life and collect similar specifications of a dozen other impartial students of human welfare, the result would be much like Thorndike's own list below.

1. Maintenance of the inner causes of the joy of living at or above their present average.
2. Food when hungry, and drink when thirsty.
3. A diet that is physiologically adequate.
4. Protection against pain-causing animals.
5. Protection against disease-causing organisms, poisons, and other causes of disease.
6. Protection or insurance against accidents and disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, wars, for which the person in question is not responsible.
7. Protection against extreme shocks, fear, and strains.
8. Some room or place where he can rest undisturbed, protected from the elements and from bad or uncongenial men.
9. Enjoyable bodily activity, especially when young.
10. Enjoyable mental activity, including esthetic pleasures.
11. Opportunity for human society.
12. Opportunity for courtship, love, and life with one's mate.
13. Opportunity to care for children and to be kind to human beings and animals.
14. The approval of one's community, or at least the absence of scorn or contempt.
15. The approval of one's self, self-respect, the absence of shame and remorse.
16. Opportunity to have friends and affection, if deserving of them.
17. Opportunity to be a friend and give affection.
- 18a. Opportunity to exercise power over some persons, animals, things, or ideas, making them do one's will.
- 18b. Opportunity to serve a worthy master.
19. Membership in organized groups, and the right to participate in ac-

³ E. L. Thorndike, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, Macmillan, 1940.

- tivities or ceremonies which are (or at least are thought to be) important.
20. Opportunity to compete with one's peers winning in about 50 percent of the trials.
 21. Opportunity to compete with one's own past record, and, if deserving, to have the pleasures of achievement and success.
 22. Occasional opportunities for adventure, risk, and danger.
 23. Something to be angry at and attack.
 24. Protection by society (via customs, laws, and government) in what is regarded by the existing moral code as a good life.
 25. Freedom to discover and publish verifiable truth.
 26. Enjoyment of the happiness of others.⁴

An adequate understanding of the general implications of the list as a whole and of the different items would require a careful reading of the explanation and defense which Thorndike himself provides. The best that can be done here is to make a few generalizations based upon such a study. First, the provision of all the items for every person or for any person at every stage of his life is not intended. Some persons should have larger provision of certain items that satisfy them more than others would. Likewise any person should have more of some item at some stage than at others. Second, any objection from intellectuals to the effect that certain items should be restricted to what the good and the wise would approve would not sufficiently take into account all human tendencies, even the nonrational. Third, there is no indication that the cost of providing the items listed would be any more than that for providing the values we now support, both positive and negative. Fourth, all the valid elements of religion, liberty, equality, fraternity, and democracy are included in the items listed even though these traditional values themselves are not explicitly mentioned. Fifth, this formulation is subject to constant improvement through further study and application.⁵

Since any generalization as to the explanations of specific items is impractical, a few of Thorndike's comments are indicated here. About Item 1 he says, "The maintenance of the inner causes of the general tendencies to enjoy life is of great importance," and it varies

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 405-416.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 411-418.

with different people and with the same people at different ages. In regard to Item 6 he says that we should provide insurance for the sufferers of widespread disasters which have heretofore been attributed to divine providence. As to Items 3, 4, 5, and 7, they "require either a careful education and establishment of habits, or control of the environment plus considerable persuasion and coercion by public health officers." Items 9 and 10 "provide for the satisfaction of the tendencies to physical and mental play, vocalization, visual exploration, manipulation, mental control, . . . and whatever leads man to want to run, jump, climb, hunt, fish, see, hear, taste, tinker, construct, sing, dance, read, think, write, etc., though no profit or praise is his as the outcome."

"Item 11 is and has always been available to all save a few humans, without special care on anybody's part," Thorndike dryly comments. For Item 12 he says, "Until man invents some better arrangement for a small social unit and for producing and rearing future generations, through the monogamous family, it seems best to set a certain premium upon the courtship, love, and life with one's mate which has satisfied decent people fairly well for several thousand years." In regard to Item 13 he says, "Since there are to be children and creatures in need of kindness, it would be folly not to arrange that those who will be made happy by meeting these needs should have the chance to do so." Items 14 and 15 are "potent satisfiers." For Items 18a and 18b "There need be no conflict between them because each in its place and to a suitable stimulus is a part of the good life for man."

Item 20 recognizes "the zest of rivalry" and purges "the competition of schools, sports, and business from unhealthy conditions." Item 21 "is a very beneficent form of satisfaction and one which will be more and more easily provided as means of measuring achievement . . . are improved and extended." The importance of Item 22 is obvious. Item 23 is qualified to the extent that the objects of hate and anger should be limited to things which by common consent are the enemies of man. Item 24 "is defective in that it leaves the person who is in advance of his times unprotected in his eccentricities." But Item 25 alleviates it "by permitting the verification of the truth of any statement . . . to be its complete defense. Item 26 applies to the positive side of sharing, for its author doubts

the value of being miserable because others are miserable.⁶

Thorndike did not consider the sole responsibility of organized education to be realization of the ends of the good life for man which he proposed and explained. In the same volume and elsewhere he indicated general ways by which the family, the government, the church, industry, the school, and public opinion might contribute to these ends. He recognized the varying, dissimilar, capacities of different institutions and agencies to contribute to various ends without assigning to any of them definite responsibility for particular ends. Apparently, his specifications were designed as a challenge to all who shared his belief in the possibility of a better life for man. They are not specific objectives but rather are general criteria on the basis of which institutions, agencies, and even individuals may determine their own ends. What Thorndike and other leaders of the scientific movement in education believed to be the function of the schools will be duly considered, but first we shall give some attention to his philosophical presuppositions and assumptions.

Philosophical Foundations

Proponents of the scientific movement in education would deny that their program required any philosophical justification. They were first of all scientists and would therefore look to science rather than philosophy as the final arbiter of both theoretical and practical issues. Some of them might go all the way with "behaviorism" and deny the existence of consciousness, purposes, and values even as phenomena. But most of them would perhaps agree with Thorndike that, while human consciousness, purposes, and values exist and are important, they can be explained in terms of connections in the nervous system and are subject to the laws of mechanical cause and effect, as is the physical world. They would continue to think of the ends of the educative process in terms of knowledge, appreciation, skills, attitudes, and personality traits just as students of education and members of the teaching profession have done in the past. Still they would be ever mindful that such products of the educative

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 406-411.

process represent changes in behavior explainable in terms of mechanical stimulus-response bonds formed in the nervous system.

The proponents of the human-wants theory of education and the good life are also committed to the belief that such all-inclusive values as those listed and defined as the criteria of goals of the school and other social institutions are likewise patterns of mechanical connections in the nervous system. Therefore proponents of the scientific movement in education, like proponents of other general theories of education, are, consciously or unconsciously, committed to certain presuppositions or assumptions as to the nature of mind, reality, knowledge, and value. Thorndike's assumptions with respect to these topics thus constitute the philosophical foundations of the scientific movement in education.

NATURE OF MIND

In his effort to make psychology a natural science William James, as a scientist, considered the nervous system a condition but not an explanation of the human mind or consciousness. Even later as a philosopher, in his denial of the existence of consciousness as a special substance he did not reduce it to a physical substance but to an aspect of some neutral reality which he called pure experience. But Thorndike and his followers who called themselves connectionists did not hesitate to identify the mind with certain neural connections. In this respect they agreed with the radical behaviorists—led by Watson—and the new realists—neo- and critical realists.

They considered psychology a study of behavior rather than of consciousness, but they did not deny the existence of mental processes as phenomena, as did Watson and the behaviorists in a narrow sense. They explained the mental processes of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, thinking, feeling, and willing, and any other factor that psychologists study in terms of neural connections and their relations. To them the mental processes were manifestations of the operation of stimulus-response bonds in the nervous system, just as to the Herbartians the mental processes were manifestations of the operation of ideas in the mind. They explained intelligence and personality in a similar way. According to Thorndike, intelligence is making correct responses from the standpoint of truth and fact. For him, as for Watson, the personality of any individual is

the total system of his stimulus-response connections established in the nervous system.

The connectionists recognized original responses and patterns of response which, like other physical characteristics, are determined by heredity, as distinguished from other responses and patterns of response acquired through learning. Like Watson and other radical behaviorists, they recognized the existence of original reflexes, but unlike them, they also recognized instincts—combinations of original reflexes, and capacities—more complex even than instincts. They agreed with the radical behaviorists that learning is the acquisition of new patterns of response, but they did not agree that learning is limited to the integration of conditioned reflexes or that all learning depends upon bare repetition. They admitted that conditioned reflexes explain some learning and that repetition, other things being equal, is one condition of learning, but they did not agree that repetition alone is sufficient to account for all learning, or even any learning. Thorndike first explained the principles of behavior in terms of what he called the laws of readiness and the laws of learning.

After explaining a conduction unit in terms of neural connections, he stated the laws of readiness as follows: "I believe that the original tendencies of man to be satisfied and to be annoyed—to welcome and reject—are described by these three laws of readiness and unreadiness:—(1) that when a conduction unit is ready to conduct, conduction by it is satisfying, nothing being done to alter its action; (2) that for a conduction unit ready to conduct not to conduct is annoying, and provokes whatever responses nature provides in connection with that particular annoying lack; (3) that when a conduction unit unready for conduction is forced to conduct, conduction by it is annoying."⁷

The two laws of learning he called the law of exercise and the law of effect. The law of exercise in turn has two aspects—the laws of use and disuse. According to the law of use, other things being equal, exercise strengthens the bond between the stimulus and the response, and according to the law of disuse, other things being

⁷ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology, Briefer Course*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1914, p. 55, by permission of R. L. Thorndike.

equal, lack of exercise weakens the bond between the stimulus and the response. The law of effect also has two aspects. When a satisfying state of affairs accompanies or follows a given response to a given stimulus, the connection is strengthened, and when the state of affairs is annoying, other things being equal, the bond is weakened.⁸ On the basis of further experimentation Thorndike later modified these two laws in important respects. He concluded that exercise makes possible only the registration of satisfying and annoying effects, which alone influence behavior, and he confirmed the positive phase of the law of effect and discarded the negative.⁹

In ordinary language satisfaction and annoyance are usually synonymous with the conscious states of pleasure and pain, comfort and discomfort, and Thorndike's language in various connections seems to encourage this interpretation. But his immediate followers considered satisfaction and annoyance entirely behavioristic terms that had no reference to conscious states. Some of his followers have used *adient* or *confirming* for satisfying responses and *abient* or *nonconfirming* for annoying responses. In some of his later writing, however, Thorndike himself referred to the satisfaction and annoyance of the neurones rather than to personal satisfaction or annoyance, and offered this speculative hypothesis:

The life-processes of a neurone are (1) eating, (2) excreting waste products, (3) growing, (4) being sensitive, conducting and discharging, and (5) movement. The movements or changes of position made by it are restricted to its ends. It may then be, according to its physiological state, more or less ready or unready, disposed or indisposed, to *eat*, to *excrete*, to *grow*, to *play its part in receiving and passing on a stimulus*, and to *move*. . . . Now, for the neurone's life-processes of receiving and transmitting stimuli to go on well in a given state of affairs is the physiological fact that we mean when we say that the state of affairs is satisfying to the animal. For this conductive process in the neurones to be interfered with in a given state of affairs is the physiological fact that we mean when we say that the state of affairs is annoying.¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

E. L. Thorndike, *Education: A First Book*, pp. 95-97.

⁹ L. P. Thorpe and A. M. Schmuher, *Contemporary Theories of Learning*, New York, Ronald Press, 1954, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰ E. L. Thorndike, *Human Learning*, New York, Century, 1931, pp. 56-58, by permission of R. L. Thorndike.

To summarize the connectionist assumptions as to the nature of the mind the following general statement from Thorndike himself seems sufficient:

If I attempt to analyze a man's entire mind, I find connections of varying strength between (a) situations, elements of situations, and compounds of situations and (b) responses, readinesses to respond, facilitations, inhibitions, and directions of responses. If all of these could be completely inventoried, telling what the man would think and do and what would satisfy and annoy him, in every conceivable situation, it seems to me that nothing would be left.

I read the facts which psychologists report about adjustments, configurations, drives, integrations, purposes, tensions, and the like, and all these facts seem to me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers to influence the course of thought or feeling or action, to connections and readinesses. Learning is connecting. The mind is man's connection-system. Purposes are as mechanical in their nature and action as anything else is.¹¹

NATURE OF REALITY

Thorndike's conception of the human mind as a system of neural stimulus-response bonds and the learning process as connecting seems to indicate that he, no less than Watson, Weiss, and other radical behaviorists, was committed to metaphysical materialism. But there are different kinds of materialism just as there are different kinds of idealism and realism. The connectionist is committed to the belief that, in the last analysis, what the modern physical scientist studies is all that is really real. Just as connections in the nervous system are explanatory of consciousness and mind, so atoms, electrons, protons, and neutrons, or whatever the physical scientist considers the ultimate element of physical things explain the nervous system.

In this respect Thorndike seems to be in agreement with behaviorism and most of the neo-realists and critical realists in philosophy. But unlike "behaviorism" he does not deny the existence of consciousness or mind. Moreover, he uses such traditional psychological terms as thinking, feeling, willing, ideational learning as contrasted with other kinds of learning, and ideas, truths, and values as if they have real meaning to him as well as to the reader.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Nevertheless, all philosophical materialists are committed to two fundamental principles: (1) the substance from which all things are derived is matter; and (2) the relationship of events or occurrences is mechanical. Materialism dates back to Leucippus and Democritus about 700 B.C. It was adopted by the Epicureans and elaborated by the Roman poet, Lucretius, in his *De rerum natura*. It was revived by the early modern philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who said all that exists is body and all that occurs is motion. As to substance, materialists believe that all things are derived from matter, but recognize no official interpretation of the nature of matter. As to the occurrence of events and their relations, they have two attitudes. According to some, the universe as well as what happens in it is partially due to chance, but to most modern materialists the universe is perfectly machinelike and mechanical through and through.

The first fundamental principle is indispensable to the physical scientist as a scientist. Matter is simply the kind of thing that he studies, whether it is what common sense calls matter or not. The second fundamental principle, mechanical causation, is indispensable to any scientist as a scientist. Every experimental investigation simply assumes the principle of mechanical cause and effect.

Thorndike is first of all a scientist, and as a scientist he is committed to materialism in both its aspects. In this respect he is no different from other scientists, but as a philosopher he does not go all the way with pure materialism in the strict sense. Although he admits the existence of what we usually call consciousness and mental processes, he denies their efficacy. As a fact of experience he cannot deny their phenomenal existence, but to him they are simply manifestations of the neural process which does things and causes things to be done. In this respect the connectionist theory of the mind, to which the human wants theory is an educational correlate, is committed to a kind of moderate materialism. It is similar to what Huxley called epiphenomenalism, according to which consciousness in its relationship to the nervous system is analogous to the sparks on the trolley wire. They appear under certain conditions but have nothing to do with running the car. But it seems more likely that for Thorndike happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, and joy as well as their opposites are qualities of conscious experience.

Consciousness thus serves a human function even if explainable on the basis of matter and the operation of mechanical cause and effect. This is the position to which the so-called innocent or intentional realists subscribe. Professor Rupert C. Lodge says:

The *intentional* or *innocent realist* differs sharply from his colleagues on this question of 'consciousness.' He can, of course, appreciate the logic of their position. If there is no physical evidence of a 'consciousness'—if consciousness is not a physical thing—it would be inconsistent for a purely physical realist to concede its existence. The innocent realist can see that it enormously simplifies the problem for physical realism if consciousness is rejected as an unnecessary and exploded hypothesis. . . . The innocent realist takes one thing more seriously even than the theory of physical realism: He thinks it his primary business to accept *facts*, however awkward they may be from the point of view of theory, even his own theory. His 'natural piety' induces him to accept consciousness as a fact of direct experience, something which cannot be explained away.¹²

This acceptance of the fact of consciousness along with other facts may account for Thorndike's constant reference to consciousness and other factors which involve what has always been called conscious awareness.

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Thorndike, a connectionist in psychology and a proponent of the human-wants theory of education, has this to say concerning knowledge: "In the work of making use of the forces and laws of nature to satisfy human wants, the main—almost the only—cause of success is knowledge of natural forces and laws. In the work of improving our own wants an important cause of success is knowledge of the forces and laws of human nature.

"So it is one great aim of all education, and the special aim assigned by society to school education to increase the sum of knowledge, to put all men in possession of it, each in possession of those portions which it is best for the common weal for him to know, and to teach man to apply this knowledge to the conduct of life."¹³ He says further, "Morality itself, though often contrasted with or

¹² Rupert C. Lodge, *Philosophy of Education*, (rev. ed.), New York, Harper, 1937, pp. 115-116.

¹³ Thorndike, *Education: A First Book*, pp. 35-36.

set apart from knowledge, is, except for the good will and certain other noble and humane qualities of character and temperament, a creature of knowledge." ¹⁴

Still in spite of such emphasis on the primacy of knowledge as a contributory end of education and the good life, Thorndike does not explicitly analyze the nature of knowledge, as do most philosophers. He does not raise the epistemological question as to what it is we know when we know or the logical question of the truth and falsity of propositions. What his answers might be if he were as explicit in epistemology and logic as he is in axiology, we can only infer from the logic of his general position.

As to method he distinguishes sharply between the method of discovery and the method of distribution. The latter consists of all the devices and techniques by which teachers teach and students learn the knowledge that has already been discovered. The method of discovery is the scientific method that has been developed in the natural sciences since the beginning of modern times. The objects of knowledge are thus what the scientific research workers discover. So far, so good. But just what are these objects of knowledge? Are they the facts and principles determined by the scientist? Are they objective realities residing in nature independent of their being known? Are they merely instruments of control invented for the purpose of resolving practical and intellectual difficulties with which the discoverer is confronted?

Nowhere does Thorndike explicitly come to grips with these questions, but apparently were he to do so his answers would be something like this: All reliable knowledge is the product of the scientific method. The products of the scientific method are the objects of knowledge. They are revelations or disclosures of reality itself and not mere instruments of control, whether fictions invented for purposes of personal and social utility or hypotheses convertible into warranted assertions through experimental or practical operations.

Apparently he thus subscribes to some form of realism rather than to fictionalism after the manner of Vahinger, to pragmatism after the manner of William James, or to instrumentalism after the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

manner of John Dewey. The objects of knowledge are such features of reality as are disclosed through the operation of the scientific method. Knowledge that cannot meet the test of the scientific method is mere opinion, supposition, or prejudice.

NATURE OF VALUE

Thorndike is much more explicit in his beliefs about the nature of value than about the nature of knowledge. At least verbally, he explicitly subscribes to pleasure or happiness as the criterion of positive value and to displeasure or unhappiness as the criterion of negative value. If we may take satisfaction and annoyance as analogous to pleasure and pain, or to comfort and discomfort, he is as clear on this point as are the Epicureans among the ancients and Bentham and the Mills among the moderns. Unlike Watson, who at most merely suggested social utility as the criterion of specific values, Thorndike constantly refers to satisfaction as the criterion of all directly experienced values.

This seems to have been his sole criterion of the ends of education and the good life from the publication of his *Educational Psychology* to the end of his career. As early as 1912, he wrote: "The value of any change in things or men is its value to somebody, its satisfaction of somebody's wants. Things are not good and bad for no reason. Better and worse, worthy and harmful, right and wrong, have meaning only in reference to some conscious beings whose lives can be made more satisfying or more bearable. A thing or event or act or condition is not, in the last analysis, desirable because it is valuable. It is valuable because it is desirable—because it satisfies a want or craving or impulse of some man or other conscious being."¹⁵

In 1940 he stated what seemed to him to be six important facts about value:

1. "All things which can be experienced or thought of by man can be valued by him—can be judged to be good, bad, or indifferent."
2. "Judgments of values, or tendencies functionally equivalent to judgments of values, antedate judgments of existence or 'mere fact' in the animal kingdom and in man."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

3. "In the last analysis they (valuations) usually, probably always, refer to and depend upon satisfactions and annoyances, desires for and against. . . . A man's judgment that a certain thing, event, quality, or relation has value is, obviously, not the same as his judgment that he wants it. It is rather a judgment that he approves or esteems it, or ought to approve or esteem it. . . . Value, positive and negative, resides in satisfaction and annoyance."

4. "On the whole, values can be determined. If we knew the exact difference which any event made to the satisfactions and annoyances of all sentient beings and agreed about the weights to attach to each of these, we could determine values in the same sense that we can determine the effect of an epidemic on the production of goods, or the probable age of life upon the earth."

5. "The concrete valuations of reputable transcendental systems of valuations are in so close agreement with any reputable scientific and humane system of weighting the wants of a sentient being that it is not necessary to argue about them. . . . When philosophers seem to assert that qualities and acts have value regardless of any satisfaction to anybody, they may really be asserting something different. Even if they do assert that and mean it, their later inferences about goods and bads commonly agree very closely with what any well informed and benevolent trustee for the human species would decide on factual grounds."

6. "We have the possibility and desirability of a natural science of values, which will progress from and improve upon the best present opinions about what is good and what is bad by studying the consequences of various conditions and events for the satisfaction of wants present and future."¹⁶

The foregoing excerpts from Thorndike's discussion of value, some near the beginning and some near the end of his career, indicate that the positive values with which we are most concerned in education can be defined only in terms of the satisfaction of men. Things presently desired must be checked against probable conse-

¹⁶ Thorndike, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 340-347, by permission of R. L. Thorndike.

quences conceived in terms of the satisfaction of human individuals. The possibility of a science of value such as he suggests harks back to the calculus of pleasures and pains as proposed by the English utilitarians of the nineteenth century, and to their belief that some kind of pleasure principle is the criterion of all positive values.

Yet we cannot be sure about this interpretation because, in the last analysis, Thorndike's best qualified interpreters have asserted that satisfaction and annoyance are entirely behavioristic terms and have no reference to conscious states. Furthermore, Thorndike himself says that "a state of affairs is satisfying when the animal makes an effort to maintain it or does nothing to change it." Nevertheless, people take satisfaction to be synonymous with pleasure or happiness, which has seemed all-important to all hedonists throughout the history of Western philosophy. Furthermore, Thorndike himself does not hesitate to use such terms as comfort, pleasure, happiness and satisfaction interchangeably as if they meant essentially the same thing to him.

In spite of Watson's rejection of Thorndike's conception of original nature and the law of effect, his occasional reference to social utility and the possibility of developing whatever kind of people society may demand seems to commit even the radical behaviorist to some form of hedonism. Therefore, whether the proponents of the scientific movement in education subscribe to connectionism or behaviorism, they are committed to some form of hedonistic axiology.

Implications and Applications

The theory of human wants, like other theories of education and the good life, contains implications for all aspects of human welfare. It is thus as applicable to other social institutions and agencies as to the school. Thorndike himself has indicated that its general adoption and application would require a reconstruction of the family, church, government, business, and industry. But he was a specialist in the field of professional education and exerted more influence on the school than on any other agency of human welfare. In various connections and in many ways he has indicated the significance of

the human-wants theory of education and the good life for many features of school practice, some of the more important of which are school aims, the school curriculum, and school administration.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

The recognition of the satisfaction of human wants as the ultimate aim of all welfare institutions does not make it any less the ultimate end of school education. According to Thorndike, the ideal of the school, as of other institutions, is "to secure the fullest satisfaction of human wants; satisfying the wants of all people in order to give each person the fullest realization of his own desires." It is substantially equivalent to "the greatest happiness for the most people." As Thorndike saw it, the satisfaction of human wants as an ideal thus understood is sufficiently comprehensive to include all that is important in other ideals. It even provides a basis for an adequate interpretation of Dewey's statement that "education is not preparation for life, it is life itself." Of this Thorndike and Gates say:

"The apparent conflict between 'happy living here and now' and 'preparation for life' as statements of the aim of education, then, in the main, reduces itself to a conflict about the chances of attaining happiness and the relative value of present and deferred satisfaction. The greatest happiness for the most people for the most time is an end to be sought by making children's lives as happy as possible and by not denying their wants unless demonstrable good may come from it."¹⁷

The elaboration of the all-inclusive value or ideal of the fullest satisfaction of human wants into the 26 specific values thus provides a basis of orientation in the development of institutional programs. But these items are formal in that they do not indicate the structure of the wants or satisfactions that constitute the ends of education and the good life, or allocate to the different social institutions their respective responsibility for realizing them. Consequently, those who undertake to apply this theory to school practice are confronted with the psychological question as to the structure of the specific value patterns and the means of determining those for which the school should be responsible. The complete answers which Thorn-

¹⁷ E. L. Thorndike and A. I. Gates, *Elementary Principles of Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 18-23.

dike supplies, indicates, or suggests would require a more detailed discussion than is possible in a synoptic study such as this. The best we can do is to make a few generalizations and leave the interested reader to consult the original works for details.

According to Thorndike, values conceived in terms of the satisfaction of human wants, like other factors of human welfare, are patterns of stimulus-response bonds in the nervous system. "If," he says, "we had perfect knowledge of a human body including the workings of the billion cells (called neurones) which compose a man's nervous system, we should presumably have perfect, or nearly perfect, knowledge of him. His abilities, wants, and ideas are presumably events in time and space which an omniscient physiologist could read in the structure and activities of his neurones more completely and accurately than a psychologist or historian can read them in his words and acts—more completely and accurately even than the person himself can report them from introspections."¹⁸

The different patterns of thought, feeling, and action which psychologists, students of education, and common sense consider meaningful and significant, such as knowledge, skill, appreciation, ideals, attitudes, and qualities of personality, are all associations, organizations, combinations, and collocations of stimulus-response bonds in the nervous system. The ultimate elements of which each pattern is composed are essentially the same. Patterns of neural connections are experienced as qualitatively different not because of any difference in the structural elements themselves but because of variation in their number and arrangement. Nevertheless, for practical purposes we recognize the different types of connection patterns as meaningful.

Such qualitative distinctions are useful in allocating to the school responsibility for the improvement and satisfaction of human wants. In Thorndike's master list of satisfactions there are none in particular for which the school or any other social institution should be entirely responsible. But they all involve such patterns of response as knowledge, conduct, skill, appreciation, and general qualities of personality. The school may not be solely responsible for any single type, and the degree of responsibility it should assume will depend

¹⁸ Thorndike, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 184-185.

upon practical social conditions. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate the kind of patterns to which it could contribute most under conditions prevailing at different times and places.

In one connection or another, Thorndike mentions these psychological patterns for which the school should assume some definite responsibility: knowledge, conduct, appreciation, skills, and personal qualities. Apparently knowledge is indispensable in the realization of all satisfactions; conduct is a function of many situations; appreciation is the primary function of certain subjects such as art and music. He says further that even the power to get knowledge is acquired mainly through getting knowledge. Knowledge is for use and not for display. The constant increase in Knowledge means that old facts in the school program should often be replaced with new and better ones. Courses of study are often improved more by adding some new and more desirable knowledge than by adding more of the same sort. The presence rather than the absence of interest is the better criterion in the determination of what knowledge should be taught.¹⁹ To quote him directly:

Not all knowledge can be given to all men. Who should have this or that fact in his possession is to be decided by what he can do with it for the improvement and satisfaction of his own and other men's wants. Many men need to know how to read, count and keep clean; very few need to know the names of the Pharaohs in order, or the distance of Sirius from Arcturus. It would be wasteful for a man of a certain original nature and training to be taught to manipulate logarithms, and still more wasteful for a man of a certain other nature and training not to be. Here, as everywhere, the material—that is, the persons to be educated—decide in part what the proximate aims of education should be.²⁰

Thorndike is, of course, well aware that such general statements in regard to the psychological ends of the education for which the school should be responsible are largely formal. His generalizations in regard to such ends as knowledge, skill, conduct, appreciation, and general qualities of personality could doubtless be justified on the basis of his theory of human wants and the specific values into which he had analyzed it. They still do not indicate what knowledge,

¹⁹ Thorndike, *Education: A First Book*, pp. 35-42.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

skill, appreciation, attitudes, ideals, etc., students should learn and teachers should teach. Nevertheless, Thorndike does not leave us entirely in the dark on these matters. Much of his work as a psychologist and a student of education is devoted to these very problems. He may not have said specifically who should learn what, but he says in effect that students of education should make scientific studies and the school should rely on their findings. He looks to psychology, history, and personal experience for evidence as to the nature of human values; to psychology and school practice for evidence as to the psychological products for which the school might be responsible; and to scientific students of education to determine what specific things should be taught, to whom, when, and how.

The scientific movement in education, for the initiation of which Thorndike was partly if not mainly responsible, involved just such scientific investigations. Whether or not they were fully aware of the meaning of the human-wants theory of education, those who engaged in such scientific studies implicitly, if not explicitly, assumed some kind of personal satisfaction or social utility as the general criterion of educational aims—a principle that seems to be quite consistent if not identical with the human-wants theory.

This is as true of those who, like Franklin Bobbitt and W. W. Charters, sought to establish school aims through an analysis of life activities, cultural ideals, or human needs, as it was of those who, like Thorndike, began with a study of the utility of the content of the school subjects. They tried: (1) to determine scientifically those patterns of knowledge, appreciation, skill, etc., that would be most useful personally and socially; and (2) to make the school responsible for pupils for whose achievement other institutions and agencies were unable to provide. Some, like Bobbitt, analyzed the life activities in which responsible citizens of the community engaged and sought to determine what subject-matter ends would be most useful to them. Others, like Charters, analyzed such activities and sought a consensus as to ideals that could be used as standards for improving them. Then they used these findings as a basis for determining school aims. Others analyzed what they called general human needs and selected the subject-matter ends most important in satisfying them.

Some, like Thorndike, confined their studies mainly to analyses of the uses which adults made of the kind of things learned in the dif-

ferent school subjects and of the uses students made of them while still in school. They then used these findings to determine the subject-matter aims to be learned and taught. In consequence of such studies, especially those most directly related to the usefulness of the subject content, many important changes were made in the more immediate ends of school education, particularly in the elementary school. As a result, reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, geography, history, physiology, and drawing were soon transformed, and a much larger place was given to the fine arts, the practical arts, and physical education.

We need not go into detail here as to the specific changes made in the subject-matter objectives. It is sufficient to say that they were not arbitrary or based on mere opinion, prejudice, or tradition, but on the findings of scientific studies as to what knowledge, appreciation, skill, etc., would be most useful to students in the present and the future. The ideal, of course, was to determine scientifically what every student on every level should learn and how he should learn it. Here we are simply trying to indicate how Thorndike and others who explicitly or implicitly subscribed to the human-wants theory of education and the good life proposed to determine just what specific patterns of thought, feeling, and action students should acquire.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

The point has already been made that the curriculum in the broad educational sense—as contrasted with the curriculum in the narrow administrative sense—is now conceived by specialists in the field as all the activities of the students under the direction of the school. This conception of the curriculum had not emerged when what is now called the movement for the scientific study of education reached its peak. Neither Thorndike nor any other leader of the movement in its early stages used the term in this broad sense. Nevertheless, for convenience of discussion, we may now use it to include such features of school practice as curriculum scope, subject matter, and methods of teaching. These topics are here considered as areas of curriculum development, which, like aims and administration, is a more inclusive feature of school practice.

CURRICULUM SCOPE. The general framework of the school pro-

gram that sets the boundaries within which curriculum activities of students are developed is now usually designated as the scope of the curriculum. Since the beginning of the scientific movement in education several general patterns have been advocated by one professional education group or another. According to some, the more important activities of students are related to the school subjects; according to others, they are related to "centers of interest;" according to still others, they are related to "major functions of social life;" and according to still others, they do not have to be related to any predetermined topics of any kind—this is the "activity" or the "project" curriculum.

In the early stages of the scientific movement the only plan generally recognized was the pattern of the school subjects, and the leaders took it for granted. Soon after the project method emerged, a few realized its revolutionary implications when conceived as a principle of curriculum organization, but none considered it an adequate substitute for the subjects pattern. Those who took the existing school subjects as their point of departure for scientific studies acknowledged the possibility of decreasing the requirements in some subjects, increasing them in others, and even adding new subjects where desirable materials were available. Even those who began with the analysis of life activities, ideals, or needs in the end always arranged the subject matter for study according to the traditional subjects pattern with no thought of making substitutions for subjects.

Charters as well as Gates and Thorndike recognized the revolutionary possibility of the project principle as a determiner of curriculum scope. But none of them considered the required shift in emphasis justified on the basis of general principles. Charters maintained that, in the last analysis, all subject matter of school education was derived from the projects of people outside the school, and went further in this direction than any other representative of the scientific movement. He admitted that some school projects would be justified, but specified that "on the one hand, they must parallel life activities and on the other hand they must include the items of the subject in proper proportion."²¹ But he thought no fundamental change should be made in the traditional pattern of school subjects

²¹ W. W. Charters, *Curriculum Construction*, New York, Macmillan, 1923, pp. 147-151.

until its desirability was determined through experimentation.

Bobbitt began with an analysis of life activities but simply took the subjects pattern for granted. The following items taken from his analysis of a proposed program for general education illustrate his general position:

8. The general training program will consist of two positions:
 - (1) *The basic general training.* This is training for those human qualities and abilities the need or desirability of which is universal, evident, and generally accepted.
 - (2) *Additional opportunities or extras.* These are designed to train for human activities that are not specialized and yet not universal; for things that appear to be relatively remote from fundamental human activities; and for things upon which there is no relative unanimity of judgment.
9. The lines of training to be cared for in the basic general program are probably the following:
 - (1) English language: reading, oral and written expression.
 - (2) Citizenship attitudes, judgments, and activities. Social studies.
 - (3) Literature: English and general.
 - (4) The several science fields.
 - (5) Everyday mathematics.
 - (6) Physical training, hygiene, sanitation.
 - (7) Unspecialized practical arts.
 - (8) Musical appreciation and judgment.
 - (9) Art appreciation and judgment.
10. Capable, industrious and ambitious students should be permitted to widen their general training program through the taking of certain extras, such as the following:
 - (1) Foreign languages.
 - (2) Advanced mathematics.
 - (3) History of English Literature.
 - (4) Music for technical proficiency.
 - (5) Art for technical proficiency.
 - (6) Literary writing for technical proficiency.
 - (7) Typewriting.
 - (8) Dramatics.
 - (9) Public speaking.
 - (10) And many others.
11. Except as students are differentiated into ability classes, there should be but one curriculum of general training, extending through all of

the grade levels from primary to end of junior college. Neither its outer boundaries nor its upper limits can be definitely fixed. In these outer and higher portions there should be full freedom of opportunity for any student to go as far as he will or can go,—so long as his total program is reasonably well balanced.²²

Other concepts of curriculum scope soon began to emerge, but they were not the products of the scientific movement in education. Although leaders in the movement had to give these conceptions some attention, they continued to support the subjects pattern. They found some advantages in the correlation and fusion of subjects and some place for supplementary projects. But whether subjects were added, dropped, modified, or however they might be related to one another, the subjects pattern still remained intact. The scientific studies in education contributed much to the improvement of the content of the curriculum, but did not encourage any overall reconstruction of the whole organizational pattern, as have recent movements that will presently be considered.

SUBJECT MATTER. Subject matter as an abbreviation of subject-matter-of-study consists of topics, issues, problems, facts, principles, skills, forms of conduct, or whatever students devote their attention to for purposes of learning. It has reference to the selection, placement, and organization of things for study and learning within the general pattern determining the scope of the whole school program, which we have just considered.

To the selection of subject matter content, as we have said, Thorndike and other leaders in the scientific movement gave much attention. They undertook many specific studies themselves and directed their students in many more in order to determine what subject matter responsible citizens and pupils in school found most useful. They knew, of course, that such a scientific program was endless and that much time would be required to secure sufficient scientific information as to just what students should learn and teachers should teach. But they did not hesitate to propose changes in subject matter requirements which the results of specific studies appeared to justify.

They realized, however, that the schools must go on, and there-

²² Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make A Curriculum*, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1924, pp. 69-70.

fore in their proposals they did not confine themselves to the application of knowledge secured through these specific studies. They went further and suggested plans of curriculum development for schools and school systems, and even offered curriculum makers guiding principles that the more general theory of satisfaction or utility seemed to imply with regard to the selection of subject matter. For this purpose some, like Thorndike and Gates, proposed as criteria general aims of a certain type just coming into common use and designated them "adjustments to the physical world, to family, social, economic, and civic situations and the effects of each in increasing bodily and mental health and balance, and the recreational, ethical, religious, and intellectual resources."²³ They considered these aims as embodying roughly the essential values of the human-wants theory under the cultural conditions existing in the United States. These aims seem to hark back to Herbert Spencer's analysis of what knowledge is of most use and do not essentially differ from many other formulations.²⁴

Thorndike and Gates also offered additional suggestive principles for the use of curriculum makers in selecting subject matter. Those studies and activities should be favored that (1) "are least likely to be provided satisfactorily by other agencies;" (2) "will give proper range and proportion to the totality of educative experiences"—in-school and out-of-school; (3) contribute most "to the primary or assigned learnings" as compared to the secondary or concomitant learnings; (4) more directly meet "genuine life demands;" (5) will more likely be widely "employed in life;" (6) are the "most effective means of fostering such desirable concomitants as . . . ability to think, originality, sociability, initiative, trustworthiness, and the like;" (7) prepare for the future as well as "meet present demands;" and (8) "are most interesting to pupils."²⁵

Except for the reference to "concomitant learnings," which probably represents the influence of Kilpatrick, similar suggestions and principles could be cited from Charters, Bobbitt, and other leaders in the scientific movement in education.

Unlike the proponents of some more recent educational theories

²³ Thorndike and Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-60.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-186.

to be considered in later chapters, the proponents of the human-wants theory and the leaders in the scientific movement did not go beyond available scientific evidence in stating just what subject-matter content should be included in the school curriculum in general. They were content to recommend guiding principles, usually qualified by "other things being equal," which curriculum makers could apply in selecting additional subject matter in actual situations.

Unlike the problem of selection, which has to do with what subject matter is most important for inclusion in the curriculum as a whole, the problem of placement has to do with its allocation to facilitate effective learning. Whereas the guiding principles in selection are derived from a consideration of personal satisfaction and personal and social utility, the guiding principles for placement are derived from a consideration of the psychology of learning. Charters, for instance, says:

Up to this point the ability and interests of the learner have not entered into the discussion except where by implication the limits of analysis set at the level of working units were discussed; but from this point forward the learner exercises an increasingly important effect on the curriculum. His effect on methods of instruction is always evident, of course; but in addition he has a profound influence upon the curriculum itself.²⁶

In what follows he points out that cultural epochs and genetic stages as criteria of grade placement are now obsolete, and that newer proposals of interest and needs as criteria are also faced with much difficulty. He then suggests the significance of a few objective studies "made to determine the grade during which selected units of subject matter are of maximum interest," adding: "Methods such as these illustrate the procedure which must be followed in placing subject material according to the interests of students." He also says, "Another method for the gradation of material is found in the concept of use," and "there is no question that the material should in part be graded so as to synchronize with psychological moments of utility. . . . The principle of difficulty enters in as a factor to modify the criterial factors of interest and of use. . . . In general, material must be so graded that a unit shall not be presented before the learner has reached the level of ability where he may reasonably

²⁶ Charters, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

hope to master it, and instruction must be continued until he has mastered it to a satisfactory degree." He then suggests procedures whereby difficulty and interest and difficulty and use in their several relations may be effectively applied as criteria in the placement of subject matter.²⁷

The principles proposed by Thorndike and Gates for guidance in subject-matter placement are similar to those suggested by Charters and are stated in the form of criteria.

1. The criterion of *need*. A fact or skill should be introduced "when it can be used in some serviceable way."
2. The criterion of *felt need*. It should be introduced "when the learner is conscious of the need for it as a means of satisfying some useful purpose."
3. The criterion of *difficulty*. It should be introduced "when it is most suited in difficulty to the ability of the learner."
4. The criterion of *temperamental compatibility*. It should be introduced "when it will harmonize most fully with the level and type of emotions, tastes, instinctive and volitional dispositions most active at the time."
5. The criterion of *facilitation*. It should be introduced "when it is most fully facilitated by immediately preceding learnings and when it will most fully facilitate learnings which are to follow shortly."²⁸

To conclude the discussion of subject-matter placement a few generalizations are in order. First of all, the principles of placement, like those of selection of subject matter, are presented by the proponents of the human-wants theory and leaders in the scientific movement not as things to do in general but as factors to consider in particular situations. Second, every criterion is qualified by the phrase, "other things being equal," with the implication that the findings of scientific studies with regard to any criterion or principle should be taken into account in practical situations. Third, such principles and criteria indicate beyond question that they are considered consistent with the theory of human wants as the ultimate end of education and the good life.

The factor of organization has, of course, been involved in the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-100.

²⁸ Thorndike and Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-210.

discussion of scope and the selection and placement of subject matter. But for a clear understanding of the practical implications of the human-wants theory of education for curriculum development, it must be accorded separate consideration. To the proponents of this theory, organization of subject matter was a condition of effective learning. They recognized the distinction between logical organization for the convenience of school officials and psychological organization for the convenience of students.

In adopting the general pattern of school subjects as the scope of the curriculum they had in mind the logical organization. According to their way of thinking, each school subject in the subjects pattern was to be logically organized so that specialists in the different fields and teachers themselves could best understand it. In the selection and placement of subject matter they took for granted the logical subject organization. Traditional subjects they might discontinue at one level or move to another level, and they might modify the content of different subjects or add new ones, but they would keep the subject matter organization intact.

Adoption of the logical subject organization, however, did not mean that they favored the principle of "coordination," according to which every subject was to remain isolated and separated from every other subject. On the other hand, they favored "correlation," according to which related elements of different subjects were studied at approximately the same time; they favored "concentration," according to which some one subject was taken as the integrating center for related elements of several other subjects; and they even favored "fusion," according to which important aspects of several subjects were combined into a new subject. Correlation, concentration, and fusion were simply devices for organizing subject matter psychologically to facilitate learning what had already been logically organized. After the official curriculum-makers had done what they could through the use of these and other means to transform the logical order of the different subjects into a psychological order, the final arrangement could be determined only by the teacher in dealing with students.

According to Thorndike and Gates the principles proposed as criteria of placement—need, felt need, difficulty, temperamental compatibility, and facilitation—are equally applicable to organization. In

regard to the content of subjects, they say: "Thus in history it may be found that the story of the voyage of the parents of some pupil in the class should precede that of the voyage of Columbus. . . . In arithmetic, fractions and decimals, although they come late in the internal logic of the subject, will be introduced early in school in connection with quarters of pies, quarts, etc." The same principle applies in the case of skills. For instance, in drawing children are primarily interested "in informing or telling facts by it." Therefore illustrative drawing should precede rather than follow representative and decorative drawing.²⁹ The official curriculum maker or the teacher should make whatever changes may be necessary in the strictly logical organization of any subject or in the relationship of any subjects so as to comply with criteria consistent with the ultimate aims of human welfare conceived in terms of the improvement and satisfaction of human wants.

METHODS OF TEACHING. Specialists in curriculum development now consider methods of teaching a feature of the curriculum in the broad educational sense. But during the scientific studies era when Thorndike and his students were developing the human-wants theory of education, it was generally considered a feature of school practice coordinate with administration and the course of study, often called the curriculum. Therefore, leaders in the scientific movement in education gave special attention to the problem of method.

Thorndike defined the problem of method from the standpoint of science in this way:

By a method in education is meant the way in which a teacher puts educative agents and means to work upon human nature so as to produce some desired result. Thus a book may be used as a matter to be understood, or to be understood and remembered, or to be merely memorized without understanding, or to be understood, remembered and used in the solution of problems. Thus, to produce the result—knowledge of certain facts in chemistry—the teacher may describe the facts orally, or have students read printed descriptions of them in a textbook, or demonstrate the facts by experiments, or get the students to perform the experiments themselves.

²⁹ Thorndike and Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-212.

The variety of methods which one may use to attain even any one given result is often very great, since in the last analysis every difference in the teacher's facial expression or voice, or in the wording of his statements and questions, is a difference in method. The variety possible in connection with all the different results which education seeks is practically infinite. It is, indeed, the task of the science of education to study the effect of everything that any teacher can do upon every person to whom anything can be done.³⁰

Thorndike acknowledged the present value of different expert opinions on the different general methods which "cover the teaching of many different things to many kinds of pupils." But authoritative general methods were so numerous that Thorndike and other scientific students of education gave special consideration to relatively few, some of which may now properly be called the drill method, the deductive method, the inductive method, the lecture method, the question method, and the object lesson. Although in the opinion of Thorndike and the others such methods as these were general in the sense that any one of them might be used in teaching many things to many different kinds of pupils, none of them could be used in teaching every thing to every kind of pupil.

Unlike these scientists, educational philosophers had long been trying to define an all-inclusive general method—a pattern of procedure for teaching every thing to every student. Some defined the object lesson as such a pattern. Some with more success defined Herbart's analysis of the learning unit in terms of the "formal steps of the recitation." Others took James's laws of habit forming as an acceptable pattern of learning and teaching. Still others in the same way considered Dewey's formulation of the steps of reflective thinking and Kilpatrick's formulation of the stages of purposeful activity.

To all of these educators the lecturing, questioning, etc.—which Thorndike and others called general methods—were simply contributory devices and techniques to be used wherever they were relevant in an all-inclusive general pattern of learning and teaching. But proponents of the human-wants theory and leaders in the scientific movement usually considered this attitude the result of loose thinking characteristic of philosophers. To them the pattern of reflective thinking and the pattern of purposeful activity were general methods

³⁰ Thorndike, *Education: A First Book*, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

useful in teaching some things but inadequate for teaching everything.

Although they admitted that there was some value for the teacher in expert opinions regarding general method thus narrowly conceived as a means of acquiring facts and principles in certain specific learning and teaching situations, they preferred what they called special methods, or the psychology of school subjects based on scientific evidence. They adopted the school subjects for organizing the general scientific evidence in regard to learning and teaching procedures just as they did for organizing the curriculum.

Since the development of the scientific movement in education there have been three fairly distinct attitudes toward the teaching of methods. The more philosophic students of education continued to define and apply an all-inclusive universal pattern of learning and teaching to which all devices and techniques, whether derived from expert opinion or scientific studies, were contributory and subsidiary. Other students of professional education rejected this idea of an all-inclusive general method. They organized methods courses for teachers, in each of which they considered procedures useful in teaching many things but not in teaching everything. The proponents of the scientific movement also organized courses and textbook for teachers in special methods, or the psychology of school subjects.

Charles H. Judd, Chairman of the Department of Education at the University of Chicago, contributed much in this direction. Although he differed with Thorndike on many points, they were both leaders in the scientific movement in education and exerted considerable influence on the way methods were taught in institutions for teacher education. Thorndike and his colleagues made many studies of the learning and teaching of different school subjects and wrote special methods books in different fields. Judd and his colleagues made similar studies, but organized the results of scientific studies and general psychological principles into textbooks dealing with several subjects. Two pioneer works in this field were F. N. Freeman's *The Psychology of the Common Branches* and Judd's *Psychology of High School Subjects*. It was therefore practical to use in the subject-matter departments books on methods of teaching single subjects such as reading or arithmetic, and in the departments

of education works on methods of teaching several subjects, such as the high school subjects.

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Although Thorndike did not define any formal designs for general use in dealing with various aspects of school administration, he did recognize it as a general feature of school practice no less important than aims and curriculum development. The application of the human-wants theory to administration was therefore indirect rather than direct.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the scientific movement in education such educational reformers as G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, Charles W. Eliot, William Rainey Harper, Francis Parker, and William T. Harris were pointing out defects in the existing school system and suggesting various measures of reform. But their personal convictions were based upon intellectual insight and philosophical presuppositions and were not defined in objective terms that carried the weight of scientific evidence essential for adequate proof. Proponents of the human-wants theory and leaders in the scientific movement undertook to supply the means by which the objective information required could in time be secured. The questions these reformers had raised and with which progressive superintendents were faced paved the way for the school survey movement.

Proponents of the human-wants theory and leaders in the scientific movement participated directly or indirectly in these surveys and exercised considerable influence on the administrators and teachers in many school systems. In these surveys they demonstrated improved observation, questionnaire, and interview techniques; tests and measurements and statistical methods; the use of scientific psychological principles and specific studies. They encouraged reliance on objective factual information and research in making practical decisions. From first to last they emphasized social utility, personal satisfaction, or some other principle or principles consistent with the human-wants theory as the all-inclusive educational ideal.

The survey movement seems to be consistent with the human-wants theory which, to Thorndike and probably to other leaders in the scientific movement, was based on scientific evidence. For him,

therefore, the principles of educational administration were essentially the same as the aims of school education and the principles of curriculum-making and methods of teaching. What specifically these principles imply regarding the various aspects of administration apparently should always be qualified by "other things being equal." This is a qualification Thorndike usually made in regard to the application of general principles, probably because he realized that what should be done in particular situations should be determined on the basis of practical conditions and relevant scientific information. Some of the more important aspects of school administration to which both Thorndike and other leaders in the scientific movement gave some attention are school discipline, pupil placement, and school organization. For convenience of discussion, therefore, the remainder of this section will be devoted to a brief consideration of these topics from the standpoint of the human-wants theory.

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE. In her report on the contribution of the scientific movement in education to discipline and control, Professor Ruth Strang emphasizes the tendency toward what she called the "development type" of discipline as compared with the "compulsion and competitive types."³¹ Its goal is child development with freedom and responsibility. This new conception, she thinks, was partly due to laboratory experiments, especially those of Thorndike and his students, in which they demonstrated, so they thought, the superiority of satisfaction over annoyingness in learning under laboratory conditions. Since the law of effect is definitely an aspect of the human-wants theory, the weight of this theory would seem to be on the side of the mental hygienists who are more concerned with the development of wholesome personality than with a smoothly running school; and on the side of the psychologists who emphasize "freedom from compulsion." The few experiments in classroom situations to test the relative efficacy of rewards and punishment also seem to be on the side of freedom with responsibility.³²

Although Thorndike himself made no systematic application of his

³¹ Ruth Strang, "Contributions of Research to Discipline and Control," in *The Scientific Movement in Education*, 37th Yearbook, Part 2, of National Society for Study of Education, Guy M. Whipple, Ed., Bloomington, Ill., Public School Publishing Co., 1938, pp. 211-216.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 216-220.

human-wants theory to discipline as a distinct feature of school practice, a few generalizations may be inferred from what he had to say about learning in general and about behavior, conduct, and moral education. First of all, it seems quite clear that whatever one learns is in the last analysis a habit. Therefore discipline as a product consists of certain desirable habits acquired by students. Those in charge of school activities and programs serve the disciplinary function properly when they select the habits which adjustment to school and life conditions requires and teach them systematically just as in the subject-matter ends of the course of study. Second, psychologically considered, general habits of discipline, like any other general habits, should include knowledge and positive feeling. Consequently, in the process of acquiring habits of discipline the activities of the students should be thoughtful and satisfying. Finally, the habits of discipline to be taught students at any time and place depend in part upon their capacities and dispositions. Although an orderly school is necessary for adequate instruction, rules and regulations should be socially warranted and personally acceptable to the students. They should also be rendered intellectually meaningful in whatever ways are most practical, ranging from the teacher's explanation of specific directions to the participation of students in making and enforcing their own regulations.

PUPIL PLACEMENT. Pupil placement as an aspect of school administration involves admission or enrollment, classification of grades into sections, classification of sections into groups, and graduation or termination. What Thorndike had to say and much of what other leaders in the scientific movement had to say about these factors may be taken as implications or applications of the human-wants theory of education and the good life, or of some equivalent theory such as personal satisfaction and social utility.

The interrelation of the human-wants theory of education and the good life and the movement for the scientific study of education is nowhere better exemplified than in Thorndike's study of the College Entrance Board Examinations as it was used by Columbia College, his objective analysis of its efficiency, and his recommendations for its improvement. According to Thorndike, all students ought to have the kind of education that would be most satisfying to them and to the people of the wider community in the present and in the

future. His recommendations of ways and means by which the better qualified students could be selected and encouraged to attend college was consistent with the, as yet, unformulated but presupposed human-wants theory of education.³³ Incidentally, the Board eventually introduced changes in the type of examinations more in accord with the educational ideal that Thorndike was trying to apply to admission practices.³⁴

Likewise Thorndike's analysis of certain quantitative studies of such topics as enrollment, elimination, promotions, retardations, accelerations, and variations of pupils in the same grade may be taken as suggestive of the relation of his general theory of education to the objective studies of school practice and also of its implications for the general feature of student placement. For purposes of illustration the following excerpts from his statements should be sufficient.

As to promotions, Thorndike says: "It is desirable that the course of study should be stated in terms of objective achievement grade by grade, so that teachers may know what their pupils are supposed to accomplish." Again he says, the facts do not support "the doctrine that retardation by non-promotion at the end of the year is an injustice to the pupil retarded . . . there is probably far more injustice done to the gifted one-seventh who are not promoted 'doubly' . . . than is done to the one-seventh who fail of promotion in one year. Systems of promotion need to be fitted to individual differences in capacity—to be made more *flexible*—rather than to be made *easier* for those who now fail." On the whole he thinks "teachers refuse promotion to a pupil only because they honestly think he is not fit to do the work of the next grade and that it is not for the common good to let him attempt it; and in a majority of cases they are right. Special industrial and trade schools in which pupils who make slow progress in the typical elementary schools could be given a trial at another sort of education, would be more to the advantage" of over-age pupils in the third, fourth, and fifth grades "than such relaxation of standards in the typical school as would allow the

³³ G. D. Strayer and E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Administration, Quantitative Studies*, New York, Macmillan, 1922, pp. 176-185.

³⁴ Fred Kelly, "Contributions of Research to Higher Education," in *The Scientific Movement in Education*, 37th Yearbook, 1938, Part 2, p. 233.

less scholarly children to progress in it at the speed now expected of the modal child.”³⁵

A comment on pupil variability within the same grade is equally enlightening:

Great variability within one school grade and overlapping by it of the grades on either side has been found in every careful test of the abilities of school children. . . . For any intellectual task or combination of tasks, whether a psychologist's tests, a common-sense problem, or a series of school tests in history, arithmetic, spelling or what not, the groups got by the school's promotion system will be found to overlap each other enormously. . . . The conventional opinions of school officers and teachers overweigh the importance of the instruction given grade by grade. They promote unfit children because they fancy that these children, having had once, twice, or three times over the supposedly valuable instruction of a given grade, must be fit for the next. They refuse to permit gifted children to skip grades because they fancy that the loss of any fraction of this supposedly valuable instruction must cause some grave injury or risk. . . . So school gradation and promotion are far from being measures of intellectual merit pure and undefiled. . . . Gradation and promotion should not *pretend to be* for intellectual merit when they are not, and should be efficiently managed consequences of *some* rational principles. . . . Lest any reader fancy that the great individual differences found within the same grades were due to age or maturity, I assure him that this is far from the case. Ages will be found to overlap as do grades, and even more.³⁶

But to determine the implications of the human-wants theory for the general feature of pupil placement we are not dependent alone on Thorndike's comments on specific situations. We have also a number of general principles of which some of the more important are: (1) that individual development depends both on innate growth and personal experience; (2) that future achievement as well as present satisfaction depends primarily on original capacity; (3) that human development is continuous; (4) that individuals by both nature and education develop at very different rates; and (5) that the activities which are best in terms of satisfaction for both the individual and the community differ widely.

³⁵ Strayer and Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68 *passim*.

Thorndike's comments on other studies and his general principles when taken together supply a basis for inferring the implications of the human-wants theory for pupil placement. First of all, it is perfectly clear that the various items into which he analyzed the human-wants theory are applicable equally to the school and other institutions of human welfare, and also applicable equally to student placement and other features of school practice. Second, each student should be so placed in the school, the grade, the section, or the group as to facilitate, on the whole, the most satisfaction for him, his fellows, and the wider community. Third, achievement, intellectual ability, physiological maturity, individual interests, effort, and many other factors should be considered in specific situations, but no one or any number of them is adequate for all situations.

Several means are available or might be made available for facilitating the application of these principles. A statement of the course of study in terms of objective achievement for each pupil would give teachers necessary information as to what pupils are supposed to accomplish. Availability of special industrial and vocational work at both elementary and secondary levels would facilitate the placement of backward or retarded students. Arrangement for double promotions, trial promotions, interterm promotions, and promotions by subjects would facilitate the proper placement of many students. Homogeneous grouping where it can be practically and educationally justified would assist in better placement of some students. But the qualification of "other things being equal" should always be recognized in the use of any of these devices. The proper application of any formal system of student placement depends upon the implications, for specific situations, of the human-wants theory of education or its equivalent, however designated.

SCHOOL ORGANIZATION. School organization as a feature of educational administration includes the structure and function of both the school system and the schools themselves, which in their interrelationship constitute the system. The two sources on which we must mainly rely for explicit statements in regard to the implications of the human-wants theory for school organization are Thorndike's *Education; A First Book* and Thorndike and Gates's *Elementary Principles of Education*. The first of these was published in 1912 after the scientific movement in education was well under way, and

the second, in effect a revision of the first, in 1929 after the peak of the movement. Both were designed as textbooks for a beginning course in the principles of education and little space is therefore given to administrative problems. They both show that the principles of school education consistent with the human wants theory, whose implications have been indicated for other features of school practice, are also applicable to school organization.

In the second book, *Elementary Principles of Education*, these principles are stated formally with special reference to the structure of the school system as follows:

The function of each period of education in school is to enable every pupil at each stage to achieve the most productive and satisfying participation in life at that time. The purpose of schooling as a whole for each individual is to equip him to continue, after leaving school, to participate in life most fruitfully. The most productive and satisfying participation in life requires the achievement of physical vigor, mental health and balance, and of those adjustments to the physical world, to social, civic, economic, and family situations and the acquisitions of those ethical, religious, recreational, and intellectual resources which will promote most abundantly the interests of mankind as a whole. The general aim of increasing the fullness of life for each individual by promoting the welfare of society at large requires not only adjustment to the needs of each stage in development during the whole period but specialization in school to harmonize with different careers in after-school life.³⁷

The structure of the existing school system as described in the first book and the attitude of the two authors toward the changes taking place within a period of 20 years, when taken together, enable one to see the implications of the principles of school education summarized above. In the first book four levels of school organization are distinguished: the pre-elementary school, roughly for ages 4 to 6½; the elementary school, roughly for ages 6½ to 15; the secondary school, roughly for ages 14½ to 20; and higher education, roughly for ages 18 to 30.

In the analysis of the emerging structure given in the second book 17 years later, the authors note with approval certain divergencies from the pattern of the existing system, which they considered "a

³⁷ Thorndike and Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304.

compromise between what nature and education demand and what tradition permits." They approve the tendency to extend the elementary school downward to include kindergarten and nursery school, and to combine one or more of the upper elementary grades with one or more of the lower high school grades into a new administrative unit, the junior high school, thus establishing the 6-3-3-4 plan. They also seem to favor the idea of the newly emerged junior college. This attitude they here present definitely: "The newer units in this series, especially in the junior high school and the junior college, arose chiefly as devices for spanning the gaps between, and integrating the purposes of, the older, highly distinctive units, the elementary and high schools and the college, and of providing better adjustments to vocational needs and other individual variations. Thus it may be said that the pronounced trend in school organization is in the desirable direction of harmonizing the activities of the school with the characteristics of human nature. The movement, while in the right direction, has much distance to cover before an ideal combination of continuity and specialization is achieved." ³⁸

In accord with the principle of continuity the curriculum of the kindergarten should be an extension of the life of the home and "the transition from kindergarten to first grade should be no more abrupt than the change within the kindergarten school before and after the Christmas vacation." ³⁹

The main functions of the six-year elementary school are (1) to provide for each child that general education which "enables him to make at each step . . . adjustments to the most essential phases of life" and equips him with the ethical, religious, recreational, and intellectual resources "which promote most abundantly the interests of mankind as a whole;" (2) to determine as accurately as possible his capacities and aptitudes; and (3) to explore to some extent his vocational interests and aptitudes and provide some vocational adjustment for him in case he leaves school. ⁴⁰

The realization of these purposes requires: determination of the elements of all essential facts and skills by surveys of the uses to which they are put in and out of school; the improvement of in-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-307.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 309-310.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

struction through better organization of materials and methods of teaching; the fusion of related formal subjects with each other and with content subjects; the cultivation of other ends through the incorporation of new subjects which the more economical use of time permits; modification of requirements in content and pace corresponding to the interests and abilities of both the bright and the dull children; adjustment of the program to the vocational prospects of pupils who will turn relatively early to the work of the world; provision of guidance based on the exploration of individual capacities and talents; and the maintenance and increase of intimate contacts between the school and the life of the community.⁴¹

Acknowledgment of the 6-3-3-4 structure as a working ideal for school systems above the sixth year and below the graduate and higher professional schools enabled Thorndike and Gates to adopt a well-defined policy for elementary education but left them still uncertain about secondary education. As early as 1907 Thorndike pointed out that the high school of six to twelve teachers, which authoritative discussions of secondary education assumed to be typical, was nowhere really typical in a valuable sense and that the recommendations in the discussions were therefore irrelevant to most schools. The wide size variation in secondary schools rendered any single curricular pattern for all schools impractical in most situations for most schools.⁴²

But even this ideal of a six-year secondary school did not enable Thorndike and Gates to advocate a very definite general policy 20 years later. They were reasonably sure that the secondary school should enable all students to continue on a higher level of experience the kind of general education proposed for the elementary school; and for those completing their full-time formal education during the secondary school period to have more specialization, guidance, and vocational work. They were sure, too, that the increasing variation in the abilities and capacities of students as they moved up the educational ladder made the existing academic and trade schools inadequate. The highly linguistic, mathematical, and abstract character of the curriculum, the formal teaching methods and standards of attainment were so exacting that barely half the adolescent population

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 311-316.

⁴² Strayer and Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-175.

"is sufficiently endowed intellectually to complete the work successfully."⁴³

From their standpoint, even for general education, such a program was questionable for those who could succeed, and vocational interests were given little or no consideration. The trade schools were emphasizing specialization to such an extent that they were not satisfactory even for vocational education, which should include much general education. To be specific, both these schools failed to provide a satisfactory secondary education for all youth, and neither provided it for the very group it was especially designed to serve. Not either type nor both together could provide the kind of secondary education that Thorndike and Gates considered desirable. Then, too, these authors were not at all sure that even the newer progressive schools could succeed in their attempt "to make available a broader education for a wide range of ability." The pressure of tradition and the demand for "great specialization" presented serious difficulties.

The main problem of secondary education which confronted them then is essentially the same as that of college education today. Granted that "each child should have as much high school work as the common good requires," they still faced the problem of how much high school work on various levels of ability and aptitude the common good did, or would, require. They realized that if completion of high school for everybody was the answer, then some radical change in the structure of the secondary school was necessary.⁴⁴ As a matter of record, their own answer was not essentially different from that which many are today making in regard to college education.⁴⁵

The policies they advocated in regard to higher education are quite clear. They considered, "Recent attempts to provide full-time education in the junior college, the college, professional and vocational schools for a larger proportion of persons over 18 than ever before" entirely experimental.⁴⁶ They found that even the experts, on whom they would always depend in practical matters for which

⁴³ Thorndike and Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-322.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

scientific evidence was insufficient, differed "concerning who should be taught, what should be taught, and how it should be taught in these full-time institutions."⁴⁷ Combining part-time education and part-time work in one's chosen field for those over 18, they supported as "one of the most significant experiments in democratic life."⁴⁸

Whatever their final decision in regard to these matters, the obligation of higher institutions is clearly defined: "For reasons presented in earlier chapters, we may state that the institutions of higher education should probably be frankly devoted to the education of the most gifted young men and women who give the greatest promise of ability to serve as leaders in furthering the interests of mankind. To fulfill this purpose, the higher institutions must find means of restricting their efforts to those persons of sufficient intellect and character to profit richly by them."⁴⁹

Cultural Conditions

In its cultural background the human-wants theory harks back to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, to the early modern science of the seventeenth century, and to the Christian tradition that extends backward to a much earlier period. But however significant the sources, our problem here is the more limited one of analyzing the cultural conditions in the United States during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth, when Thorndike was developing and applying this theory to school practice.

The outcome of the Civil War demonstrated by force of arms the superiority of the industrial and democratic North over the agricultural and aristocratic South. After the War, therefore, nothing could seem more reasonable to industrial leaders than promoting with renewed vigor the expansion of production, and this they did. But while idealizing the values of free competition and equality of opportunity for all through cooperative effort, they established con-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

trol of natural resources, the labor supply, and the market. The rich became richer and the poor became poorer. The plight of the farmer, the wage-earner, and the small businessman grew steadily worse. Consequently, many intellectuals joined with these groups in voicing protests and proposing measures of reform. They were all primarily interested in social amelioration, and increasingly aware of the indefensible conditions which the muckrakers were soon to expose on a grand scale. Their proposals for reform were, on the whole, palliative rather than radically reconstructive. They advocated public control and changes in the currency and taxation, but to more radical programs for fundamental reconstruction they gave little or no consideration.⁵⁰ Although the various reform movements differed in detail, according to Curti: "A common theory underlay the ideas of reform, even the most extreme. This was the old theory of human rights—the idea that 'the individual has a natural right to an existence worthy of a human being, that institutions and social arrangements are but means to the realization of this right.'" ⁵¹

At first the loud clamor for the improvement of the lot of the common man fell on deaf ears. The industrial leaders did not find it necessary to elaborate any intellectual defense. They could rely, at least for a while, on the individualistic faith of the great body of plain people that anyone might still follow in the footsteps of the few who had achieved great fortunes. But, according to Curti, "As prolonged periods of depression began to cast doubt upon the popular faith, and as the strength of reform groups mounted, industrial leaders and their defenders began to elaborate theoretical defenses." ⁵²

In general, these defenses were whatever slogans, assumptions, and values in the cultural heritage would seem most convincing to the plain people. The conservatives, who included ministers, educators, literary men, social scientists, and articulate business leaders, identified their defense with the general good and with the universal and immutable values. It was adopted by the entire business class with the exception of a few articulate independents who joined the re-

⁵⁰ Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 605-632.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 608.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 634.

formers. The conservatives appealed to the individualistic doctrine of laissez faire and free competition. The final justification for their belief in social inequality they found in the evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer, the classical economy, the experimental psychology, and the humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer Moore. Justification for the idea of the self-made man and the cult of success they found in the spectacular achievements of individual men featured in post-Civil War literature.⁵³ Finally, the conservatives brought forth a new kind of argument. In the words of Curti,

As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the conservative defense tended increasingly to emphasize not only the doctrine of self-help and the possibility of personal success, but also the natural and inherent beneficence of capitalism as it actually functioned and would presumably continue to function in the future. This aspect of the defense was expressed in theoretical expositions, in high-powered publicity, and in practical philanthropic works.⁵⁴

Soon the movement for reform found its way into national politics. It played a part in the free silver movement and the defeat of William Jennings Bryan and the Democrats in 1896. Later both the Progressive party under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and the Democratic party under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson championed the cause of the reformers. But with the outbreak of World War I all groups except the extreme radicals concentrated on winning the war, and in the "Roaring Twenties" that followed the movements for reform were just about forgotten. The plight of the farmers grew worse and worse, and they received little or no attention. Business men, industrialists, and financial leaders had demonstrated, at least to themselves, through practical results, the efficiency of the established industrial and political system in terms of victory, production, and prosperity. All went well with them until the financial crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 30's.

The period so briefly described saw the rise and fall of the scientific movement in education and the development of the human-wants theory. Therefore, it was inevitable that both movements should reflect to some extent the cultural conflict that had waxed

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 634-650.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 650.

and waned throughout the period. To repeat what has already been indicated, certain general ideas or beliefs that have important bearing on educational theory and practice seem to have been taken for granted, explicitly or implicitly, by both reformers and conservatives. Some of the more important of these beliefs are: (1) that human progress is possible and desirable; (2) that the development and application of scientific knowledge is the chief means of human betterment; (3) that efficiency requires reliance on experts; and (4) that the good life involves the cultivation of both the traditional moral virtues and the individualistic, capitalistic, and democratic personality traits.

HUMAN PROGRESS

During the eighteenth century men began to look more and more to the future rather than to the past for the Golden Age. Since then philosophers, however much they have differed as to the structure of the world or the nature of progress, have agreed that a better mundane life for man was possible. According to some, it was inevitable; according to others, it was contingent on man himself. The idea of biological evolution, however interpreted, lent support to this faith in human progress. The collectivists under the leadership of Karl Marx no less than the individualists under the leadership of Herbert Spencer expressed their faith in the possibility or even the inevitability of human betterment. For the most part, they all agreed, too, that, whatever else progress might mean, it consisted of an increase in personal pleasure or happiness for all. On this point both the capitalists and the individualists were as much utilitarian as were the followers of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill.

After the Civil War this faith in human progress, conceived in terms of mundane pleasure or satisfaction with rugged *laissez-faire* individualism as method, became a part of what the Germans called the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the time. People subscribed without question to a social system which they believed was designed to secure the human rights idealized not only in the revolutions of the eighteenth century but also in the Christian tradition. They believed sincerely in liberty, equality of opportunity, independence, initiative, and respect for each person as an individual. Usually such beliefs, traits, virtues, and ideals were attributed to the middle class,

but they were no less acceptable to the rank and file of Americans, both North and South. Although the reformers recognized many defects and advocated many changes, for the most part, they considered the system itself unquestionably sound in its general structure.

The scientific movement in education, which is so closely related in time to the development and application of the human-wants theory that the two may be considered different phases of a more inclusive program, emphasized approximately the same values as the primary ends of school education. Therefore, Thorndike's systematic statement of the ultimate aims of human welfare in terms of improving and satisfying human wants and his application of these aims as standards of direction in the development of school programs met with general approval. The values which he defined seemed to be just about what the public as well as students of education would have liked to say for themselves. Therefore, with respect to its aims, the human-wants theory is relevant to the cultural conditions under which it was defined and applied.

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

From its beginnings in the seventeenth century modern science had continued to broaden its field of operation. At first it was confined to the physical world which the physicists and chemists studied. But under the Cartesian formula all living things, including plants and animals, below man, together with the human body, belonged exclusively to the physical world. The subject matter of biology, including both physiology and botany, was qualitatively the same as that of physics and chemistry. But the recognition of the relation of mental processes to the nervous system soon led to the development of scientific psychology. The social sciences of sociology and anthropology in their approach to social phenomena gradually adopted the methods of the physical sciences, which, beginning with Harvard University in 1873, would become requirements in most colleges and many high schools in the United States by the turn of the century. The science of management had demonstrated its efficiency in the field of business. Moreover, the achievements of science in the field of technology had even then been spectacular and prophetic of greater things to come.

Furthermore, with the new mental and achievement tests and the statistical methods then available, students of education demonstrated the effectiveness of scientific procedures in the field of school education and initiated what is known as the scientific movement in education. The findings of scientific studies were more convincing to school people and the public than were the general pronouncements of the most respected educational leaders, whose opinions were based on personal experience and philosophy. Since Thorndike's human-wants theory was also to be based on scientific evidence rather than on philosophy or mere opinion, its practical implications seemed convincing to most industrial and educational leaders, to many members of the teaching profession, and to a large part of the general public.

THE EFFICIENCY EXPERT

At the turn of the century, in spite of their gullibility and superstition, most plain Americans were taking their health problems to the physician, their legal problems to the lawyer, and their religious problems to the minister; and for assistance in other fields they had to rely on such specialists as the mechanic, the plumber, and the electrician. The expert had therefore made his place in the professional fields, in management and social engineering, and even in the more practical fields.

Now, in the formulation and application of the human-wants theory, Thorndike found a definite place for the expert. Even in his analysis of the human-wants theory into a set of specific values, he did not rely on a majority vote. To him only impartial individuals of good will familiar with the scientific evidence as to the nature of man could be trusted to define in detail the values that should control our lives and therefore should serve as standards of direction in the development of welfare programs. Likewise, he considered the expert indispensable in determining the implications and applications of the human-wants theory in general and in specific situations. To assess the values for the various features of school practice, many specific studies had to be conducted, and only educational specialists or experts could carry on such studies.

But since school education is always a going concern, reliance on the expert for something more is also necessary. The nearest ap-

proach to the use of scientific evidence is the utilization of the knowledge and skills of specialists experienced in the various fields. Moreover, in many instances only such experts are qualified to indicate the implications of scientific studies for particular educational situations. Therefore, it is as important for students to learn how to choose their experts as it is to learn the solution or proposed solution of personal and social problems. This attitude toward the expert seems to many people simply like good common sense.

PERSONALITY TRAITS

The American people have always idealized some personality traits as preferable to their opposites. Two kinds are easily distinguishable. The first consists of the moral virtues or character traits, such as honesty, courage, piety, temperance, justice, and many others which the whole cultural tradition of our Western civilization has approved or idealized. The second consists of such qualities of personality as self-reliance, initiative, independence, responsibility, inventiveness, etc., which our individualistic, capitalistic, and democratic cultural tradition has long approved, idealized, and cultivated. During this period practically everyone idealized these so-called character traits and also added thrift, economy, and efficiency, which, strictly speaking, are middle-class virtues. The cultivation of these moral attributes had long been considered a function of religion, but with the elimination of religious instruction from the common school, the people generally approved of placing responsibility on the school for character or moral education—that is, for cultivating these traits.

On the other hand, few, if any, industrial leaders or social reformers had even considered the schools responsible for the cultivation of the individualistic traits of self-reliance, initiative, independence, etc., but they recognized their importance, at least for the leaders. Since the days of Emerson, spokesmen for the middle class, capitalism, and democracy had idealized just such individualistic personality traits, since they were highly relevant to established competitive, laissez faire, economic, and political arrangements. After the Civil War the social reformers as well as the conservative spokesmen for the status quo continued to emphasize the same traits. Even those reformers who occasionally stressed the im-

portance of cooperation and security and those conservatives who stressed the importance of blind obedience still idealized the traditional individualistic virtues as supremely important.

In his analysis of the improvement and satisfaction of human wants into a detailed set of values to be sought through all the agencies of human welfare, Thorndike did not specifically designate the foregoing personality traits. But he no doubt considered them all essential aspects of the 26 items that he did designate. Moreover, when he came to apply the human-wants theory to organized education, he recognized moral education as a special responsibility of the school. He also accepted the distinction between assignable subject-matter ends and general traits to be cultivated in a variety of situations, whatever the subject matter. Among the traits he definitely included the moral virtues of our Western civilization, and the contrasting qualities of obedience and self-reliance. The human-wants theory of education and the good life thus takes into consideration those personality traits which seemed most important to the people of the United States at this period.⁵⁵

Concluding Comments

The name "human wants" was chosen for the theory considered in this chapter mainly because Thorndike, the chief exponent of the theory and a leader in the scientific movement in education, consistently from first to last referred to the satisfaction and improvement of human wants as the end of education. In its philosophical and psychological foundations this theory is continuous with the habit-tendency theory of the immediately preceding chapter and even with the earlier theories considered; and it is in no sense an outgrowth of the theories to be considered in subsequent chapters. Consequently, the proper place for a discussion of the human-wants theory is between the James and the Dewey theories. Although an adequate account of its development has involved extended consideration of the scientific movement in education, the chapter cannot close without some further remarks on the impor-

⁵⁵ E. L. Thorndike, "Education for Initiative and Originality," *Teachers College Record*, 17:405-416, November 1916.

tance of this theory, its philosophic foundations, and its social implications.

There can be little doubt that together James, Dewey, and Thorndike contributed much to improving school education. They discredited school practices based on mere custom and tradition, and educational beliefs based upon pure prejudice. They did much to encourage members of the teaching profession to base school programs and activities on objective facts rather than on uncriticized beliefs. Improvement in curriculum making, methods of teaching, and school administration resulting from the accumulation and utilization of reliable factual information was a significant achievement that no qualified educational critic will deny.

As already indicated, Thorndike and other leaders of the scientific movement in education made important philosophical assumptions which they failed either to avow or explain. As to the nature of reality they clearly assume some form of mechanical materialism which most philosophers now reject. As to the fundamental nature of knowledge and its relation to reality, they have little or nothing to say. But in retrospect it seems quite clear that for them the objects of knowledge are disclosures of some antecedent fixed reality rather than merely instruments of control. In this assumption they are committed to the tradition of Greek science as exemplified in what some modern philosophers of science have to say about knowledge rather than in what scientists do in their scientific investigations. The theory of knowledge to which they are committed is therefore inconsistent with their own practices as scientists. Yet they do not hesitate to express their beliefs about value.

According to Thorndike, value judgments, unlike factual judgments which consist of quantitative propositions about existences, are always qualitative propositions about satisfactions or annoyances. All the natural sciences include both kinds of subject matter and therefore both kinds of value judgments. But for the most part, scientists have tried to confine themselves to factual judgments without reference to worth, preference, or desirability, all of which value judgments involve. This tendency, Thorndike thinks, is very unfortunate, for those responsible for programs of social welfare, including school education, most need to know the findings of the different sciences—just what things and what events are on the

whole most satisfying to what conscious beings and under what conditions. The different scientists should make explicit their judgments on these matters because any natural science of value independent of such values is worthless. But a science of values which is based upon the judgments of the different sciences, particularly the sciences of man, is very important and especially useful to those responsible for any kind of social welfare program, such as school education. The human-wants theory is therefore based upon a natural science of valuation consisting of the value judgments of the various natural sciences, rather than on the normative science of value usually considered a branch of philosophy.

But the philosophical critic is not convinced that the value judgment of the various sciences or the combinations of such judgments, constituting a natural science of value, should be limited to the determination of what things and events are satisfying or annoying, to what extent, and to whom. Like Thorndike and other proponents of the human-wants theory, the philosophical critic recognizes the distinction between positive and negative values to which such terms as satisfaction and annoyance, pleasure and pain, comfort and discomfort, and happiness and unhappiness call attention. Still he is not convinced that the value of any object, event, or activity consists solely in the satisfaction or annoyance it provides for conscious beings. To the impartial critic, therefore, the axiological presupposition of the human-wants theory lies outside any such natural science of values as that proposed by Thorndike. Such a science may determine what people want and what satisfies those wants, but it cannot determine whether or not satisfaction is the sole criterion of positive values or annoyance the sole criterion of negative values. Therefore the natural science of value proposed as a replacement of the normative science of value uncritically presupposes the validity of the happiness principle which could be justified, if at all, by the normative science of axiology.

As to the social implications, the human-wants theory and the scientific movement in education belong to that period in American history in which the more articulate representatives of the plain people, including farmers and wage-earners and their intellectual and literary spokesmen, were advocating changes in social institutions in line with the general belief inherited from the earlier Revo-

lutionary period that each individual had a natural right to live a life worthy of a human being. Some critics have charged that they lent intellectual support to the conservative advocates of the status quo against the attack of the reformers. Professor Merle Curti suggests that Thorndike, an authoritative interpreter of the human-wants theory and a leader in the scientific movement, either because of his personal connections or from lack of perspective, supported the social conservatives rather than the social reformers. Space does not permit a detailed analysis of this criticism. But it seems only fair to say that Thorndike's beliefs that learning consists in the establishment of mechanical nerve connections, that educational aims should be externally determined, and that the curriculum should be specialized, point in this direction.

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The Universal-Growth Theory

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It is a familiar paradox that the human individual always tends to expand or grow physiologically, intellectually, and morally and to contract or decay at the same time. As decay symbolizes less living, so growth symbolizes more living. As Dewey points out: "In directing the activities of the young society determines its own future in determining that of the young. Since the young at a given time will at some later date compose the society of that period, the latter's nature will largely turn upon the direction children's activities were given at an earlier period. This cumulative movement of action toward a later result is what is meant by growth."¹ But growth here conceived is a fact, not a theory. It is identical with the continuity of experience and is both physiological and environmental, both individual and social. Growth in this sense may therefore be taken as the starting point in defining any theory of education and the good life. But Sidney Hook, an authoritative student of Dewey's philosophy, means something more than this when he calls Dewey "the philosopher of growth." As Hook explains, growth for Dewey is the only moral as well as the only educational end; that is the

¹ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1916, p. 49.

aim of education and the good life." ² Growth as just the cumulative movement of action toward a later result indicates no ends, aims, or values to which education and the good life refer.²

Dewey is evidently the "philosopher of growth" because for him this cumulative movement of action toward a later result is of one kind rather than some other. It is what he himself calls "universal growth," "continued growth," and "improvement of the quality of experience." "The ulterior significance of every mode of human association lies in the contribution it makes to the improvement of the quality of experience."³ Growth, as a theory of education and the good life, and the improvement of the quality of experience are for Dewey two ways of saying the same thing. Growth is its own end and not merely a means to some other ends outside the process of human experience. Therefore, the theory of Dewey and others who identify growth with the improvement of the quality of experience may properly be called the universal growth theory.

In 1916, referring to growth, Dewey says: "If our conclusions are justified, they carry with them . . . definite educational consequences. When it is said that education is development, everything depends upon *how* development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and (ii) that the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming."⁴ In contrasting the ideal of growth with the conception of unfolding from within and formation from without, Dewey says again: "The ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—the direct transformation of the quality of experience. . . . What is really learned at any and every stage of experience constitutes the value of that experience, and in the sense that it is the chief business of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible meaning." On the basis of the foregoing, he concludes: "We thus

² Sidney Hook, "John Dewey—Philosopher of Growth," *Journal of Philosophy*, 56:1010-1016, Dec. 17, 1959, pp. 1013-1014.

³ Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

reach a technical definition of education: It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."⁵

In what is his last systematic statement of his educational theory, Dewey continues to identify universal growth with the improvement of the quality of experience. "It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, nor even of activity in experience. Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had. . . . Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experience."⁶

Speaking of the American people, he says we prefer an educational policy or program that is "in accord with the democratic ideal" to which we are committed, and states the reason for this preference:

Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic forms of social life? Does not the principle of regard for individual freedom and for decency and kindness of human relations come back in the end to the conviction that these things are contributory to a higher quality of experience on the part of a greater number than are methods of repression and coercion or force? Is it not the reason for our preference that we believe that mutual consultation and convictions reached through persuasion, make possible a better quality of experience than can otherwise be provided on any wide scale?

This identification of growth with the quality of experience, Dewey continues, "goes back to the fact that discrimination is made between the inherent values of different experiences. So I come back to the principle of continuity of experience as a criterion of discrimination." He then explains the continuity of experience on the basis of habit:

At bottom, this principle rests upon the fact of habit, when *habit* is interpreted biologically. The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

⁶ John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 16-17, by permission of E. I. F. Williams, Kappa Delta Pi.

subsequent experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into them. The principle of habit so understood obviously goes deeper than the ordinary conception of a habit as a more or less fixed way of doing things, although it includes the latter as one of its special cases. It covers the formation of attitudes, attitudes that are emotional and intellectual; it covers our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we meet in living. From this point of view, the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after.⁷

Dewey then reaffirms his original idea that the educative process "can be identified in terms of the active participle, *growing*. Growth, or growing as developing, not only physically but intellectually and morally, is one exemplification of the principle of continuity. The objection made is that growth might take many different directions: A man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that direction and by practice may grow into a highly expert burglar. Hence, it is argued that 'growth' is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which it tends." Dewey does not, however, accept this objection as conclusive, for he analyzes the case further:

That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth, the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines?

He concludes that "When and *only* when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing. For the conception is one that must find universal and not specialized, limited application."⁸

In his elaboration of the continuity of experience he shows that

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

the quality of present experience influences the quality of future experience. Some qualities of experience facilitate growth and some facilitate arrested development. An experience that "arouses curiosity, strengthens initiative, and sets up desires and purposes that are sufficiently intense to carry a person over dead places in the future" facilitates growth.⁹

In 1916, after defining growth as the reconstruction of experience which adds to the meaning of experience and increases the control of future experience, Dewey defines the ideal democratic society as a criterion of growth in societies committed to the democratic way of life. He begins his definition with an analysis of social groups as they actually exist. "Now in any social group whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find some interest held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?"¹⁰ For him these two elements in the criterion point to democracy. "The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interests, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could keep up separation) but change in social habits—its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society."¹¹

With regard to education, he goes on to say that the realization of these two characteristics "makes a democratic community more interested than other communities have cause to be in deliberate and systematic education. The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact." The fundamental explanation of this fact is: "A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest that each has to refer his own action to that of others,

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity."¹² He does not hold, however, that the widening the area of shared concerns and the liberation of greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize a democracy are the product of deliberate and conscious effort. They are caused by the development of science and technology, involving intercommunication. But after such a democratic communication has come into existence, "it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and extend" its characteristic elements. "Obviously a society to which stratification into separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms." The members of such a society must be "educated to personal initiative and adaptability."¹³ The cultural aim of a democratic society such as that in the United States is, then, the widening of the area of shared concerns and the liberation of greater diversity or personal capacities that characterize a democracy.

In the light of this analysis of Dewey's conception of the democratic ideal, one is tempted to call his theory of education and the good life "democratic growth." This name would doubtless be appropriate when he refers to the education of a people committed to the democratic way of life. But his later emphasis on desirable qualities of experience as the criteria of democracy shows beyond question that his primary concern is the establishment and promotion of an educational and life ideal that is not restricted to any particular kind of society. For this reason, the term "universal growth" has been retained.

As Max Otto says of Dewey, "He did not speak, as have others, for a given culture, a limited geographical area, a particular time. He spoke for the human undertaking as a whole, for the entire world, for times to come no less than for the time in which we must make our way."¹⁴ Only as we keep the universality of his ideal in mind can we understand the significance of his conception of the

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

¹⁴ Max Otto, "John Dewey," *Progressive Education*, 30:1-2, October 1952, p. 2.

desirable qualities of experience as the justification for the democratic way of life.

In 1938 Dewey is seen to shift his emphasis from the democratic ideal to certain qualities of experience. He still prefers democracy to any other ideal of social arrangements, but only because of the kind of qualities of experience which the democratic system facilitates. Such an emphasis on the quality of experience does not, however, represent any break with his earlier position but rather represents an elaboration of it.

Dewey's emphasis on the quality of experience which an empirical analysis of experience itself finds most desirable as an explanation of growth and as the criterion of democracy is neither a side remark nor a mere afterthought. In his most systematic discussion of educational theory he asserts that "the ulterior significance of every mode of human association lies in the contribution it makes to the improvement of the quality of experience."¹⁵ Repeatedly throughout the book, and in various connections, he emphasizes the importance of certain qualities like intelligence, sensitivity to practical conditions, purposefulness, and creativity. It is true that he does not make a systematic formulation of the qualities which his own empirical analysis of experience reveals to be most desirable, nor does he systematically apply them to educational practice. But the fact that he sensed the problem at all is enough to challenge experimentalists.

Their attitudes toward this problem, however, range all the way from complete indifference to marked enthusiasm. Of the first generation of pragmatists Dewey is the only one who clearly gives priority to the quality of experience as the criterion of all values. Of the second generation of pragmatists who are primarily interested in educational theory, Bode and Kilpatrick at most only incidentally mention the term "quality of experience." For the most part the same is true of the third generation of pragmatists in spite of the fact that specialists in elementary education and teacher education now often use the term.

There are two exceptions, however, in this third generation. First, Professor John L. Childs, a recognized student of pragmatism and education, notes Dewey's identification of growth with certain qual-

¹⁵ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

ities of experience in preference to others. He quotes Dewey on the quality of experience as the criterion of democracy and then says:

In the book from which the above quotation is taken, Dewey does not undertake to give a detailed statement of the reasons for his faith in the democratic ideal. He merely says that all these reasons "ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life." Beyond the implication that the reason for the democratic preference must be justified by an empirical analysis of the quality of experience men have actually had under various forms of social and political life, this summary says very little, and it would be persuasive only to those who are already convinced of the superiority of the democratic pattern.¹⁶

Second, this writer admits the logic of Professor Childs's interpretation of this particular statement by Dewey taken in isolation, but he is convinced that the idea of process, to which all experimentalists are committed, and Dewey's many other references to the quality of the process of experience indicate that experimentalists of the third generation—and even of the fourth—still have a long-term but no less urgent problem before them. He holds that an empirical selection of such preferred qualities of experience might throw much light on many other issues on which experimentalists and other students of education are divided. He also finds, in Dewey's constant emphasis on the importance of the quality of experience, authoritative support of his own efforts over the years to enlist the cooperation of others in the empirical study of qualities of the process of experience and their application in planning, developing, and evaluating educational policies, programs, and activities.¹⁷

But Dewey's emphasis on the universal importance of growth as identical with improvement of the quality of experience as the aim of education and the good life does not mean that he fails to recognize the significance of variation in conditions. As indicated in

¹⁶ John L. Childs, *American Pragmatism and Education*, New York, Holt, 1956, p. 126.

¹⁷ John P. Wynne, *Philosophies of Education*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1947.

the analysis of his conception of democracy and shown later in the analysis of his theory of knowledge, his theory of education and the good life eventuate in an orientation rooted in the experimental way of thinking and the democratic way of living. For him the theory of universal growth, like any other theory, remains formal and abstract until it is applied to some particular society existing at some particular time and place. It is the responsibility of the philosopher in the United States espousing the theory of universal growth to show how it is related in this country to the essential features of the family, business and industry, government, education, and religion.

The theory of universal growth cannot be directly and systematically applied to the school and other social institutions in a regimented and authoritarian society. But the idea that qualities of the process of experience, which the theory of universal growth symbolizes, will seem desirable to men of good will remains an abiding faith. Parents, teachers, and others who are directly responsible for particular programs and who share this faith can exert a significant influence in the most regimented and authoritarian society. Whatever may be the cultural conditions and the political and social arrangements, this faith remains a challenge.

Growth and Progressivism

One of the most confusing factors in the public mind and even in the minds of many members of the teaching profession is the relation of the experimentalist theory of growth and democracy to what is generally called Progressive Education.

In 1919 the Progressive Education Association was organized for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of those who were seeking ways and means of developing a new form of education in the United States. The members of this organization contrasted their educational ideals and practices, which they called the New Education or Progressive Education, with the old or traditional education. But in order to demonstrate and test their ideas and procedures, they had to have New or Progressive schools that were not subject to fixed standards and requirements as were the public schools. They

needed intellectual support not only to establish a degree of consistency in point of view, but also to secure the patronage necessary for the development of private progressive schools.

Realizing that a radical educational reform was desirable, Dewey and his associates supported the Progressive Education movement, welcoming in the new schools an opportunity for demonstrating the meaning of their own educational principles and testing their significance in practice. These educational philosophers could help the Progressives, who, in turn could help them. But they were not the only philosophic students of education who participated in the Progressive Education movement and influenced its course of direction. Moreover, according to their own avowed principles, it is the function of the educational philosopher to criticize, evaluate, and suggest rather than predetermine educational policies and programs.

They were also well aware that social and educational reforms begin with negative and destructive criticism of the system to be modified or replaced. Therefore, they joined with the Progressives in condemning many aspects of the traditional school and the principles it exemplified. But they did not formulate or approve any authoritative set of principles that were officially adopted and systematically applied by the Progressives. As a matter of fact, as soon as the movement's assumptions and practices became sufficiently clear, both Dewey and other experimentalists were quick to point out their weaknesses, just as they had done for traditional public schools.

The nature of growth was not new when Dewey defined it in technical terms and proposed it as the universal aim of education and the good life, just as the idea of natural development was not new when Rousseau defined it in technical terms and proposed it as the universal aim of education and the good life. As we have previously seen in Chapter 2, the Rousseau tradition was built not on his own interpretation of natural development but on the pseudo-interpretation of his followers and the prejudiced interpretations of his adversaries. Similarly, many Progressives based their educational principles and doctrines not on Dewey's technical interpretation of growth but on other interpretations with which they often confused it. Moreover, some of them, including Dewey himself, may at first have given the impression that growth is not to be qualified in any way.

But later Dewey does qualify it with the term "universal."

According to the universal-growth theory as conceived by Dewey, the standard of direction is to be found in experience in which both the individual and the environment are involved. According to traditional education, the standard of direction is to be found in the environment in isolation from the individual. In opposition to traditional education, some Progressives found their standards of direction in the individual in isolation from the environment. Therefore, they were inclined to speak and act as if the teacher and the school should invariably look to the pupil to find out what to do and how it should be done. They were inclined to frown upon advance planning of educational programs and preliminary selection of aims, subject matter, forms of organization, and methods of teaching. Such an attitude as exemplified in some of the Progressive schools and the principles used to justify it plays into the hands of Dewey's indiscriminating and irresponsible critics who identify Progressive Education in general with the educational application of the Dewey philosophy.

As early as 1925, however, we find Dewey condemning that kind of Progressivism. In February of that year in the *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, he points out that the current tendency to look to the pupil for standards of direction exemplifies the same theory as does Cizek's *Teaching of Art*. He shows that just as the application of such a principle in art does not produce an artist, so its application in education in general would never result in solid achievement on the part of pupils.¹⁸ From that time on he continues to criticize Progressive Education in a similar way. For him it is more important to determine what is good education than to contrast Progressive Education with traditional education.

Again and again Dewey reaffirms growth as the universal criterion of all education, and democracy as a cultural condition of such growth in a complex industrial society like that of the United States. In a society committed to the democratic ideal, universal growth not only requires direction and guidance on the part of the teacher and the school, but it also supplies the standard of direction to be observed by those in control of educational policies, programs, and

¹⁸ John Dewey, "Individuality and Experience," *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, 2:1-6, January 1926.

activities. It signifies not only such reconstruction of experience as adds to the meaning of it and to the control of subsequent experience, but also such reconstruction as would in concrete situations improve the quality of experience.

It is quite clear, therefore, that in Dewey's mind the Progressive Education movement and the movement in philosophy for which he is known are two very different things and should not be confused. Progressive Education, as it actually developed in this country between the two World Wars, exemplifies a mixture of principles having not one but a variety of sources, and from the standpoint of Dewey it does not even make sense. To identify the educational equivalent of Dewey's philosophy, whether designated as universal growth or improvement of the quality of experience, with Progressive Education represents a misunderstanding of both. For educational philosophers to encourage such identification in the minds of the teaching profession and the wider public by giving them the same name, whatever that name may be, is confusing to say the least. To call the theory of education developed by Dewey and his associates Progressive Education or Progressivism tends to shift, in the minds of many readers, the responsibility for all the sins of Progressive Education to the shoulders of the one man who has done most to expose its deficiencies and to improve its principles. It also plays into the hands of those irresponsible critics who are more interested in propaganda than in professional or public enlightenment. All this is not to say, however, that Dewey did not find in Progressive Education much that he approved any more than it is to say that he disapproved of everything he found in traditional education. It means only that the consistent principles and practices implied in his own theory are too unlike the collection of doctrines known as Progressive Education to be identified with it.

Philosophical Foundations

If the subject matter of philosophy as a study consists of different sets of explicitly defined beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value, then the philosophical foundations of any particular educational theory consist of its presuppositions with respect to these same

topics. Dewey not only holds philosophic beliefs but in many connections makes them explicit. He does not, however, first formally define them as logical premises and then by deduction derive as a logical conclusion the ideal of "universal growth" or "improvement of the quality of experience." There is some organic connection between his educational doctrines and his general philosophical beliefs, but there is no one-to-one correspondence between his general philosophy and his educational proposals. It is not even necessary to understand his underlying philosophy in order to test these proposals. Their soundness may even be judged independently of any supporting philosophy. Sidney Hook summarizes Dewey's attitude in this way: "Although there is an organic connection in Dewey's own thinking between his philosophical ideas and his educational proposals, they are not related as logical premise to logical conclusion. Dewey, of course, believed that the soundness of his proposals constituted some evidence that his philosophical method was fruitful. But he never contended that, before one could determine whether or not those proposals were sound, one antecedently had to accept pragmatism. The soundness of these proposals was to be a matter for independent investigation."¹⁹

Consistent with our general plan of organization, we shall give only a brief account of this philosophy; and, since Dewey has stated his own philosophic tenets much more systematically than have proponents of certain other theories like those of William James and E. L. Thorndike, we shall here present only a very short analysis of his philosophic beliefs and refer the reader to his original works.

The philosophical way of thinking, for the development of which Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, George H. Mead, and John Dewey are primarily responsible, has been designated in many ways. When the problem of reality is the main emphasis, it may be called critical naturalism, empirical naturalism, naturalistic empiricism, or even naturalistic humanism. When the psychological problem is the main emphasis, it may be called functionalism or functional behaviorism. When the problem of knowledge is the main emphasis, it may be called pragmatism or instrumentalism. When the problem

¹⁹ Sidney Hook, "Modern Education and Its Critics," *Seventh Yearbook*, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, Washington, D.C., 1954, p. 145.

of value is the main emphasis, it may be called the philosophy of growth. But since, in this way of thinking, experience and nature as well as knowing are conceived as experimental, it is now generally known as the philosophy of experimentalism. Both Dewey and James recognized Peirce as the founder of pragmatism. Since James's version of this way of thinking and its educational implications and applications are indicated in Chapter 4, we shall now be mainly concerned with the philosophical beliefs of Dewey, Mead, and Peirce, especially those of Dewey.

DEWEY'S BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

Dewey himself says of this theory of experience and nature that it "may be termed empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism, or, taking 'experience' in its usual signification, naturalistic humanism."²⁰ It is a naturalism because for him, nature includes all that is. It is an empiricism because the account of the nature of nature or reality is derived solely by what Dewey calls the empirical or denotative method, and because reality is as it is experienced to be. It is a humanism because the term "experience" usually signifies human experience. There is no substitute for a study of Dewey's original works, but for the convenience of the reader some of his more important beliefs about reality are here considered as they are related to (1) experience as method; (2) culture as experience; (3) nature as continuous; (4) existences as events; and (5) events as relative.

1. EXPERIENCE AS METHOD. Dewey calls his method of investigation the empirical or denotative method because for him reality is as it is experienced to be and its essential traits are just what may be pointed to in experience. The whole of nature is not to be identified with experience, which, in fact, consists of experiences that occur only in situations where a human organism is present. But experience is not merely a mental process—the kind of experiencing the psychologist studies. It does include experiencing, but it also includes the things experienced and even the individual who experiences them. As a matter of fact, the experienter and the experienced are differentiated within experience, which not only includes but precedes both. Experience includes knowing, the things known, and even the

²⁰ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, New York, Norton (1925), 1929, p. 1a.

knower, all of which are eventual and emergent rather than original and primitive.

As a matter of fact, knowing begins and ends in experience, which consists of doing and undergoing, having and being. The objects of these processes are primary and therefore evidential of the nature of nature or reality; they are not objects of knowledge, which are secondary and instrumental. In fact, these processes and their corresponding objects constitute the world of unsophisticated naïve experience as contrasted with the world of intellectual experience. From this point of view, experience as method becomes the key to the development of an adequate ontology or theory of reality.

The qualities of reality as they are experienced are also the qualities of the reality of nature and of man. The qualities of objects as they are experienced are continuous with the qualities of objects that have not yet been experienced. The qualities of experienced objects are thus the qualities of ultimate reality, whatever it may be. Naïve experience is a manifestation of qualities of reality to which we may point and direct attention even when we do not know them; and intellectual experience is a means of controlling the conditions through which we preserve, enhance, and render more secure some existences and modify and neutralize others. But even objects of knowledge themselves become features of naïve experience to be enjoyed, suffered, had, or endured just as are the objects of immediate experience. Reality thus conceived includes the foundation of the intellectual, the aesthetic, the economic, the political, and the religious experiences that have been differentiated for purposes of understanding and control, none of which is more real than any other.²¹

2. CULTURE AS EXPERIENCE. The radical empiricist is sometimes confronted with the question as to whose experience he has in mind. Whatever his direct answer might be, Dewey shows beyond question that he relies mainly on human culture in the broad and neutral sense of the term. Culture so considered includes the records of what man has felt, thought, said, and done. It is primarily the kind of material which the anthropologists and the historians, rather than the psychologists, have made available to philosophers. It consists of

²¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. 1.

the experiences of man—both primitive and modern—and includes religion, the fine and practical arts, the sciences, and even philosophy itself. In his analysis Dewey includes materials from all these sources. Since culture in its various aspects is a product of human experience, its generic traits are pervasive traits of human experience. Culture as the man-made environment reflects the qualitative reactions of man to the world throughout human history. It is therefore evidential of generic and pervasive traits of nature, which, according to Dewey, is reality.²²

3. NATURE AS CONTINUOUS. According to Dewey, existence, nature, and reality, which in fact are the same as they are revealed in naïve experience, are continuous with experience, which is in and of nature and not outside it. It consists of natural objects in interaction and is thus continuous with them and the more inclusive world to which they belong. These objects are interrelated and continuous with one another. The physical, the vital, the mental, and the social are levels of the same reality rather than different kinds of reality. All things are physical, but some physical things are vital, some vital things are mental, and some mental things are social. Metaphysically, any one level is no more real than any other. When qualitatively considered, however, the different levels vary with respect to the number of factors involved and the complexity of the organization. When qualitatively considered, too, the social is more inclusive than any of the other levels and is thus "the philosophical category."

Likewise, on the psychological side, the different aspects of experience or mental processes are continuous with one another. Just as no level of existence is more real than any other, so no mental factor is more real than any other. Still, reflective thinking is more complex and inclusive than any other mental process. It is the supreme category of method just as sociality is the supreme category on the structural side of nature. Although some levels of structural reality and some aspects of the process of experience are more inclusive than others, no one is more real than another. No one level or aspect, such as the economic or the intellectual, is to be taken as primary and superior to all others. Experience is a manifestation of nature and continues with it. So every level, aspect, or form of ex-

²² *Ibid.*, Chap. 2.

perience is continuous with all others and with the wider nature to which they all belong.²³

4. EXISTENCES AS EVENTS. According to Dewey, the particular existences that may be differentiated in the realm of experience and nature are events rather than permanent and enduring substances or structures of any kind. They are indeterminate, dynamic, and continuous occurrences. In the language of common sense any happening, like a marriage, a birth, or a death, is an event. But in Dewey's ontology the most enduring structure is also an event. Even mountains are subject to the gnawing tooth of time. Every object that can be distinguished has four dimensions; it is temporal as well as spatial. Reality is dynamic, uncertain, and precarious, but some things are changing less rapidly than others. There is such a vast difference in the rate of change that the more slowly moving events may be used as means of controlling those moving more rapidly.

In this respect the conclusions of the modern physical scientist and the philosophic student of naïve experience are not essentially different. But the conclusions of Dewey no less than those of the scientist are what his investigations show and not what he would like to find. As a metaphysician, he has no more preference for change and uncertainty than have the classical philosophers. He is merely giving an account of what he finds through a study of naïve experience, just as the physical scientists are giving an account of their experimental observations and mathematical calculations. Whatever may be their personal preferences, both report just what they find, and however much they differ in other respects, their reports as to the dynamic character of the world of nature and of man are in substantial agreement.

The fact of preference is, however, not neglected. Most things have their biases, their aversions, and their attractions. By the use of symbols man has instituted forms of control through which the esteemed, the prized, and the approved events are rendered more secure, and those that are unacceptable are eliminated, modified, or neutralized. Such preferences and the capacity for symbolization suggest to the reflective individual the need for classification and organization of other existences as a means of controlling them.

²³ *Ibid.*, Chap. 7.

Therefore, such distinctions as cause and effect, structure and process, are instrumental. The fact that they serve as instruments of control, however, does not change their ontological status. They are all events: causes as well as effects, structures as well as processes. One existence may change more rapidly than another or precede rather than follow another. But ontologically one is no more real than another.

The things that are prized are among the most fleeting and unstable, while those that are neutral are among the most stable. Since we cannot directly control the fleeting, our only recourse is to control the conditions of their existence and maintenance. Therefore, the relatively more fleeting events are conceived as processes, and the relatively more permanent and enduring ones are conceived as structures. Both processes and structures are thus qualities of events and are not different kinds of existences. Likewise, cause and effect are properly conceived as practical rather than existential distinctions. Effect is no less real than cause; a later event is no less real than an earlier one. Certain events are somehow related. Cause and effect refer to a sequence of events. Which event is conceived as cause and which as effect depends upon the problem under consideration and not on something outside experienced events.²⁴

5. EVENTS AS RELATIVE. Other qualities of reality which experienced events exemplify may be subsumed under the caption of relativity. The relativity of events signifies that reality is both plural and contextual. The empirical reality, which the empirical denotative method in the hands of Dewey portrays, is a concatenation of qualitative events related in innumerable ways. No single one of them nor all of them together constitute a complete determinate system. Each one is always relatively unique and independent, and any set of them is always relatively unique and independent. Reality is not only indeterminate but plural in character. No event or no system of events can be reduced to an eternally fixed structure whether conceived in terms of matter, or mind, or partly one and partly the other. There is no such thing as matter or mind in general; there are "matters" and "minds," though not in isolation. The terms "matter" and "mind" are adjectives rather than nouns.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Chap. 2.

Events are all matter insofar as they are stable and thus predictable. They are minds insofar as they clothe things with meanings and use ideas as means of controlling other events. But there are many minded as well as unminded events. The only universal mind consists of the meanings which individuals hold in common. This is the purport of the functional theory of mind as conceived by Dewey. It is only one aspect of the pluralism of events constituting nature or reality.

Events are contextual in the sense that they do not stand alone and in isolation from other events. The character of any event or reality is relative to other related events, which in turn are relative to it and to still other events. Moreover, any events change in terms of other events which are also changing in terms of the event to which they are related. Therefore, empirical naturalism, naturalistic empiricism, or naturalistic humanism is also a pluralism, a contextualism, and a relativism.²⁵

PSYCHOLOGICAL BELIEFS

The two psychological problems which usually confront educational philosophers are the explanation of the relation of mind and body and the meaning of the mental processes. Dewey, as an empirical naturalist, in his theory of mind as a quality of events bypasses the mind-body problem. Since mind and matter are both qualities of the same event, they have never been separated, and the problem of relating them does not arise. For instance, whatever the metaphysical substance of events may be—if there is any such thing—the difference between things as experienced, whether called objects or processes, is a difference in quality and not in substance. A person is physical, vital, social, and mental at one and the same time, and not a composite or mixture of physical, vital, social, and mental substances. The idea of qualitative events, therefore, renders the old mind-body problem obsolete.

As to the mental processes which are the recognized subject matter of psychology, Dewey does not find it necessary to rely entirely on either the traditional introspection method or the method of behaviorism, which neglects or denies the existence of consciousness.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

For him the psychologist must determine the subject-matter content that sets the problems and select subject-matter materials and procedures to be used in dealing with them. Such qualities of behaving or experiencing as perceiving, memorizing, recalling, imagining, reasoning, feeling, and willing, usually called mental processes, are the subject-matter content of psychology. They are distinguished through observation just as are oil and water, iron and tin, which form the original subject matter of physics and chemistry. "There is no more reason for denying the reality of the one than of the other, while to deny the reality of either leaves the science in question without any concrete subject matter."²⁶ This form of observation may be designated by the term "inspection" or even "introspection," provided it is used in the denotative sense and not in the sense of analyzing some assumed structure not directly observed.

Dewey does not, however, explain these modes of experiencing on the basis of hypothetical faculties or the simple ideas of traditional psychology. For him the subject matter to be used in explaining them must be found not in the subjective materials disclosed through "introspection" or even "inspection" but in the objective materials and procedures "derived from physiology, biology, and other sciences. . . . Identifying modes of individual experiencing with modes of behavior identified objectively and objectively analyzable makes a science of psychology possible."²⁶ No less than the mechanical behaviorist and connectionist, Dewey relies on scientific evidence as revealed by specific studies. But for him the mental processes serve instrumental functions in the life of the organism just as do the organs of the body. Moreover, they are neither isolated processes nor aspects of any particular cross-section of experience. Any conscious experience is a temporal affair in which the various aspects of experience are involved and often clearly distinguishable, one predominant in some experiences and others in other experiences. Which one is dominant at any given time depends upon its capacity to serve the demands of the organism under the prevailing conditions.²⁶

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Chap. 7.

John Dewey, "Conduct and Experience," in Carl Murchison, ed., *Psychologies of 1930*, Worcester, Mass., Clark University Press, 1930, pp. 417, 418.

Charles W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932, Chap. 6.

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

The philosophy of experimentalism, of which the universal-growth theory is an educational equivalent, has a definite theory of knowledge. It is sometimes called the pragmatic theory and sometimes the instrumental theory. As conceived by Dewey, it differs in fundamental respects from pragmatism as developed by William James and which we considered in Chapter 4. An understanding of this theory requires an analysis of: (1) the knowing situation; (2) the subject matter of knowledge; (3) the objects of knowledge; and (4) the meaning of truth.²⁷

1. THE KNOWING SITUATION. When the individual is engaged in making adjustments in which reflective thinking is involved, there is what Dewey calls a knowing situation. Adjustment of some disturbances in the life process is made without consciousness. But as adjustment becomes increasingly complex on the human level, situations develop in which only reflective thinking can harmonize, integrate, unify, or settle the conflicting, incompatible, or antagonistic factors involved. When, in the course of human events, the method of reflective thinking is used in the settlement or resolution of such troubled, confused, and indeterminate situations, knowledge in the honorific sense is produced.

Among the many features of the operation involved, four seem to be especially significant. First, the situation is intellectualized; that is, the difficulty is located and defined. Second, a working hypothesis is established through a reflective analysis of the conditions and the various suggestions that occur. Third, the hypothesis is so elaborated and defined through reasoning that it can be subjected to the test of practical operations. Fourth, the projected hypothesis is tested through an examination of all the consequences which its application involves; thus belief or disbelief in its validity is established.

Apparently for Dewey himself, and for most other pragmatists,

²⁷ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Chaps. 4 and 8.

John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916, Chaps. 2-6.

John Dewey, *How We Think*, Boston, Heath, 1933, Chaps. 6, 7, 9, and 11.

John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, New York, Holt, 1938, Chaps. 1, 6, and 8.

reflective thinking is not just a method of inquiry, but inquiry itself. The devices and techniques of inquiry thus conceived vary for different subject matters, but the method of inquiry thus conceived is equally applicable in all fields. Due to historical conditions, it is most evident in the natural sciences and least evident in morals, government, education, and the fine arts. The way to overcome the cultural lag in our current civilization is to extend reflective inquiry to all fields rather than restrict it to any field.

A group of third-generation pragmatists rejects this belief. The pattern of reflective thinking is the method of dealing with theoretical problems concerned with democracy and formulation of facts, and the pattern of practical judgment is the method of dealing with normative principles.²⁸

Professor Childs, who is also a third-generation pragmatist, recognizes that the advocates of the new discipline of practical judgment "have made a significant contribution to social and educational thought by the manner in which they have focused attention on the foundational role of personal character both in our democratic way of life and in our experimental mode of thought."²⁹ But on various grounds he questions the value of the discipline of practical judgment as a distinct method of research. In the first place, since its advocates assume the empirical approach to the problem of knowledge, those who reject it will also reject the proposed supplementary method just as they have the method of reflective thinking. Second, the argument that the new method takes into account "the personality, the mind, and the character" of the investigator is not sufficient, because the proponents of the method of reflective thinking claim that it also takes these factors into account. Third, even if the method of reflective thinking does not adequately take these factors into account, the proponents of the new method, to convince other pragmatists, would have to demonstrate that it could not be made to do so.³⁰

²⁸ Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

R. Bruce Raup, George Axtelle, Kenneth Benne, and B. Othanel Smith, *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence*, 28th Yearbook of the National Society of College Teachers of Education, New York, Harper, 1950.

²⁹ Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-311.

2. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF KNOWLEDGE. In the foregoing analysis of reflective thinking two types of subject matter are clearly implicit. Whatever the nature of the problem, whether practical or scientific, it involves the use of facts and ideas. No confused situation is entirely indeterminate. Some things are reasonably certain and assured. It is therefore necessary to note not only the incompatibilities but also the compatibilities. Those things that are found relevant to the problem at hand are data. They are not only facts but facts of the situation. They are derived through an observation of the situation in the process of applying first one suggestion and then another, elaborating first one idea and then another, and testing the idea which is accepted as an hypothesis for use in solving the problem.

The suggestions, ideas, and hypotheses thus applied constitute the second type of subject matter involved in the acquisition of new knowledge. Suggestions are derived from results of previous experience, whether preserved in memory or in public records. Such suggestions become ideas when they are conceived as possible plans of experimental operations—overt or imaginary. The ideas become hypotheses when they are accepted as plans to be applied and tested through trial or experiment.

These two types of subject matter are indispensable, but neither one nor both together provide new knowledge to be directly appropriated. They are the building materials out of which such knowledge is produced through reflective thinking. They are constantly modified in terms of each other until a conclusion is reached in which both are integrated and combined. Such a conclusion is warranted not because of the inherent nature of either or both types of subject matter considered in advance, but because of their functional reconstruction and integration in terms of each other in the process of reflective operations. Such conclusions are funded knowledge and serve as a source of suggestions, ideas, and hypotheses in subsequent reflective thinking.

3. THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. In Dewey's philosophy such warranted assertions or outcomes of reflective thinking in specific situations are called objects of knowledge. They are accepted as reliable because of the method through which they are achieved rather than because of any immediate knowledge, whether rational or empirical,

utilized in the process of achieving them. They are not, therefore, conceived as fixed facts, beliefs, or conceptions to be directly appropriated by future thinkers. They are sources of suggestion in the selection of ideas and hypotheses in dealing with future indeterminate situations, but they are subject to constant modification and adjustment, as were the meanings which were utilized in their production. In fact, later discovery of new facts that are incompatible with them may even produce indeterminate situations in the resolution of which they will be modified in important respects.

4. THE MEANING OF TRUTH. According to Dewey's philosophy, logical meaning and truth are qualities of propositions or judgments involving a logical subject and a logical predicate. In his theory of knowledge some verbal propositions are meaningless and are therefore not logically real. Some that are meaningful are true and others are false. As applied to propositions, logical meaning is more inclusive than truth. All true propositions are logically meaningful, but not all meaningful propositions are true. Meaning is thus a quality by virtue of which a proposition may be said to be real. A proposition may be said to be psychologically meaningful when it is personally important, perhaps to those who entertain it or to someone else. But a logical proposition must be definable in objective terms; that is, in such a way that one can tell what observable conditions would necessarily follow if it were true.

Just as personal significance is irrelevant to the logical meaning of propositions, so it is irrelevant to their truth or falsity. A proposition is true if it turns out as expected, and false if it does not. Whether its being true or false is satisfying or annoying to anyone is entirely irrelevant. Its being true can cause much pain and suffering or its being false can be pleasing beyond measure.³¹

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

On the axiological side experimentalists distinguish between what is immediately liked, preferred, and desired and what, after reflective thinking, is found likable, preferable, and desirable. In the classical philosophic tradition statements regarding what one likes or dislikes, accepts or avoids, are called value judgments. These state-

³¹ Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-325.

ments the experimentalist considers merely factual and descriptive. They are the subject matter with which a study of value begins just as certain other statements may constitute the subject matter with which science begins. But they no more indicate what is valuable than other primitive factual statements indicate what is true. They constitute only a point of departure. They are factors in an incompatible situation in which the subject matter under consideration is different from the subject matter of other situations in which liking and disliking and similar distinctions are not inherent.

The problem of value is a matter of deciding which instances of liking or disliking deserve to be liked, prized, esteemed, or the opposite. For the sake of brevity, problems of negative values may be neglected here because things that are not in any way prized or esteemed in practical life are usually not problems. With this understanding it may be said that only those likings are values which are found through reflective thinking to be desirable. The problem of value thus conceived falls within the pattern of reflective thinking already considered. Things are not good in a moral, religious, or aesthetic sense merely because they immediately seem so. Value propositions are just as tentative and hypothetical as are scientific propositions. Moreover, they are to be formulated, elaborated, and tested in the same general way. A warranted conclusion as to their value is the product of reflective thinking in which both data and ideas are utilized as subject matter just as in the solution of any other problem.

Specifically, subject matter consists of the immediate likings or dislikings which provoke the problem, as do other facts which are used in defining the situation; and it also consists of various suggestions, ideas, and hypotheses in regard to the good that may be derived from past experience or records of such experience. But only beliefs about what is good that have been so developed can properly be called values.

Such a conception departs from two older axiological traditions. It recognizes, with certain philosophical empiricists, that immediate liking and disliking are involved in evaluation. But it rejects the belief that such uncriticized likings bear their own credentials. Things are neither good nor bad because they immediately seem so. To be recognized as values such likings must be tested in the same way

as other suggestions, ideas, and hypotheses are tested. Such a conception also agrees with certain philosophical rationalists that immediate liking raises a problem as to criteria. But it rejects the belief of those rationalists that such criteria can be found in fixed and objective realities of any kind independent of human experience. The various traditional formulations of beliefs about the ultimate natures of values may be considered as sources of suggestion in dealing with the specific problems of value, but they are not themselves values. Beliefs about values are values only when they have been found through reflective operations to be warranted assertions. When once established, such axiological beliefs may be used as axiological principles provided they are subject to further revision, modification, and adoption through use and reflective thinking.³²

Implications and Applications

The features of school practice referred to by Dewey in demonstrating implications and applications of the universal growth theory vary somewhat according to the interests of the teaching profession at different times. During his last years the main school topics were educational aims, curriculum development, and school administration. The older topics—subject matter and method—are still recognized as important, but because of the technical definition of curriculum formulated during the 1930's, they are perhaps best considered as features of curriculum development, just as discipline, pupil placement, and school organization are best considered as features of school administration. Consequently, we shall try to organize our account of Dewey's discussion of the school around these three topics.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Dewey's statement that the "trinity of school topics is subject matter, methods, and administration or government" does not mean that he minimizes the importance of aims.³³ As a matter of fact, in

³² Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 10.

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, New York, Minton, Balch, 1929, Chap. 10.

³³ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 193.

the same book he gives more space to aims than to any other topic. Furthermore, it matters not what other school topic he may be discussing at any time, he is almost sure to refer to aims or objectives. Still, strange as it may seem to members and prospective members of the teaching profession familiar with professional education courses and official courses of study that stress some particular set of aims as all-important, Dewey does not propose any fixed set of aims to serve as standards of direction, as have proponents of certain other theories. Nevertheless, he has not left the student entirely without assistance in efforts to determine his own aims. He has said so much about aims in various connections that it is impossible to do more here than to touch some of the high points and refer the reader to the original sources.

In his most systematic discussion of aims Dewey first reaffirms his conception of growth and democracy as the universal and cultural ideals of education and the good life in these words: "The aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education—or the object and reward of learning is the continued capacity for growth. Now this idea cannot be applied to *all* members of a society except where intercourse of man with man is mutual, and except where there is adequate provision for the reconstruction of social habits and institutions by means of wide stimulation arising from equitably distributed interests. And this means a democratic society."³⁴ The educational aims with which he is primarily concerned belong therefore within the educative process and not outside it.

To define the nature of such aims as fall within an activity he explains the likenesses and differences between results and ends on the one hand, and between ends and aims on the other. They all represent the exhibition of energy. The nature of mere results is exemplified in the movements of grains of sand in the desert; the nature of ends is exemplified in the activities of bees; and the nature of aims is exemplified in the orderly and ordered activities controlled by a foreseen end that makes choice of alternatives possible. "Acting with an aim is all one with acting intelligently. . . . To have an aim is to act with meaning, not like an automatic machine; it is

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

to *mean* to do something and to perceive the meaning of things in the light of that intent." ³⁵

Through the application of his analysis of results, ends, and aims, Dewey proposes the criteria of a good aim: A good aim is "an outgrowth of existing conditions;" it is flexible in that it emerges within an activity and is capable of alteration with changing conditions in the course of action; it represents a "freeing" of activities in that it puts before the mind the "termination or conclusion of some process" by means of which the activity is directed, "rather than something to be attained and possessed." ³⁶

These criteria of a good aim are as applicable to education as to any other directed occupation. The aim of the educator, like that of the farmer, for example, is to make the energies of conditioning factors and his own activities work together rather than against one another. According to Dewey, it is as absurd for the educator, whether parent or teacher, to set up his

... own aims as the proper objects of growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of conditions. . . . Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea like education. And consequently, their purposes are indefinitely varied, differing with different children, changing as children grow and with the growth of experience on the part of the one who teaches. Even the most valid aims which can be put in words will, as words, do more harm than good unless one recognizes that they are not aims, but rather suggestions to educators as to how to observe, how to look ahead, and how to choose in liberating and directing the energies of the concrete situations in which they find themselves. ³⁷

In the light of these criteria of a good aim in general, three characteristics of any good educational aim are defined: (1) A good educational aim "must be founded upon the intrinsic activities and needs . . . of the given individual to be educated;" (2) It "must be capable of translation into a method of co-operating with the activities of those undergoing instruction;" and (3) if it is a "truly good aim," it is a comprehensive survey of the field of present

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

activities rather than a mere abstraction that is disconnected from means.³⁸

In other connections in *Democracy and Education* and elsewhere, often in the discussion of other subjects, Dewey renders still more explicit the implications of universal growth and the democratic ideal for the nature, selection, and use of specific educational aims. Immediately following his systematic analysis of aims, he states their implications for what he designates the so-called comprehensive aims. He points out that any such aim reflects certain cultural and educational defects at some particular stage in the history of civilization. For instance, natural development reflects a reaction and a protest against formal aspects of continental life that prevailed in the nineteenth century. And culture as an aim represents a reaction and a protest against the overemphasis on utility that prevailed in the early twentieth century.

Now in the development of school programs and activities "comprehensive" aims may be used in three ways. First, some one of them may be taken as all-inclusive and therefore the sole standard of direction in the selection of all specific ends and means. Second, a set of them may be used as an all-inclusive standard of direction in the same way. Third, they may be considered simply as stand-points from which to survey the existing educational situation. Dewey approves only this third way and finds such comprehensive aims valuable sources of suggestion in particular situations. Since different aims represent different points of emphasis, they are not inconsistent. Therefore, the more of such aims, the better, because they enable the educator to see things that he might otherwise miss.³⁹

From what he says in regard to the proper use of so-called comprehensive aims we may infer what he would have said in regard to certain authoritative sets of aims. Such sets of general aims as Cardinal Principles, Purposes of Education for American Democracy, Needs of Secondary School Students, or Needs of Elementary School Pupils are for him no less external than are the comprehensive aims. Therefore, they are to be considered sources of suggestion in particular situations, rather than standards of direction. Likewise

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 127-145.

the so-called scientific aims produced in the "scientific movement in education" by such authorities as Bobbitt, Charters, and Snedden, Dewey considers pertinent materials for use in the selection of aims, and not standards of direction to be immediately applied. Similarly, the aims incorporated in official courses of study, no less than other authoritative aims, are useful as sources of suggestion in the selection of aims, but real aims are indigenous to particular situations and cannot be fixed in advance by external authorities. Even the aims which the staff of any given school formulates could by administrators and teachers be considered suggestive rather than determinative of the aims of specific activities and programs.

Implicit in Dewey's analysis of aims, and his criticism of external aims, is his attitude toward what is now known as the social consensus method of determining educational aims. The advocates of this procedure would establish a set of aims, embodying both content and method and derived through social consensus on the wants of man, as indispensable criteria in the development of educational programs and activities. For Dewey, such a consensus on human wants describes only what exists and not what ought to exist. Any predetermined aims or sets of aims that embody a specified content are no less fixed than are the scientific aims derived through the questionnaire technique. Like other fixed and external aims, they are useful only as sources of suggestion, but do more harm than good when taken as standards of direction in specific situations.

In stressing the importance of thinking, Dewey reveals interesting sidelights on his conception of certain educational aims. He notes that

There is no adequate theoretical recognition that all which the school can or need do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned . . . is to develop their ability to think. The parceling out of instruction among various ends such as acquisition of skill . . . ; acquiring information . . . ; and training or thinking is a measure of the ineffective way in which we accomplish all three. Thinking which is not connected with increase of efficiency in action, and with learning more about ourselves and the world in which we live, has something the matter with it just as thought.⁴⁰

From this statement and his analysis of reflection,⁴¹ two conclusions emerge. First, isolation of different psychological types of

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

aims—skills, knowledge, appreciation, etc.,—in the learning process is indefensible. Second, it is possible to define general aims of education in terms of the modes and qualities of experience, or even the cumulative effect of such modes and qualities, provided the subject matter content is not specified. Thinking itself is one such mode or quality.

In his discussion of qualitative *vs.* quantitative values, Dewey considers the relation of the acquisition of specific measurable ends to general qualitative ends. "How far is education a matter of forming specific skills and acquiring special bodies of information which are capable of isolated treatment? It is no answer to say that a human being is always occupied in acquiring a special skill or a special body of facts, if he is learning anything at all. This is true. But the *educational* issue is what *other* things in the way of desires, tastes, aversions, abilities, and disabilities he is learning along with his specific acquisitions."⁴² Then he notes that whereas in the psychological laboratory these more general traits are neglected, "in educating individualities, no such exclusion can be had. The number of variables that enter in is enormous. The intelligence of the teacher is dependent upon the extent to which he takes into account the variables that are not obviously involved in his immediate special task. Judgment is such matter of qualitative situations and must itself be qualitative." Then he points out that the situations with which the parent or educator deals involve other than quantitative determinations and warns against the overemphasis on specific ends. "Exaggeration of their importance tends to cramp judgment, to substitute uniform rules for the free play of thought, and to emphasize the mechanical factors that also exist in schools. They contribute at most to the more efficient working of present practices in some subjects. . . . But they do not give any help in larger questions of reconstruction of curriculum and methods. What is worse, they divert attention and energy from the need of reconstruction due to change of social conditions and to the inertia of traditions of the school system."⁴³

Later on he raises the question of how educational values are to

⁴² John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education*, New York, Live-right, 1929, pp. 64-65.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66 *passim*.

be determined. He rejects as a fallacy the belief that social conditions determine educational objectives, and continues:

Education is autonomous and should be free to determine its own ends, its own objectives. To go outside the educational function and to borrow objectives from an external source is to surrender the educational cause. . . . Educators have a place in this process, but they are not it, far from it. . . . Education is itself a process of discovering what values are worth while and are to be pursued as objectives. To see what is going on and to observe the results of what goes on so as to see their further consequences in the process of growth, and so on indefinitely, is the only way in which the value of what takes place can be judged. To look to some outside source to provide aims is to fail to know what education is as an ongoing process. What a society is, it is, by and large, as a product of education as far as its animating spirit and purpose are concerned. Hence it does not furnish a standard to which education is to conform. It supplies material by which to judge more clearly what education as it has been carried on has done to those who have been subjected to it. Another conclusion follows. There is no such thing as a fixed and final set of objectives, even for the time being or temporarily. Each day of teaching ought to enable a teacher to revise and better in some respect the objectives aimed at in previous work.⁴⁴

Perhaps at this point the irresponsible criticism that Dewey is not concerned with aims should be exposed by a direct quotation. At the close of the Inglis Lecture on the prevailing educational confusion, Dewey says that the one thing required is the recognition of new aims. "For confusion is due ultimately to aimlessness. . . . The simile of new wine in old bottles is trite. Yet no other is so apt. We use leathern bottles in an age of steel and glass. The bottles leak and sag. The new wine spills and sours. No prohibitory holds against the attempt to make a new wine of culture and to provide new containers. Only new aims can inspire educational effort for clarity and unity. They alone can reduce confusion; if they do not terminate conflict they will at least render it intelligent and profitable."⁴⁵

Finally, Dewey's distinction between content aims and method

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁵ John Dewey, *The Way out of Educational Confusion* (The Inglis Lecture), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931, pp. 40-41.

aims should perhaps be mentioned. For him, method and subject matter are inherent components of educative experience and can be distinguished only in retrospect through reflective analysis. When thus distinguished, subject matter refers to the *what* and method to the *how* of experiencing.⁴⁶ At this point, however, we are concerned with the effects of method—the way pupils are treated, as compared with the effects of subject matter—the things studied. In his analysis of the idea of aims, Dewey seems to have in mind the effects of subject matter since they are specific and can be determined in specific situations. But method aims, from the standpoint of the universal-growth theory, may at least be defined in advance.

In his consideration of method as the effects of individual responses Dewey notes four attitudes that may be cultivated through method—the way pupils are treated—regardless of what the subject matter may be. "Some attitudes may be named, however, which are central in effective intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter. Among the most important are directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness (or whole-heartedness), and responsibility."⁴⁷ In the course of explaining these attitudes or personality traits Dewey mentions several others which may be taken as synonymous or constituent attitudes. Directness signifies confidence or straightforwardness. Open-mindedness signifies accessibility of mind, expansion of horizon, and intellectual hospitality. Single-mindedness signifies intellectual integrity, honesty, and sincerity. Responsibility signifies intellectual thoroughness; that is, the disposition to consider in advance the probable consequences and to acknowledge them in action.⁴⁸ There are many other such traits which Dewey emphasizes from time to time and which he doubtless considers the effects of method. Among them are initiative, independence, cooperation, and originality.

These effects of method he usually calls attitudes, personality traits, dispositions, habits, and qualities of experience. Nevertheless, later experimentalists find support not only in the whole philosophic movement to which they, along with Dewey and Mead, are com-

⁴⁶ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 193-197.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-210.

mitted, but also in the ideals of growth and democracy as Dewey has explained them in terms of beliefs about the ends and means of the school. Some experimentalists, like Childs and Counts, have found in Dewey's beliefs about growth, reconstruction of experience, and democracy support for the advance selection of the specific subject matter or content aims required for the realization of the new social order which they envision. On the other hand, some like Bode and Kilpatrick have found in these same Deweyan beliefs support for rejecting predetermined content aims of all kinds and for concentrating attention on the more general and flexible method ends, which they usually define in terms of attitudes, interests, ideals, and personality traits.⁴⁹

Both groups recognize the importance of both kinds of aims, but members of the first group give the impression that for them subject matter or content aims are primary and fundamental in various educational situations, and that the qualitative method ends which seem fundamental to the second group are secondary and subsidiary. Members of the first group sometimes attribute to the second group the belief that content aims are mere means to the realization of general method aims, and members of the second group often attribute to the first group the belief that general method ends are mere means to the realization of specific content aims.

In the controversy that raged in the 1930's Dewey does not explicitly take sides. As was his custom in dealing with many issues on which his experimentalist colleagues in philosophy and education were divided, we see him simply restating his original position in different terms. Although some 20 years before, he had already identified growth with the improvement of the quality of experience, he now reaffirms his original interpretation of both growth and democracy and implies the necessity of defining both in terms of preferred qualities of the process of experience and through an empirical study of experience itself. Although he himself does not formally and explicitly define any set of such preferred qualities to be used as standards of direction in the selection of both ends

⁴⁹ John L. Childs, *Education and Morals*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

Boyd H. Bode, *How We Learn*, Boston, Heath, 1940.

and means in specific situations, his belief in the need for such standards is unmistakable.

Those committed to the general philosophy to which the first generation of American pragmatists contributed most, should, if they take Dewey's suggestion seriously, cooperate with one another in determining and applying such qualities in planning, developing, and evaluating educational policies, programs, and activities. If we agree with Dewey that something "hardly less than a revolution in teaching" is desirable and that it will come when all instructors realize that "the quality of the mental process" or "the quality of the experience which is had" is "the measure of educative growth," then we have the responsibility of determining what qualities of experience are most desirable, and of so defining them that all members of the teaching profession can readily understand and systematically apply them over a wide front.

The foregoing interpretation of Dewey's conception of educational aims shows that he recognizes the responsibility of deliberate education for cultivating certain fundamental dispositions, attitudes, or qualities of personality rather than others. These are process or method aims and no doubt include regard for human personality, sharing experience, the worth of the experimental method of thinking, and widening areas of common interests and concerns. But this fact implies that such dispositions, attitudes, and personality traits, however designated, do not have a definite subject matter content that can be prescribed in advance without regard to the specific situations in which they are to be cultivated. The method aims are permanent and abiding in form, but in content they vary from one situation to another.

This interpretation of method aims also affirms, at least by implication, Dewey's recognition of the school's responsibility for content ends whether conceived in terms of knowledge, skills, appreciations, or in some other way. It likewise shows that for Dewey specific content aims of the right kind must be determined in the light of the method aims by those in charge of concrete educational situations in which these content aims are to be sought. Finally, this interpretation suggests that for Dewey the qualities of experience, of which the fundamental dispositions, attitudes, and qualities of personality are the cumulative effect, are the primary aims. In

form they are permanent and enduring, but flexible in content. They may—in fact, should—be defined in advance and then used as criteria in the selection of content aims in specific situations. Dewey does not go quite this far, but in effect is moving in this direction.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

For two reasons Dewey seldom uses the term “curriculum development.” First, when it emerged as one of the current features of school practice in the 1930’s, he had already indicated the implications and applications of his version of the general philosophy of which he is one of the recognized founders. Second, in applying his philosophy to social institutions, including the school, he usually directs attention to current features of school practice rather than to making new classifications and introducing new terms. Nevertheless, he would probably have approved from the beginning the present technical definition of the curriculum as “all the activities of pupils under the direction of the school,” or some close equivalent.

Around the turn of the century he is already including the extracurricular activities in his discussion of the curriculum. In some of his later discussions of the school he shows that activity or experience is not a distinguishing characteristic of any curriculum because pupils engage in activities and have experiences in any kind of school.⁵⁰ And he shows further that the most important thing about any school is the quality of these activities or experiences. But from first to last he discusses whatever features of curriculum development—subject matter, organization, method of teaching, etc.—are at the time of most concern to the teaching profession because they are the most useful vehicles for explaining universal growth, the democratic ideal, and desirable qualities of experience.

SCOPE AND CONTENT. For Dewey, curriculum activities or experiences always involve the pupils and the environment, especially the social environment. Consequently, for him the realization of aims consistent with the theory of universal growth or the improvement of the quality of experience in a democratic society requires that

⁵⁰ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

curriculum-makers at whatever educational level observe two principles: one psychological and the other sociological, neither of which is to be compromised or subordinated to the other.⁵¹ As early as 1897 in the first paragraph of his "Pedagogic Creed," Dewey indicates his beliefs about the scope of the curriculum.

I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at birth. . . . Through this unconscious education the individual gradually comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in getting together. . . . The most formal and technical education in the world cannot safely depart from this general process. It can only organize it or differentiate it in some particular direction.⁵²

In the light of educational aims consistent with universal growth in any situation, the criteria for selecting the content of the curriculum are to be found in the structure of the individual on the one hand, and in the culture of the community on the other. "The child's own instincts and powers furnish the material and give the starting-point for all education. . . . [I believe that] Knowledge of social conditions, of the present state of civilization, is necessary in order properly to interpret the child's powers. The child has his own instincts and tendencies, but we do not know what these mean until we can translate them into their social equivalents. We must be able to carry them back into a social past and see them as the inheritance of previous race activities. We must also be able to project them into the future to see what their outcome and end will be." ⁵³

Since all types of subject matter that may be distinguished within the culture correspond to certain structures in the individual, they would all be represented in the school curriculum at every school level. But just what selections should be made at any given time and place in a democratic society depends upon the powers and tendencies of the pupil on the one hand, and the cultural conditions of the community on the other. In the light of the method aim of

⁵¹ John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897), in *Education Today*, ed. Joseph Ratner, New York, Putnam's, 1940, pp. 3-5.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

universal growth, it is therefore impossible to determine in advance just what the subject matter content of the curriculum should be. Although advance selection on the part of official committees assisted by specialists in psychology, sociology, and other fields, is highly desirable, it is to be considered only tentative and suggestive. Likewise, such advance planning on the part of the school should be merely suggestive for the teacher, who in the last analysis is the curriculum-maker wherever the curriculum means "all the activities of the pupils under the direction of the school." But in general, for Dewey, studies within the elementary school curriculum may be placed under three heads, an arrangement that has some philosophic value.

The first group consists of those "which are not so much studies as active pursuits or occupations—modes of activity which appeal to the child for their own sake, and yet lend themselves to educational ends." This group of studies "presents to the child the same sort of activities that occupy him directly in his daily life; and re-presents to him modes of social occupation with which he is thoroughly familiar in his everyday surroundings." It includes a wide variety of activities: manual training—"work with cardboard, wood, bent iron, the cooking, sewing, weaving, etc."; plays and games and school gardens; and outdoor excursions and much of the observation and experimental work in nature study. Physical activity, the use of bodily organs, is necessarily a phase of whatever directly occupies and absorbs the child.⁵⁴

The value of these physical activities in the direct training of hand, eye, and ear, and their effect in the indirect training of attention, imagination, and power of judgment is now recognized. The manual training movement has the support of the growing importance attached, in psychological theory, to the motor factor, which is so closely bound up with the intellectual elements of sensitivity and ideas that they cannot be intelligently considered without reference to it. But besides these established beliefs, Dewey thinks there is "also something peculiarly appropriate, upon the social side, in demanding a considerable part in elementary education for this group of activities." Constructive activities, he says,

⁵⁴ John Dewey, "The Place of Manual Training in the Elementary Course of Study" (1901), *ibid.*, pp. 53, 54.

"lay hold of the entire physical and mental organism; give play to fundamental aptitudes and instincts; and meet fundamental organic necessities," so that "we should see what social needs they spring out of, and what social values, what intellectual and emotional nutriment, they bring to the child which cannot be conveyed as well in any other way."⁵⁵

The second group of studies consists of "the subject matter which gives us the background of social life. I include here both geography and history; history as the record of what has made present forms of associated life what they are; geography as the statement of the physical conditions and theater of man's social activities." These subjects naturally grow out of the manual training in the first group which projects and ramifies into them inevitably. "It only remains for the teacher to be alert to these connections and to take advantage of them." History, along with manual training, science, nature study, and art, is one of the controlling facts in primary education. But in the middle and upper grades of the elementary school, geography should also be included.⁵⁶

The third group consists of those "studies which give the pupil command of the forms and methods of intellectual communication and inquiry. Such studies as reading, grammar, and the more technical modes of arithmetic are the instrumentalities which the race has worked out as best adapted to further its distinctively intellectual interests. The child's need of command of these, so that, using them freely for himself, he can appropriate the intellectual products of civilization, is so obvious that they constitute the bulk of the traditional curriculum."⁵⁷

Extreme emphasis on these studies, especially in the primary school, Dewey thinks, can no longer be justified as in an earlier period. They have long been the core of the elementary school curriculum in the first three years. Although other subjects may be included, they are "introduced in strict subordination." The fact that "this mode of education was adapted to past conditions is in itself a reason why it should no longer hold supreme sway. The present has its claims. It is in education, if anywhere, that the claims

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 60.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

of the present should be controlling. . . . My proposition is, that conditions—social, industrial, and intellectual, have undergone such radical change, that the time has come for a thoroughgoing examination of the emphasis put upon linguistic work in elementary instruction.”⁵⁸

Dewey would shift this group of studies from the hub to the rim of the curriculum for many reasons: the ability to read is no longer the sole avenue to knowledge nor the only tool which insures “control over the accumulated resources of civilization”; scientific methods of observation, experimentation, and testing “permit the pupil to begin his school career in direct contact with the materials of nature and life”; reading and writing are no longer the only open doors to learning and success; with the great change in the intellectual atmosphere these studies “lose their motive and motor force”; much of the time once devoted to the communicative arts must now be devoted to the practical arts which the shift from a rural to an industrial life denies the child; evidence from physiology justifies, in the early years of the elementary school, more activities involving the larger muscles and fewer involving the smaller muscles; and the connection of the symbols and forms of these intellectual studies become more interesting and meaningful to children when approached through the first group.⁵⁹

Although it is more difficult to document the implications of Dewey’s theory of universal and continuous growth for the scope and content of secondary education than it is for elementary, he has said enough in various connections to indicate his general position. His statement in the “Creed” that the “most formal and technical education in the world cannot safely depart” from the general process through which the individual “gradually comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in getting together” is as applicable to secondary education as to elementary.⁶⁰

The process itself sets the limits and determines the scope of all education. Dewey’s psychological principles about the powers and instincts of the child and his sociological principles about “knowl-

⁵⁸ John Dewey, “The Primary Education Fetich,” *The Forum*, 25:315-328, May, 1898, p. 315.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-321.

⁶⁰ Dewey, “My Pedagogic Creed,” in *Education Today*, p. 3.

edge of social conditions of present civilization" apply to secondary education as well as to elementary. A knowledge of the psychological structure of the individual indicates what is possible for him, and a knowledge of social or cultural conditions at the time indicates what these instincts and powers mean. In secondary education these two principles are the criteria for selection and placement of the subject-matter content of the curriculum that will facilitate growth or improve the quality of experience.

Particular situations on the secondary level will differ from those on the elementary level. But whatever they are, they will represent a differentiation of the three groups of studies into which the subject matter of the lower school is classified. Although Dewey admits that specialization may be necessary in varying situations, his primary concern is that all secondary students continue to widen and deepen their interpretation of the culture begun in the elementary school.

Just what particular selections from the three general fields should constitute the subject matter would be determined on the basis of the psychological characteristics of the student and the social conditions in each particular situation. Still each field is equally important and should not be neglected at any age level of the secondary school. There are always some factors in each field that are relevant to both the students and the social conditions of any community, and it is the function of curriculum-makers in each situation to determine what these factors are.

Nevertheless, there is no one uniform set of subjects or courses that is indispensable for all students in all schools and in all communities. On this point Dewey says:

This is not the place or time to go into the question of what is meant by general training and its relation to secondary-school work. It certainly means, however, that the pupil shall be touched, shall be stimulated, on all sides; that he shall be given a survey, at least, of the universe in its manifold phases. Through this survey, through this elaboration, coming to know both himself and the universe, he may get his orientation—his placing of himself in the larger world. With proper economy and instruction, and harmonious organization instead of blind confusion in the curriculum, this result should certainly be attained by the time the average student is twenty or twenty-one.

He then adds: "Having found himself, a student would then be

prepared to enter upon that special training which is needed to equip him for the particular calling in life which he finds adapted to the freest and most effective expression of his own powers."⁶¹

In his reference to general education as the primary function of the secondary school, Dewey indicates his beliefs as to the proper scope and content of the curriculum of higher educational institutions. Referring to the idea of special training mentioned above, he says:

This, by whatever name called, is professional training. The extent to which our larger universities have already moved in this direction is concealed, first, by the fact that they still retain considerable secondary work in the earlier years of their course; and secondly, by the fact that training for the calling of teaching, or of special research, is marked off in the public mind from training for the calling of doctor, lawyer, or engineer. In reality the kind of training, which students receive to make them professors or directors of laboratories is, of course, as professional as that of the school of technology or medicine.⁶²

Nevertheless, with obvious approval he continues:

The movement, however, is steady, and I believe inevitable, in one direction: the demarcation of secondary work as the period of general training and culture, thus restoring to it freshness and vitality by making it what it should be, the renaissance of the individual mind, the period of self-consciousness in the true sense, of knowledge of self in relation to the larger meanings of life; and the reservation of the higher institution for specific training, for gaining control of the particular body of knowledge and methods of research and verification which fit the individual to apply truth to the guidance of his own special calling in life. All of us have callings and occupations—only the luxuriously idle and the submerged idle, only the leisure class of fashion and of pauperism, violate this law. When education ceases to ignore this fact, when it recognizes it frankly and fully, and adapts its curriculum and methods to it, the university will be coherent in itself and also doing what the people really want done.⁶³

Therefore, for Dewey, the function of the university is specialized education as contrasted with that of the secondary school,

⁶¹ Dewey, "The Place of Manual Training in the Elementary Course of Study," *ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

general education. This distinction between the university and the secondary school does not necessarily mean a formal reorganization of high schools, colleges, and universities, as at first sight it may seem. As to the scope and content of the curriculum, all types of institutions, however designated, should confine their efforts to their proper role. Students under the age of 20 or 21 should concentrate on general education, and older students should concentrate on some form of specialized education. Practical conditions may require that many existing institutions play a dual role of secondary school and university; but they should distinguish clearly between the two. For instance, the liberal arts college may for the first two years concentrate on general education—the secondary school, and then cooperate with some existing university in the preparation of students for research work in certain subjects—the university role.

From the standpoint of a tendency that has been underway now for a long time and that Dewey thinks should be consciously and deliberately promoted, the ideal university consists of the various divisions, schools, or departments, the sole function of which is the preparation of students for recognized professions or callings. These callings, of course, include not only medicine, law, and engineering, but also business, teaching, research, and others as conditions require.

As for the subject matter for both general and specialized education, Dewey has very definite ideas. The curriculum of the secondary school should be designed for students from thirteen or fourteen years of age to twenty or twenty-one, whether in the 7-, 8-, or 9-4-4, the 6-6-4, the 7-5-4, the 6-3-3-4, or the 6-3-3-2-2 plan, or some other, and should represent the selection, differentiation, and organization of materials implicit in the threefold classification of studies for the elementary school. These three groups of studies, which are constantly expanding, include all that is of concern to man as man, whatever his calling may be. The particular items selected and the way they are organized should vary from one situation to another because of differences in abilities and interests of students on the one hand, and the cultural conditions of the community on the other.

The curriculum of the university conceived as a federation of colleges, schools, or divisions, however designated, is vastly different from that of the secondary school. For the university student,

that subject matter is selected which will, in the judgment of those in charge, best prepare him for some particular form of service, regardless of his ability or immediate interests. Although material must still correspond roughly to the three groups of studies, it varies in terms of the requirements for different professions rather than for the general orientation in the culture, as in the case of the ideal secondary school.

For the present and in the foreseeable future professional education should be much more general than the specialized training provided by the high schools and colleges of the past. The program of the traditional liberal arts college is too specialized not only for liberal or general education, but even for the training of research workers and teachers in the secondary schools and colleges. The programs of the usual technical high school and college are too specialized for a dynamic society in which unforeseen circumstances require skilled workers to change occupations.

SUBJECT-MATTER MATERIALS. Our summary account of Dewey's conception of the curriculum must turn now from scope and content to another closely related feature which may be designated as subject-matter materials. This topic has reference to the sources of subject matter used in the development of curriculum, irrespective of scope and content. For Dewey, there are two kinds of subject-matter materials—the indirect and the direct—both of which are indispensable to curriculum activities that are *really* educative.⁶⁴ "Much of our experience is indirect; it is dependent upon signs which intervene between the things and ourselves, signs which stand for or represent the former. . . . All language, all symbols, are implements of an indirect experience; in technical language the experience which is procured by their means is 'mediated.' It stands in contrast with an immediate, direct experience, something in which we take part vitally and at first hand, instead of through the intervention of representative media."

Since the scope of personal, vitally direct experience is very limited, were it not "for the intervention of agencies representing absent and distant affairs, our experience would remain on the level of that of the brutes. Every step from savagery to civilization is

⁶⁴ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-274.

dependent upon the invention of media which enlarge the range of purely immediate experience and give it deepened as well as wider meaning by connecting it with things which can only be signified or symbolized." The use of these mediating materials becomes increasingly important in curriculum development from the primary school through the university.

But these materials are insufficient without an abundance of material derived from immediate and direct experience. "There is always a danger that symbols will not be truly representative; danger that instead of really calling up the absent and remote in a way to make it enter a present experience, the linguistic media of representation will become an end in themselves." The only safeguard against this tendency toward the mere academic or bookishness is the use of the materials of direct and immediate experience which supplies the foundation for what in colloquial speech is called "a realizing sense." This "realizing sense" means "genuine appreciation," "coming home to one," or "really taking it in." It differs from the remote and coldly detached quality of representative experience in the same way as reading a technical description of a picture differs from seeing it; or as just seeing it differs from being moved by it. To provide this "realizing sense" of symbols and materials which are significant on their own account, direct experience is indispensable in curriculum development at all educational levels, but more particularly for young children and beginners in any subject. The relative emphasis on the one or the other should vary with the experiential background of the student. But both are equally important, for neither is sufficient without the other.⁶⁵

ORGANIZATION OF SUBJECT MATTER. Another feature of curriculum development which Dewey constantly uses as a vehicle for demonstrating the implications of the theory of universal growth or improvement of the quality of experience is the organization of subject matter. It may refer to the problem of organizing material into subjects or courses for study, or of organizing the effects of such material in the process of learning. For Dewey, the latter problem is primary and determines one's attitude toward the former. In practice there are two different approaches to the problem of organizing

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

subject matter in the mind of the learner. The more usual procedure is to begin with the subject matter as organized in the mind of the teacher, the author of the textbook, or the expert in the field, analyze it into its logical elements, arrange them in the order of logical complexity from the simplest to the most abstract, and assign the simplest elements to the younger and inexperienced, and the most complex to the oldest and most mature students. A second approach is to have the learner begin with the subject matter as it is already organized in his experience and subject it to continuous reconstruction through further study.⁶⁶

The two approaches are often contrasted and called, respectively, the logical and the psychological methods of organization. Those who adopt the first approach emphasize the importance of the shortcuts and the economy of time. Dewey admits that less ground will be covered in the second approach, but claims that what is learned will be learned better. As a matter of fact, he goes further and holds that whatever is learned must be learned in the "psychological order" even by brighter pupils who apparently follow the logical order. When the educative process is conceived as reflective thinking, the psychological and the logical order are not antithetical. "The 'psychological' as we use the term, is not, then, opposed to the 'logical.' As far as an actual process of thought is truly reflective, it is alert, careful, thorough, definite, and accurate, pursuing an orderly course. In short, it is then logical. . . . A genuinely reflective activity terminates in declaring just what the outcome is." When formulated as definitely as possible, the outcome becomes a "true *conclusion*." "Reflective activity also makes a survey, a review, of the material upon which *alone* the conclusion rests, and thus formulates the *premises* upon which it rests." Real learning always involves thinking, and "psychological thinking is just the actual process that takes place." It has genuinely logical or reflective qualities because of its intrinsic intellectual elements and the pressure of circumstances.⁶⁷

Proponents of the logical approach to the organization of subject matter in the mind of the pupil often neglect the psychological phase of reflective thinking, and the proponents of the psychological approach often neglect the logical phase. In so doing, however, both

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-261.

⁶⁷ Dewey, *How We Think*, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79.

overlook "the internal and necessary connection between the actual process of thinking and its intellectual product." One group "thinks that the mind is naturally so illogical in its processes that logical form must be impressed upon it from without." The other group "also assumes that the mind is naturally averse to logical form," and that logical order "is of slight importance in education, at least in that of the young."⁶⁸

For Dewey, "The basic error of the two schools is the same. Both ignore and virtually deny the fact that tendencies toward . . . truly logical activity are native to the mind" and show themselves even in early childhood. As a matter of fact, "the psychological and the logical, instead of being opposed to each other, . . . are connected as the earlier and terminal . . . states of the same process."⁶⁹

The logical arrangement of the expert is not, however, the same as that of the beginner. "That which is strictly logical from the standpoint of subject matter really represents the conclusions of an expert, trained mind" such as those of the conventional textbook. If a person is ever to be able to make such logical classifications, definitions, and generalizations, he must think "alertly and carefully on his own *present* level." The beginner cannot "commence where the adept stops." He should, however, "be trained to demand from himself careful examination, consecutiveness, and some sort of summary and formulation of his conclusions, together with a statement of the reasons for them."⁷⁰

In the foregoing Dewey is suggesting what he later will call progressive organization, as opposed to both the tendency of certain "traditionalists" toward "logical organization" and the tendency of certain progressives toward "psychological organization." "When education is conceived in terms of experience . . . a study . . . must be derived from materials . . . of ordinary life experience." The first step is to find "the materials for learning within experience," and the second step "is the progressive development of what has already been experienced into a fuller and richer . . . and more organized form . . . that gradually approximates" that of the expert. "The educative experience requires that equal thought and attention be

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 82-83.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

given" to both phases of the problem.⁷¹ Although the second phase is more difficult than the first, those who deal with younger children "do not have much difficulty in determining the range of past experience or in finding activities that connect in vital ways with it. With older children both factors of the problem offer increased difficulties to the educator. It is harder to find out the background of the experience of individuals and harder to find out just how the subject matters already contained in that experience shall be directed so as to lead out to larger and better organized fields."⁷² Dewey insists that the problem be squarely faced by all who are concerned primarily with what real education ought to be. The starting point must be the experiential background of the learner, and the standard of direction must be the logical organization of the expert.

In line with his conception of progressive organization of subject matter in the mind of the learner, Dewey suggests the responsibility of specialists for such organization of materials as will facilitate the work of the teacher. He indicates the need for experimenting with different plans of organization which may involve research specialists as well as administrators. He emphasizes the need for breaking down the traditional isolation of school subjects. He calls attention to the possibilities of the project method and the problem method that cut across all subject-matter lines. He does not, however, distinguish these conceptions and does not consider any one or all of them the only way out of the confusion symbolized by the isolation of subjects. For him it is not so much subject organization that creates the barrier to progressive organization of subject matter learned as it is the sharp lines drawn between subjects on the one hand, and between subjects and the activities of social life on the other.

The time has come, he thinks, for a thoroughgoing reorganization of subject matter on all educational levels so that the occupations of the people will constitute the primary basis for the organization of subjects and courses. Only then will liberal education and practical education be perceived as essential aspects of any education that is truly liberal and general, and the teacher be free to promote progressive organization of subject matter in the mind of the learner at all educational levels.

⁷¹ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-89.

⁷² *Ibid.*

METHOD OF TEACHING. Dewey's reference to the problem method and the project method suggests the topic of general method, now considered a feature of curriculum development. This topic he also uses as a means of elaborating and applying his theory of universal growth to school practice. As already noted, he apparently does not distinguish between the problem method and the project method as ways of reducing the segregation of school subjects, the isolation of the "liberal and the practical," in general education, and the separation of the psychological from the logical in subject organization. It should be noted, too, that he does not consider the problem method or the project method as the only means of integration and unification his theory requires. Referring to the "project method" he says: "I do not urge it as the sole way out of educational confusion, not even in the elementary school, though I think experimentation with it is desirable in college and secondary school."⁷³

These two facts show beyond question that he considers the so-called problem method and the project method different formulations of the same conception, and that no one such formulation may be taken as the universal method of curriculum development. They suggest also that this conception of the educative process may be translated into a general pattern that is applicable in learning and teaching, whatever the subject matter. For Dewey all learning that is educative has an intellectual aspect, and on this point he is quite clear:

From what has been said, however, it is evident that education, *upon the intellectual side*, is vitally concerned with cultivating the attitude of reflective thinking, preserving it where it already exists, and changing looser methods of thought into stricter ones whenever possible. Of course, education is not exhausted in its intellectual aspect; there are practical attitudes of efficiency to be formed, moral dispositions to be strengthened and developed, esthetic appreciations to be cultivated. But in all these things there is at least an element of conscious meaning and hence of thought. Otherwise, practical activity is mechanical and routine, morals are blind and arbitrary, and esthetic appreciation is sentimental gush.⁷⁴

Therefore, in translating the theory of universal growth into a pattern of learning and teaching—a general method—he places the

⁷³ Dewey, *The Way Out of Educational Confusion*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁷⁴ Dewey, *How We Think*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

main emphasis on this "thought" element, which is fundamental in activities whether they are primarily practical, moral, esthetic, or intellectual. This pattern of general method is identical in principle with the steps of reflective thinking conceived as the method of knowing, which has already been mentioned in the preceding section as a feature of knowledge.

For the convenience of the reader, one of his most recent formulations which he systematically applied to procedure in teaching is here cited: "The two limits of every unit of thinking are a perplexed, troubled, or confused situation at the beginning and a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation at the close." Of these two situations, the first is "pre-reflective" and the other "post-reflective." The phases or aspects of the pattern of reflective thinking within these limits "are (1) *suggestions*, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been *felt* . . . into a *problem* to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or *hypothesis*, to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition . . . in the sense in which reasoning is a part, . . . and (5) testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action."⁷⁵

For Dewey the principles of reflective thinking are applicable to every feature of the learning-teaching relationship. They are the criteria for determining the function of the recitation or whatever device or technique the teacher may use in dealing with pupils. They are equally applicable on all educational levels and with all types of subject matter. They are not, however, conceived as chronological steps to be followed in order. They are logical principles to be considered as criteria in planning, developing, and evaluating curriculum activities and in selecting devices and techniques to be used. Although as a method of curriculum organization the principle of reflective thinking may be considered one among a number of devices that may be used, it is the universal method of teaching as it is the universal method of science and research.

As Professor Childs says, pragmatists generally agree with Dewey that "so far as possible the acquisition of skills, techniques, mean-

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

ings, and beliefs should be made a conscious process, so that the learner will grasp the connections—the life significance and relevance—of that which he is learning.” But as he further observes, pragmatists do not all see eye to eye with Dewey in his effort to “make the research pattern of experimental inquiry the foundational and the inclusive pattern for education and teaching.” Although Professor Childs admits that research and teaching “have much in common,” he is “convinced that education suffers whenever the two are identified.” He is further convinced as Dewey himself suggests, that “there are two kinds of inquiry and they need to be distinguished.”⁷⁶

For Childs, the pattern of a complete act of thought is applicable to genuine research situations from the analysis of which it was derived, and therefore to certain learning-teaching situations. He does not agree that:

The problem of the *communication* and the *acquisition* of meaning can be equated with the problem of the *discovery* of meaning in the sense in which the achievement of knowledge through research is ordinarily interpreted. In research the problem to be resolved is paramount and controls the whole process. The supreme test of a research project is what has been discovered as a result of the investigation. In education the meanings already known and which are to be communicated to the young necessarily occupy a central place. The supreme test of an educational experience is not primarily what new knowledge has been uncovered, but rather what changes have taken place in the habits, appreciations, meanings, and attitudes of the young.⁷⁷

This writer agrees with Professor Childs in regard to the differences between research and learning established meanings. Apparently in identifying them, Dewey is open to the charge that “incidental learning” is educationally sufficient, and to the further charge that “when problem-solving activities are thus narrowly conceived, they cannot provide for much that should be learned.”⁷⁸ This writer is inclined to think that Dewey himself is aware of the difficulty; that he does not approve any existing situation; and that he does not advocate the establishment of any new one. Instead, for him

⁷⁶ Childs, *American Pragmatism and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 354, 355.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

the way out of the educational confusion is to define a set of desirable qualities of the process of experience for use as criteria in the development of educational programs and activities on all educational levels. His analysis of experience in *Experience and Education* seems to point in this direction.

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

Compared with his formal treatment of educational aims and curriculum development, Dewey's discussion of school administration is very scattered and incidental. For example, in his most complete educational work, *Democracy and Education*, he refers to the topic only three times.⁷⁹ In the first instance, he merely indicates that administration is in part responsible for securing "school facilities of such amplitude and efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic inequalities and secure to all the wards of the nation equality of equipment for their future careers." In the second instance, he simply recognizes without comment that administration is one of the main features of school practice. "The trinity of school topics is subject matter, methods, and administration." In the third instance, he summarizes the import of what he said earlier about the social function of education by stating that "the measure of the worth of the administration, curriculum, and methods of instruction of the school is the extent to which they are animated by a social spirit." Still, in various connections, he says enough about school administration to indicate the implications of the theory of growth and democracy for some of the more important topics usually classified as primarily administrative.

POLICY-MAKING. For Dewey, the seat of authority in school administration as in the federal government is to be found in the consent of all concerned openly arrived at. When so conceived, school boards, superintendents, principals, presidents, and teachers are all administrators. In an autocratic society it is the responsibility of those at the top to decide what is good for the people and to require their official representatives at each lower level to follow the rules and regulations they provide for the realization of these ends. In school administration the relationship of officials to one another is known as the line-staff organization. The administrator at each lower

⁷⁹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 193, 415.

level merely follows instructions from the next higher level with minimum variation. But for Dewey, in a society committed to both political democracy and democracy as a way of life, the source of administrative authority in the school, as in every other social institution, rests, in the last analysis, not on what administrative officials consider good for pupils and teachers but on what all concerned consider good for the entire group.

In practice such a sharing of responsibility in administration requires constant consultation and discussion in the determination of policies. Official school boards, superintendents, and presidents must keep the lines of communication open from top to bottom in the determination of general policies. Deans, department chairmen, principals, and supervisors must work out policies *with* rather than *for* their faculties. In turn, teachers should plan policies and programs *with* rather than *for* their pupils.

Dewey finds the tendency in this direction well established, especially in the pupil-teacher relationship, and considerable progress has been made even with official administrators and teachers. In 1901, he had pointed out: "The teacher has not the power of initiation and constructive endeavor which is necessary to the fulfillment of the function of teaching. The learner finds conditions antagonistic (or at least lacking) to the individual mental power and to adequate responsibility for its use."⁸⁰

Thirty-four years later in his address before the Department of Superintendents (NEA), he refers to his earlier statement in regard to the lack of official constitutional provision for the participation of teachers in school administration and says: "I could not make that statement today. There has been in some places a great advance in the democratic direction." Still he notes that "even up to the present democratic methods of dealing with pupils have made more progress than have similar methods of dealing with members of the teaching staff. . . . Whatever reason holds for adopting this course with respect to the young certainly more strongly holds for teachers, since the latter are more mature and have more experience."⁸¹

⁸⁰ John Dewey, "The People and the Schools," *Educational Review*, 21:459-474, May 1901, p. 460.

⁸¹ John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," *School and Society*, 45:458-462, April 3, 1937, p. 460.

Dewey's argument in favor of administrative provision for the participation of teachers in policy-making is to be found in the promotion of growth in a society committed to the democratic way of life. "The best way to produce initiative and constructive power is to exercise it. Power, as well as interest, comes by use and practice." Teachers are better qualified for the "delicate task of developing character and good judgment in the young" when they "have that understanding of what they are doing that comes from having shared in forming its guiding ideas." The only way of conserving what is good in the experience of "successful teachers" is to provide for them to transmit it to "other teachers who might profit by it." Unless teachers understand the reasons for the courses of study they are called upon to use in the classroom, waste is inevitable.⁸²

PUPIL DISCIPLINE. As a feature of school administration and management pupil discipline is usually conceived as the problem of maintaining order, but for Dewey discipline is a personality trait to be acquired by each pupil. Such a trait may be conceived as a habit of following directions and doing as one is told or the habit of self-control. For Dewey the power of self-control on the part of the pupil is an educational ideal and the criterion to be considered in the determination of methods of maintaining order is a condition of instruction.

Discipline in this sense consists of "the power to recognize what one is about" and "persistence in accomplishments." A disciplined person has been trained "to consider his activities, to undertake them deliberately," and he has the "power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in the face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty." Such a person has the essence of discipline which means "power at command; mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to move to do it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be disciplined. . . . Discipline is positive."⁸³

When thus conceived "discipline is a product, an outcome, an achievement, not something applied from without. All genuine education *terminates* in discipline, but it *proceeds* by engaging the mind in activities worth while for their own sake." Furthermore, "the

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 460-462.

⁸³ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.

discipline that is identical with trained power is also identical with freedom," when conceived as a positive achievement rather than absence of physical restraint. For in this sense, "freedom is power to act and to execute independent of external tutelage. It signifies mastery capable of independent exercise, emancipation from leading strings of others, not mere unhindered external operation." For the end to be sought, whether called discipline or freedom, "is something to be achieved through conquering, by personal reflection, the difficulties that prevent immediate overflow into actions and spontaneous success."⁸⁴ Discipline is therefore another name for freedom, which is a positive and constructive power achieved through the intelligent operation which the determination and pursuit of ends involves.

Needless to say, interest is indispensable to discipline or freedom as a positive and constructive achievement. "Even the more purely intellectual phase" of discipline "is not possible without interest. Deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest. . . . That interest is requisite for executive persistence" as a phase of discipline, "is even more obvious. . . . Interest measures—or rather is—the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one to moving one to act for its realization."⁸⁵

In classroom situations where discipline is conceived as a positive and constructive power to be developed through intelligent determination and pursuit of ends, the seat of authority is in the whole group including both teacher and pupils rather than in the personal will of the teacher.

When the school or class "is a group or community held together by participation in common activities," the primary source of control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise "in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute" and to which all feel a responsibility. Although such a community has its ground in the native sociability of pupils, it does not spontaneously organize itself in an enduring way. "It requires thought and planning ahead. The educator is responsible for a knowledge of individuals and for a knowledge of subject matter that will enable activities to be selected which lend themselves to social organization, an or-

⁸⁴ Dewey, *How We Think*, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88.

⁸⁵ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

ganization in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute something, and in which the activities in which all participate are the chief carrier of control." The teacher or educator in charge is responsible for arranging "in advance for the kind of work (by which I mean all kinds of activities engaged in) which will create situations that of themselves tend to exercise control over what this, that, and the other pupil does and how he does it." ⁸⁶

Although Dewey recognizes the fact "that preparatory planning by the teacher" may be done in such "a rigid and intellectually inflexible fashion that it does result in adult imposition," this kind of planning is not inherent in the principle involved. It is the teacher's responsibility to arrange conditions that are "conducive to community activity and to organization which exercises control over individual impulses by the mere fact that all are engaged in communal projects." The control that the teacher is to exercise "when education is based upon experience and educative experience is seen to be a social process," is vastly different from that which he exercises when the pupils are a class rather than a social group. He "loses the position of external boss or dictator but takes on that of leader of group activities." He is, however, responsible for seeing that forms of intercourse are developed "that are inherently appropriate to social situations." ⁸⁷

Finally, the educator in charge should not forget that as a representative of the group he is responsible for maintaining the kind of order which the development of educational activities requires. When the source of control rests in the educational situation, the number of occasions in which the teacher will have to intervene will be fewer than when it rests in the teacher or in an external authority. Still, there are times when the teacher "has to exercise authority in a personal way. When it is necessary . . . to speak and act firmly, it is done in behalf of the interest of the group, not as an exhibition of personal power. This makes the difference between action which is arbitrary and that which is just and fair." ⁸⁸ Children can and will understand this difference.

PUPIL PLACEMENT. It is practically impossible to document

⁸⁶ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-68.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Dewey's attitude toward that feature of administration now known as pupil placement because he has little to say about classification, promotion, admission, retention, or graduation. But because of the widespread interest in this topic which the controversy over the integration of the races in the public school has aroused, an effort to capture what might have been his general attitude toward it seems to be in order. For any light on this subject we must rely on his general position in regard to equality of opportunity and his general attitude toward devices and techniques.

As he points out time after time, the democratic way of life to which our people are committed demands respect for personality. In theory all individuals are entitled to an equal opportunity for personal development and participation in the culture of the period. This means that discrimination among pupils because of residence, economic status, race, etc., is inconsistent with the democratic tradition. To practice such discrimination not only is unjust to the individual but deprives society of the benefit to be derived from his maximum development.

On the other hand, in accordance with his general philosophic position, there is no way for those outside a particular situation to tell exactly what should be or not be done in that situation. On the negative side, of course, Dewey would not assign pupils to schools, grades, sections, or groups *solely* on the basis of residence, mental age, intelligence quotient, social age, or any composite formula that may be derived from such factors. For him every pupil should be placed where the opportunity for growth is most favorable for him and at the same time for all concerned. No fixed formula, however derived, should be taken as the final criterion for pupil placement in any of its aspects without regard to practical conditions. The effect on the quality of the present experience and the probable future experience of the pupil himself and of the other pupils involved is the final criterion.

Since the proper use of such formulas is equally applicable whatever the practical educational problem may be, Dewey's discussion of the application of science to school practice indicates what might be his position with respect to the use of any fixed formula as the criterion of pupil placement. School administration and instruction is a much more complex operation than is the one factor contained

in a scientific result. "The significance of one factor for educational practice can be determined only as it is balanced with many other factors." This principle is of universal application. "No conclusion of scientific research can be converted into an immediate rule of educational art. For there is no educational practice whatever which is not highly complex; that is to say, which does not contain many other conditions and factors than are included in the scientific finding."⁸⁹

SCHOOL ORGANIZATION. Perhaps the best way to explain Dewey's attitude toward organization as a feature of school administration is to compare the various systems now in operation with those in operation at the close of the nineteenth century. In 1888 President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University addressed the Department of Superintendents of the National Education Association on "Can School Programs Be Shortened and Enriched?" In 1892 he addressed the same group on shortening and enriching the grammar school course; and in the same year he addressed the National Education Association on "Undesirable and Desirable Uniformity in Schools."

At that time there were three different forms of school systems—the 9-4-4 plan in New England, the 7-4-4 plan in the South, and the 8-4-4 plan in other parts of the country, the first figure referring to the elementary school, the second to the high school, and the third to the college. Today the main types are the 6-6-4 plan, the 6-3-3-4 plan, and, in principle if not, in fact, the 6-3-3-2-2-3 or 4 plan, in all of which the different figures correspond, respectively, to the elementary school, the junior high school, the senior high school, the junior college, the senior college, and the professional schools or the university.

At the autumn meeting of the affiliated and cooperating schools of the University of Chicago in 1902, we find President Harper and Dewey giving the discussion initiated by President Eliot a new turn. They both question the existing organization of public education, and Dewey endorses President Harper's proposition to shorten the elementary school to six years and extend the high school to six, pointing out the advantage of the proposed reorganization.

⁸⁹ John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education*, New York, Live-right, 1929, p. 19.

With respect to the elementary school, Dewey recognizes the danger, if the proposition were carried out in a purely mechanical way, of restricting "the movement to introduce more worthy objects of study and important modes of activity" and of promoting "a reaction to the more formal and mechanical courses which we are just now at great cost escaping."⁹⁰ With respect to higher education he recognizes the danger also of excluding "important facts of general culture from the education of those going into professions when more specialized and professional work are begun at the very outset of the university period." But such an outcome he is convinced is not inherent in the proposal. "... this quantitative and external rearrangement is only . . . for the purpose of securing administrative conditions of an internal and qualitative readjustment. The real value of the scheme is in the opportunity it affords and the demand it makes for a more efficient division of labor between the elementary, secondary, and collegiate members of the educational organism."⁹¹

For Dewey, the proper aim of the elementary school is "to organize the instincts and impulses of children into working interests and tools," rather than "to cover a certain amount of ground in studies and thus acquire a certain amount of knowledge." To accomplish this task he thinks six years ought to be enough, and "limiting the period to that time would . . . tend in the long run to make clear what is the real issue in elementary education." A six-year period he says

would enable the high school to face its own peculiar problem: That of opening to the mind avenues of approach to all the typical phases of nature and society, and acquiring a sympathetic knowledge of these areas of life—culture, in a word. Facing its own problem without distortion from outside pressure, it would have free space and leisure in which to work out that knowledge of the universe of nature and of humanity that is worth while; and that would enable its graduates to undertake later specialization in professional and research lines in an intelligent way—intelligent both as to consciousness of their own capacities, tastes, and needs, and as to the knowledge of the relations of the particular province

⁹⁰ John Dewey, "Discussion," *Educational Review*, 21:469-476, May 1901, pp. 469, 470, 471.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 19.

to which they are to devote themselves to the whole federated field of life.⁹²

For Dewey it is the function of the schools to do what the people want when they understand their real needs. Social democracy means an abandonment of the opposition of the upper and lower classes and the corresponding educational system that supports it. "It means a common heritage, a common work, and a common destiny. It is flat hostility to the ethic of modern life to suppose that there are two different ends of life located on different planes; that the few who are educated are to live on a plane of exclusive and isolated culture, while the many toil below on the level of practical endeavor directed at material commodity. The problem of our modern life is precisely to do away with all the barriers that keep up this division." Of the university, in which he apparently includes the liberal arts college, he continues: "If the university cannot accommodate itself to this movement, so much the worse for it. Nay, more; it is doomed to helpless failure unless it does more than accommodate itself; unless it becomes one of the chief agencies for bridging the gap, and bringing about an effective interaction of all callings in society."⁹³

For Dewey, shortening the elementary school and lengthening the secondary school constitute, then, a first educational step in bridging the gap in the culture which supports the isolation of the people into the upper and lower classes—a step which evidently involves a reorganization of the college and the university. Both the elementary and the secondary schools are to be devoted to general education, broadly conceived to include "acquaintance with the best that has been thought and said and done in the past and the practical factor—or more truly speaking, the social factor, the factor of adaptation to the present need of the people."⁹⁴

Although both schools are devoted to general education, assigning young children and adolescents to different schools seems to be both educationally and administratively justified. Children under 12 or 13 years of age are still tied closely to the home and have different in-

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

⁹³ John Dewey, "The People and the Schools," *ibid.*, pp. 459-471 *passim*.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

terests and capacities from older children. Since adolescence begins at 12 or 13, the elementary school should end and the high school should begin at that age. Moreover, by the beginning of adolescence pupils should have sufficiently distinguished subjects implicit in Dewey's threefold classification of subject matter in elementary education to permit more departmental organization and systematic instruction.

As Dewey contemplates the increasing accumulation of knowledge and the ever-lengthening period of childhood due to industrial development, he realizes that they force a corresponding extension of the time devoted to formal education. He sees that it must be extended to at least 20 or 21 years of age for everybody and to at least three years further for those who enter the learned and technical professions and callings. For reasons already mentioned, the first 14 years should be devoted to general education, which, in quality, should be the same for all, and in content represent the main types of human culture.

This program means for Dewey that secondary education would cover a period of 8 years, from the 6-year elementary school through the first two years of college. Such a concept, however, does not commit him to any unit or sequence of units of fixed lengths such as the junior high school, the senior high school, or junior college. What it does is to provide a perspective in the light of which different units and sequences of units may be considered in different situations. The types of schools most satisfactory in any situation are those which best facilitate general education. When the junior high school is introduced, it is to be considered a secondary school, and when the junior college is introduced, it is to be considered a secondary school rather than a division of higher education.

For Dewey, higher education, which is the function of the university, should be specialized and cover a period of three years. But the university so conceived does not necessarily mean the abandonment of all four-year colleges or even the four-year college on the university campus. The university proper, whether located on one campus or on many campuses, is limited to specialized education in the broad sense which includes not merely skills and techniques required in the practice of a profession, but also the principles that

explain them and the cultural perspective which their adequate application requires. In other words, professional education has its general as well as its technical aspects.

For instance, psychology is an essential aspect of the specialized preparation for law and medicine. When professional education is thus broadly conceived, several of the recognized subjects that supply the content of general education would be represented in the programs preparatory to any profession. In fact, the programs of some students—those preparing for teaching or research—would include more extensive studies in some of the same subject fields that supply the content of general education. For example, a student preparing to teach physics would take advanced courses in physics and related subjects.

The differentiation of schools for any age group below the university is objectionable because such distinctions as the classical high school, the technical high school, and the industrial high school support the traditional class distinctions that should be abandoned. In actual practice all types of school in response to popular demands tend to become very much alike.

According to Dewey, skilled workers that our industrial civilization requires can get the necessary technical training more economically on the job than in specially designed programs provided in separate schools, departments, or courses on either the elementary or the secondary school level. The best preparation the public school can give skilled workers in any field below the learned professions and callings is an allround general education in which relevant elements of the cultural tradition and the practical arts of modern life are both included. The narrow vocational training in the elementary and secondary schools of the past is now inadequate. The constant changes in the fields of business and industry require corresponding changes in the technical qualifications of skilled workers. Those who are narrowly trained cannot shift from one occupation to another, but those who spend their period of formal schooling on general education are not thus handicapped. In this respect the products of the so-called technical schools and the so-called classical schools are in the same boat.

Since for Dewey it is the function of education to bridge the cultural gap that separates one class of people from another, those forms

of school organization that tend to narrow or close it should be favored and those that tend to widen or maintain it should be opposed. For that reason Dewey opposes the movement to establish a separate system of vocational schools. As Curti says, for Dewey, "it seemed to be an overt attempt to have the public school system legally and actually recognize the stratification of classes and adapt its administrative machinery, its course of study, and methods of instruction to perpetuate that stratification."⁹⁵

This idea of bridging the cultural gap in our civilization also explains Dewey's emphasis on intermingling pupils of various backgrounds, interests, and capacities, and of relating school and community life. In the administration of individual schools, practices within the school should be relevant to approved practices outside the school. For Dewey, "There is nothing in any one study or any one calling which makes it in and of itself low or meanly practical. It is all a question of its isolation or its setting."⁹⁶ The school should be so organized as to avoid the isolation of subjects as well as of students of varying interests. It should be made a social center for several reasons, not the least of which is that it would bring together adults of different interests and callings to participate in activities of common concern.⁹⁷

Cultural Conditions

Like other theories of education and the good life, universal growth is an aspect of a general way of thinking about the world of nature and of man. Therefore, it reflects the cultural background of the new way of thinking of which Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey are the recognized founders, and the particular cultural conditions under which it was developed and applied to school education. The cultural background of this theory is much the same as that of the habit-tendency theory, but the conditions under which

⁹⁵ Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, Part 10, New York, Scribner's, 1935, p. 530.

⁹⁶ Dewey, *The Educational Situation*, *op. cit.* pp. 76-77.

⁹⁷ John Dewey, "The School as a Social Center," *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1902, pp. 373-383.

Dewey developed and applied his theory are somewhat different from those under which James developed and applied his. James died in 1908, but Dewey lived to see the First World War, the recent phenomenal rise of the labor movement, the development of totalitarian states on both the right and the left, the Great Depression, World War II, and the emergence of the atomic age—all of which have had some influence on the development and application of the universal-growth theory.

The philosophical background of this new way of thinking since the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century—also a cultural condition—influenced Dewey as well as James. The universal-growth theory and the habit-tendency theory may properly be considered earlier and later educational versions of this new way of thinking. As a thorough student of the history of philosophy and as a philosopher sensitive to the changed conditions of the modern world, Dewey sees the conflict of new scientific knowledge and new interests of modern man with traditional values. He sees also, as did Peirce, James, and Mead, the inadequacy of the Cartesian compromise which recognized the natural sciences as the source of reliable beliefs about the physical world, and the theological sciences as the source of reliable beliefs about values.

Unlike the classical philosophers since Descartes, Dewey rejects the Cartesian dualism, which for him lends philosophical support to all kinds of separations, inconsistencies, and confusions in our Western culture and civilization. He goes further afield and out of doors to find a new working hypothesis that will overcome this dualism. He finds a basis of orientation in naïve human experience, but he relies more on anthropology than does James. As a philosopher, he recognizes the authority of science, but does not confine his philosophical beliefs about nature and man to an interpretation of the findings of science. For him, scientific knowledge serves a limiting role in philosophy. It is a part but not the whole of human experience, of which philosophy is a synoptic account. For Dewey, the materials on the basis of which such a synoptic account is to be built include much more than scientific knowledge, but must not be inconsistent with it.

Through the application of naïve experience as a philosophic method, Dewey concludes that reality is not a revelation or dis-

closure of intellect, thought, or cognition. Since experience includes all the aspects of individual and environment, it is much more inclusive than knowing, which may be distinguished within it. Reality is therefore what it is experienced to be rather than what it is known to be. Knowledge is secondary and instrumental, but, nevertheless, is indispensable to a life that is good to live in the modern world. It is a means of rendering experienced objects meaningful, of preserving the useful, and of destroying or neutralizing the harmful.

Scientific knowledge is the most reliable and dependable because of the method by which it is acquired. Therefore, for Dewey one function of philosophy is to define a method that is consistent with the scientific method, and that is applicable in all fields, whatever the subject matter may be. The method of reflective thinking which he proposes as the universal method of research and education is derived from an analysis not only of the practices of scientists but also of certain practices in everyday life. This is the method that many successful Americans have always used. It is the method which the primitive conditions of pioneer life in America forced men to adopt because they were confronted with problems much more pressing than determining the substance or structure of reality.

For them, the knowledge acquired through reflective thinking was the only dependable means of advancement, and often of survival. The use of technology has transformed the pioneer and rural life of our fathers into a highly industrialized economy. This technology is the product of reflective thinking involved in applying scientific knowledge, which is itself a product of the same method in its most refined form. Most of us recognize and appreciate the many benefits derived from the application of this method in both production and communication.⁹⁸

The social problems that now confront our people are no less pressing than those which our fathers had to face in carving a nation out of the woods and transforming an agricultural into an industrial economy. They may, therefore, come to appreciate the possibility of still greater advantages to be derived from extending the method of reflective thinking to other fields, especially education. If so,

⁹⁸ Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-22.

the universal-growth theory, which includes the universal application of this method, would in this respect meet with general approval.

The universal-growth theory and its underlying philosophic pre-suppositions clearly assume an interpretation of the idea of progress that took form during the eighteenth century. From this point of view the Golden Age, if there is such a thing, lies in the future rather than in the past. The philosophy of growth and instrumentalism is oriented to the future rather than to the past. The test of ideas is to be found in their future application rather than in their conformity to past ideas, however derived. A better life for all in this world is recognized as a possibility, but the goal of perfection cannot be envisioned and is not near at hand. Life is a process, and gradual improvement of its quality is a reasonable expectation. But even when conceived in terms of the quality of the process, progress is not inevitable, for it is not inherent in the nature of things but dependent upon human thought and effort.

This interpretation of the idea of progress seems consistent with the attitude of the American people. They are oriented toward the future rather than the past. They are not, however, primarily concerned with some distant goal of perfection but with more immediate ends that are the outgrowth of existing conditions. Nor do they believe that even general improvement is inevitable. They are committed to self-reliance rather than dependence on others. For them life is what they make it; an opportunity to think, speak, and act in matters that concern themselves is preferable to security at the price of freedom. They do not identify change with progress, but they welcome it as an opportunity for improvement.

An interpretation of progress which the theory of universal growth requires is so compatible with the beliefs of the American people that this theory can be systematically applied to the present cultural situation. It will not, however, seem convincing to those who think they know the structure of the ideal social order and the means by which it can be attained. Nor will it appeal to those who believe that cultural conditions are so critical that the only hope for the future is the commitment of the teaching profession to the promotion, through public schools, of a new social order whose structure can now be envisioned. But to those who believe that the quality of human experience can be gradually and increasingly improved over a wide front through cooperative thought and

effort, the ideal of progress as an aspect of universal growth will seem practical and promising under present cultural conditions.

Finally, democracy as a way of life rather than as merely a form of government is a cultural condition of Dewey's version of this new way of thinking and of his formulation and application of the universal-growth theory of education and the good life. For Dewey, Democracy is "a way of life, social and individual. The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed . . . as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals."⁹⁹

The individual is the only one who can know authentically how things affect him. He is unique and can make a significant contribution, however small, to the formation of social values. Therefore, his participation in determining social policy is an essential aspect of democracy as a way of life. Such sharing in policy-making is a necessary means of promoting both individual development and social welfare. It is properly considered a criterion of every kind of social arrangement in a democratic society—industrial, political, domestic, and educational. It is necessary for citizenship and therefore is an essential phase of education in a democracy.

This ideal of a way of life is not to be identified with everything that has been called democracy since the Enlightenment. It includes the idea of political democracy developed by the ancient Greeks and applied by the rising middle class. But unlike their idea, it includes all men rather than certain classes of men. It includes the idea of respect for personality and humanitarianism implicit in primitive Christianity, but rejects the belief that only a select group of leaders can determine what is best for all. It includes something of the nineteenth century romanticism, but rejects its anarchistic extremes. It includes the twentieth century idea of social responsibility for individual welfare, but rejects economic determinism and political paternalism. It recognizes the desirability of individual freedom and responsibility, but also respects socially constituted authority.

Not everyone approves democracy as a way of life, which

⁹⁹ Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," *op. cit.*, p. 458.

Dewey's theory of universal growth in its various aspects assumes. It seems preposterous to those for whom democracy is merely a form of political arrangements. It seems impractical to advocates of any form of paternalism, however devoted they may be to the advancement of the common man. It seems too conservative to those who would abandon all forms of authoritative regulation, however established. It seems insufficient to those who identify democracy with any particular form of economic determinism. It seems too gradual and too slow to those who wish to build, through public education, a new social order of some particular structure. It is acceptable only to those who believe that the participation of the common man in forming social policy is essential to the fullest development of the individual and the greatest improvement of society.¹⁰⁰

Concluding Comments

The development of the universal-growth theory marks a turning point in the history of educational theory in this country. All later theories, including recent versions of old theories, embody within themselves the reactions of their authors to Dewey's theory. Those already considered in our account were developed prior to, or simultaneously with, the theory of universal growth. Those that follow, even the more recent, are somewhat different from what they would have been without Dewey's influence, his philosophy, and its educational application. These considerations explain the placement of universal growth before the more recent educational applications of philosophies much older than experimentalism. Consequently, their place in our account as well as in the history of education requires that certain current misconceptions of the universal-growth theory be corrected at this point.

One of these misconceptions is that Dewey's theory of education has undergone a radical change since World War I. When his article on individuality appeared in the *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*

¹⁰⁰ Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-22.

Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thought*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950, Chaps. 10-15.

around 1925, condemning educational doctrines which some students of education attributed to Progressive Education and also to Dewey, certain members of the faculty at Teachers College, Columbia University, hailed it as a shift in Dewey's general position from the left toward the right. This writer was at that time one of Dewey's students and decided to look into the matter.

Dewey's beliefs about reality explicitly stated in *Experience and Nature* (1925) are clearly implicit in *The Logical Essays* (1900). His beliefs about knowledge, defined in the second edition of *How We Think* (1932) and in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), are an elaboration of the same conceptions stated in *The Logical Essays* (1900), *How We Think* (1909), and *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916). In the Preface to *How We Think* (1932), which is a revision of the 1909 edition, Dewey says: "The whole logical analysis of reflection has been rewritten and, it is believed, very considerably simplified in statement. At the same time, the basic ideas, those that gave the original work its distinctive character, have not only been retained but have been enriched and developed further."¹⁰¹ Our present survey indicates that his position on such topics as the participation of teachers in school policy-making is the same in 1937 as in 1901,¹⁰² and further, that his emphasis on qualities of experience in *Experience and Education* (1938) is an elaboration of a position taken in *Democracy and Education* (1916). Therefore, the conclusion seems warranted that Dewey's educational theory has remained fundamentally the same from first to last.

In the minds of many both within and without the teaching profession, Progressive Education is the application of Dewey's philosophy of education. But our survey shows beyond question that, although he welcomes the Progressive Education movement as a starting point, he is convinced of the inadequacy of the principles and practices of many of its proponents. For him, the Progressive schools often go as far wrong in one direction as the traditional schools do in another. For him the problem in educational theory

¹⁰¹ Dewey, *How We Think*, *op. cit.*, p. iii.

¹⁰² Dewey, "The People and the Schools," *Educational Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," *School and Society*, *ibid.*, p. 460.

is not to decide what is progressive or traditional education but what is *good* education, and a choice between them is not the only alternative. "Those who are looking ahead to a new movement in education, adapted to the existing need for a new social order, should think in terms of Education itself rather than in terms of some 'ism about education, even such an 'ism as 'progressivism.'" ¹⁰³

But perhaps the biggest mistake of all is to ascribe to Dewey the sponsorship of specific devices and techniques to be generally applied. Between the two World Wars almost every educational reformer—conservative, reactionary, or radical—who advocated any means of improving education, for purposes of publicity advocated it as a concrete application of Dewey's philosophy of education. Proponents of various plans of curriculum development that kept teachers busy during the Great Depression invariably let it be known that the proposals were in line with both Progressive Education and Dewey's philosophy. Sponsors of the program of education for life adjustment acted in the name of growth and democracy as conceived by Dewey. The problem method, the project method, the activity curriculum, and the core curriculum, as measures of curriculum reform were all conceived as conforming to the practical demands of Progressive Education, growth, and democracy as Dewey interpreted them.

The same was true of administration, whether related to classification, promotion, school discipline, pupil placement, or organization of the school and the school system. Consequently, when the forces of reaction gained the upper hand during the late 1940's and early 1950's, those who were disappointed with superficiality in the reform measures that had been introduced into the schools, and those who wished to return to past practices, condemned Dewey's educational theory as the root of all they found wrong with education.

Educational critics differ among themselves as to the significance of specific devices and techniques of general application, but they are all mistaken in taking them as implications of the universal-growth theory. As our survey has shown, Dewey rejects any fixed requirement of any kind, whether aims, content, organization, or methods of teaching, or anything else. No fixed set of aims can be

¹⁰³ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. vi-vii.

satisfactory even temporarily. The specific subject-matter content and the materials should always vary with the interests and capacities of students and the needs of the community. The organization of schools and school systems should vary in different communities. There is no universal best device or technique of teaching.

No authoritative fixed means or ends are acceptable to Dewey. He agrees with James that even the findings of science cannot be directly translated into educational procedures of any kind. Authoritative proposals of all kinds are to be welcomed as sources of suggestion, and the more, the better; but only those directly in charge are responsible for deciding specifically what should be done in concrete situations. With regard to the relativity of devices and techniques, there are no exceptions in education or any other field. Dewey does not exclude even experience as the method of philosophy to which he himself is committed. When all philosophers recognize "the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith and without discount . . . then the word and notion of experience might be discarded."¹⁰⁴

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
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The Later Experimentalist Theories

7

The movement in philosophical and educational thought of which the habit-tendency and universal-growth theories are two versions has been called pragmatism, instrumentalism, experimentalism, and objective relativism. Any one of these terms broadly conceived is satisfactory, but in recent years many students of education prefer experimentalism. It has reference to a general movement and not merely to some one of its different versions. Since experimentalism is an open rather than a closed system, it can be indefinitely developed through the use of new materials and constantly applied to any new features of practice that emerge as cultural conditions change. Of the second generation of experimentalists, William H. Kilpatrick and Boyd H. Bode are the recognized leaders in educational theory. This chapter is therefore devoted to their theories of education and the good life.

THE DEMOCRATIC-CHARACTER THEORY

The significance of character as a value of the good life and as an aim of education is generally accepted. What we mean when we

say he "is a character" is not at all what we mean when we say he "is a good (moral) character." This distinction is indispensable to an understanding of Kilpatrick's theory of education and the good life. A person's character is all his "tendencies to regular and predictable behavior."¹ A good character is at least self-directing. A democratic character is the good character who respects the personality of others and cooperates with them in making group living foster the general welfare. It is the kind of character that is best qualified to live the good life conceived as a life good to live.² When character is so defined, Kilpatrick's theory of education is properly designated as the democratic-character theory.

Even as a young teacher and administrator before he came under the influence of Dewey and Thorndike, Kilpatrick is seen critically examining the existing school practice and its supporting assumptions and finding it indefensible. Later he comes to call the established system the "old school" and the "old education" to distinguish it from what he considers a better system and which he envisions as the "new school" and the "new education." The main difference between the two systems is that the old education is subject-matter-centered and the new is character-centered. After the organization of the Progressive Education Association (1919), it was therefore only natural to identify Kilpatrick with Progressive Education as contrasted with traditional education.

This identification is logically permissible provided it is clearly understood that the character-centered education Kilpatrick has in mind is a certain kind of progressive education rather than progressive education in general. As Dewey pointed out as late as 1951: "In the best sense of the words, progressive education and the work of Dr. Kilpatrick are virtually synonymous. I say in the best sense because the phrase 'progressive education' has been and is frequently used to signify almost any kind of school theory and practice that departs from previously established scholastic methods. . . . What has often been criticized as constituting progressive education has taken progressive education to mean methods on the part of the teacher which are marked chiefly by following the immediate and

¹ William H. Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1951, p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 219-221.

spontaneous activities of children in the schoolroom.”³ Dewey then takes pains to show that progressive education in this sense does not apply to the work of Dr. Kilpatrick. In order to avoid confusing Kilpatrick’s theory with progressive education in this sense, as well as to distinguish it from Dewey’s theory, to which the term progressivism also has been applied, the term progressive education will not be used here.

In calling it the democratic-character theory, however, it must be pointed out that although from the very beginning Kilpatrick has some such conception in mind, it is late in his career before it is fully developed. During his early years at Teachers College, Columbia University, prior to 1930, he considers himself primarily an interpreter of Dewey’s philosophy in terms of Thorndike’s psychology, and takes growth or reconstruction of experience—which he sometimes calls the remaking of life—as the ultimate aim of education. It is only with the development of his own psychology of learning and his philosophy of a life good to live that he uses the term “character” in defining his educational theory. Consequently, any adequate account of his mature philosophical, psychological, and educational outlook must be based mainly on his later rather than his earlier works, which made him famous.

Philosophical Foundations

As a student of education Kilpatrick naturally gives primary emphasis to those aspects of general philosophy that are most directly related to education. The new outlook he takes to include the philosophical foundations of the democratic-character theory and defines it in terms of beliefs about such themes as the life process, the nature of man, social institutions, selfhood and civilization, individual and society, change and progress, culture and morality, learning and thinking, respect for personality and democracy, and the good life. He does not, however, neglect such central philosophical topics as reality, knowledge, and value, but for the most part he considers them as they seem relevant in his discussion of other topics more

³ Samuel Tenenbaum, *William H. Kilpatrick, Trail Blazer in Education*, New York, Harper, 1951, p. vii.

directly related to education. In fact, some of his beliefs about certain aspects of these philosophical topics are so clearly implicit that they can be inferred, and others are so explicit that they can be documented.

BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

Historically, philosophers often take sides on the ultimate substance or structure of reality. Beginning with the existence of mind and matter which they take for granted, the dualists believe they are ultimate and separate substances; the idealists believe that in the last analysis the physical is one aspect of mind; and the materialists believe that the mental is reducible to the physical. For Kilpatrick the insoluble problems in these beliefs can be avoided through inductive study of situations that involve thinking. "No one can doubt the observed fact that what we do is affected by what we think. . . . All we actually know about 'thinking substance' is that thinking and behavior do take place. . . . If we refuse to make the unwarranted assumption of 'substances,' we have no problem to solve." In so saying he rejects not only metaphysical dualism but also metaphysical materialism, that reduces mind to matter, and metaphysical idealism, that reduces matter to mind. As he phrases it: "Metaphysics must fit the facts of life, rather than have facts fit a metaphysics made superior to and in disregard of the facts."⁴

A closely related problem on which philosophers have often taken sides is what is known as predeterminism and indeterminism. On the one hand, the predeterminists hold that human conduct is a part of nature and subject to the law of causation in the same way as all other natural objects. Therefore, they conclude that whatever a person thinks or does is fully determined by preceding events. On the other hand, the indeterminists believe that the mind of man is outside nature and not subject to the natural laws of causation; as a faculty of the mind, man's will is therefore free. Kilpatrick rejects both positions. Again he refers to actual situations, and shows that a man is free in a sense in which a brick or a moth is not, because man can learn, criticize, and better avoid evils and attain values.

For Kilpatrick causation as a process "is the combined effect of

⁴ Kilpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

all the factors that enter into an event to determine what it shall be. . . . When a moral decision is being considered, it is the influence of thought on thought and feeling, and of these on decision." In a moral situation a man will intelligently complete a program of action that is better than any other alternative he finds and, if his moral character is effective, will "accept this program and proceed to put it into effect." Here both insight and character are involved. "This insight and this particular character as they come together, each being what it is at the time, will uniquely determine the decision. And this resulting decision . . . is as inevitably caused—determined at the time, not *predetermined*—as is true of the acts of brick or moth." All these actions are determined by what has gone before but the decision of the man is not predetermined; his decision is free.⁵ Furthermore, experience seems to testify that there are situations in which the outcome is contingent on human foresight and effort.

But even such moral freedom, which seems to be a fact of experience, is denied by those who accept cosmic determinism. For Kilpatrick, however, this conception of the world of nature and of man is now obsolete. This is predeterminism and contradicts the belief that effort counts in the affairs of men, which is a fundamental assumption of his whole theory of education and the good life.

Kilpatrick marshals five arguments against the doctrine that the law of causation fixed events at the beginning of the world once and for all.⁶

The argument from common sense is that "it would explain away the whole behavior situation on which life is based, including even the wish to argue the question. Against such notions common sense does and must rebel. If anything is real, it is that effort counts."

The argument from the logic of science is that the predeterminist "attempts to prove his doctrine by assuming . . . that his doctrine is not true. Such a logical contradiction invalidates the conclusion."

The argument from the psychology of behavior is that causation is consistent with desirable personal freedom and moral responsibility and essential to their actual exercise; that such exercise requires also a plastic and contingent situation; and that determinism

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-196.

permits and even supports the essential life process of free and responsible effort, which the doctrine of predeterminism negates.

The moral argument is that the acceptance of predeterminism "will confuse and obstruct moral behavior and will even deny to morality the plasticity and contingency in human affairs necessary to its very existence"; that "this theory is increasingly denied by competent scientists"; and that, therefore, "it is as yet unproved and . . . denies any effective status to the essential social institution of morality."

The argument from an infinite universe is that in a universe infinite in its details it is impossible for us to choose for study "a finite number of discrete physical objects in such a way that we can apply our known mechanics and mathematics" and can "foretell the future movements of the chosen objects." Such a view is impossible because from either within or without our infinite universe there might come another body to upset the otherwise known movements.

In concluding, however, Kilpatrick emphasizes his conviction that particular determinism, the "law of causation," holds in all situations. His denial of predeterminism is at the same time an acceptance of the "law of causation." "In an infinite universe, whether the outside body will or will not influence events remains inconclusive up to the last moment of the determination of any event chosen for consideration." But such an "event is finally determined only as it actually happens, but not in advance of the happening." Looking backwards we may say that it was predetermined, but in "looking ahead we always face the uncertainty of what an infinite universe may supply. In one final word, we can in our infinite world accept determinism without accepting predeterminism."⁷

Implicit in the foregoing effort to integrate the moral demands of freedom and the scientific law of causation is the assumption that reality is pluralistic, continuous, and dynamic. For Kilpatrick as for Dewey, the world of nature and of man is a concatenation of related but relatively independent events. For him as for James and Dewey, the various levels of existence—the physical, the vital, the mental, and the social—are continuous throughout. For him as for James,

⁷ *Ibid.*

our universe is still in the making, and for him as for Dewey, existences are uncertain and precarious. For him as for the others, events are contextual in that they are relative to the systems to which they belong. For all these beliefs he finds support in his study of culture, his interpretation of science, and his analysis of specific practical situations.

Kilpatrick's analysis of man as part of nature is rather striking. Through inductive studies he distinguishes two kinds of human traits. "One set, rather strictly hereditary, is shared largely by man with at least the higher of the lower animals. The other aggregate seems peculiar to man and depends on the existence of selfhood."⁸ The tendencies in the first group are individual in origin rather than social: "But any control over them is learned and this learning proceeds almost exclusively under social guidance following cultural standards." These tendencies may be changed to some extent through learning, but only "such traits as are widespread and refuse to yield in fact to learning" may be said to "belong to human nature." Among these are hunger, sex, and anger.

Human traits of the second group are social rather than individual in origin. They emerge in the development of the self through the interaction of the human organism with the social environment. Once acquired, they are as imperious and inevitable in some of their demands as are hereditary traits, and may therefore be considered a part of human nature. Among these desire for recognition is a typical example. It is practically universal and very insistent, but unlike the traits in the first group it is learned. "It grows directly out of the self-other origin of human selfhood and depends for its existence upon the contrast between the self and the others." The same is true of other traits in the second group such as "the recognition of agency . . . the sense of oughtness . . . the acceptance of responsibility, the existence of conscience. . . . These traits are in essential character practically inevitable results when a self-other type of being lives under group conditions." Only two others need be mentioned: "The desire to communicate with other people" and "to know anything that we think others know which concerns us."

The answers to certain questions in regard to the nature of human

⁸ William H. Kilpatrick, *Selfhood and Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. 130-134.

nature depends upon which of these groups of traits we have in mind. When human nature is conceived in terms of the hereditary traits, it is generally considered permanent and fixed. Man "has no innate or instinctive endowment either to tell him what is right rather than wrong or to incline him, in general, either toward or against what others would recognize as the morally good." But when human nature is conceived in terms of the acquired traits, it is subject to constant change and normally develops a moral character. "The natural and practically inevitable outworking of the self-other compounded personality living normally in a social group is to develop what may be called the moral-nature or moral-character machinery of human personality." Although the person may not choose the morally good deed, "his act can have, and normally will thereafter have, a moral quality. . . . The self-other personality . . . will normally develop the self-conscious traits of agency, accountability, and sense of oughtness" together with "responsibility and conscience." These are the "personality equipment for moral conduct." What use a person will make of it "depends on the character he builds and the way this interacts with the environment." On this level "man ceases to me amoral. His conduct will have moral quality; it may, however, be either good or bad."⁹

On the psychological side, as already indicated, for Kilpatrick the mind-body problem has been created by philosophers who have hypostatized the mental and physical aspects of experienced things into mental and physical substances. If we take social, mental, vital, and physical phenomena as they are experienced to be, the assumption of different substances as explanatory principles is unnecessary and useless. For Kilpatrick, too, in the Darwin-James-Dewey tradition the mental processes serve useful functions in the development of organic life. But the subject matter of scientific psychology that is of primary concern to students of education, morals, and politics consists of the distinctly human behavior that emerges under the conditions of social life. Such behavior includes not only thinking, feeling, and willing on the highest level, but also learning as a process of acquiring the distinctly human traits resulting from development of the self in social relationships. For guidance in promoting

⁹ *Ibid.*

the acquisition of these traits Kilpatrick finds both "behaviorism" as developed by John B. Watson and A. P. Weiss and the connectionism of Thorndike inadequate and inapplicable.¹⁰

Kilpatrick tries with some degree of success to find support in Dewey's philosophy for his own original idea of shifting emphasis in education from the acquisition, under penalty, of subject matter prescribed in advance to the building of character, and to express it in terms of Thorndike's psychological theory. Eventually, as his distinctive theory of education becomes clearly established in his own mind, he finds it necessary to develop a new psychology for explaining and applying it. For him the character-centered education representing the new outlook requires a different theory of learning from that of the subject-centered education representing the old outlook. But unlike specialists in psychology, he is concerned with developing the subject of education rather than the subject of psychology as such. His treatment of learning, therefore, differs from the usual treatment. It is concerned with the learning of self-conscious humans rather than that of lower animals; with the human learning that promises most for man; with a theory of learning that sees the child from birth as a behaving, feeling human being, whose present living is to be respected and properly guided so that what is learned will be used now in making present living more effective.

The problem, then, is to develop a theory of learning which squares scientifically with the facts of life and learning and to use it in meeting the express demands of higher human living for such ends as reasoning, initiative, creativity, responsibility, and co-operation. The theory Kilpatrick develops holds: "(i) that behaving is typically an essential part of the learning process; (ii) that the learning goes forward best, if not solely, in a situation of concrete personal living; (iii) that the learning comes from behaving, not from mere repetition of words. . . ; (iv) that the first application of learning comes, normally, within the experience in which the learning takes place, in fact, that the learning comes typically in order to carry on this experience."¹¹

In biology Kilpatrick finds suggestions that support certain aspects

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-94.

¹¹ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-237, 238.

of this theory. Among the more striking are those which will now be mentioned.¹²

"Learning is the tendency of any part or phase of what one has lived so to remain with the learner as to come back pertinently into further experience." The earlier stages pervade the later stages of any learning experience. Because the mind of man biologically has not improved significantly since he became *homo sapiens*, his capacity to learn must have been developed before that time. The learning in which behaving is an essential part comes closer to man as a behaving organism than any form of learning that came into existence after the invention of writing.

This is the kind of learning which, for Kilpatrick, is fundamental in the development of democratic and ethical character. In this conception of learning, "for one to *learn* anything, he must first *live* that thing." For instance, "to learn community spirit means," first of all, that he has "so got it in him" that he will himself, as opportunity may occur, put it into effect. It includes attitude, interest, and habit of so acting that others can count on him as occasion demands. Learning thus involves overt performance and internal concern. To live such a thing as school spirit pupils "must have the opportunity to respond, and must in fact so respond, with that spirit, to some life situations." Opportunity, however, is not enough; acceptance is also essential. "Acceptance in some degree, positive or negative, is always present in the learning then going on; each person, whatever the enterprise, feels his degree of acceptance of that thing at that time under those conditions. *Degree of acceptance of any part of an experience means degree of living that part of the experience.*"

On the basis of the analysis of which the foregoing is an abbreviation, Kilpatrick states his new theory of learning in two ways. (1) "*We learn what we live, we learn each item we live as we accept it, and we learn it in the degree we accept it.*" (2) "*We learn our responses, only our responses, and all our responses; we learn each as we accept it to live by, and we learn it in the degree we accept it.*"

The implications of this theory of learning as Kilpatrick indicates them can now be summarized.¹³ First of all, life consists of the hap-

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 239-247.

¹³ *Ibid.*

penings affecting us and our responses to them. About any one such happening three things may be distinguished: "(i) the happening, objectively considered; (ii) the happening as I accept it; and (iii) my response to the happening as I understand and accept it. That I may mistake the happening is quite possible; but if so, the clearer does it become that I respond not to the objective happening, but to my mistaken sizing up of it." Second, the degree of learning any particular item depends upon the degree that we live it, count it important, or find it meaningful and useful. Other things being equal, items learned are recallable in the degree of the frequency and recency of their use. Third, some things are fully learned at once, but others, like our regard for friends, our standards, our ideas, and our principles, are learned over a period of time; that is cumulative learning.

Such cumulative learning may be simultaneous or concomitant. "In any significant experience, the human organism acts as an organized whole; . . . Each experience is thus a complex of many interacting parts and aspects." Successive similar experiences repeat certain thoughts, feelings, and movements of previous experiences, and when accumulated and organized in relation to any experience, object, or situation, they become attitudes, interests, and ideals. For instance, while pupils are learning assigned subject matter, they are also learning at the same time attitudes toward the teacher, toward the school, toward the subject, toward each other, and toward themselves. Out of these concomitant, cumulative learnings—"conceptions, attitudes, ideals, standards, habits, skills, and the like—is the child's character all the time being formed."

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

Any complete philosophical treatment of the problem of knowledge involves a systematic consideration of the origin of knowledge, the method of knowing, the objects of knowledge, and the validity or truth of ideas. Although Kilpatrick does not deal fully and systematically with any of these topics, it is possible to infer, from his scattered statements about them and from his own method of research, some of his more important basic assumptions about knowledge. From his contrast of the nature of knowledge as conceived by Plato and Aristotle with that of modern experimental science since

Galileo, it is evident that for him the foundation of reliable knowledge is not to be found either in the *a priori* disclosures of reason or in the direct revelation of the senses. Reliable knowledge is a product of what he calls inductive thinking, which apparently is not fundamentally different from scientific method, and the more inclusive method of reflective thinking as defined by Dewey.

The nature of the inductive method he proposes is exemplified in the way he develops the "experience theory" of learning. His first step is to analyze the difficulty of adequately defining—in terms of Thorndike's connectionist psychology—the learning process required by his conception of an ethical and democratic character as the aim of education. The second step consists in entertaining suggestions and ideas as to the nature of the theory of learning required. The third step is setting up a definition of the experience theory as an hypothesis. The fourth step is checking it against the relevant findings of science and observed facts. The fifth and final step consists in the application of the experience theory which the evidence indicates to be a warranted conclusion. Kilpatrick's inductive method of developing his theory of learning seems in principle consistent with both the scientific method and Dewey's pattern of reflective thinking.

The objects of knowledge are, for Kilpatrick, neither disclosures of antecedent, fixed realities nor mere means of satisfying personal desires: they are products of inductive studies, the subject matter of which is observed facts and suggested ideas relevant to the situation. They are instruments of control rather than objects of contemplation. As instruments of control they serve as sources of suggestion in subsequent study, but they are subject to future modification by these studies.

For Kilpatrick, as for the experimental scientists and for Dewey, the criterion of the truth claim of any proposition is to be found in the future rather than in the past. Its logical meaning lies solely in its practical implication or application, and its validity depends upon the extent to which it does what it is expected to do when put into effect. Kilpatrick's theory of learning is to be justified like any other hypothesis in the long run, only on the basis of its future applications.

From the very beginning of his professional career Kilpatrick was

one to recognize the significance of inductive knowledge, especially the discoveries and inventions of the experimental scientists. Even in his earlier works when seeking support, in the philosophy of Dewey, for his emerging theory of character building, and trying to express it in the language of Thorndike's connectionist psychology, he gives science credit for the changes that have taken place in industry and education. "I think science lies at the bottom of our discoveries and our inventions; without it they would not have been; and our discoveries and inventions in turn underlie the changes in modern industry. You have only to mention steam, electricity, and chemistry to see what I mean." ¹⁴

Such inductive knowledge and the method of acquiring it that contemporary civilization reflects are for him from first to last fundamental aims of education. "The building of knowledge and thought are important school aims." The character he stresses is able to think adequately before it decides to act, and to do so, "it must have a wide range of effective knowledge." To be effective, knowledge must "help life to go on better and to make it more meaningful, and to deal with it more intelligently." But to do these things, knowledge must be "learned on the basis of its present functioning in the life of the learner." ¹⁵ The inductive method, which is also the method of reflective thinking through which the most reliable knowledge is acquired, is also the method of education in its intellectual aspects. In the last analysis all knowledge is inductive in that it is derived through reflective thinking in concrete situations.

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

For Kilpatrick, values psychologically considered are criticized wants. When the human organism comes into interaction with the environment, there typically results a stirring within from which typically arises a want. Two such wants may occur at the same time and conflict. This situation requires reflective thinking. "When I do think through a conflict of wants and come out with a criticized principle of action, that principle becomes a *value*. A value in this sense is thus a want which has been critically evaluated and found

¹⁴ William H. Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, New York, Macmillan, 1925, p. 253.

¹⁵ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 368, 369.

worthy of choice." Kilpatrick is convinced that "everyone 'who expects to amount to anything' must do a good deal of such valuing. And live up to the values he sets up. The worthy man will accumulate and live such criticized values. In this sense he has . . . a guiding outlook on life; and in the degree that this outlook is consistent, part with part, and defensible to reason, in like degree he has what may properly be called a philosophy of life."¹⁶

Of the different psychological bases of values arising from reflective criticism of wants, Kilpatrick distinguishes five.¹⁷ The most common and widely recognized of these is the satisfaction of wants: "*The satisfaction of getting and enjoying what we want, with the added fact that the stronger the want is felt, the greater is the resulting satisfaction.*" In contrast to this satisfaction is "*the satisfaction from effort, from devising and using means in the pursuit of a desired end or aim.*" In the former the satisfaction comes from the ends but in the latter it comes from the means used, "the actual process of devising and using promising means." Another form of satisfaction stems from the principle of leading on, which Dewey calls happiness. "*When an enterprise grows under effort, additional satisfaction is produced.*" With proper qualification it may be said also that "*variety increases satisfaction.*" Variety may not be an organized form of satisfaction, but it is a "fact that one kind of activity tends, if continued too long, to pall. Change to something new is thus welcome, especially if the new is satisfying on its own account." Finally, there is "the satisfaction that comes from living up to one's own personally held standards. . . . The finer the character of an individual the surer and finer will be the quality of his satisfaction from living up to his standards; and the greater the proportion of such individuals the higher the civilization."

Life's values for Kilpatrick consist of the areas of life in which the foregoing satisfactions are "especially to be found." The twelve points of emphasis, though somewhat different from the usual, are less striking than the interpretation he gives them.¹⁸

1. Physical health, whose importance is generally recognized, is neither the highest value as Herbert Spencer thought, nor the lowest

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-150.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-158.

as Aristotle thought. The apparent conflict may be resolved "by seeking such physical health and vigor as allows the other constituents of the good life their best chance to come into vigorous being."

2. Mental wholeness, the well-regulated personality, has been only recently differentiated and is too often disregarded. Nevertheless, "if there be any one single value which is essential to all else of the good life, this seems to be it." If man "is to live effectively and enjoy the good life, his internal arrangements, his attitudes and habits, must be in good mutual adjustment. Specifically, both emotion and habit must always be ready to obey one's reason."

3. Satisfying personal relationship is a source of satisfaction which everyone feels throughout conscious life. "Few things cut deeper than unsatisfying personal relations," and "few things bring more abiding pleasure than satisfying personal relations." Recent progress in understanding this source of happiness and unhappiness places a peculiar responsibility on education to "make effective use of the growing knowledge."

4. The chance to choose as a responsible self is a fundamental constituent of the good life. The full capacity to choose is peculiar to man and choice is "the most characteristic activity of a self." To be without freedom to choose for one's self is to be a slave. Decent living requires that both individuals and groups learn to choose intelligently and responsibly. Such choice involves selection of means and ends on the basis of probable consequences. The cumulative effect of intelligent choice is continually to rebuild and enrich the self and its living, especially when one accepts responsibility for supporting one's choices. Such critical and careful choosing "is pre-eminently the way to build both a responsible character and a criticized philosophy."

5. Meaningful work as a constituent of the good life differs from drudgery, which "is work which one must do without identifying one's self with it, without seeing and accepting its justification." It is "purposeful activity with which one identifies himself."

6. The chance to create is an essential constituent of the good life because "to feel one's self actually creative is one of the highest and keenest joys," and because "even ordinary men, given the chance, can create." Society, then, has the moral obligation to provide conditions under which "everyone may have the chance to

work and live both thoughtfully and creatively, at least in reasonable measure."

7. "Leading on" as a constituent of the life-good-to-live must be distinguished from deceptive leading on. It has reference to the fact that "some activities open up vistas, new possibilities to follow up, with possibly a new disposition to realize the new insights, while the deceptive kind in the end results in loss of freedom. This principle means finding and embodying "in institutional life and its supporting attitudes those ways of behaving which open up new possibilities in both content and richness of life, which lead on so consistently and so widely as to promise increasing good life to all." When so understood, "it may be said to restate the end and aim of all moral behavior and civilization itself."

8. Range of interest, when properly qualified, is a constituent of the good life. Other things being equal, Francis Bacon's statement that "the more good things we are interested in, the more ardently we live" is true. But other things are seldom equal. The matter of dispersing and concentrating interest is a factor to be considered. Preference should also be given to the "larger interests of the public good" where they "conflict with personal and other close interests." Here the "principle of leading on may supply the guiding corrective to Bacon's generalization."

9. The esthetic as a constituent of the life good-to-live is broader than the more conventional definition of the classical tradition. When so considered, "esthetic enjoyment is any and every experience directly enjoyed for its own quality." It is not confined to nature or the fine arts, but "may play a role in the lives of men in all walks of life in both work and leisure, whatever the occupation may be."

10. Music is logically a part of the esthetic as a constituent of the good life. But because of its widely recognized significance as well as the tendency of some to regard it as an aspect of economic truth, it is for emphasis here listed separately.

11. An adequate social life process as a constituent of the life good-to-live recognizes the inherent dependence of the human individual "on his social environment." For him to live the good life, society, therefore, must "furnish him both stimulating climate and institutions to call out his finer and better possibilities, and mean-

while protect him in this better and finer life." Only a democratic society "can develop and express the necessary aggregate of personal traits."

12. Religion as a constituent of the life good-to-live is taken to mean "the spirit with which one holds one's supreme value—the value in terms of which one values all else—plus the outworking of this attitude appropriately in life. . . . Religion is a unifying of one's self and one's life on the basis of some supreme and inclusive outlook and consequent program of action." The bearing of religion thus understood on the good life "is that the overarching concern of each individual should be that all people shall have and enjoy the fullest and finest life possible."

Kilpatrick states the value assumptions of his philosophy of life under three heads. First, "the living of people is the primary value," because in working it out is found the criterion of all values. Second, the good life is the inclusive aim "because it means the life good-to-live without which nothing else has meaning." To define its content is to state "the content aims of ethics, of democracy, and of education." Third, "morality is a social necessity" because the living of people as the primary value and the good life as an all-inclusive aim require it. "If quality of the living of people is the paramount value; if enriching the quality of life be taken as the criterion of endeavor; if, in addition, we live in a world where all are tied together, with acts of each affecting all—then acceptance of moral obligation becomes essential to satisfactory social living." Finally, "democracy is the chosen way of life" because it includes not only "government by the people," but respect for personality, liberty, equality, and regard for the common good.

Implications and Applications

Our account here states the implications and applications of the democratic-character theory in terms of educational aims, curriculum development, and school administration. These take in all the less inclusive features such as subject matter, method, and discipline,

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421, reference for the 12 points above.

to which Kilpatrick directs attention in various connections. They are meaningful and significant to members of the teaching profession, whatever their field of specialization; and when so stated, they can be readily compared with those of other theories that have been analyzed with reference to the same features.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Kilpatrick uses such terms as "aims," "objectives," and "goals" interchangeably. He recognizes three kinds—the remote, the intermediate, and the immediate.²⁰

In the 1920's, while still concerned mainly with interpreting Dewey's educational implications in terms of Thorndike's psychology, he calls the remote objective growth, reconstruction of experience, or the remaking of life. "The immediate objective is to secure a good instance of present child living, gripping and sufficiently difficult to 'lead on.'" The intermediate objectives are "the habits, skills, attitudes, knowledge, and personal traits." The relation between them he painstakingly explains: "Suppose I attain this objective (immediate), then my second (intermediate) objective is the acquisition through this experience of certain desirable traits, as knowledge, skill, habit, or attitude. These I must get in order to attain my still further aim (more remote objective) of a higher level of living. The intermediate traits have been satisfactorily got only as they eventuate in this higher living." Apparently these personality traits are just what the term "intermediate" implies. Whatever value they may have they get from the quality of the immediate experience of which they are the cumulative effect, and from their function as a means to attaining the remote objective of continuous growth or reconstruction of experience. They are not criteria to be considered in the selection of immediate ends but are means of realizing remote ends.

With the further development of his own distinctive position he modifies considerably the relation of the different types of aims. He still recognizes the same three kinds of objectives, which he now calls aims. Growth, reconstruction of experience, or the remaking of life is still fundamental, but is only one of the aspects of a life

²⁰ Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, pp. 362, 363.

good-to-live and of its correlative educational aim—building a democratic character. The traits constituting the intermediate aims now become constituents of the remote aim and are criteria to be considered in the selection of immediate aims. They can and should be formulated prior to determining the immediate aim.

The importance of stating a set of intermediate aims or values in advance and using them as standards of direction in the selection and development of immediate aims he shows in three ways. First, he analyzes the life good-to-live into the twelve constituent traits listed earlier. Second, he states less formally but no less definitely some of the more important intermediate traits which the democratic character includes as the remote, inclusive, and guiding aim of education. Third, he formulates more systematically eight traits of character which he considers “strategically important and representative of any proposed complete list that might be offered.”

For convenience of comparison with the constituent values of a life good-to-live and the more informal analysis of democratic character previously summarized, we here abbreviate these eight traits:²¹

1. A well-adjusted personality
2. Common sense in facing life's practical demands
3. Acting on thinking
4. Skill in group discussion and decision making
5. Respect for the rights and feelings of others
6. Attitude of responsible citizenship and regard for the common good
7. Variety of interests and sources of finer enjoyment
8. Ideals, standards, and principles of action.

The teacher's “map of values,” like the constituent values and character traits with which they are consistent, is to be considered in the selection of immediate aims, whether called instances of present living, activities, or experiences. To be specific, the qualitative character traits, however designated, determine the qualities of the immediate aims: that is, the units of the curriculum, whether designated as projects, activities, experiences, enterprises, or in some other way.

For instance, in all his analyses of the values of a life good-to-live

²¹ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 428-443.

and the traits of a democratic character, Kilpatrick invariably recognizes a balanced, effective, intelligent, creative, and morally responsible personality. When such qualities of personality or character are recognized as aspects of the intermediate aims, the immediate aims of which they are the cumulative effect must therefore be pervaded with the same qualities. To illustrate, if to act on thinking as a value of a life good-to-live and of a well-developed democratic character is an intermediate educational aim, then, to act on thinking is a quality of the "instances of present living" (experiences) which may properly be taken as immediate aims. Intermediate aims are therefore constituents of the remote aim and are standards of direction to which immediate aims must conform.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

In applying his democratic-character theory to curriculum development, Kilpatrick does not take sides on the structure of the school system, but for purposes of clearness in discussion he assumes the 6-3-3 plan. For him the curriculum at any educational level consists of the total living of the pupils under the direction of the school. The organization of the ideal curriculum for general education, however, differs in important respects from that for specialized education. The curriculum of the elementary school should be designed for general education only, and those of the secondary school and of the college should be designed partly for general and partly for specialized education. In principle, therefore, curriculum development for general education in both the secondary school and the college is very much like that of the elementary school.

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM. The curriculum of the elementary school, which is entirely for general education, is the process of pupil living under the direct guidance of the teacher. Such living consists of the interaction or transaction of pupils with the environment. The transaction itself is called experience; but when the response of the pupil is emphasized, it is called activity, and when the effect of the environment is emphasized, it is called learning. In keeping with the currently accepted technical definition of curriculum, the term "activity" will here be given preference. Any adequate account of the development of the elementary cur-

riculum from the standpoint of the democratic-character theory, therefore, involves a consideration of not only the activities constituting the units of curriculum development but also the methods of teaching and the subject matter.

A unit of curriculum development is an activity developed by the pupils under the direction of the teacher. These units or activities may be called projects, enterprises, experiences, or simply activities. But however they may be designated, ideally they are activities which the pupils choose and develop with the approval and assistance of the teacher. They are not to be limited by any advance selection or organization of subject matter prescribed in an official course of study corresponding to the traditional school subjects or any combination of them. Neither are they to be limited by any official requirements in terms of ground to be covered or fixed subject-matter objectives to be achieved: that is, knowledge, skills, and appreciations. The only recognized criterion of selection is the continuous growth of the pupils consistent with the constituent values of the democratic-character theory of education.

When the unit of curriculum development is conceived as an activity in the process of living or experience, rather than as an integral part of an organized subject, method of learning is the primary feature of the educative process, and method of teaching becomes the primary feature of curriculum development. From World War I through the 1920's Kilpatrick defines the unit of the educative process and of curriculum development in terms of purposeful activity and calls it the project method. The nature of purposeful activity thus determines the method of teaching as well as the curriculum.

A purposeful activity as the unit of a life good-to-live and therefore of the educative process is analyzed into four logical steps corresponding to Herbart's analysis of the learning experience conceived as the organization of ideas, and to Dewey's analysis of the learning experience as reflective thinking. In the first step, *purposing*, a purpose is selected as a guide to the process of learning. In the second step, *planning*, plans are made for guidance in executing the project proposed. In the third step, *executing*, plans for the attainment of the aims projected are carried out. In the fourth step, *judging*, results are estimated with respect to the specific situation and

to the general lessons to be derived from the experience.²²

Reminiscent of the attempts of the proponents of formal discipline to capture the object lesson and of the Herbartians to capture the recitation, Kilpatrick calls his new formulation of purposeful activity the project method. Apparently to circumvent the tendency to reduce every general pattern, such as the Herbartian formal steps and Dewey's reflective thinking, to one of several coordinate general techniques, he distinguishes four different types of projects corresponding to the four most widely recognized of the general techniques. The producer's project corresponds to the so-called construction technique; the consumer's project corresponds to the so-called appreciation technique; the problem project corresponds to the so-called problem technique; and the drill project corresponds to the so-called drill technique. When the method of purposeful activity is so broadly conceived as to include and reinterpret these general procedures, the understanding of the practical implications of the theory of growth and reconstruction of experience as defined by Dewey is widely extended. Many came to consider the project method not merely a device or technique coordinate with other devices and techniques, but as a set of principles that are really general in application. Extended also was the idea of the wider meaning of method involving all aspects of experience and "simultaneous learning."

But as Kilpatrick's conception of the life good-to-live and its correlative democratic-character theory of education increasingly take on definite form after 1930, his analysis of the learning-teaching technique undergoes reconstruction. He places more emphasis upon advance planning on the part of the teacher and gives more recognition to standards of direction consistent with the constituent values of a life good-to-live in a democratic society. Although the recognition of social and moral standards of direction is clearly implicit in the conception of purposeful activity, the steps of the complete purposeful act into which it is analyzed are mainly psycho-

²² William H. Kilpatrick, *The Project Method*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1916, pp. 1-18.

Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, pp. 200-216.

John P. Wynne, *Philosophies of Education: from the Standpoint of the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1947, p. 310.

logical. The only criterion of good purposes seems to be growth or reconstruction of experience, which appears to be itself mainly psychological.²³ But his later formulation of the general technique of teaching incorporates the constituent values of the life good-to-live and traits of the democratic character. This formulation includes much of his original analysis of purposeful activity and shows the influence of his psychology of learning developed after 1930, but it contains no reference to the different types of purposes emphasized in the earlier formulations.

For a full understanding of his comprehensive technique of teaching consistent with a life good-to-live, the experience theory of learning, and the democratic-character theory of education, there is no substitute for a firsthand study of his own formulation. For the sake of brevity, our arrangement differs from the original, but every effort has been made to include all the important points of emphasis. This technique, which is applicable to the elementary school and to the general education program of the secondary school and the college is called "teaching as guiding." Since according to the experience theory of learning a "pupil learns what he lives and builds that at once into character, the quality of that pupil's living becomes the essential and crucial aim immediately before the teacher." Therefore, it is the function of teaching to promote the "living of a quality fit to be built into abiding character."²⁴

Here it is clearly assumed that the criteria of the immediate quality of living, growth, or experience, to be encouraged and developed are the constituent values of a life good-to-live, or the patterns of character which constitute the intermediate aims of education. The teaching pattern proposed for the cultivation of such quality of living in its various aspects is here summarized under three general heads:

I. PLANNING FOR TEACHING

1. The teacher should develop a map of all the criticized values that he could hope for his pupils. These selected values must be consistent with the constituent values of the intermediate aims of building a democratic character. Along with these values should

²³ Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-216.

²⁴ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

be "some notion of how to help pupils live each time so as to learn it."

2. *He determines what is to be done and what "will hopefully be learned."* Emphasis is to be placed on character and personality development to be consciously sought all the time. "An essential part of this development will include certain areas of thought and attitude, with their supporting knowledge and skills as demanded by the good life of the individual and of society." Although the place of these areas in the curriculum cannot be determined in advance, the teacher should prepare to guide the "work of the class all the while so that the important areas will not be disregarded or unduly postponed."
3. He sets the stage for stimulating pupils to suggest proposals, always keeping in mind the whole class, promising lines of activity for this age pupil, and an understanding of the interests of each pupil and of their promise for behavior and learning.

II. THE TEACHER'S GUIDANCE IN THE SELECTION OF CURRICULUM ACTIVITIES

1. The teacher should encourage pupils to suggest and evaluate activities, considering with them, in intelligent and responsible discussion, the various proposals suggested.
2. He should keep constantly in mind possible values to be sought, promising lines of activity, and the class interests and attitudes.
3. The activity chosen should rank high in class interest, should be difficult enough to be challenging but not discouraging, and should rate high among items on the map of values.
4. The teacher should lead both individual learners and the class as a whole, through discussion and choice, to whole-hearted commitment to the activity chosen.
5. He should encourage in the "pupils as high a degree of self-directed responsible acting on thinking" as possible.

III. THE TEACHER'S GUIDANCE IN DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVITIES

1. The teacher should continue to promote self-directed responsible acting on thinking already begun in selecting the activity.

2. He should help individual pupils and the class as may prove necessary, but always so as to help them help themselves.
3. He should give "the least degree of direct help consistent with the best personal work on the part of the pupils."
4. He should help the pupils initiate the activity, plan how to carry it forward, execute the plan, and evaluate the progress during the activity and the results at the end.
5. He should encourage and help pupils to think up and note suggestions as new leads for other and further work, and formulate them for clarification of thinking, later recall, and possible use.
6. He should help pupils to criticize their own thinking, "pick up and fix important kinds of learning involved," and "draw lessons for the future."²⁵

Subject matter is an abbreviation for "subject matter of study." It consists of the materials derived from or secured through observing, reading, listening, experimenting, and participating in activities of various kinds, and may be classified in different ways. From one point of view it consists of facts and principles classified as disciplines or subjects, such as the natural sciences, the fine arts, mathematics, and philosophy, and their various subdivisions or subjects.

In the democratic-character theory subject matter is a means of stimulating and developing curriculum activities. A background in direct experience is indispensable for dealing with the organized symbolic materials supplied by the various subjects or disciplines. Consequently, for pupils in the primary grades and for beginners in any school subject, the starting point should be the subject matter of their experiential background. None of the school subjects is to be neglected. They are all indispensable aids to education, and the teacher should have such a thorough understanding of them that he can concentrate his attention on assisting his pupils in using, and therefore acquiring, subject matter in meaningful situations. But there is no virtue in merely acquiring information of which one does not have a realizing sense. The selection and placement of subject matter depend upon its usefulness in selecting and developing curriculum activities.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 304-307.

The fundamental tools of education, including the three R's, are to be acquired in activities or experiences that are desirable because they contribute to the development of constituent values of a life good-to-live, and therefore to the development of traits that are intermediate aims in building a democratic character. Likewise, all the essential aspects of all school subjects may be acquired when and as they are needed in the selection and development of a well-balanced program of pupil activities or experiences. Since the democratic character, the ultimate guiding aim of education, is all-inclusive, and since learning involves all the various aspects of the learner's experience, his curriculum activities will include subject matter of all types. Such a well-balanced program of curriculum activities can be developed by any teacher who keeps his "map of values" up to date and all the while guides the work of the class so that neither the essential areas of thought and attitude nor their supporting knowledge and skills will be neglected.²⁶

The placement of any particular item of subject matter of any kind is to be determined not by its position in any official course of study or even in any course of instruction the teacher himself may have planned in advance. It is to be determined by the function it serves in stimulating and developing curriculum activities in particular situations consistent with pupil interests on the one hand, and the teacher's map of values on the other.

Finally, the problem of organization must be considered. Psychological organization has to do with the arrangement of subject matter of study for use in the process of learning, and logical organization has to do with the arrangement of the effect of learning (or subject matter learned) in the mind of the learner.²⁷ Psychological organization is not only desirable but necessary if real learning is to occur. The learner learns what he does in the way he does it. Consequently, subject matter to be fully learned must fit into the experience of the pupil. Therefore, the psychological organization problem of teachers, of authors of textbooks, and official curriculum-makers is to arrange the subject matter of study so as to facilitate its use in selecting and developing curriculum activities at various levels.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 310-315.

²⁷ Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

Logical organization, for which the teacher rather than the author or the official curriculum-maker is primarily responsible, should culminate the development of curriculum activities. It consists of such arrangement of outcomes as will render them available for future use. It is not, however, to be based upon the logical analysis of subject matter as arranged in the mind of the teacher, the author, or the expert. It is the responsibility of the teacher to guide the pupil so that he will at various stages logically relate the effect of each new experience with the effect of each previous experience. The learner, under teacher guidance, thus develops his own logical order rather than absorbs or appropriates that of any previously established system of subject matter.

THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM. The core program in the secondary school—the junior and senior high schools—is for general education and would follow the same pattern as the curriculum in the elementary school, with a core teacher in charge of each home room. Methods of teaching, grade placement, and organization would not differ in principle. There would be no official course of study prescribing subject matter content. “This core teacher will teach along the same lines as were followed in the elementary schools; the activity program; no subjects as such, though rich in content of study about living problems; no curriculum fixed in advance, though constant painstaking planning and evaluating with reference to the needs of the group.”²⁸

Planning like that contemplated would involve the continuous development of a map of values by each core teacher, and constant cooperative planning of core teachers with one another and with the teachers in the specialized fields responsible for the same pupils for some part of the school day. The general education curriculum would actually be constructed from day to day and from year to year by teachers and pupils working and planning together. Even the specialized part of the curriculum should grow out of the core curriculum, feed back into it, and have a real contribution to make to general education.

THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM. In regard to the college curriculum

²⁸ William H. Kilpatrick, *Remaking the Curriculum*, New York, Newson, 1938, pp. 99-107.

Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

Kilpatrick makes a number of very specific recommendations,²⁹ beginning as follows:

"The college curriculum . . . should recognize four fairly distinct divisions, each with a primary aim: (i) the general core work aiming at the general or inclusive or common education of all; (ii) the vocationally directed work—direct vocational education and professional preparation for later study of medicine, law, engineering, or the like; (iii) special interests, usually nonvocational, as literature or music or art or economics, typically a specialization of what is given more generally under (i); (iv) work experience required of all but adapted to each." Although teachers will need special preparation for core work, "much can be accomplished, especially if the preparation of college teachers can be shifted from the present emphasis on research to actual preparation to teach."

Vocational preparation and prepreparation for the existing graduate school "should be consciously conducted in the light of what is going forward under general education so as to support it." Special interests "will usually represent further and specialized treatment of interests cared for more generally under general education. . . . These, too, should be taught on the living and learning basis" that should characterize the curriculum activities of all general education on all levels. Work experience should also be included in the curriculum on the college level. It should represent a conscious effort to provide students with a background in direct experience that will better prepare them for the responsibilities of life and help them see meanings in their experiences.

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

School administration and management involves pupils, teachers, administrators, janitors, parents, schools, and school systems. "Whether we consider the superintendent, or his staff, or the separate schools, or the school board, the primary and guiding concern of organized education is the proper development of the pupils. *Everything connected with the whole school system centers in this one thing, the educative development of the pupils.*" The aim and test of all that is done in the school system is the educative effect

²⁹ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., pp. 327-329.

on the pupils and "the educative effect and the life effect . . . of every act by and in the system."³⁰ Since the pupils are always affected, the same principles hold in this broader relationship as in the relation of teachers and pupils.

In problems of special concern to the teacher, Kilpatrick gives attention to questions of detail. Classes should be large enough to provide for social participation but small enough to permit individual attention. Although in the last analysis individual teachers should be responsible for curriculum making, they should have the support and assistance of the whole school. Through continuous discussion of educational values, curriculum activities, and teaching procedures all teachers may be kept abreast of what others are doing, and each teacher can know how to make his program fit into what has gone before and what is yet to come. Moreover, each teacher can continue to improve his map of values.

The continuous record for each pupil should contain an accumulation of facts of many kinds helpful to the inquiring teacher interested in learning more about his character and capabilities. Personal conferences of teacher and parents once or twice a year might well replace more formal reports. School marks direct the attention of both pupil and parent to the less important ends of education, and honor rolls and prizes are artificial incentives and probably do more harm than good. As a usual thing pupils should be promoted on the basis of social age rather than on the basis of achievement of mere subject matter ends.

In the wider sense school management includes such problems as pupil grouping, teacher assignment, and community relations.³¹ From the standpoint of the total effect on the pupil, homogeneous grouping should be rejected and some other solution found for the problem it is intended to solve. In the activity program proposed there is no place for departmental teaching or semiannual promotions. The school should develop such community relations as will provide an opportunity for all kinds of "educative social responses." Pupils, teachers, and parents should all participate in community affairs through which the educational activities of the school will be significantly extended.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 331-337.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-339.

Some of the general problems of school administration have to do with the work of the supervisor, the size and kinds of high schools, transfer of pupils from one school system to another, consolidation of schools, examinations, policymaking, and Federal aid.³² According to Kilpatrick, the supervisors should "help steer the in-service study program with a minimum use of authority and a maximum amount of encouragement of teacher leadership," and "help new teachers find themselves in their work." There is no place for supervision of subject fields except in some of the specialized fields such as art or music. Here supervisors should consider themselves as consultants to help teachers rather than inspectors or administrative officials. High schools, like elementary schools, may be too large. Perhaps the pupil enrollment should be limited to something like 3000. Otherwise, "the personal touch, the sharing of problems, both among pupils and among teachers, becomes increasingly difficult as the school gets increasingly large." The high school should be comprehensive; there is no place in a democracy for different types of high schools designed to serve different social classes.

The activity program facilitates the transfer of pupils from one school to another because when the curriculum consists of activities the preparation of the transfer pupil for a new activity is not essentially different from that of the other pupils. Although schools may be too small to provide adequate socialization, there are other considerations involved in consolidation. Some of the best activity programs are to be found in relatively small schools, and the school is often a center of community life and should not be disturbed. Although testing and evaluation is an essential feature of the activity program, it has no place for the centrally administered examination that tends to reduce education to formalism and to eliminate "all the finer points and aspects of a proper education." In the development of educational programs teachers should share either directly or indirectly in policy-making.

Federal aid to public schools for the equalization of educational opportunity has the same justification as does state aid. On the other hand, neither federal nor state aid can be justified for private

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 342-346.

schools because it would tend to introduce and perpetuate divisions in the population when the success of democracy depends upon bringing people together "into one effectively communicating whole." Furthermore, federal control to the extent of decreasing local and individual responsibility and initiative is a danger that should be avoided in whatever plan of federal aid to education may be adopted.³³

As with other theories, the implications of the democratic-character theory for personal discipline are here considered under the head of school administration. Because for Kilpatrick pupil discipline is strategically important, he gives it the emphasis of separate treatment under the heads of *Coercion and Learning* and *Character Building*.³⁴ Discipline is an essential aspect of character building for which the pupil himself is primarily responsible. Therefore, discipline in the ideal sense is self-discipline.

But in educational practice, whether in the home or the school, it assumes two forms. Self-discipline, which is the ideal, depends upon the development of the self. In Kilpatrick's analysis of the philosophical and psychological structure of human nature, the self is a product of the interaction of the human organism with others—which he calls the self-other process. The degree of responsibility for self-discipline depends upon the development of the self through its interaction with others. Only when the self is sufficiently developed can self-discipline be fully exercised. But in the meantime, neither parent nor teacher can afford to wait. They must begin early to make certain requirements in order to prevent the acquisition of undesirable habits. With ideal self-discipline in mind, however, they will place on the young such responsibility as the maturity of the self may warrant. Measures of external control will be limited to what necessity requires, and will be considered critically with pupils as soon as they are able to understand them.

Those in charge of the educational situation are responsible for the maintenance of order as well as for growth in self-discipline of pupils. They may—in fact, should—if coercion seems the better part of wisdom, compel pupils for their own good and that of others

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 351-355.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 263-270, 346-369.

Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-98.

to conform to certain regulations. But in doing so, they must not forget that self-discipline is the end to be sought, and that overt compliance with demands does not assure the cultivation of desirable traits of character. Coercion under certain conditions is necessary for the sake of order and sometimes for the sake of education. Still it is usually a choice between two evils. More often than not it succeeds in securing outward compliance and fails in the long-term effect. The achievement of self-discipline depends upon the development of positive interests and the development of the habit of considering probable consequences and acting on thinking. Since pupils learn what they accept to act on, coercion may promote negative interests and encourage doing as one is told or is disposed to do instead of acting on thinking.

THE DEMOCRATIC-RECONSTRUCTION THEORY

The term "progressive education" is even less appropriately applied to Bode's theory of education and the good life than to those of Dewey and Kilpatrick. Bode does not consider himself an indiscriminating patron of the new education and ridicules educational *laissez faire*, sometimes identified with Progressive Education. For Bode, education in the neutral sense—that is, without reference to desirability—and learning are one and the same thing. But learning as well as all human behavior is purposive, and all significant learning involves the reconstruction of experience. Desirable education, however, as with Dewey, consists of a reconstruction that adds to the meaning of experience and increases the control of subsequent experience. Desirable education in a democratic society must conform to the democratic way of life.

For Bode, the democratic ideal is best defined as "widening the areas of common interests and concerns" (or purposes); and this definition is preferable to Dewey's, which emphasizes the "quantitative side of the question."³⁵ Bode himself sometimes refers to his position as the democratic growth theory and at others as the dem-

³⁵ Boyd H. Bode, *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, New York, Newson, 1936, p. 106.

ocratic-reconstruction theory. But since he would, at least for a while, avoid the term "growth" because of its misuse by the Progressives, Bode's theory of education and the good life is here designated the democratic-reconstruction theory.

Philosophical Foundations

Near the close of his career Bode once said to me, "After receiving the Ph.D. degree from Cornell in 1900, I was perfectly miserable until Dewey asked me to write a chapter for his *Creative Intelligence*, and from that time on I began to get myself straightened out." Careful students of Bode's complete works note that he is bothered by the conflicts and inconsistencies he finds in his own experience between "absolutes" of the pre-scientific cultural tradition on the one hand, and scientific knowledge and the relativistic standards of practical life in a democratic country, on the other. The duality that he observes in his own experience and also in the American democratic tradition he attributes to the influence of Plato's two-worldism in which the supersensible world of absolutes is superior to the empirical world of sense experience. By 1909 he begins to see, in the pragmatism and instrumentalism of Peirce, James, and Dewey, the objective relativism required for the integration of his own experience and that of a democratic people. For Bode there is no compromise between relativism and absolutism. As professor of education at Ohio State University (1917), he decides to concentrate on acquainting the teaching profession with the cultural cleavage and its philosophical foundations with a view to gradual adjustment through education.

Unlike some educational philosophers, Bode places primary emphasis on mind rather than on reality, knowledge, or value. This emphasis is due apparently to his recognition of the importance of the psychology of learning in the development of educational theory. "Developments in the field of psychology are making it increasingly apparent that studies in the learning process derive their chief significance for education from the conceptions of the mind which lie back of them. What we conceive or assume the mind to be is of determining influence, both in the field of method

and in the realm of values or goals.”³⁶

Bode's explanation of his beliefs about the other topics—reality, knowledge, and value—is subsidiary and contributory to his explanation of mind as the foundation of different theories of learning. Nevertheless, two general assumptions clearly underlie his whole philosophy. The first of these is that philosophy, “to justify itself, must recognize and accept the obligation to aid in the creation and realization of human ideals, not in a realm apart but in the affairs of common life.”³⁷ Second, we “must take the position that there is only one road to truth and that this road is marked out by scientific method.”³⁸

BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

The two problems of primary concern to Bode in his attempt to deal with reality are the nature of reality in general and the nature of mind in particular.³⁹ Consistent with his presuppositions, Bode relies on science more than does James or Dewey. All experimentalists or objective relativists recognize the scientific method as the most dependable way to secure reliable knowledge. But with regard to reality both James and Dewey rely more on what is known as naïve experience than on scientific knowledge previously established. But in their beliefs about reality science serves a negative role in that nothing inconsistent with established scientific knowledge is included. On the other hand, for Bode science serves a positive role in that his beliefs about reality are based on established scientific knowledge.

It mattered to him that, in the findings of the new physics—as contrasted with the classical physics of Newton that played a role in the development of classical empiricism—the unit of action is the “field” rather than the atom. “Every atom is located in a field and is continuous with that field, and every field is, in turn, overlapping

³⁶ Boyd H. Bode, *How We Learn*, New York, Heath, 1949, Preface.

³⁷ Boyd H. Bode, “Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method,” *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 15:701-710, December 19, 1918, p. 707.

³⁸ Boyd H. Bode, “Our Faith in Education,” *Education Digest*, 10:21-23, October 1944, p. 23.

³⁹ George Tulley, *An Evaluation of Boyd H. Bode's Philosophy of Education*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver, 1958, p. 76.

with other fields, world without end. The field, not the atom, is now being regarded as the unit of action. A change anywhere is a change in a whole field; it is a manifestation of a process that is as wide as the field itself. Thus saith our oracle, modern physics." Bode then adds, "The electro-magnetic field is, for the modern physicist, as real as the chair in which he sits."⁴⁰ For Bode the revolution in physics implies a corresponding revolution in our beliefs about the nature of man and of the world. The field theory of modern physics provides for him a clue as to the nature of reality which should replace the idealist tradition of two worlds and the realist tradition of a divided world.

Although Bode leaves to the specialists in physics the problem of explaining how atoms behave, we can infer from his avowed belief in the scientific method that for him "the components of any given field behave in an orderly fashion thereby making prediction possible."⁴¹ Causation, therefore, in the field theory is a much more complex concept than the mechanical causation of predeterminism. Bode's general belief in a wide open universe as conceived by James means that for him, while the cause-and-effect relationship obtains among various fields, there is always a probability of the emergence of a real novelty.

Unlike the single cause-and-effect sequence in the mechanistic universe, in the universe which the field theory suggests, outcomes, to some extent predictable, are never certain because of the endless ways in which the different components of the field affect one another.⁴² Any given event is the result of the interaction of all the components of a given field; therefore, it does not, in and of itself, cause another event. Causation in the field theory is much more complex.

Without denying scientific causation, the possibility of novelty, originality, and creativity undercuts the predeterminism of a mechanistic world and makes human freedom possible. Since the world is always changing and is never complete, participation of man in the shaping of events to some degree always remains a possibility. Within certain limitations foresight and effort count. In such a world

⁴⁰ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 213, 216.

⁴¹ Tulley, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

freedom of thought and intelligence is not only possible but even indispensable to human progress. Such a world is the foundation for the freedom of intelligence to which all experimentalists and relativists of the James-Dewey tradition subscribe.

The shift in physics from the conception of substantial matter to fields as the foundation of things requires a corresponding change in the conception of mind. Since objective things are events, mind is a quality of certain events. It is functional not only in the instrumental sense in accord with biological evolution, but also in the sense of symbolizing events or playing a role. Such categories as the physical, the vital, the mental, and the social or spiritual are qualities of events and have no reference to different substances. All things are physical in that they are subject to cause and effect; but some physical things are vital, some vital things are mental, and some mental things are social or spiritual. "This new conception of mind" as a function and quality of events "leaves no room for the division of reality into a natural and a supernatural realm. It holds that the world is all of one piece. The leadings or pointings which are identified with mind are relationships between present experiences and future possible experiences; they are not relationships between present experiences and a reality beyond experience."⁴³

Consistent with reality as a process and concatenation of events, some of which function as instruments of control, the self can no longer be identified with a mind which has access to a supersensible realm of truth, knowledge, and value, or be taken to be something with which one is born. Selfhood in the new context of reality and mind are things which a man develops for himself in his interaction with others.⁴⁴ In the process of interaction with his fellows an individual forms ideals which have their roots in experience, and Bode analyzes how he identifies himself with them:⁴⁵ "We form concepts and then use these concepts as instruments with which to analyze situations so as to discover their possibilities, and we convert concepts into ideals for the guidance of conduct." For Bode such ideals are the structural materials with which each individual builds a self.

⁴³ Bode, *How We Learn*, pp. 264-265.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 112-114.

Tulley, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

⁴⁵ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 115.

"These ideals represent values or interests which we seek to realize or to maintain and with which we identify ourselves. The development of ideals is, in fact, the same thing as the development of self. The content of the self is furnished by the ideals and interests that we cherish."

Since man develops many kinds of ideals, he develops many different selves. "A man may be one kind of man at home, another at his office, and a third at his club. In each case he lives up to different standards, maintains a different set of interests. The number of selves which it is possible to recognize in connection with any individual is indefinitely large." But however different these selves may be, "there is an underlying unity in that these different interests or selves constantly require adjustment and harmonization." Since in the process of adjustment conflicting interests or selves may undergo modification, the "self is not a fixed quantity or static thing . . . but an achievement. It expands in one direction and contracts in another; it is in the making all the while." In the last analysis criteria for the adjustment or harmonization of the various selves rest "on a social pattern for the development of selfhood. This pattern . . . demands the integration of values on the basis of cooperation with mutual recognition of divergent interests." When the mind is conceived as a quality of events and a function of certain situations, adjustment to the social order, Bode concludes, "becomes a matter of identifying one's self with certain activities or concerns that are present in the environment. A selfhood is *built up*, and it is built up in terms of social content."⁴⁶

In this connection Tulley observes that the development of Bode's kind of selfhood requires two conditions. "First, the environment or society in which man lived had to be organized so as to provide the greatest possible number of opportunities for the cultivation of interests and meaningful endeavors. Second, man as a social creature had to assume the responsibility, not only for meaningful participation in the affairs of society, but also for the integration of his interests and values with those of others and with those of society as a whole."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-262.

⁴⁷ Tulley, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-259.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BELIEFS

According to Bode, the psychologist, by virtue of his profession, is responsible for explaining "what we have been accustomed to call mental life." How he explains it has fundamental import for a theory of learning which the development of a theory of education involves. To explain it he must give an adequate account of such mental processes as perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, feeling, and willing. The faculty psychology, which explains them on the basis of the powers of a metaphysical mind, and the association psychology, which explains them on the basis of the association of ideas or mental states, are inadequate because the metaphysical dualism of mind and matter which they reflect is now obsolete. To explain these mental processes in terms of mechanical physical movement as "behaviorism" and "connectionism" do is to subscribe to crude metaphysical materialism which is no less obsolete than metaphysical dualism.

For Bode the only recourse seems to be to adopt some form of organismic psychology like that developed by Dewey and the Gestalt psychologists. From this point of view, purposive behavior includes all the mental processes together with habits, skills, attitudes, and appreciations. It involves foresight of ends and can be explained only on the basis of mind as a function of the environment. From the point of view of the field theory, the so-called mental states, Bode says,⁴⁸

are not mental at all but just "natural" occurrences like rainfall or the budding of flowers. If we think in terms of the field concept, however, we are no longer obliged to hold that all qualitative changes are reducible to quantitative terms. Qualitative changes can and do make their appearance without being reducible to anything else, or without requiring to be labeled mental.

In referring to qualities of events such as perception, Bode says to "account for them we need to assume nothing beyond a physical organism in relation to its field. . . . As Dewey says, 'The qualities themselves are not sensory; sensory designates an important condi-

⁴⁸ Bode, *How We Learn*, pp. 216-225.

tion of their occurrence, not a constituent of their nature.' . . . In a field that includes a percipient organism, the conditions are fulfilled for the appearance of sense activities." But with special reference to sense perception,

there is room for endless variations in the perceptual experiences of different percipients, but these variations provide no warrant for the supposition either that perceptions are just cerebral disturbances and therefore identifiable with motions or that they are merely "mental states." . . . Every sense quality belongs to a field, and it varies with variations in the field; in no case is a sense quality located in the mind.

As to where sense qualities are located, "the simplest answer is that they are located where we happen to find them. . . . If we stick to the field theory concept, we are obliged to say that locating an object is a practical matter and is determined in terms of the responses of the observer. We locate a thing at a place as a matter of convenience, or we may not locate it at all."

For Bode, "The 'field' concept suggests that the unit of a given experience is not a product of blending . . . but is rather an aboriginal quality or characteristic of the situation. The experience is not a composite because the field is not a composite. The perceived object necessarily appears in some kind of context, and all the elements in the situation modify one another reciprocally." The "peculiar function of things in pointing to the future is what is meant by mind. . . . The term mind is a name, not for a substance or a mental state, but for a function of the environment. . . . The function of pointing or leading is what is meant by mind. This function is not anything separate; it is something that things do."⁴⁹

Bode thinks the field concept and the functional concept of mind require a change in the meaning of the relation of stimulus and response.⁵⁰ "Since the field operates as a unit, we are bound to assume that the whole field, including the body, is active from the start. This is just another way of saying that the 'reflex arc' concept, in which activity is a pure sequence, is all wrong. The 'stimulus' does not precede the 'response' but the two operate simultaneously." For Bode the

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 226-245.

stimulus and response mark a distinction within a larger co-ordination or "field." The entire field operates as a unit, and so stimulus and response cannot be separated from each other temporally. But they can be contrasted in terms of functions. . . . The stimulus is that phase of the situation which requires to be made more definite or explicit. The response is constituted by the reactions which create the need for a more adequate determination of the conditions for further activity. A situation, then, is a stimulus in a psychological sense, only as long as there is this need of greater definiteness.

Bode concludes that his discussion of the psychological implications of the field process and the functional theory of mind "has not got very much beyond an insistence that human behavior has a certain kind of distinctiveness. To study this behavior in detail is the proper task of psychology. . . . Whether simple or complex, our behavior may involve memory and emotion, and habit, and imagery, and what not. It is clear that this general point of view involves a distinctive approach to the whole problem of learning."

In his analysis of the learning process Bode takes his clue from the idea that the mind is a process of "progressively shaping up the environment." Behavior in which "mind" plays a directing role involves selecting and choosing, as when a pedestrian makes his way across a slippery street and has to decide where to step next. "A whole field, consisting of environmental relationships and bodily reactions, is in continuous reorganization . . . if our pedestrian discovers, as a result of his experience, that clay is slippery, whereas sod or gravel affords a firm footing," he learns something. "He learns about clay, for example, provided that he notes the connection between the appearance of clay and what the clay does to him when he tries to walk on it."

Such "learning takes the form of changing the experience. The clay now *looks* slippery; it has acquired meaning. Such change in an experience whereby it becomes more serviceable for the guidance of behavior is what is meant by learning." For Bode, "in this illustration learning is an intellectual affair, since it is identified with the perception of significant relationships." Even when a result is achieved without any knowledge of how it is done, "the learning is a process of getting the 'feel' of the thing; which is to say that the experience is changed so as to provide better control of behavior."

Although Bode recognizes many different kinds of learning, he is convinced that "all learning involves some perception of relationship, however dim . . . and that analysis, or insight into relationship, however extensive, never keeps abreast with the adaptive change in our experience." All forms of learning, says Bode, involve as a common element "a change in the experiential situation which gives greater control in relation to subsequent behavior. . . . All learning is . . . a change in experience such as to provide for increased control of behavior. . . . All learning . . . has to do with the transformation of experience in the interests of better control. . . . In order to bring about this transformation, it is necessary to do something that will produce the desired change."⁵¹

Some of the general implications drawn from Bode on the conception of learning as the reconstruction of experience will here suffice.⁵²

First, "the school is designed as a special made-to-order environment, so devised or organized that the activities which are carried on in it will do what the life outside does not do." Second, "the theory that learning is a matter of reconstructing experience in the interests of better adaption creates an insistence that the principle of the continuity of experience must be respected at all times." Third, "if we stress the reconstruction of experience in accordance with the conception of the 'field' theory, it becomes apparent" that the common separation of school subjects is "essentially artificial." Fourth, "learning as reconstruction of experience combines thinking, skill, imagination, and appreciation in a single unitary process, and it is characterized by flexibility, since it must constantly adapt itself to the circumstances of the situation." Fifth, consistent with the field theory, "the essence of habit-formation is not repetition but smoothness or co-ordination" and this means flexibility and adaptability. Such a description means that "habit-formation must be linked up with learning as a process of reorganizing or reconstructing experience in a certain way, which means that relation to ends must be constantly kept in view." Sixth, thinking, which "may be defined most simply as the finding and testing of meanings, is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 247-251.

the mind." Therefore, "the cultivation of thinking is a major responsibility of the schools."

The foregoing summary of Bode's psychological beliefs indicates their importance. For more than 20 years, Professor Ernest E. Bayles of the University of Kansas and one of Bode's former students, has continued to elaborate Bode's general psychological position, and a few references to him are appropriate.⁵³

As to how we behave, Bayles says: "If we are to predict behavior accurately . . . we seemingly must interpret human nature as purposive or goal-seeking, as insight-directed, but as taking place in an environment which . . . has to be dealt with on its own terms. . . . A human individual will always design his behavior so as to achieve what he is after (or satisfy his wants) in the quickest and easiest way that he senses or sees as possible under the circumstances." Learning, he says, is to be defined "as a *change in insight*; a process of developing insight; building new insights or modifying old ones." He thus agrees with Dewey's principle of perceptual *interaction* or *transaction*, whereby what each person takes the world to be "serves as the foundation" upon which he fashions his "design for living."

Although Bayles considers the insight theory general in its application, he admits that "some learning is gradual" and that "*teaching for development of insight can be either reflective or nonreflective.*" In regard to transfer of training he says: "*Any given item of training will transfer if and when—and only if and when—(1) opportunity offers, (2) a trained individual sees or senses it as an opportunity, and (3) he is disposed to take advantage of the opportunity.*" This, he continues, is a theory of intelligent behavior "wherein a person's mind is at work," but it is not applicable "to cases of inanimate push and pull wherein . . . one falls victim to circumstances unforeseen or unintended."

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

Bode's beliefs about knowledge that lend support to the democratic-reconstruction theory of education and the good life are of two kinds. On the negative side he rejects *a priori* knowledge as primary on the ground that it assumes the metaphysical dualism of mind and matter which the new physics makes obsolete and unten-

⁵³ Ernest E. Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, New York, Harper, 1960, pp. 43, 46, 47, 55, 58.

able. He rejects the inductive development of general principles by summarizing facts which the senses supply on the ground that induction in isolation from deduction violates the scientific method in which both are functionally involved. He rejects traditional epistemology on the ground that the actual existence of scientific knowledge renders the problem of the existence of knowledge in general irrelevant and obsolete. Like Dewey, he rejects the whole conception of immediate or direct knowledge in all its forms on the ground that its validity is not subject to empirical verification. Finally, like Dewey, too, he rejects, for the same reason, the traditional belief that the function of knowing is the disclosure of an antecedent, fixed reality outside experience.

On the positive side, for Bode as for Dewey, the scientific method, when broadly conceived as the method of reflective thinking, is the only dependable method of securing reliable knowledge. It consists in removing obstacles with which an individual or group is often confronted in purposive activity. When one is faced with some obstacle to further progress, whether in practical life or in the scientific laboratory, purposive behavior becomes conscious or purposeful. The removal of such an obstacle then becomes a problem which involves the quest for a more adequate stimulus or the search for the meaning of the situation. The presence of such an obstacle to purposive behavior transforms it into conscious and deliberate activity. The activity necessary to remove the obstacle involves, according to Bode, four phases or stages: (1) becoming aware of the problem; (2) gathering data for use in solving it; (3) developing and formulating an hypothesis from suggestions derived from past experience and data derived from observation; and (4) verifying or revising the hypothesis through practical application.

The scientific method in the broad sense to which Bode subscribes Bayles calls the scientific-reflective method, and summarizes it in four logical steps. (1) A problem arises because available data seem to be out of harmony with one another in the light of current interpretations or generalizations; (2) alternative hypotheses are sought, new ones invented if necessary, and all are taken into consideration; (3) on the basis of each hypothesis concrete facts are deduced, some known, some experimentally derived; (4) if one of the hypotheses harmonizes all known facts and predicts with ac-

curacy unknown facts, the conclusion is that it is an acceptable hypothesis; otherwise the problem is not yet solved.⁵⁴

When verified, the conclusion becomes an object of knowledge. It is conceived, however, not as a disclosure of some reality outside experience to be contemplated but as an instrument of control. It not only clarifies the present situation and allows the purposive activity to continue, but it also serves as a source of suggestion in dealing with similar situations in the future. The conclusion, though more reliable than the hypothesis prior to its verification, remains tentative and subject to modification or even rejection in consequence of new evidence.

The verified conclusion developed through the scientific method broadly conceived indicates Bode's conception of the meaning of truth. Such a conclusion is considered true to the extent that alternative conclusions are unwarranted. To be true, a suggestion or idea must be able to "organize all relevant facts into a body of evidence to the exclusion of reasonable doubt."⁵⁵ To be reasonable, a doubt must be based upon evidence which supports a different conclusion. But even a conclusion from which all reasonable doubt is eliminated for the time being is subject to modification or rejection whenever such reasonable doubt may arise in subsequent experience. Experience is the final criterion. In this connection Bayles says that, viewed pragmatically, truth "*is that quality of an insight which enables its possessor to design behavior which is successful in that it achieves what it is designed to achieve. Accuracy in the anticipation of future events is the pragmatic test for truth.*"⁵⁶ Apparently Bayles and Bode agree that a proposition remains true only so long as future events can be anticipated with accuracy. Truth—any truth—is therefore, for them, a product of the scientific-reflective method, and therefore is man-made and relative.

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

Since for Bode the self consists of a system or pattern of ideals, an account of his beliefs about value that lend support to the demo-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

⁵⁵ Boyd H. Bode, *Fundamentals of Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1922, pp. 119-120.

⁵⁶ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

cratic-reconstruction theory may be considered a continuation of our account of his conception of the self as a factor of human nature. The ideals, also called interests, which constitute the structure of the self are values. They are, however, more or less permanent interests that are derived from experience itself and not from any set of principles which claim authority on the ground of cosmic origin and sanction.⁵⁷ They are established through the critical evaluation of intrinsic values—immediate interests, wishes, and desires that have been subjected to experimental application. For values *de facto* to become values *de jure*, they must be subjected to intellectual appraisal.

In an earlier work, Bode recognizes the distinction between intrinsic values, which are ends within themselves, and instrumental values, which are means to intrinsic values. In his later works, however, the ideals and interests constituting the ends of education and the good life apparently have both intrinsic and instrumental aspects.⁵⁸ For immediate ends or means to be recognized as values, they must be transmuted through intellectual operations. "Any proposed aim or objective, if it is considered apart from everything else, has value by virtue of the fact that some human being desires it. Nothing further is necessary to give it the quality of value. . . . To determine whether a proposed course of action is really desirable in the light of all the surrounding circumstances or conditions, the only procedure . . . open to us is to canvass the relevant conditions . . . to see what the proposed action looks like in the larger context or setting."⁵⁹ In comparing the two kinds of values Bayles contends that "*instrumental values are scientifically verifiable*" and that "*intrinsic values are not scientifically verifiable*." He attributes the same position to Dewey and probably to Bode also.⁶⁰

For Bode, values are as varied as the human capacities or as the aspects of experience to which they correspond. Economic, social,

⁵⁷ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁵⁸ Bode, *Fundamentals of Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

Boyd H. Bode, *Democracy as a Way of Life*, New York, Macmillan, 1939, pp. 49, 67-68.

⁵⁹ Boyd H. Bode, "Where Does One Go for Fundamental Assumptions in Education?" *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 14:361-370, September 1928, p. 367.

⁶⁰ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

and religious values correspond one-for-one to other aspects of experience just as the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the moral values correspond, respectively, to thinking, feeling, and willing. On the psychological side, achievement of the good life consists of the maximum growth or development of individual capacity.⁶¹

"Every normal person maintains a variety of interests or values" some one of which is central. In case of conflict, Bode holds, this dominant or central value "pushes the others aside and claims the right of way." Nevertheless, it is not to be taken as exclusive. For instance, one man's chief concern may be business success; but this is not his only interest. He may desire "to be more than just a business man; he wants to be a good citizen, a good neighbor, a good Christian." Adjustment or integration of his various concerns is prerequisite to all-round development. Just how such harmonization of values is to be achieved is a matter which each individual must determine for himself through experimentation and reflection on conditions and consequences. The required pattern each individual must build for himself. It is the product of "a process of creation or invention."

The only test or validation of such a pattern is "that, in some sense or other, it serves to promote better adjustment." Such better adjustment, which is missed if any value or set of values "is developed at the expense of the rest, must consist in some pattern of social relationships." The problem with which the educational philosopher is faced, then, is to determine the social pattern for use as a criterion of the relative emphases to be placed on different values. For Bode such a social pattern is a good criterion "in proportion as it provides a basis for the integration or harmonization of conflicting interests; it is bad if it permits some one of the interests to ride roughshod over all the rest."

For those who "conceive of the mind in terms of 'function,' adjustment to the social order becomes a matter of identifying one's self with certain activities or concerns that are present in the environment." The foundation of such a social pattern or criterion of values in a democratic society Bode finds in certain tendencies which are already under way in our American life and to which he believes

⁶¹ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 256, 260.

our people are unconsciously committed. He believes, too, that they would consciously and deliberately identify themselves with these tendencies if they were fully aware of the social ideal implicit in them. Of these tendencies, he mentions several.

In the field of industry there are signs that employers, employees, and consumers are becoming socialized in the sense that they emphasize "co-operation on the basis of respect for divergent interests." In the field of religion there is now a "marked shift of emphasis in our churches toward the importance of present living." In our cultural beliefs "we seem to be moving toward a conception of culture which stresses the integration of values . . . one of which seeks to arrive at a consistent and inclusive outlook on life. A re-interpretation of culture, away from the aristocratic tradition, is taking place." In our economic system there is a tendency toward "the participation of all concerned to make industry serve an increasingly wider range of common interests." This points "to the ideal of making industry contribute to the continuous development of all who are engaged in it, as well as providing a livelihood."⁶²

Such tendencies are not, of course, a conscious and deliberate application of the democratic way of life as an ideal. But on the other hand, they indicate the gradual development of a way of life which, when adequately formulated, may be contrasted with other ideals that have been defined and applied. The conception of the field theory of reality, the corresponding functional conception of mind, and the relativistic conception of knowledge and value are clearly implicit in these tendencies toward the reconstruction of our social institutions. Therefore, for Bode these tendencies may be expressed in terms of an inclusive ideal which may properly be called democracy because it represents a reconstruction of our historical democratic tradition in response to the new conditions which now obtain. When clearly defined, it may be used as a criterion of ends and means in the development of social and educational programs.

The problem of primary concern to the educational and social philosopher who is committed to the field theory of reality, the functional theory of mind, and the relativistic theory of knowledge and value is to define democracy as a way of life or world "outlook"

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 267 *passim*.

so that it may be intelligently compared with other ways of life or outlooks.

In practically all of his later works Bode defines the ideal pattern of democracy thus conceived in many ways. The inclusive end of democracy to which many current social tendencies point "is to promote common interests and purposes." It is the faith of democracy that "the continuous extension of cooperation and common interests will eventually make such extension the ultimate ideal." For Bode "the only solid basis for dealing with our modern problems lies in the cultivation of *common interests and purposes*, i.e., in cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition of divergent interests. Reliance on this principle for the determination of values and conduct constitutes the essential meaning of democracy."⁶³ For him, "if we are to remain a democratic people, we seem to have no choice but to seek maximum development for the individual, the cultivation of a common life, and to make the continuous extension of common interests our final test of right or wrong, or of what is called progress."⁶⁴

For both Bode and Dewey, then, democracy is "a way of life" rather than merely a form of government, and they are in substantial agreement as to the particular way of life intended. True, in at least one connection Bode takes exception to Dewey's quantitative definition; but it should be noted that Dewey never questions Bode's changing his definition from the number of interests and the full and free interplay of relations to "widening the areas of common interests and concerns."

In fact, Dewey uses the very terms contained in Bode's definition; and later, like Bode, replaces "common interests and concerns" with "common interests and purposes." Even in their arguments for this conception of democracy, they do not differ in any fundamental respects. On the other hand, Bayles questions their statements that "democracy is a 'way of life' *rather than* a form of government." For Bayles, democracy should be defined not as a way of life, which

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 278.

⁶⁴ Tulley, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

Boyd H. Bode, "Ends and Means in Education or the Conflicts in our Cultural Heritage," in *What is a Democracy?* Norman, Okla., Co-operative Books, 1939, pp. 13-14.

embodies both product and method, but in terms of means or procedures alone. "We propose that democracy should be defined as *equality of opportunity to participate in making group decisions and equality of obligation to abide by them*, once they are made and until they are revised or rescinded." In spite of the apparent difference between his definition and those of Dewey and Bode, Bayles is quite certain that they would not find his objectionable. "Although neither, to my knowledge, overtly defined democracy as I have defined it, they certainly did in a functional way understand it as such; and stand for it four square." ⁶⁵

As an opinion from an outsider, Bayles' definition seems to be included in those of Bode and Dewey. As he says, they may have inadvertently introduced the phrase "rather than a form of government," but in various connections they show that they mean to include government in the conception of "widening the areas of common interests and purposes." ⁶⁶ The main difference is that Bayles' definition is based on clearly defined criteria as to what a good definition requires and Dewey's and Bode's definitions are based upon certain tendencies in American life which they idealize themselves, and wish to designate, elaborate, and apply in order to reveal the conflicting ways of life found side by side in the experience of us all.

Implications and Applications

Bode himself is primarily concerned with the development of the social outlook of the teaching profession, especially classroom teachers, and not with its implementation or translation into practice through devices and techniques. With the assistance of Bayles, however, who claims Bode as his "mentor," ⁶⁷ it is possible to indicate some of the implications of Bode's philosophy of the democratic-reconstruction theory for certain aspects of educational aims, curriculum development, and school administration—features such as have been considered in our account of other theories.

⁶⁵ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, pp. 156, 157.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

⁶⁷ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

In indicating Bode's conception of educational aims, it may be well to begin by restating the democratic-reconstruction theory in general terms in the light of its philosophical foundations. For Bode, "the reconstruction of experience with reference to an ultimate standard of value is the outstanding concern of education."⁶⁸ Psychologically considered, education as the reconstruction of experience consists in remaking the interests, ideals, and beliefs of the individual and the culture of the society. It involves the development of his capacities as the reconstruction of experience requires.

Without regard to any particular social order, in terms of a universal ideal, growth and reconstruction of experience are one and the same thing. In the words of Dewey, they mean "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."⁶⁹ But in a society, however vaguely or even unconsciously committed to democracy as a way of life, the ultimate standard consists of "widening the areas of common interests and purposes." For Bode, then, the all-inclusive aim of education in our democratic society is this widening of the areas of common interests and concerns. It involves a reinterpretation of certain educational conceptions often recognized as educational ends, and includes whatever aims may be contributory to their reinterpretation.

The aims of education are often conceived in terms of growth, needs, or interests, all three of which must be reinterpreted in the light of the ideal of "widening the areas of common interests and purposes." For Bode, as for Dewey, growth for more growth, when qualified in the light of this democratic ideal, means the fullest intellectual, moral, and aesthetic development of the individual. Growth is to be conceived not merely as individual development but also as a common interest and concern of society for the development of certain beliefs, attitudes, and capacities. In our American society the possibility of growth depends, first of all, on the individual's becoming aware of the conflict or cleavage in the culture—the

⁶⁸ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁶⁹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

conflict of traditional and democratic ideals.⁷⁰

Although Bode's recognition of growth consistent with his democratic ideal implies that individuals have a variety of needs, for him one need is of supreme importance—the need of understanding the cleavage in the culture, without which democratic growth is impossible. This is not merely another need coordinate with others; it is the basic need in terms of which all other needs are determined, and is not subject to advance analysis into particular needs. The more specific “needs must be determined with reference to the way of life which the pupil eventually adopts as his own, and the choice he will make cannot be presupposed from the outset. Instead of using needs as a starting point, we educate people in order that they may discover their needs.”⁷¹ The needs required for the development of capacities, beliefs, habits, and attitudes necessary in democratic living are to be discovered by the individual himself. But he cannot discover them until he critically and deliberately commits himself to the democratic ideal rather than to some other. This choice not all students can be expected to make.

Bode's theory of interest indicates that for him the need for the development of individual capacities, beliefs, and attitudes which the democratic way of life requires is as important as the basic need of understanding the cleavage in the culture. This is the need which Bode has in mind when he speaks of the wider interests and common purposes of democracy. Apparently for him the success of his theory of education depends on the student's interest in the two foregoing fundamental needs. “Immediate interests, though important, must either be derived from or merged into the larger interests.”⁷² In the process of instruction the student must be made aware of the consequences of not relating his interests to the larger, common interests and purposes of democracy, and then he must be held responsible for concern with them whether he approves of them or not.

⁷⁰ Bode, *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

Boyd H. Bode, “Education as Growth,” *Educational Forum*, 8:5-10, November 1943, p. 7; and “Ends and Means in Education or the Conflicts in our Cultural Heritage,” *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

Tulley, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

⁷¹ Bode, *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-72.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

In no place does Bode propose any set of aims of fixed content for education in general, "even temporarily or for the time being." But he does in various connections emphasize a number of flexible process aims—aims without any specific content—which he considers contributory to growth, need, and interest, as he defines them in terms of the reconstruction of experience and the democratic ideal. Among these process aims he mentions capacity for thinking as the specialist thinks in the various subject fields; an understanding of the bearing of the subject on the question of absolute standards; active concern with the wider interest of society; appreciation of how other men live; open-mindedness in inquiry; sympathetic and effective participation in matters of human concern; the habit of feeling and willing consistent with the conception of democratic living; cooperation with others in the promotion of democratic living; an understanding and appreciation of the meaning of the democratic ideal; the disposition of social responsibility, cooperativeness, and consideration for others.⁷³

Among the various psychological types of specific aims, objectives, or outcomes which Bode recognizes as proper distinctions are knowledge, understanding, information, skills, appreciations, interests, ideals, and attitudes. But for him they are all for purposes of emphasis and cannot be so separated as to become the values of different subjects, or the ends of separate psychological techniques of learning and teaching, like problem-solving, drill, etc.

Consistent with reconstructing experience and widening the areas of common interests and concerns, which are fundamental aspects of the democratic-reconstruction theory, Bode condemns any method of determining educational aims through an analysis of the ideals, interests, beliefs, or practices that now exist or have existed in the past. Even the aims which educational scientists purport to discover without reference to philosophy through a statistical analysis of current opinion or existing practices, reflect the cleavage in the culture, and, when adopted uncritically as ends to be sought in the school, support the existing social order.

The same is true of educational aims derived through social con-

⁷³ Boyd H. Bode, "Educational Method and Philosophical Theory," *Educational Method*, 20:61-64, November 1946, pp. 62-63.

Tulley, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

sensus for any school or any school system. If the reconstruction of experience means anything, the discovery of new aims, which involves a reconstruction of the existing culture and the social order, is a primary consideration. Preparation for living in the present social order does not in itself prepare one for living in a future social order in our world of constant, cumulative, and indeterminate change. The so-called aims supplied by scientific analysis and social consensus are meaningful only in the light of some acknowledged social ideal to whose realization they contribute. The aims that represent the existing culture and social order without regard to any social ideal perpetuate rather than resolve the cleavage, inconsistencies, and confusions that now exist. The determination of such an ideal is the function of philosophy rather than science. The democratic reconstruction of experience is one such social ideal and the ultimate standard to which every other aim should be contributory and subsidiary.

But for Bode neither the teacher nor the school committed to the democratic way of life can be neutral. Still, for him as well as for Bayles, indoctrination in the sense of determining conclusions in advance, whether designed to maintain the old order or to make a new one, is inconsistent with the democratic-reconstruction theory of education.

Even indoctrination for democracy in this sense is not permissible. "The newer developments in both the natural sciences and the social order point to the conclusion that standards of value and conduct are flexible and changing products of everyday experience and are to be judged by no other test than the enrichment of human life here and now." Democracy in this wider sense means that the central task of education is *not* to determine in advance what students shall think, feel, or do. The reconstruction of experience required by this conception of democracy "is something that the individual must do for himself. There must be no indoctrination in the sense that the outcome is to be prescribed. A democratic philosophy of education rests on the faith that, if the oncoming generation is given an opportunity to see the basic issue, democracy will win. It must win on these terms or it cannot win at all." ⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-297.

For two reasons Bayles' statement about educational purposes should throw some light on Bode's position. For them both, learning is a process of the reconstruction of experience, and Bayles is sure that Bode approves his definition of democracy. The democratic-reconstruction theory is therefore as applicable to his general position as to that of Bode. He agrees with Bode that the problem of aims is a matter not of determining the ends implicit in present practices but of determining the proper ends for future practices. The so-called scientific aims derived from analyses of the cultural tradition, public opinion, or current practice are acceptable only when they are contributory to some inclusive aim or aims consistent with some definable theory of education and the good life. For Bayles this good purpose or aim may be defined in a single sentence: "*It is to promote reflective studies of problems which represent not only inadequacies but also disharmonies in student outlooks on the life of which they are a part.*"⁷⁵

This criterion has two phases or aspects. The student's world in which inadequacies exist includes his whole culture or social heritage. It is the student's *world of effect*; that is, whatever affects him either immediately or remotely. On the other hand, student outlooks represent another world—a world of insight. A student's outlook "*represents what he knows of his world of effect.*" A person is concerned to know primarily more of his world of effect—what is pressing and pulling him about. The expansion of insight which such knowing involves is the principle of continuous growth, which for Bode is a fundamental assumption.⁷⁶ The second aspect of this two-fold criterion is that, in the words of Bode, "*the primary concern of a democratic educational procedure is to stimulate a reconstruction of our beliefs and habits in the light of their mutual relationships.*"⁷⁷ For Bayles, these two principles constitute standards to be observed not only in determining specific educational aims but also in selecting subject matter.

⁷⁵ Bayles, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

Boyd H. Bode in William H. Kilpatrick, ed., *The Educational Frontier*, New York, Century, 1933, pp. 3-30.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Although the implications of the democratic-reconstruction theory for curriculum development seem fairly clear, they have not been stated and probably cannot be stated in terms of any fixed set of content aims to be attained, any body of subject matter as ground to be covered, or any sequence of activities to be pursued. Had Bode spoken of the curriculum as all the activities of students under the direction of the school as we now do, he would have approved only activities of a special kind. In the first place, they would have to be both purposive and reflective. For him, all learning activities are purposive and all educative activities are reflective as well as purposive. A reflective activity involves becoming aware of a problem, gathering data, formulating hypotheses, and verifying or revising them on the basis of all the evidence that can be secured.

For Bode, however, not all reflective activities are contributory to the democratic reconstruction of experience, and those that are must meet the requirements of two criteria. First, they must clarify some cleavage or conflict in the culture in order to expand or enhance the learner's outlook. This is what Bayles calls the world of effect. It includes whatever is "pulling or pushing" the student, whether he is conscious of it or not. Second, curriculum activities must contribute also to harmonizing the learner's outlooks which Bode's democratic ideal of widening the areas of common interests and purposes involves. As Bayles says, "Each study unit in the curriculum is required to focus upon a problem which represents either an inadequacy in outlook or a disharmony, or, preferably, both. In other words, students must study issues; matters which, at least as far as they are concerned, are unsettled." ⁷⁸

SUBJECT MATTER. Bode does not deal systematically with the problem of selecting and placing subject matter, although he does discuss its organization. Doubtless, he would find Bayles' proposal consistent with the democratic-reconstruction theory. In whatever form issues may be stated, those to which approved student activities are related constitute the subject matter content of the curriculum. Since in practice the selection and placement of subject matter

⁷⁸ Bayles, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

are aspects of the same process, the traditional question of grade placement does not arise.

Since the issues constituting the subject matter content on all educational levels may require materials from all the established subject fields and other materials not yet organized into subjects, all kinds of subject matter will be included in the curriculum. Students may secure subject matter from direct experience—observing, experimenting, reading, and interviewing. The teacher may also provide it by telling, lecturing, and using audio-visual materials. No source of material is to be neglected, but students will rely as much as possible on direct experience because it furnishes a background of appreciation which is required by the emphasis on meanings in reflective studies. Students, however, are not expected to accumulate information for its own sake and unrelated to their reflective studies.

From the standpoint of Bode and the democratic-reconstruction theory, organization of subject matter, like its selection and placement, is an important aspect of curriculum development with the main issue centering around the significance of the logical organization and the psychological organization.⁷⁹ The ideal of logical organization is that of the established subjects, especially in the natural sciences.

It is objective, impersonal, and the same for all. "Logical organization aims to arrange knowledge in such a way as to show the relation of premise and conclusion." It is deductive rather than empirical in the sense that every principle or fact implies every other principle or fact in a system in which every part is related to every other part. It is artificial in the sense that it "is not intended primarily to furnish a record of racial experience but rather to present . . . the fruits or results of racial experience." It looks to the future rather than to the past, to the acquisition of new knowledge rather than to the acquisition of existing knowledge. It is therefore of special concern to the research specialist in different fields. "When knowledge is so organized as to make it effective for the acquisition of more knowledge, we call it pure science. When it is organized for purposes other than the accumulation of more knowl-

⁷⁹ Boyd H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, pp. 46-47, 49, 50-51, 52, 65, 66.

edge, we call it practical or applied knowledge." Logical organization is an "effective instrument in the acquisition of further knowledge," and from the standpoint of the specialist it should be exalted. Furthermore, "psychological organization lacks the purely objective, detached, impersonal quality of pure knowledge. Its center of reference is the individual learner." It is a "variable quantity; it differs with different persons and at different age levels." In education it "is a matter both of teaching method and of the curriculum."

From the standpoint of the proponents of the democratic-reconstruction theory, the significance of both forms of organization is clearly recognized. Both Bode and Bayles seem to take for granted a sequence of established subjects as a frame of reference in the selection of curriculum units. Although existing subjects may be modified and rearranged so as to facilitate the selection and development of reflective activities or studies, they would leave intact some kind of logical organization of subjects and curricula. By implication, they also emphasize the importance of psychological organization in the nature of the purposive activities or reflective studies proposed as curriculum units.

The starting point for each unit, Bode says, is some problem that is real for the learner, and Bayles says the same thing in another way. For him the starting point is not only a real problem, but one that is real in the sense that it represents an inadequacy or disharmony of outlook experienced by the pupils or students themselves. Activities that begin with the interests, problems, or concerns of the learners imply the psychological organization of subject matter.

The foregoing inferences as to the importance of both types of organization can be supplemented by explicit statements. Even granting that the sole aim of logical organization is to extend the frontiers of human knowledge, it is nevertheless, Bode believes, indispensable for all in general education as well as in specialized education for research workers. The introduction of practical courses like general science is therefore justified in the interest of life enrichment and vocational guidance. Still without some "guiding ideal of logical organization," such a course as general science, for instance, "which aims at breadth of view, easily becomes a grabbag of miscellaneous information. It must 'head in' somewhere, so as to give the pupils

the power to think independently when confronted with new situations. This result is achieved if a logical organization of knowledge grows out of it." ⁸⁰

To illustrate this point Bode continues: "A boy who learns to drive the family Ford may transfer his knowledge to . . . the general principles of the gas engine." Again, "The youngster who learns to manipulate numbers" in playing games designed to introduce him "to the abstract formulations of arithmetic," may acquire the power to deal with more difficult matters. With very young pupils emphasis on method is not a primary consideration, "but as we go up the scale method becomes increasingly important if we are to meet the requirements of a sound education. The cultivation of intellectual interest, then, is necessary in order to protect the future growth of the pupil. Without it there can be no effective social insight which will make it possible to deal adequately with new situations." When broadly treated, specialized courses "can become sources of new interests. . . . But these new interests must lead on to a knowledge of underlying principles of 'logical organization' if they are to become effective agencies for continued growth." ⁸¹

But as already suggested, Bode considers psychological organization equally important. "Logical organization is indispensable, but it must be a final result and not a starting point. Psychological organization is equally necessary. This is the truth in the contention that purposive activity must be encouraged as much as possible." Unlike logical organization which is abstract and impersonal, psychological organization is empirical, variable, and personal. To secure psychological organization, "the teacher must have sufficient resourcefulness to use his knowledge of individual pupils or of circumstances that are more or less local or of passing significance." When considered without reference to a social ideal, which for Bode is a fundamental consideration, the organization of subject matter should be conceived as progressive; that is, beginning with the immediate interests of the learner and moving toward the logical systems of specialists. ⁸²

In all fundamental respects Bayles agrees with Bode as to the

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 65, 66.

meaning of logical and psychological organization. For him as for Bode, both "seem to be highly desirable." To indicate the educational significance of psychological organization Bayles says: "The starting point in a process of learning is with the knowledge and experiences which the learner actually possesses." These "must be organized in such a way as to achieve some purpose" of the learner. Psychological organization "*follows the logic of a growing mind.*" In teaching, psychological organization of subject matter begins with a class interest, culminating in a problem, the study of which leads to a consideration of the consequences and the implications of the solution "until another problem is opened and the process repeats."⁸³

Logical organization is, however, also involved in solving any problems. Data are gathered and organized. The accepted solution enables "the data to be arranged in a 'logical pattern.'" The solution itself organizes "the material of study" in a logical system from the standpoint of the participants. "Therefore, through a *psychological* approach a *logical* organization is reached. In this way organization of subject matter of teaching becomes simultaneously logical and psychological." Although such logical organization does not meet the requirements of specialists in the field, it points in that direction. Apparently for Bayles as for Bode, psychological and logical organization of subject matter in curriculum development designates, respectively, the earlier and later stages of a continuous process of problem-solving within an administrative framework of established subjects, courses, and curricula.⁸⁴

METHODS OF TEACHING. Any general method, whether conceived as a single pattern, a set of psychological techniques, or a variety of special methods, is a correlative of some theory of the learning process. The democratic-reconstruction theory identifies the learning process with the reconstruction of experience, "which," Bode says, "is a distinctive thing for each individual. Learning as reconstruction combines thinking, skill, information, and appreciation into a single unitary process and is characterized by flexibility, since it must constantly adapt itself to the circumstances of the situation."⁸⁵

On its highest qualitative level reconstruction becomes reflective

⁸³ Bayles, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 200, 201.

⁸⁵ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

thinking or the scientific method broadly understood to include intelligent practice. This is the general method of learning with which the teacher is concerned, and its various steps or stages have already been indicated. Since reflective thinking involves all other aspects of experience, it is a single-pattern form of general method. There is no place for such separate procedures as problem-solving, the drill technique, the appreciation technique, and the construction technique. The aspects of experience to which they refer are all included in the method of reflective thinking. Only such so-called special methods as conform to the principles of reflective thinking can be justified.

Unlike Dewey in his *How We Think*, Bode does not implement his analysis of reflective thinking with specific suggestions for teaching. For such implementation we must rely on his students. They usually take Bode's analysis for granted, suggest ways of applying it, and call their application reflective teaching. We shall refer to only two such applications and leave the reader to examine the originals for himself. The first is Bayles' account of the work he and his students have done in applying his analysis of reflective thinking—which is essentially the same as Bode's—to teaching in various fields and on different levels. In a careful analysis of their work he distinguishes two steps: (1) "problem-raising" in which "the class is manoeuvred into a problem;" and (2) "problem-solving," short or long, and including formulation and verification of hypotheses.⁸⁶

A second application of Bode's analysis is that of Hullfish and Smith. Although their analysis is based on different materials from those used by Bode, it does not differ from his in any fundamental respect. In fact, they explicitly accept his definition of thinking and his analysis of the complete act of thought.⁸⁷

In commenting on the use of such an analysis in reflective teaching they make general practical suggestions: that it is not a pattern into which to force thinking; and that it helps teachers to gain the "feel" of the reflective process, and to see more clearly their responsibility for getting a problem recognized and defined, for eliciting promising hypotheses, for leading students to discover and face facts which,

⁸⁶ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, chaps. 1 and 12.

⁸⁷ H. Gordon Hullfish and Philip G. Smith, *Reflective Thinking, The Method of Education*, New York, Dodd, Mead, 1961, pp. 216-218.

to be valid, the hypotheses must explain, and for guiding them in activities required for prediction and verification necessary to a valid solution of the problem.

They add further that the different steps may be taken many times over in the solution of a general problem; that each testing step is unitary in character; that for an hypothesis to be successful the evidence must be sufficient to rule out all competing hypotheses; and that although the teacher should study and apply the analysis in his own thinking, he should forget it in the process of actual teaching. In a summary statement they conclude: "*The essential point to keep to the fore is simply this: thinking cannot be scheduled; it cannot be held within a rigid pattern when it occurs; it will not be encouraged in an atmosphere that transforms the inquiring mind into a fearful scheming mind. Teachers must sense when the iron is hot and then strike.*"⁸⁸

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

Bode and Bayles have little to say about school administration, but this fact should not be taken to mean that the democratic-reconstruction theory has no implications for this feature of school practice. Like proponents of other theories, they recognize that the primary function of administration is to provide conditions that will promote the realization of the aims of education, and by implication these conditions should be such as to facilitate the ends of the democratic-reconstruction theory. Bode does not say much about such features of administration as (1) school organization; (2) school curricula; (3) pupil discipline; and (4) pupil progress. But by logical inference with the assistance of suggestions from Bayles, it is possible to indicate the general application of the democratic-reconstruction theory to these features.

1. SCHOOL ORGANIZATION. As to the organization of the school system, advocates of the democratic-reconstruction theory apparently take for granted, at least for the time being, the 6-3-3-4 plan, which now seems to be dominant. For instance, in describing practices to illustrate the principles of reflective teaching Bayles selects examples from the elementary school, the junior high school, the

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

high school, and the college.⁸⁹ On the other hand, Bode devotes only two magazine articles and one chapter in a book to a discussion of higher education, but he does mention other educational levels in various connections which show that he recognizes the 6-3-3-4 plan.

With regard to particular schools on any level, Bode emphasizes such organization as will best facilitate the practice of the democratic way of life. For him and also for Bayles, the democratic-reconstruction theory requires that the student have direct experience in classrooms and in schools operated on a democratic basis. In such a school the relationship of members of the teaching profession—superintendents, principals, and classroom teachers—to each other, to the pupils, and to the public should conform to recognized democratic social arrangements.

2. SCHOOL CURRICULA. As to different types of curricula, the subjects and courses, and their relationship, neither Bode nor Bayles is committed to any particular pattern. Although they recognize the advantages of certain aspects of the so-called project or activities curriculum, they would not adopt it exclusively even in the elementary school. And though they acknowledge the many shortcomings of the subject matter courses in the junior and senior high schools and the college, they are not willing to replace them with the so-called core curriculum. Current subject matter courses as now offered tend "to teach *what* to think rather than *how* to think," and neglect harmonization or integration of life outlook. Insofar as "coring the curriculum tends toward correction of this situation, we are heartily in favor of it."⁹⁰ Both longitudinal and transverse integration are essential. The subject organization tends to neglect transverse integration and the core curriculum tends to neglect longitudinal integration. Both Bode and Bayles rely on the classroom teacher so to demonstrate the superiority of reflective teaching as to stimulate administrators in various situations to make changes necessary to facilitate its extension.

3. PUPIL DISCIPLINE. The basis of the democratic-reconstruction theory of discipline is found in Bode's elaboration of the democratic ideal as widening the areas of common interests and purposes. In

⁸⁹ Ernest E. Bayles, *The Theory and Practice of Teaching*, New York, Harper, 1950, Part 3.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 180.

this he emphasizes two fundamental needs in any democratic program—the need for understanding the cleavage in the culture, and the need for developing individual capacities, beliefs, and attitudes on which the maintenance and extension of the democratic way of life depend. This latter need is what Bode means by the larger interest and common purpose of democracy.⁹¹ The success of any educational program based on these needs depends upon the interest the student has in them despite any conflicting interest he may have. Any immediate interests students may have must be either derived from or merged into the larger interest.

To facilitate harmonizing immediate interests with the larger interest, the student must be shown the undesirable consequences of not integrating his immediate interest with the common interest or purpose of democracy. The reduction of the conflicts and confusions in the culture depends on the concern of the individual for the common purpose. Once informed of the consequences, the student himself is to be held responsible for such common concern. "In cases of deliberate refusal to consider consequences which come within the range of his insight, he must be held to account. This is not imposition as long as we are dealing with consequences which, if given reasonable consideration by the pupil himself, would be of concern to him."⁹²

To justify such apparent imposition, Bode says, "Authority is necessary in order to protect the common purpose, and to this extent . . . it considers itself entitled to demand cooperation of everybody. . . . People must obey laws whether they happen to approve of those laws or not." Unlike authoritarianism which requires both approval and obedience, democracy requires only obedience. Accountability and cooperation are to be required, but dissent is permitted, and room left for change of the common purpose.⁹³

The nature of pupil discipline is clearly implied when the democratic ideal as Bode defines it is translated into school practice. The school embodies insofar as possible the democratic ideal. It is therefore not a place for either regimentation on the one hand, in the view of Bode, or, on the other, for toleration of pupil whims and

⁹¹ Bode, *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 59.

⁹³ Bode, "Education as Growth," *Educational Forum*, *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
Tulley, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-185.

fancies.⁹⁴ Our emphasis on the school as "form of social living" provides "the same basis for intelligent application of compulsion or discipline in school as out of school."

The rejection of the older concepts of discipline "is no excuse for an indiscriminating reaction against the whole notion of discipline." The criterion in particular situations is that the method employed "serve the ends of promoting voluntary cooperation, a sense of social responsibility or duty, a disposition to consider others, and the like. Leaving room for discipline does not invalidate the proposition that the chief and direct way of promoting the spirit of democracy is to provide opportunity for the practice of it." The school should provide for the participation of pupils "in the management of affairs that are of common concern." They "should be invited to share responsibility insofar as they are capable of doing so, and they should be permitted to make mistakes, within reasonably safe limits."

Bayles' conception of pupil discipline and control does not differ much from that of Bode, but his special emphasis requires attention. For him, as for Bode and Dewey, a disciplined person is able to carry through a program based on a consideration of details intelligently selected in spite of conflicting immediate interests. It requires the practice of the principle of enlightened self-interest, which involves a consideration of relatively long-term consequences.

With special reference to the school, Bayles rejects any belief that democracy requires either "letting students or pupils do largely as they please or . . . letting them decide what shall be the rules of behavior." Like Bode, he would enlist their participation in school management insofar as they are capable and permit them to make mistakes. In connection with this point he recognizes the whole people as the seat of authority in a democracy and its responsibility for the delegation of power. Although no individual or group has the right to exceed the delegated powers, its decisions within its jurisdiction should be accepted as final whether approved by the delegating authority or not. The observance of such a principle means that when the school or teacher assigns responsibility to pupils in certain matters, their decisions should not be overruled.⁹⁵

With regard to enforcement Bayles says a decision "democrat-

⁹⁴ Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 272, 273.

⁹⁵ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-171.

ically made . . . must be democratically enforced." Whatever coercion is required to enforce such decisions "is democratic if applied equally to all." When any feature of democracy as a "*working governmental system*" is found through experience to be unworkable, it "becomes a candidate for alteration into a workable one." In working with "human beings, including children in schools . . . as they are here and now," unnecessary "rules and regulations should be avoided" in and out of school. "But needed regulatory measures, if democratically enacted, require enforcement even though they may be distasteful to certain members of a body politic."

PUPIL PROGRESS. From the standpoint of the democratic-reconstruction theory the appraisal of pupil progress is an important feature of school practice in both its administrative and instructive aspects. Bode does not consider these topics, but from what he says about other topics like aims and method, it is quite clear that for him the progress of pupils should be conceived in terms of some such ends as improvement in independent thinking, expansion of outlook, and integration of values. Consequently, the estimation of progress would have to be shifted from emphasis on the acquisition of isolated facts and skills to improvement in reflective thinking and to the adequacy and harmony of outlook. Hullfish and Smith as well as Bayles support this interpretation in their discussion of tests and examinations.⁹⁶

It is impossible to go into detail, but Bayles deals so systematically with appraisal of pupil progress that a few of his comments are here cited. Since reflective thinking includes both understanding and memory, tests for the improvement of adequacy and harmony of outlooks—which represent the effect of reflective thinking—also include all necessary facts and most of the necessary understandings. Therefore, testing for memory work is unnecessary in most situations, and testing for understanding may be greatly reduced. Testing for independent thinking and adequacy and harmony of outlook should be the main consideration in the evaluation of pupil progress. The results of the appraisal of pupil progress serve primarily to improve instruction and secondarily to provide adequate records of

⁹⁶ Hullfish and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-202.

Bayles, *The Theory and Practice of Teaching*, *op. cit.*, chap. 15, pp. 313-332.

pupil achievement for the information of parents and the public, neither of which should be neglected.⁹⁷

Cultural Conditions

Like other theories of education and the good life, the democratic-character theory and the democratic-reconstruction theory reflect not only well-defined philosophical beliefs and the wider cultural background that includes them but also a particular set of cultural conditions which account for their translation into educational principles. For both Kilpatrick and Bode, culture in a generic sense is the man-made environment of the self-other process and includes all the products of human thought, feeling, and action which are sometimes called, in their different aspects, the "social inheritance" or the "funded capital" of civilization. Culture as such is neither good nor bad. It is entirely neutral in that it is not something approved or disapproved, but something that must be taken into account. It is a reality rather than a value. Only those cultural elements are values which experience itself finds desirable. For Kilpatrick and Bode, as for Dewey, it is not the function of philosophy to idealize any culture as such, but to be worthy of the name, philosophy must idealize some cultural elements rather than others.

The historical cultural elements in this country which Kilpatrick and Bode, along with other experimentalists, consider most influential are what they call democracy, critical thinking, and experimental science. As to the significance of these three cultural elements, Bode would no doubt concur in Kilpatrick's statement that we "have so far only begun to exploit the possibilities from these three advances. . . . There is now no turning back. Unless civilization should fail in some manner, man will never willingly give up what these three offer. The only reasonable proposal is to use them better. . . . Whether man's happiness is or is not greater than formerly, life has a different quality, and few who have ever truly experienced that quality will consider giving it up. Rather must we see that all have opportunity to experience that quality."⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Bayles, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-235.

⁹⁸ Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education, op. cit.*, p. 77.

The main difference between Kilpatrick and Bode lies in their interpretations of democracy as a moral ideal. For Kilpatrick the idea of democracy dates back to the ancient conception of respect for personality, and for Bode it has its roots in the development of Western culture since the Renaissance. Nevertheless, Bode agrees with Kilpatrick that the moral, intellectual, and practical possibilities of these three elements of our social inheritance must be so combined as to provide an effective program for the future; that it can be done; and that it is man's responsibility to do it. No doubt he would also concur in Kilpatrick's further statement: "Philosophy must at each successive stage of growth help men to set up appropriate aims and ideals of life. A suitable philosophy of education must help practical school people find the educative procedures necessary to attain these aims and prepare for still higher. Education must bring up successive generations devoted to making life really good for all." ^{99a}

Apparently, then, the all-inclusive cultural end of both the democratic-character theory and the democratic-reconstruction theory must be to combine these three cultural elements into an effective program. For proponents of both theories, therefore, philosophy and educational theory are not only products of the culture but the means of its continuous reconstruction.

As noted in various connections, the development of any educational theory depends upon the presence of certain cultural conditions. The founders of theories may be conscious or unconscious of the motivating cultural conditions. In the development of their theories, however, both Kilpatrick and Bode deliberately take into account not only the three fundamental cultural elements reflected in all versions of experimentalism, but also the special cultural conditions of their own time.

To be specific, each recognizes in his own experience the cultural conflicts between the traditional absolutes on the one hand, and the demands of the new scientific knowledge and the changed conditions of life on the other. With more or less difficulty, however, they eventually so remake their ideas, beliefs, and attitudes as to integrate them with the demands of the new situation. They sur-

render all absolutes in whatever form and rely solely on empirical experience and scientific method in determining their standards of direction.

Their active careers as critical students of education cover almost the same period. They have lived through two World Wars and the social upheavals that followed. They have witnessed the rise of the new totalitarianism from the right and the left, its challenge to the democratic tradition, the rebellious hilarity of the roaring Twenties, and the fear and insecurity of the depression Thirties. They have seen the accelerated shift from traditional individualism in government and economics toward the welfare state under the New Deal, and have taken part in the controversy as to the responsibility of the teaching profession in building a new social order. They have felt the effects of the break with authority and with traditional moral standards on the part of youth, when youth was the "Lost Generation."

Repeatedly they emphasize the significance, for organized education, of continuous, indeterminate, and cumulative cultural change. In an interdependent industrial society neither Kilpatrick nor Bode considers adequate the traditional formal training with which the school in the self-contained rural community supplemented the informal out-of-school education. While both recognize cultural conflicts and confusions in their own lives and in the larger community as well, Bode emphasizes more the reduction of the cultural cleavage in the democratic tradition as a primary concern of organized education. While both consider democracy as the way of life to be preferred, only Bode would reinterpret it in terms of cultural tendencies already under way and make it the all-inclusive end of education and the good life. They both realize that the increasing rapidity of change makes specific habits, skills, and attitudes acquired in unreflective experience inadequate for the flexibility necessary in our dynamic society.

The period in which Kilpatrick and Bode play significant roles in education is characterized by several so-called educational movements—Progressive Education, the scientific movement in education, the "new humanist" movement, the "new intellectualist" movement, and "social reconstruction." Except for Progressive Education they both reject all of these outright as undemocratic and irrelevant to

the demands of the existing cultural situation. They see in Progressive Education an emphasis, which, if properly directed, could lead to the reconstruction they anticipate. But Bode's attitude toward it is somewhat different from that of Kilpatrick. Like Dewey, Bode sees in Progressive Education important consistent, constructive possibilities for the future, if only it will define its operative principles consistent with the philosophical beliefs of the main current of the experimentalist or relativistic philosophy.

Bode is therefore very critical of certain slogans and purported practices of the Progressives. On the other hand, Kilpatrick is concerned more with implementing his own theory by reinterpreting certain doctrines of Progressive Education. For both the demands of the prevailing cultural conditions require a thoroughgoing reconstruction of organized education, but they differ on the course such reconstruction should take and therefore on the role of Progressive Education as a going concern. However effective their efforts may be, each in his own way tries to put together the intellectual possibilities of philosophy, the moral possibilities of democracy, and the practical possibilities of science in an educational theory and program relevant to cultural conditions of his own day.

Concluding Comments

Any further effort here to compare Kilpatrick's democratic-character theory and Bode's democratic-reconstruction theory or to compare them with Dewey's universal-growth theory does not seem necessary or desirable. The relation of these three theories to Progressive Education, to the philosophy of experimentalism, and to prevailing cultural conditions has already been indicated and their practical implications and applications suggested. Additional documentation or argument would make a new chapter and deprive the interested student of the benefit of making such comparisons for himself. Therefore, by way of conclusion we shall merely state a few hypothetical propositions without comment.

First of all, both Kilpatrick and Bode are very much concerned with Progressive Education and scientific education as movements, but neither the democratic-character theory nor the democratic-

reconstruction theory can properly be identified with either. Both Kilpatrick and Bode are independent thinkers, and in the wider perspective they are colleagues rather than disciples of Dewey. Both were professionally and personally associated with Dewey, and their own beliefs are so similar and so much in harmony with his that it is practically impossible to make any clearcut distinctions on fundamental assumptions. Both recognize the importance of Dewey's theory of universal growth or reconstruction of experience as the end of education and the good life, but neither of them accepts it as adequate without considerable qualification. For Bode the democratic ideal conceived as widening the areas of common interests and purposes provides the qualification required. But for Kilpatrick democracy alone conceived as respect for personality is insufficient, even when supplemented by moral obligation. The life good-to-live includes other values over and beyond what democracy and moral obligation imply.

Neither Kilpatrick nor Bode relies on the immediate interests, desires, wishes, and wants of the student, or on the perspective of common sense as the source of an adequate standard of direction. For Kilpatrick the criteria are to be found in a whole set of values defined in terms of a life good-to-live. For Bode they are to be found in the democratic ideal of widening the areas of common interests and purposes through harmonizing individual beliefs and interests.

Both Kilpatrick and Bode distinguish the obligation of the educator as a member of the teaching profession and as a citizen of a democratic society. For Kilpatrick, the educator as a citizen is as free as any other individual to support or advocate social programs, but as a member of the teaching profession he is not commissioned to fix in the minds and hearts of the young specific ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, or to assume leadership in reconstructing the social order through education according to any predetermined pattern. Both Bode and Bayles admit, as does Kilpatrick, that the educator cannot be neutral with regard to political and economic issues, but they reject any educational program that predetermines specific outcomes in the form of fixed beliefs, attitudes, and habits.

Kilpatrick and Bode clearly oppose any movement of the teaching profession to join forces in the name of democracy with either side of any so-called class struggle to build a new social order. They there-

fore reject indoctrination, which for Kilpatrick means a "partisan exploitation of the individual's right to be educated to do his own thinking and make his own decisions," and for Bode means "trying to predetermine the beliefs of the pupils." They would not approve indoctrination even of democracy. For Kilpatrick, indoctrination of democracy would be "to teach democracy in an undemocratic fashion, in a way to foster uncritical acceptance." For Bode, education for democracy would not try to go beyond the purpose of making clear the nature of its challenge.^{99b}

Apparently Dewey is not quite so extreme on the matter of indoctrination as Kilpatrick and Bode but approves what he considers Kilpatrick's reliance on "cultural and social conditions" for standards of direction.¹⁰⁰ Bayles goes all the way on the matter of indoctrination but fails to find in Kilpatrick, as distinct from Bode and Dewey, "any criterion as to what is good thinking," by which he means any standard of social direction.¹⁰¹

For two reasons the implications of the democratic-character theory and of the democratic-reconstruction theory are difficult to compare. Kilpatrick gives so much attention to the implementation of his theory that the casual reader may take suggested procedures for the principles they are designed to illustrate. On the other hand, Bode gives so much attention to principles to the relative neglect of their implementation that the practical application of his theory is far from obvious to even the careful reader. Any comparison that can here be drawn between the practical implications of the two theories is to be taken as tentative and hypothetical.

In the light of the foregoing a few propositions are now suggested to be considered by the reader familiar with the two theories and their application. When the curriculum is conceived in the technical sense of all the activities or experiences of the student under the direction of the school, the desirable curriculum is a sequence of activities or experiences of a certain kind. For Kilpatrick the desirable curriculum unit is apparently a purposeful activity in a social setting and analyzable into four logical stages—purposing, planning,

^{99b} Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 125.

Bode, *How We Learn*, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

¹⁰⁰ Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

¹⁰¹ Bayles, *Democratic Educational Theory*, pp. 182-183.

executing, and judging; and for Bode it is a reflective activity—finding the problem, gathering data, formulating hypotheses, and testing them. For Kilpatrick, the subject matter content is determined by the nature of the activities selected on the basis of the interest of the student and a flexible set of values which the teacher has in mind. For Bode, it is a set of specific issues which are of concern to the student and which reflect the cleavage in the culture.

Since Kilpatrick's purposeful activity is reflective and Bode's reflective activity is purposeful, the reader may wish to take a new look at Kilpatrick's technique of guiding teaching and Bayles' interpretation of Bode's analysis of a complete act of thought and the corresponding technique of reflective teaching. Both these conceptions of the curriculum necessitate a radical reconstruction of subjects, curricula, and schools in order to facilitate the kind of teaching implied in each.

To effect the changes required, Kilpatrick proposes an over-all educational program clearly defined in all its aspects, while Bode relies on experimentation and the promotion of desirable changes in specific situations. In practice, however, both recognize the need for gradual reorganization on which progress in a democratic society must depend. Such general statements as to the implications may raise a question of whether such differences are merely matters of detail, or inherent in the two theories. The effort to answer this question may lead to a better understanding of the two theories and of the general movement in philosophy and education of which they and the universal-growth theory are closely related versions.

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The Spiritual Self-Realization Theory

8

The idea that education is development from within is no more meaningful than the idea that it is formation from without. Before such an idea can be established, some account must be given as to the meaning of development from within. Does it signify merely the expansion, unfoldment, or development of whatever tendencies are inherent in the individual? If not, which tendencies are to be given preference? Those who adopt the first alternative are consciously or unconsciously subscribing to what we have called the Rousseau tradition; those who adopt the second are still faced with the problem of indicating the criteria for deciding which tendencies to cultivate. Of these, those students of education who subscribe to the philosophy of absolute idealism find the required criteria in the nature of man and his relationship to God.

For convenience of reference, the meaning of this philosophy for education recently developed by Professor Horne and his students is here designated as spiritual self-realization. When historically considered, it is an outgrowth of the educational theories of the German idealists, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Froebel, which have been

designated as spiritual unfoldment, self-perfection, and self-realization; but it is not to be identified with them. Neither is it to be confused with self-perfection and self-realization, which have been used to designate, respectively, the educational theory correlative to classical realism and one of its three essential aspects.

Proponents of the theory of spiritual self-realization identify education psychologically with human experience. Like other educational philosophers, they therefore identify the ultimate aim of education with the ultimate end of the good life. Education is thus a divine process in which God throughout human history is engaged in man-making. As a human process education is also a function of the home, the church, and the state as well as of the school. The self as the key factor in the conception is spiritual, finite, and infinite. The standard of direction in the development of concrete programs and activities for the education of the young in schools and colleges is to be found in the manifestation of the divine self in the world of nature and in social institutions.

The philosophy of absolute idealism was developed during the nineteenth century, first in Germany and then in England and the United States. In this country it was popularized by Dr. W. T. Harris and his associates. As one of the founders and leaders of the St. Louis Philosophical Society and the Kant Club, as founder and editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* from 1870 to 1892, as a recognized scholar in many fields, and as a popular lecturer, Harris stimulated philosophical thinking in intellectual circles throughout the country. As opposed to Spencer's theory of determinism and Darwin's theory of evolution, which had challenged the faith of orthodox Christians, Dr. Harris advocated an absolute idealism that provided authoritative support to those who sought "philosophic justification of faith in God, freedom, and immortality." Before the end of the century this philosophy was well established in colleges and universities throughout the country.

As superintendent of schools in St. Louis, as United States Commissioner of Education, as a leader in the National Education Association, as editor of the *International Education Series* of 58 volumes (to each of which he wrote a Preface), as a member of national education committees, and as a popular speaker at educational meetings, Dr. Harris also developed the educational implica-

tions and applications of this idealism to which he wholeheartedly subscribed. The philosophical tradition thus popularized by Harris was perpetuated by such thinkers as Howison at the University of California, Bowne and Brightman at Boston University, Royce and Hocking at Harvard, and Calkins at Wellesley.

During this period the movement for the professional education of teachers made rapid progress, and philosophy of education was recognized as an important aspect of teacher education. Under the leadership of Herman Harrell Horne, professor of history and philosophy of education at New York University, the author of many books, and a popular lecturer, the development of the educational implications of absolute idealism has kept pace with its historical modifications and adaptations in response to the findings of science and the democratic individualism of the New World. In the hands of such recognized students of philosophy and education as Louise Antz of New York University, J. Donald Butler of the Department of Religion, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., Franklin H. McNutt of the University of North Carolina, and many others, its position is well established.

Philosophical Foundations

Absolute idealism has a metaphysics, an epistemology, a psychology, and an axiology, which, when taken together, distinguish it from other forms of idealism as well as from other systems of philosophic thought. For the interested reader who wishes a complete understanding of this philosophy there is no substitute for the published works of representative idealistic philosophers and historians of philosophy. All we can do here is to indicate the common aspects of the theories of reality, knowledge, and value to which the more recent proponents of absolute idealism subscribe.

BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

Like all philosophical idealists, the absolute idealists take as their starting point the fact of self-consciousness. As everyone knows, the act of self-consciousness is reflexive in that the subject is also the object. In the act of being self-conscious the individual is directly

aware of himself. The reality of the individual self seems as clear and certain to absolute idealists as it did to Descartes, who could not doubt that he himself was doing the doubting.

They are also sure that this self, whatever else it may be, is spiritual or mental in character, and that whatever else they may be aware of is also spiritual or mental. Otherwise it could not be perceived at all. The object as well as the subject of consciousness, then, partakes of the nature of mind. Butler means to include the absolute idealist when he says, "By and large idealists hold that mind or spirit as each man experiences it in himself is fundamentally real and that the totality of the universe is somehow mind or spirit in its essence."¹

On the metaphysical side, the Credo of Mary Whiton Calkins, which would be acceptable to the proponents of the theory of spiritual self-realization, reads as follows:

1. The universe contains distinctively mental realities; it may or may not also contain nonmental entities, but in any case irreducible mental realities exist.
2. Mental realities are ultimately personal . . . the mental phenomena which I directly observe are not percepts, thoughts, emotions, and volitions in unending succession, but rather receiving, thinking, feeling, and willing self or selves.
3. The universe is through and through mental in character. . . . All that is real is ultimately mental, and accordingly personal, in nature.
4. The universe literally is one all-including (and accordingly complete) self of which all the lesser selves are genuine and identical parts or members.
5. By Absolute Self as *absolute* I understand, in the first place . . . all-including self: no shred of reality, however base, can be outside of it.
6. The Absolute Person as *self* I describe as a conscious being; and by 'conscious' I must mean essentially what I mean when I describe myself as conscious. In other words, I must hold that the Absolute Self genuinely perceives, thinks, feels, and wills.²

¹ J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies: Their Practice in Education and Religion*, (rev. ed.), New York, Harper, 1957, pp. 173-174.
² *Ibid.*, p. 180.

The first three propositions would be acceptable to all idealists, whether subjective or objective, whether personalistic or absolutistic. The fourth and fifth propositions would be acceptable to all absolute idealists but not to all personalists. The sixth would not be acceptable to some absolute idealists or to all personalists, but it would apparently be acceptable to those absolute idealists in whose philosophy proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory find metaphysical support. Such an absolutistic idealism seems to be entirely consistent with the philosophy of Josiah Royce, William E. Hocking, W. T. Harris, and H. H. Horne. This Absolute is just as all-inclusive as that of the early German idealism, but He is apparently more personal and thus more significant to man. The reality of the absolute idealism in which this educational theory has support is not only mental and absolute but it is also personal.

Such a personalistic absolute idealism explicitly or implicitly has its own answers to many of the perennial problems of philosophy. As a form of spiritualism it includes the belief, stated not only by Miss Calkins but also by proponents of all forms of idealism, that the ultimate nature of the world and man is qualitatively mental. Miss Calkins and many others have asserted that the Absolute is all-inclusive, and outside this integrated system there is no ultimate reality. Moreover, the pattern of the whole is prior to all of its parts, which it determines and pervades. As a spiritual personality this all-inclusive Absolute is entirely good. The evil of human experience is a bitter reality of the temporal order. It is a necessary condition for the realization of the good. But it has no place in ultimate reality. As a spiritual personality the Absolute supports the theism of the Christian tradition, according to which God both transcends the world and is immanent in it, and not only made man in His own image but is concerned in his ultimate salvation.

Like the finite personality, the infinite personality is purposeful. Therefore, the whole of creation is a teleological process that is moving toward a faroff end not fully and completely known to man. Nevertheless, it lends support to the belief in human freedom common among idealists. Although the individual is not free to realize his every impulse and desire and must conform to the cosmic process to which he belongs, there is still room for freedom of choice and action. As Butler says:

The essential genius of the self is initiative, an outward urge which makes its impact on the stuff of the external world and thereby discovers itself at the same time that it expresses itself to other minds. . . . We are free to determine our own selfhood. . . . The significance of this power of self-determination confronts us most decisively in the most crucial moral issues of individual existence. Do I choose to realize my selfhood by becoming devoted to and by striving to achieve the perfection of the Absolute Self? Or do I prefer indolence, mediocrity, or willful resistance in hindering the achievement of divine ends by humankind? The first alternative is the affirmation of individual selfhood. The second is the negation of both selfhood and individual existence.³

Finally, there are different levels or degrees of reality. In Hegelian terms, the whole is more real than its parts because it is more "concrete." In the ordinary sense the individual or particular is more concrete than the general or universal. But according to the technical language of the absolute idealist, as Joad says, "A thing's concreteness is proportional to the mass and richness of the ingredients it contains, to the number of elements that go to make it what it is."⁴

On this basis, the whole thing in which both universals and particulars are contained is more real than is either when taken alone. The whole, the concrete universal given in experience transcends the traditional universal and the materials supplied by sensation, both of which are abstractions. Moreover, any concrete universal is itself an aspect of a more inclusive whole. One whole, as Joad says, is "more real than another in proportion as it gathers into itself and comprehends more elements. Ultimate and complete reality is to be found only in the whole which contains *all* other wholes as its parts."⁵ Such a whole is the Absolute in which ultimate reality, ultimate truth, and ultimate value are combined in a single all-inclusive unity.

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

For good and sufficient reasons, the proponents of absolutism and its correlative spiritual self-realization theory of education do not consider any metaphysical beliefs about reality in and of themselves sufficient. Before their adoption is warranted they must be justified

³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴ C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to Philosophy*, New York, Random House, 1935, p. 422.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

on the basis of epistemology and logical considerations. To them, then, "the theory of knowledge is basic in any philosophy," and the method by which any belief about reality is acquired must be approved before it can be accepted.⁶ Like other philosophers, these idealists devote attention to these three features of the problem of knowledge: (1) the method of knowing; (2) the objects of knowledge; and (3) the criterion of truth.

1. METHOD OF KNOWING. With respect to the problem of knowing the absolute idealists no longer accept the Hegelian dialectic as sufficient. According to this method any individual begins with what Hegel called a thesis, a proposition which he believes to be true. If he concentrates his attention on this belief long enough, he will come to accept as true an antithesis, a proposition directly contradictory to the thesis or the belief with which he began. Then if he concentrates his attention on the antithesis, he will eventually come to accept as true another proposition called a synthesis in which the valid elements of both the thesis and the antithesis are combined and integrated. The synthesis thus becomes a new thesis, and the triadic operation may continue indefinitely. The degree of truth revealed in each succeeding synthesis is greater than that in the preceding one.

This method of human knowing was taken by Hegel and some of his followers as sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the more important beliefs of absolute idealism. The truth acquired by the finite individual at each successive stage is only an approximation of Ultimate Truth, which is also Ultimate Reality—the Absolute. Moreover, since knowing is a mental process, both the finite and the absolute knower are mental. The Absolute of ultimate reality and truth is fixed and complete. Nevertheless, He is constantly realizing Himself in the world of nature and man in an all-inclusive dialectical process of which the human individual, his knowing process, social institutions, and the world of nature are only phases or aspects.

However adequate this procedure may have seemed even a generation ago, it has been subjected to severe criticism. It has never been able to meet the objections that George H. Mead raised on the ground of its inconsistency with the scientific method. As he

⁶ Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

indicated, the point of departure for the scientist is not some general idea taken as a thesis, but an exception to such an idea. As he also indicated, the scientist does not proceed directly from a general idea or universal called a thesis to another universal called an antithesis, and to another called a synthesis. He always begins with an intellectual conflict occasioned by the inconsistency of some particular with some general idea or principle previously accepted as true.⁷

Although they have found their beliefs about reality not so different from those of Hegel, more recent absolute idealists have adopted other methods of knowing. They accept the scientific method as adequate in fields where it can be applied. They recognize the importance of both the deductive and the inductive method, and analysis and synthesis, or any other method that makes a real contribution to philosophy. Nevertheless, a knowledge of the whole cannot be derived by any of the methods which deal only with the parts. The synoptic method includes both synthesis and analysis and involves three stages consisting of (1) a confused synopsis, (2) a complete analysis, and (3) perception of the relation of the analysis to the original experience.

According to Brightman's analysis from which the foregoing has been taken, the synoptic method is "the only instrument by which thought can hope to reach an understanding of process of life and mind."⁸ No recent proponent of the spiritual self-realization theory of education may have specifically defined the synoptic procedure as the all-inclusive procedure in the development of a knowledge of reality. Nevertheless, most absolute idealists as well as personalists would apparently find this all-inclusive method of knowledge an acceptable substitute for the Hegelian dialectic that is now generally considered obsolete.

2. OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. Recent absolute idealists consistent with the general synoptic method start with a synopsis of the self as an object of knowledge that is either directly revealed through personal observation or indirectly inferred from such observation.

⁷ George H. Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. 131-135.

⁸ E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, New York, Holt (1925, 1951), 1953, p. 41.

But the self directly perceived or indirectly inferred to be a mental reality is found to be different from the body and the physical world, as well as from other selves. The recognition of the self as an immediate or self-evident fact thus establishes for absolute idealists a basis for an understanding of the rest of existence. These self-evident facts of the self and the not-self are contradictory unless they are fundamentally similar in substance.⁹ The common substance must apparently be spiritual in character for the not-self no less than for the self. Therefore, the not-self is another and greater self of which the individual self is a part. In the full knowledge of one's self in self-consciousness, one knows also the nature of the Absolute Self, of which it is a part.

Whether such a procedure conforms to the scientific method or not, in the more inclusive synoptic method there is a place for the primitive knowledge of the self involving two self-evident but nevertheless contradictory facts and their eventual and inevitable reconciliation in the Absolute Self. The objects of knowledge of all kinds are therefore spiritual, for the world of nature in all its aspects is itself spiritual.

3. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH. As to the criterion of truth, proponents of absolute idealism and the correlative spiritual self-realization theory of education are committed to the coherence theory involving also the theory of internal relations. From their point of view, ideas, propositions, and judgments may be true whether the correspondence with their objects can be tested or not, as the realists believe; or whether the actual or probable results can be tested or not, as the pragmatists believe. Although the criterion of correspondence or results may be sufficient in some instances, only coherence is the all-inclusive universal standard.

The criterion which the coherence theory offers has been stated by Brightman in this way: "Any proposition is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system of propositions as a whole. . . . The absolute idealist and the personal idealist . . . agree that the elements into which we analyze experience are finally to be explained in terms of the wholes to which they belong, and that, in general, the lower is to be explained in terms of the

⁹ Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

higher, not the higher in terms of the lower.”¹⁰

The theory of internal relations which the coherence theory involves means that objects of knowledge also involve their relations. Things can neither be known nor exist in isolation. In fact, terms invariably include their relations. For instance, any particular object that can be imagined is nothing apart from its relations. Moreover, its relations are negative as well as positive. The relations denied to an object are as much a part of it as are those that are ascribed to it. Thus, in the last analysis, everything in the universe is a unit in a system of connections culminating in ultimate truth, which is ultimate reality.

Perhaps the foregoing aspects of the theory of coherence most congenial to absolute idealists may be indicated by reference to the knowing situation, which involves a knower, an object known, and a process of knowing. From the standpoint of the synoptic method, these distinctions are all aspects of the act of knowing which we make in retrospective analysis. As a matter of fact, we do not begin with a knower in isolation from an object to be known. The act of knowing is always logically prior to both the subject and the object. Therefore, both are always internally related, and the only ultimate criterion of the truth is that of coherence among propositions. In the most inclusive sense the method of knowing is synoptic in that it recognizes the significance of every specialized procedure that can make a contribution to achieving the maximum of self-consistency and inherent integration, which the criterion of coherence requires.

Thus the absolute idealists' theory of knowledge seems to confirm their beliefs about reality:

1. The world of nature and man is fundamentally mental or spiritual.
2. The more inclusive mind or self both transcends the world of time and is immanent in it.
3. In His transcendent nature He is fixed and changeless and determined.
4. In His immanent nature He manifests Himself in the world of man and nature as a systematic spiritual process.
5. The Absolute, as He manifests Himself in the world, is personal in character.

¹⁰ Brightman, *op. cit.*, pp. 69 and 268.

6. The world of nature is teleological or purposeful through and through.
7. It provides for human freedom of choice and action in consistency with the all-inclusive end of the Absolute.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BELIEFS

On the psychological side, a little elaboration is sufficient to render explicit what has already been implied in the discussion of the theories of reality and knowledge. The human individual as a unique unit in the spiritual world process is also a spiritual process. The various mental processes of thinking, feeling, and willing, which introspection of self-consciousness immediately reveals, are aspects of the individual mind as they are of the world mind. They are no more to be explained by the nervous system or the physical world than is the mind of the Absolute. They are functions of a unitary process which, for the purpose of study, may be differentiated and defined as phases of a single whole.

The relationship of mind and body is not to be explained on the basis of parallelism, which isolates the one from the other by the logical gap of extended and unextended substances which are in no way related. Neither can mind or consciousness be reduced to matter, as the materialists contend. Nor do the established laws for the conservation and direction of energy permit the adoption of the principle of interaction between mind and body, so long as the one is conceived in terms of mind and the other in terms of matter. When in conformity with the philosophy of absolute idealism, however, the body itself as well as the external physical world is conceived as spiritual, the gap which has plagued modern philosophy ever since Descartes may be closed in theory as it is in fact. If all physical things are in some sense mental, as the absolute idealists find them to be in metaphysics and epistemology, the interaction of mind and body is no more a mystery than the fact that the minds of men interact in social relationships.

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

Discussion of the philosophical foundations of the theory of spiritual self-realization will conclude with a brief analysis of the axiology or theory of value as developed by recent proponents of absolute idealism. Like most philosophers, they begin with experi-

ences of liking or disliking as contrasted with other experiences in which feeling, either positive or negative, does not set the problem. They find some things immediately acceptable and others immediately unacceptable. Therefore, they feel the need for a criterion, standard, or norm on the basis of which they can determine which immediate and apparent values are real and worthy and in what respects they are real and worthy. Consistently with the synoptic method of knowing, they recognize the presence in evaluation of such factors as pleasure, desire, reason, and intuition. But they do not accept any of these as an adequate criterion.

In accord with their metaphysical belief in an all-inclusive Absolute Self as the ultimate reality in which all things move and have their being, the criterion on the basis of which all feelings, desires, obligations, intuitions, and any other factors involved in evaluation are to be appraised is found in the Ideal Personality. The specific nature of such an Ideal Personality is to be found in the basic elements of human life, which individually and collectively is systematically realizing itself in the process of becoming what the divine and ideal personality already is.

Even a general knowledge of man's physiological and psychological nature is sufficient for the belief that he has certain needs. Because of these needs and the satisfaction which their fulfillment brings, man finds value in such factors as health, character, social justice, skill, art, love, knowledge, philosophy, and religion. From the standpoint of these ideals values are not merely subjective feelings. They are temporal expressions of the eternal order of the Perfect Personality who is the source of all value. This order is spiritual, changeless, and eternal. The values that manifest themselves in the experiences of individuals and in social institutions are both subjective and objective, both human and divine. Such values are the criteria on the basis of which all immediate interests, desires, and preferences are to be appraised.

In the process of discussion or in the actual process of evaluation, such values are never to be considered equal in importance. Nevertheless, different authorities classify and arrange them differently. Moreover, there is considerable variation in the particular values included. The list above is taken from one of Dr. Horne's latest discussions. Some authorities do not give each of these the emphasis

of separate discussion and consider others, such as recreation or play, not specifically considered by Dr. Horne. In any hierarchial arrangement Dr. Horne would place worship at the top of the list and health at the bottom. Others would place intellectual values at the head of the list and some would place recreation above health, whereas recreation is not specifically included in Dr. Horne's list. Furthermore, there is considerable variation in the emphasis attached to social values as compared with other kinds of value. Even when there is general agreement, the list may be either extended through analysis or reduced through synthesis.

Although the arrangement of values in the order of importance varies somewhat, all authorities recognize essentially the same criterion of importance. For instance, Horne says: "The criterion would be the contribution that each value makes to the realization of man's absolute goal, his likeness to the spiritual order."¹¹ Brightman, the personal idealist, says, "The ground for grouping into higher and lower is found in the extent of the contribution to the coherent whole of life."¹² Finally, they all recognize the interrelationship of the various values and the contribution each makes to the realization of all.

Implications and Applications

As in other educational theories, the practical significance of the theory of spiritual self-realization is to be found in its implications and applications. As in other theories, too, these can be most briefly and systematically indicated through a consideration of some of the more important features of school practice to which its proponents have directed their attention. For more than a century they have defined both the pupil and the teacher in terms of the kind of philosophy which their philosophy idealizes, and have considered systematically the implications of their educational ideal for the aims of education, for the school as an institution, for the school curriculum, and for the methods of teaching. Both pupil and teacher

¹¹ H. H. Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education," in *Philosophies of Education*, 41st Yearbook, Part 1, National Society for Study of Education, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1942, p. 186.

¹² Brightman, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

have been clearly implicated in the preceding section and will be given attention in various connections as we proceed. Therefore, this section will be limited to consideration of the four topics: aims, school, curriculum, and method.

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

Recent proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory of education use such terms as aims, objectives, values, and goals interchangeably, as has become customary in professional education. The set of aims for living and learning to which they subscribe represent, in the last analysis, a kind of elaboration of the more inclusive aims of education and the good life. Preparatory to a consideration of any such set of aims, it is almost imperative to say something more about the general ideal from which they receive their ultimate meaning and significance.

The term "spiritual self-realization" is an abbreviated symbol for the educative process and aim in which the family, the state, and the church as well as the school share some responsibility. It is the ideal for man, individually and collectively, and all his institutions. First of all, education for life is not merely a process. It is a process with a goal. This goal was stated in many different ways by Professor Horne in one of his last summaries, of which the following are characteristic:¹³

There seems to be some pattern in the nature of things by following which man may more fully arrive.

The idealist answers that "his ideal world is the most real world, that it exists in its own eternal way, that the eternal world is the only adequate, ultimate explanation of the existence of the temporal, changing world and its values, and that man's progress consists in realizing more and more the eternal values in the temporal order.

Life, rightly understood, is just the development of man toward the infinite pattern of perfection.

Education is not simply growing, it is growing toward an objective. . . . The remote objective, the absolute goal, is likeness to the spiritual order of the universe. Education in the final analysis is the upbuilding of humanity in the image of divinity.

The body and the mind and the different functions of the mind all con-

¹³ Horne, *op. cit.*, pp. 178, 183, 185, 186, 192, 194.

stitute one unity. The ideal suggests the integrated individual in an integrated universe.

It should be noted that idealism acknowledges the positive ideals for which naturalism, realism, and pragmatism stand but rejects certain of their negative conclusions. To all of them idealism adds the realization of the spiritual order of the universe, and the consequent supreme value of personality in revealing this spiritual order. . . . Our objective is the understanding, appreciating, and realizing sense of the spiritual nature of all existence, and our personal growth in the likeness of that nature.

. . . The objective of living and learning is to develop the natural man into the ideal man.

When leaders in the school and other social institutions catch this spirit of the ideal, only then are they prepared to formulate a set of general aims for all those who deliberately assume responsibility for any part of their own education or that of others. Any complete set of educational aims or objectives is in all essential respects the same kind of hierarchical arrangement. Such aims are the all-inclusive standards of direction for the school, the teacher, and the pupil as well as for all other institutions, agencies, and individuals who consciously and deliberately accept any responsibility in the promotion of spiritual self-realization.

Corresponding to each factor in each so-called set of aims is an institution or agency. For the promotion of worship we have the church; for the promotion of love and companionship we have the home; for the promotion of health we have the medical profession and the various other associated agencies; for the improvement of justice and citizenship we have the government; for the achievement of vocational fitness we have the economic system and the practical arts. Corresponding, respectively, to the intellectual interest, the aesthetic interest, and the moral interest, we have science and philosophy, history and the social sciences, and the fine arts.

THE SCHOOL AS AN INSTITUTION

The function of the school is threefold. It should conserve, preserve, and extend the fine arts, the practical arts, and the sciences. In doing so, it cultivates all the values into which the ideal of spiritual self-realization may be analyzed. In doing so effectively, it must

teach not only the essential tools common to all fields but also other essentials indispensable in the various arts and sciences. It must also cultivate certain qualities of personality whose importance proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory and its underlying philosophy recognize as fundamental aspects of other ends, aims, or values.

Three kinds of these general personality traits are not only recognized but often idealized by proponents of absolute idealism and its correlative theory of spiritual self-realization. They include the classical cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, prudence, and wisdom and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. But they also include certain qualities that have been idealized in the free nations of the Western world during the last three hundred years. Without denying the importance of respect for authority, they idealize respect for personality. Without denying the importance of obedience, they idealize self-control. They also idealize self-reliance, initiative, independence, responsibility, and cooperation as desirable characteristics.

THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

According to the spiritual self-realization theory of education, three general types of subject matter should determine the general kinds of activities in which pupils engage under the direction of the school—that is, the curriculum. The first kind consists of the physical, biological, and social sciences correlative of the intellect in psychology, and science as an aspect of human culture and civilization. The second kind consists of the fine arts, which correspond to feeling in psychology, and art as an aspect of human culture and civilization. The third consists of the practical arts, including history and government, correlative of the human will in psychology, and social institutions as the organization of culture and civilization. Consequently, each one of these broad fields should be represented in each year of the school program from the earliest years to the end. Variation in subjects and courses selected from each field is permissible in different situations, but all general fields must be represented.

Like proponents of other theories of education, the proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory have given no definitive an-

swer as to just how the topics, problems, issues, questions, or activities constituting the content or scope should be determined. They have to use established spiritual values as criteria in selecting content, and they have to consider the capacities, interests, and experiences of the pupils in placing it. Just what subject matter content will contribute most to such general aims must be determined in each situation. Any analysis of the absolute ideal of spiritual self-realization into a set of values to be used as aims and any analysis of human culture into broad fields and subjects are to be taken as suggestive rather than prescriptive. They constitute only flexible limits within which school programs and activities are to be planned, developed, and evaluated. Within these limits just exactly what should be done in specific situations is left entirely to the genius of those in control.

THE METHODS OF TEACHING

Proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory distinguish questions relating to methods from those relating to the curriculum and those relating to teacher and pupil. But they are so interrelated that it is often very difficult to separate them even in discussion. In order to capture in as brief space as possible the significance of the implications of this philosophy of education for teaching procedure, we shall include general principles of learning and teaching, the interaction of the personality of the teacher with that of the pupil, general patterns of learning and teaching, and mere devices and techniques, and consider them all as aspects of the problem of method.

In recent discussions of the practical implications of the theory of spiritual self-realization, imitation, interest, and effort are all considered indispensable guiding principles of teaching. For the most part, imitation is conceived as an inherent tendency of the individual to act upon the suggestion of others. Just as suggestions may be consciously or unconsciously given, so they may be consciously or unconsciously received. In any case, imitation, which is characteristic of social relations in general, plays an important role in the teacher-pupil relationship. The personality and character of the teacher are reflected in the unconscious responses of the pupil. Through imitation the pupil becomes self-conscious. When self-consciousness is once developed, imitation may be indirect and our

choices may become original and even intelligent. The teacher should, therefore, do two things: first, he should supply good models, the imitation of which on the part of the pupil will contribute to the various aspects of spiritual self-realization in which character and religion are recognized; and second, he should encourage deliberate and intelligent choice through which originality as a quality of personality is cultivated.¹⁴

Proponents of the theory of spiritual self-realization consider interest a positive feeling toward an object that commands attention without any sense of strain or effort. Interest is always present in involuntary attention. As Horne says, interest "is the immediate aim of all instruction" and "puts the motive power of the feelings at the disposition of the teacher." Interest is thus an indispensable means available to the teacher, but it is not the only means. Interest is not, therefore, the only criterion to be considered in the selection of activities, and it is not in and of itself a sufficient means in all situations. It is an essential but it is not the only essential.¹⁵

Effort is another way in which the self-active spirit of man realizes itself. In one sense it is present when the individual perseveres in spite of difficulties in the pursuit of ends in which he is interested. In this sense effort and interest are complementary, and the presence of interest generates and sustains effort. But in another sense, effort is present only when the individual keeps his attention on an object which to him is indifferent or even repulsive. Effort in this sense, no less than in the first sense, is indispensable in the learning-teaching situation as in other situations outside the school. Wherever this kind of effort is necessary, there is a moral situation in which one listens to the voice of conscience and heeds the call of duty. Only by force of will can attention be maintained in the beginning of a new subject or even in carrying to a conclusion difficult but important tasks in the midst of distractions. The feeling of effort which voluntary attention involves in such situations is indispensable and paves the way for sustained interest. The teacher may cultivate the capacity for effort by appealing to future rather than immediate interest and by holding pupils to tasks the completion of which is

¹⁴ H. H. Horne, *The Philosophy of Education*, New York, Macmillan, (1904) 1916, pp. 175-187.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-199.

essential to their spiritual self-realization.¹⁶

Finally, the principles of imitation, interest, and effort are aspects of the more inclusive principle of self-activity, which proponents of the theory of spiritual self-realization consider inherent in human nature. According to this principle, the mind is the source of its own reactions to the world. It sets itself to work and supplies its own direction. Without responsible self-activity on the part of the pupil, self-realization is impossible. It is within the province of the teacher to provide favorable conditions for learning. But responsibility for setting and realizing his own tasks should be placed squarely on the pupil. Spiritual self-realization requires that the pupil be responsible for educating and disciplining himself. All education and all discipline, in the last analysis, are self-education and self-discipline. Imitation, interest, and effort all exemplify that principle of self-activity on the presence of which education conceived as spiritual self-realization depends.¹⁷

The importance of the teacher's personality as a factor of method has already been suggested in the discussion of imitation. Not only should the teacher provide good models for the pupils to imitate, but he should be such a model himself. The pupils spontaneously imitate him. To be a good model, he should already have realized in himself the values that still lie ahead of the pupils. Through supplying good models that provoke imitation, through appealing to remote interests, and through holding pupils to essential tasks, the teacher challenges them to demonstrate self-activity.

The idea of an all-inclusive general pattern of learning and teaching emerged during the nineteenth century. Herbart, consistently with the association psychology developed by the British empiricists, analyzed the learning experience into four steps. His followers elaborated these steps of learning into the five formal steps of the recitation. Then followed John Dewey's analysis of reflective thinking into the five steps of problem solving, and later Kilpatrick's analysis of purposeful activity into four steps designated as the project method.

The proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory have assumed an eclectic attitude toward such general patterns of teaching. They consider different patterns useful in teaching different things

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-175.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-206.

but no pattern good for teaching everything. For instance, they consider the Herbartian formal steps good for teaching general concepts, the steps of reflective thinking effective in problem solving, and the project method useful in the production of articles of "objective achievement." But they do not consider any one of these or any other single procedure applicable in all situations.

Before the development and recognition of any single pattern as the one general method, there had been many general methods in common use. Some of these were analogous to the logical distinctions that had become established in philosophy, such as the analytic and the synthetic methods, the deductive and the inductive methods, and the dialectical method used by Socrates. Others such as the lecture method, the question method, the discussion method, the book method, and the object method, had been distinguished and consciously employed by teachers in Europe and America. Those who subscribed to a general pattern of universal application considered both the logical methods, like deduction and induction, and the other so-called general methods, as subsidiary devices from among which the teacher might choose.

Proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory seem to consider all the different methods coordinate. They give the same recognition to the old general methods borrowed from the philosophers as to those improvised by the teachers themselves. Since they consider all general methods coordinate, they do not consider any one of them merely as a device subsidiary and contributory to other general methods. The actual method or methods employed by any teacher may consist of any number of combinations of methods available.

Finally, in closing this section, perhaps it should be said that proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory of education recognize the connection between the problem of method and the problem of curriculum development. Specialists in the field of curriculum development now conceive the curriculum as the activities of the pupils under the direction of the school. Proponents of the spiritual self-realization theory of education, with certain qualifications, might find this definition acceptable. But they would want it clearly understood that the only activities curriculum they would approve would be organized around the subjects comprising the various

sciences, the fine arts, and the practical arts, and that pupils' activities should be selected on the basis of the extent to which they promote the aims of spiritual self-realization. They would consider the so-called pupil activities, projects, and learning-teaching units as general methods that might be used under certain conditions. Only those that are related to some topic or topics in the sciences, the fine arts, and the practical arts, and that make a special contribution to one or more of the values, aims, or objectives of spiritual self-realization would be recognized as desirable units of the curriculum. Nevertheless, this eclecticism with respect to methods of teaching may be only apparent, for procedures are to be selected on the basis of the general aims of education and the principles of self-activity. Pure eclectics do not consciously use general aims or principles as standards of selection.

Cultural Conditions

With the rise of Napoleon and the failure of the Revolution, the mind of the intellectual classes in Europe turned to the past. They had lost faith in the possibility of establishing a new social order based on human reason, had suffered from the insecurity experienced in defeat, and now idealized the old way of life which they realized as never before provided a kind of security that during the Revolution had slipped from them. Their attention was directed to themselves in their present plight in contrast to the stability that had once prevailed. They imaginatively played different roles in the old social order. These intellectual classes had thus become romantic, and in consequence of their trying experiences they now found the way of life that was gone in most of Europe good to contemplate and even to preserve where possible.¹⁸

The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel expressed this idealization of the past in philosophic terms. Like their less philosophic contemporaries, they found the consciousness of the self the most real of all experiences. But self-consciousness is reflexive in that the self is both subject and object. Both the self and the not-self

¹⁸ Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-65.

are thus identified in self-consciousness, and therefore both the subject and the object are identified in the act of thinking. But the finite individual experiences involving the self and the not-self, subject and object, were conceived as only instances of an all-inclusive infinite experience which involved the Absolute Self and the world of nature and of man.

Just as the finite individual self which all Romanticists idealize is prior to the not-self, and the individual finite knower is prior to the object of knowledge, so the Absolute Self is prior to the world which he posits in the same way the individual posits the not-self. The Absolute Self, which is eternal and complete in the transcendental world, is unfolding in the world of nature and of man and supplies both the condition and the ultimate standards of thought, feeling, and action. Although the Absolute Self is fully realized in the transcendental world, He manifests Himself in history. The standards of human direction are therefore to be found in the march of history, especially in the development of social institutions. The tendency of the Romantic intellectuals to idealize the past is thus fully justified in a general philosophical system in which eternal beauty, truth, and goodness are conceived as aspects of the Absolute.¹⁹

The Absolute as He manifests himself in the world is a spiritual process involving both the individual and his environment. Since the ultimate end of the Absolute in his transcendental nature is unknown to man, and, strictly speaking, is never fully realized by finite individuals, it must be translated into something concrete and meaningful if it is to serve as the basis of educational and social programs. Without such translation the practical implications would not be essentially different from those of the theory of natural development of the Rousseau tradition. But the conception of spiritual unfolding does not contain within itself any other standards. Consequently, the way is left open for translating it into ideals which seem most important to the translator.²⁰

But in both Germany and the United States the proponents of this philosophy found the necessary concreteness in an established order.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-152.

²⁰ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1916, pp. 65-70.

Just as the philosophy of Plato in its educational and political applications seems to justify in large measure the practical programs of the Spartans, so the philosophy of absolute idealism in its political implications seems to justify programs already in existence.²¹ While in Germany an absolute monarch and a hierarchical arrangement culminating in the state seemed to symbolize the manifestation of the Absolute, in England and more especially in the United States, he was symbolized in the new social arrangements of the merchant class that had been in process of development since the Renaissance. Since 1848 the course of Western civilization has been largely in the hands of the middle class, consisting of merchants, manufacturers, and their supporting professional classes.²²

In the United States even before the Civil War, the outlines of the social arrangements that met the requirements of the middle class were clearly visible. Although the shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy was still to come, the principles of capitalism and political democracy had been established. The leaders in business, the church, and the state and their literary spokesmen had adopted the theory of *laissez faire* in economics and government that classical economics had developed. They were prepared to welcome the application of any philosophy whose principles justified the preservation and expansion of the existing social order.

When W. T. Harris and his followers elaborated the practical implications of absolute idealism in this country, they said just what the people who counted most wished to hear. Whether they conceived education as a process of spiritual unfoldment, as adjustment to the spiritual environment, or as spiritual self-realization, the conception was so translated as to justify the social arrangements which the middle class had in large measure already established. They showed that participation in government by the masses of citizens was consistent with the lessons of history, that *laissez faire* in both economics and government was based upon fundamental principles, and that industrialism, capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism were right. Although they recognized the presence of evil in the existing

²¹ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 95-107.

²² John H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*, rev. ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1940, pp. 628-632.

social order, they attributed it for the most part to deficiencies in certain elements among the people rather than to the system itself. They have, on the whole, not approved of any general system of social reform.²³

These same principles have been reflected in their conception of the school. Like proponents of other theories of education, they have recognized as educational agencies the church, the home, and the community as well as the school. But as compared with the other agencies, they believed it was the function of the school to follow rather than to lead. As they conceived the school, it was not an agency for guiding social change but for preserving and conserving the values of the past and adjusting the individual to the established social order. The content of instruction was to be found mainly in the spiritual environment which embodied the values of the middle class. Besides the values that are always associated with the volitional, intellectual, and aesthetic content of the environment, they also considered other values that were the product of method. They have idealized not only the values of thrift, perseverance, discipline, and determination, but also such qualities of personality as initiative, responsibility, independence, cooperation, and self-reliance. They have placed special emphasis on character training of the individual as a substitute for any general reform of the educational system.²⁴

The practical educational implications advocated by the proponents of spiritual self-realization have been relevant to the social scene in America for more than a century. Those who applied this theory of education to social institutions, especially the school, said just what a large section of the people sincerely believed in their hearts. Ever since the two world wars and the great depression the unqualified support of the old individualism has not been as unanimous as it once was. There are many who sincerely believe that some fundamental reconstruction in the social arrangements is imperative. Nevertheless, the middle class ideals are embodied in the recurrent belief in "a return to normalcy," and most of the modifications in the interests of the masses of people during recent years are conceived by many as a kind of aberration imposed by special

²³ Merle Curti, *Social Ideas of American Educators*, New York, Scribner's, 1935, pp. 325-347.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 341-347.

and temporary conditions, without implying any fundamental cultural change. The ideology of the middle class still seems to many, perhaps to most people, fundamental. As Randall says:

To them it still seems the only "American" ideal; they regard it as written forever into the Constitution, as something to be returned to after forced departures and temporary wanderings in heresy like the New Deal. In the face of grave industrial problems, and in response to the constant pressure of the working class, they have, of course, reluctantly consented to all manner of modifications in practice; for there are other American traditions as well, above all the strong atmosphere of adaptability and willingness to experiment. But none of these specific measures has altered significantly the underlying ideals of the middle class. It continues to look back nostalgically to the days of normalcy when the "American" way was still possible. It still regards itself as the salt of the earth and the chosen of the Lord, and sees in its own material prosperity the source of good for the whole of society.²⁵

So long as this attitude on the part of the American people—or even a significant number of them—endures, the philosophy of absolute idealism and the educational theory of spiritual self-realization will seem meaningful and significant to them. Moreover, if absolute idealism and its correlative theory of education could be so interpreted as to be relevant to such vastly different cultural conditions as existed in Germany and this country during the nineteenth century, it may be possible to revise and render them increasingly relevant to new cultural conditions now in the making. Although the inherent hold of the early middle class ideals on the minds of the people is still strong, the reconstruction of the ideals and beliefs of our fathers has long been under way, and any traditional philosophy of education that is to remain convincing must also be capable of reconstruction.

Concluding Comments

Historically, absolute idealism, which supplies the philosophical foundation of the theory of spiritual self-realization, precedes pragmatism, instrumentalism, or experimentalism, which supply the phil-

²⁵ Randall, *op. cit.*, pp. 629-630.

osophical foundation of the theory of universal growth. But in our account of educational theories spiritual self-realization follows universal growth because in its most recent development it reflects the reaction of its advocates to the philosophy of experimentalism and the universal growth theory. For instance, the earlier works of Professor Horne, the acknowledged leader among the recent advocates of absolute idealism, reflect the influence of classical idealism of the nineteenth century, but his later writings also reflect his reaction to John Dewey, the acknowledged leader of the advocates of the universal-growth theory.

As already suggested, recent cultural developments seem to require considerable modification of the spiritual self-realization theory and its supporting philosophy of absolute idealism. On the more practical side, Professor Brameld, the reconstructionist, says that, because of recent changes in the culture, philosophical idealism as well as realism represents a cultural lag.²⁶ On the philosophical side, the beliefs of the classical idealists have been seriously challenged by the new realists. According to these new realists, objects of sensory perception are not dependent upon any mind for their existence, and, as Professor Joad says, "An interpretation of the universe in terms of mind, which insists that knowledge is a universal cosmic characteristic, can no longer be sustained."²⁷ Not only realists but even idealists have raised serious objections to absolutism, which is an essential characteristic of absolute idealism. In fact, the drift of idealists away from monistic absolutism toward personalism seems unmistakable.

Although Professor Donald Butler, who is perhaps the most articulate among the educational followers of Professor Horne, grants that classical absolute idealism and its educational application require some modification, he is not willing to accept without qualification the objections raised by the reconstructionists, the realists, and the experimentalists, or to go all the way with the personal idealists. On the practical side he finds the spiritual self-realization theory in part congenial to the applications of the universal growth theory, and rejects authoritarian indoctrination. He favors real freedom and creativity on the part of the individual, but he does not agree with

²⁶ Theodore Brameld, *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective*, New York, Dryden, 1955, pp. 274-281.

²⁷ Joad, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

the reconstructionist demand for direct reconstruction of the social order based upon a set of values derived solely through empirical consensus. He agrees with the experimentalists that individuality must be respected, but he cannot go all the way with them in rejecting absolutism.

For Butler, "An idealist cannot escape the problem of the one and the many and maintain his integrity as a responsible thinker." But he concludes: "In my judgment none of the solutions to this problem attempted by the idealists succeeds in solving it. Either the unity of God is made less than unity by them, or selfhood in each of the individuals, which of course are both other and many, is made something less than a self."²⁸ Like other idealists before him, he turns to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity "to find the only source of a solution which is a genuine one."²⁹ In other words, for any adequate solution of what seems to him an inescapable problem, one must look not to philosophical idealism but to the theology of the Christian church.

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²⁸ Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 553.

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The Supernatural-Development Theory

9

The study of the Catholic theory of education by all members of the teaching profession is not difficult to justify. There are 400 million Catholics in the world. The Catholic church is the largest religious denomination in the United States. Outside the public school system, it operates the largest system of schools in the country. Here it owns and operates a complete system of elementary schools, secondary schools, colleges and universities. The educational beliefs of the Catholics should be of concern to non-Catholics because Catholics are concerned with Protestant beliefs. Since prospective Catholic teachers are provided an opportunity to study the non-Catholic theories of education, Catholics have a right to expect other prospective teachers to be given an opportunity to study the Catholic theory of education.

The Catholic church recognizes the home, the church, and the school as the primary educational agencies. The same philosophy of education is thus applicable to all of them. The term "supernatural development" here used designates Catholic supernatural development. It embodies the fundamental beliefs that God created man in

His own image and bestowed upon him the power of divine grace; that man was deprived of this divine grace because of the sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden; that it is the destiny of man to return to the estate of his lost inheritance; that the Catholic church has a responsibility for guiding man back to his supernatural lost estate; and that the dual nature of man requires both natural and supernatural education. Supernatural development emphasizes the necessity of the natural as well as the primacy of the supernatural. The supernatural does not suppress but transforms the natural.

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical system which the Catholic church approves and commends for use in speculative phases of theology is known as neo-scholasticism. It is a modern adaptation of the scholastic philosophy which culminated in the synthesis developed by St. Thomas in the thirteenth century. Neo-Thomism or neo-scholasticism is a comprehensive and integrated system of thought dealing with the nature of the world and the nature of man in their relationship to God. Just as the theology and philosophy of St. Augustine in the fourth century was a synthesis of neo-Platonism and the Judaic Christian tradition, so the philosophy of St. Thomas is a synthesis of the Platonic, Aristotelian, Augustinian, and many other elements besides. Just as the first synthesis reflected the very unusual and practical experience of St. Augustine in response to the idea of the church as the depository of the world's wisdom, so the second synthesis reflects the very unusual genius and scholarship of St. Thomas in response to the idea of social unity which medieval civilization had achieved. Since the *Encyclical Aeterni Patris* of Pope Leo XIII in 1879, this philosophy has been known as neo-Thomism or neo-scholasticism, and has come to mean in the words of Ralph Barton Perry "first, a purification of Thomist doctrines, second, such amendment of them as might be required by the advances of science, and third, their reformulation in terms calculated to convince a modern mind."¹

¹ Ralph Barton Perry, *Philosophy of the Recent Past*, New York, Scribner's, 1926, pp. 202-203.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

In neo-scholasticism both a natural and a supernatural world are recognized. To indicate the meaning of the natural world some reference to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle is necessary.

In the philosophy of Plato there were two worlds—the super-sensible, superior, real world of forms and the sensible, inferior, unreal world of experienced things. In this philosophy universals and particulars are sharply distinguished. For instance, beauty is a universal as compared with any particular instance of beauty as exemplified in a sunset, a landscape, or a painting. The same distinction is recognized not only in the realms of aesthetics, ethics, and logic, but also in the world of physical things. Triangularity, whiteness, humanity, etc., are universals as contrasted with specific triangles, particular white objects, and individual men. But in the philosophy of Aristotle there is only one real world—the world of real things, each of which is a composite of form and matter.

In his final synthesis St. Thomas adopted Aristotle's interpretation of the natural world, and the neo-scholastics have continued to follow his lead. In this philosophic tradition the forms of living things are called souls. The forms of plants are known as vegetative souls; the forms of animals are known as sensitive souls; and the forms of human individuals are known as rational souls. The rational souls of human individuals, however, embody the sensitive souls common to animals, which in turn embody the vegetative souls common to plants. Vegetative, sensitive, and rational activities correspond to these three levels of the human soul.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM

On the psychological side there are two levels of mental activities, processes, or functions corresponding to the sensitive soul and the rational soul. The sensory processes, including sensation, perception, memory of particulars; simple feeling, involving sensory factors; and impulses, involving both sensory and feeling factors, are functions of the sensitive soul. The rational processes of intellect, including understanding, reasoning, and memory of universals; emotions, involving intellect; and volition, also involving intellect and emotion, are functions of the rational soul.

In terms of the established psychological tradition, cognition or thinking includes both the rational processes of understanding, reasoning, and memory of universals and the sensory processes of sensation, perception, and memory of particulars; affection or feeling includes both rational emotion and simple sensitive feeling; and conation or will includes both rational will or volition and simple sensitive impulses. But, like many other schools of thought, the neo-scholastics have their own interpretation or explanation of the recognized psychological processes. From their point of view, each distinguishable mental process is a function of, or a form of the activity of, a metaphysical soul; each rational process is a function of, or a form of the activity of, a rational soul; and each sensory process is a function of, or a form of the activity of, a sensitive soul. For instance, reasoning and understanding are functions of rational faculties, and sensation and perception are functions of sensitive faculties.²

As contrasted with other kinds of psychology, such as association psychology, structural psychology, functional psychology, and behaviorism, the neo-scholastic psychology is a form of faculty psychology. But in conceiving the faculties as functions of the soul or forms of its activity, proponents of the neo-scholastic psychology seem to avoid the compartmentalization of the mental processes which is often attributed to advocates of formal discipline. The soul, however, is embodied in a still more inclusive unity of the human individual, which is a composite of soul and body and operates as a whole. The faculties are therefore not separate from one another, and each one involves all the others for they all belong to the soul.

An understanding of the operative relationship of the different faculties may seem difficult. The difficulty is due, however, not to the conception of faculties without which the psychological processes cannot be adequately explained, but to the complexity of these processes themselves and their interrelationship. But such an interpretation of human nature in terms of the faculties of the spiritual soul is incomplete. Man also has inherent within himself the possibility of a divine nature. Although he lost this potentiality because of original sin, it was restored through the death and resurrection of Christ. Man's supernatural power is that of divine grace whose

² William F. Cunningham, *The Pivotal Problems of Education*, New York, Macmillan, 1940, pp. 322-326.

reality is based upon the testimony of revelation rather than natural science. Just as the natural powers supply the psychological foundation of natural education, so the power of grace supplies the foundation of religious education. But all the powers of the soul affect one another. The power of divine grace affects all the natural powers and is the unifying factor in an adequately integrated human individual.

THE KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM

Like other systems of thought, neo-scholasticism has its own distinctive theory of knowledge—that is, an epistemology. As in most systems, too, both immediate or direct and mediate or indirect knowledge are recognized. Two kinds of immediate knowledge are recognized—natural and revealed, one, the knowledge of reason, the other the knowledge of faith.

The theory of natural knowledge, usually called moderate realism, is a synthesis of ultra-realism, conceptualism, and nominalism, and was first stated by St. Thomas Aquinas. According to moderate realism, the lower powers of the sensitive soul as well as the higher cognitive powers of the rational soul are involved in the acquisition of immediate natural knowledge. The objects of knowledge, consisting of the essences which make things what they are, are formally in the mind and fundamentally in the particular things. In the process of acquiring immediate knowledge, the sensory powers of the sensitive soul cooperate with the intellectual powers of the rational soul. The powers of perception supply concrete images of particular things; memory and imagination hold these concrete images of the things thus provided. The rational intellect in its active capacity abstracts from differences in images of the particular things held in memory and imagination the essential features common to all those under consideration and presents these common features, which are called essences, to the intellect in its cognitive capacity. The intellect then expresses in the form of a definition what is common to all the sensory objects involved—their essence. All natural primary conceptions are thus derived through the cooperation of the different processes of sensing, remembering, imagining, abstracting, and formulating the essences which are imbedded in things. The mind in knowing becomes the essences which it knows and expresses as definitions.

Indirect, mediate, or discursive knowledge is derived through logical inference from the direct or immediate conceptions thus abstracted from particular things and expressed in the form of definitions. Although in the last analysis nothing is in the mind that is not first in the senses, the objects of direct knowledge are funded knowledge to be used as the source of other mediate knowledge; that is, knowledge derived through deductive reasoning.

Likewise, there are two kinds of revealed knowledge—direct or immediate knowledge supplied by faith, and indirect or mediate knowledge which may be derived from it through deductive reasoning. The direct knowledge of revelation is, strictly speaking, theological rather than philosophical or scientific. It consists originally in the revelation of God to the saints, or those who by divine grace are qualified to receive it. As interpreted and formulated by recognized religious authorities, it consists in the dogmas of the church.

Although such divine knowledge is beyond the rank and file, with the assistance of the church all may understand it. Just as in the case of direct natural knowledge of reason, so the direct knowledge of faith is a source of indirect knowledge that may be derived from it through deductive reasoning. Directly revealed knowledge of faith is true beyond question. Any apparent conflict of such knowledge and direct natural knowledge is due to some error in human intellect, just as are inconsistencies of indirect knowledge with direct knowledge.

THE VALUE PROBLEM

Like other systems of thought, neo-scholasticism has its own axiology. The theory of value which has been developed by St. Thomas includes two aspects, both of which correspond respectively to the natural and supernatural nature of man. On the human level it consists of the fulfillment of the highest potentialities of human nature under the direction of reason; in a balanced and integrated life somewhat like that conceived by Plato, which is not essentially different from happiness as conceived by Aristotle. St. Thomas recognized the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice as conceived by Plato and the distinction between the moral and the intellectual virtues as conceived by Aristotle. Like Aristotle, he considered wisdom the supreme virtue and a life of

speculation the best kind of life. Like Aristotle, too, he considered reason indispensable in the guidance of the passions toward the other cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, and justice. When a man achieves the speculative virtue of wisdom and the moral virtues through the exercise of reason, he has attained his highest natural good.

In its supernatural aspect, the theory of value developed by St. Thomas and the neo-scholastics includes something quite different from the humanistic ideals of the Greek tradition as defined by Plato and Aristotle. Just as the achievement of happiness through acquiring the intellectual and moral virtues is the end of the natural man, so the realization of blessedness through acquiring faith, hope, and love is the end of the supernatural man. Moreover, blessedness rather than happiness is the supreme end of man. In fact, without it happiness, the ultimate end of the natural man, is impossible. Although it is possible for men to understand the moral virtues and means of their achievement, they nevertheless cannot realize them without supernatural assistance. They need the grace of God even to realize the happiness which they may have come to understand. Even happiness does not consist in the realization of present corrupt human nature, but in the realization of the perfect human nature man had before the fall. Only the redeemed and regenerated nature is capable of fully realizing even the cardinal virtues, and thus happiness.

Some knowledge of the good and some moral achievement are possible without it. But, in the words of Professor Sterling Lamprecht, "the soul needs grace throughout its entire progress toward the good . . . it (grace) is needed to heal the natural man of his corruption, to restore human nature to that integrity which it had before the fall, and to raise even the restored human nature toward the divine source, which is also the final end of all things."³

Although the neo-scholastics have proceeded in accord with the Encyclical of 1879 to make such modifications, adaptations, and amendments as would take into account the advances of modern science and be convincing to the modern mind, they have not com-

³ Sterling P. Lamprecht, *Our Philosophical Traditions*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, p. 193.

promised on the fundamental principles developed by St. Thomas. The changes that have been introduced have been confined to elaboration and application for the purposes of clarification. In fact, the changes have been so slight that Catholic theologians and philosophers still use the terms scholasticism and Thomism, and neo-scholasticism and neo-Thomism, without distinction. The foregoing analysis of the theological, psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological foundations of the Catholic theory of education is as applicable to neo-scholasticism as to the synthesis that St. Thomas established in the thirteenth century.

Implications and Applications

In recent years Catholic educational philosophers have systematically elaborated the educational implications of neo-scholasticism into general principles and applied them to the more important features of school practice. In this study, it is impossible to indicate the various ways in which principles have been formulated or the different methods by which they have been applied to school practice. Such details are readily available in the authoritative works of Catholic educational philosophers. Some of the better known authors and their works are: William F. Cunningham, *Pivotal Problems of Education*; William McGucken, S.J., *The Catholic Way in Education*; John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, *A Catholic Philosophy of Education*; and Jacques Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads*.

For such authoritative treatments there is no substitute. Besides urging the student to examine some of these books for himself, the best we can do here is to summarize some of the more important general principles which they have defined in different ways and to indicate their implications for certain features of school practice to which they have been systematically applied.

Catholic educational philosophers agree with other philosophic students of education in identifying education in a practical and psychological sense—without regard to its desirability—with human experience, which involves learning. In like manner they agree that the ultimate aim of good education is identical with that of the good

life. They also agree that good education requires the deliberate cooperation of all social institutions in the promotion of some ultimate ideal of the good life, which is also the ultimate end of education. They derive their conception of such an educational ideal from neo-scholastic theology and philosophy and elaborate it into guiding principles which may be classified as philosophical, psychological, and sociological.

There are three metaphysical and theological principles:

1. The all-inclusive aim of education and the good life is Christian perfection and eternal salvation.
2. In the progress toward such perfection and salvation the one complete personality—the personality of Jesus Christ—is the model.
3. Progress toward such perfection and salvation depends not merely on heredity and environment; it requires both self-discipline and divine grace.

There are three psychological principles derived from a study of the psychological tradition and the structure of the human individual as conceived in the neo-scholastic theology and philosophy:

1. Effective learning requires self-activity, motivation by interest, and apperception conceived as the perception of meanings in terms of past experience.
2. The universally recognized human tendencies or drives whose control the perfection of personality and salvation require are the drives toward possessions, pleasure, and power.
3. The recognized general types of mental functions, processes, or faculties of intellect, affection, and conation—usually called thinking, feeling, and willing—supply the basis for three kinds of formal educational aims, objectives or outcomes—knowledge, abilities, and attitudes or appreciations.

There are four sociological principles of education derived from the study of man as a social animal, society, and social institutions:

1. In the process of living the individual experiences certain needs, some of which must be met if life is to continue and others of which must be met if life is to be good.
2. Each social institution or agency is designed to meet some one recognized universal need of man living in some society.

3. Although each social institution may assist other institutions or agencies in achieving their specific functions, its primary function is to meet the need for which it has been designed.
4. The recognition of universal human needs as the foundation of social institutions furnishes a basis for the establishment of the social objectives that supply the content neglected in the formal aims of knowledge, abilities, and attitudes or appreciations.

With such guiding principles in mind we are now prepared for a brief analysis of the theory of supernatural development as applied to the school. The Catholic philosophers of education, like other students of education, recognize such general features of school practice as aims, subject matter, methods, curriculum, school organization, and types of education. Although the limitations of our study prevent our considering in detail all the general features that Catholic students of education have discussed, certain typical attitudes which most of them assume toward some features can be considered. The topics selected for attention here are: educational aims, school curriculum, methods of teaching, and school organization.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

In psychological or formal terms school aims consist of (1) knowledge, (2) abilities, and (3) attitudes. In sociological or content terms, they consist of (1) health, (2) human companionship, (3) economic security, (4) leisure, (5) civic security, and (6) divine security. In theological terms they consist of (1) Christian perfection and (2) eternal salvation.

But the school is not held responsible for meeting all these human needs in all their aspects. Like other social institutions and agencies, the school emerged in the course of civilization to meet one specific need. Several agencies are primarily responsible for meeting the universal need for health; the home, for meeting the need for human companionship; several agencies, for meeting the need for leisure; the state, for meeting the need for civic security; and the church, for meeting the need for divine security. So the school is primarily responsible for meeting the need for individual development through the transmission of the social inheritance to each oncoming generation.

Now, the supreme human ability is the ability to think. Therefore, the primary function of the school is the cultivation of the intellect, the emotions, and the will through the acquisition and expression of knowledge. The outcomes of school education thus consist of knowledge, abilities, and attitudes resulting from a study of the social inheritance in its intellectual aspects.

The secondary and sociological aims or objects of school education consist in assisting each of the other social institutions and agencies in meeting the specific need for which it has been established. To be more specific, the school should cultivate the knowledge, the abilities, and the attitudes (1) that promote the health of the individual and the community; (2) that prepare for enriched family living; (3) that promote economic security through special attention to economic problems in the social sciences; (4) that promote the enrichment of leisure time by providing for the active participation of individuals of varying interests and capacities in extra-instructional activities, and especially by stimulating interest in reading and the fine arts; (5) that promote the natural and social virtues directly through instruction in natural rights and social duties and indirectly through the general life of the school; and (6) that promote religious and social duties through instruction in theology, participation in religious worship, and cooperation in practical religious programs of social service.

According to the supernatural-development theory as the educational equivalent of the supernaturalism of the neo-scholastics, the function of the school is to promote Christian perfection and eternal salvation through having pupils and students engage in certain activities. Only those activities are satisfactory that contribute to the acquisition of the knowledge, the abilities, and the attitudes which other social institutions require in meeting the specific universal needs for which they have been established. It is thus the function of the school to assist several agencies in meeting the need for health; to assist the home in meeting the need for human companionship; to assist the state in meeting the need for civic security; to assist several agencies in meeting the need for economic security; to assist several agencies in meeting the need for leisure; and to assist the church in meeting the need for divine security.

SCHOOL CURRICULUM

The curriculum as a feature of school practice may be conceived in terms of subject-matter materials, in terms of subject-matter content, or in terms of the activities in which pupils and students actually engage. The proponents of the supernatural-development theory of education usually conceive of the curriculum in terms of content: that is, the subjects and topics that determine the scope of the activities and experiences. Whether on the basis of the recognized mental functions of knowing, thinking, and feeling, or on the basis of the powers of thought and expression that distinguish man as a rational animal, Catholic educators analyze our social inheritance into five general fields:

1. The natural sciences, such as physics or chemistry, that deal with the physical world, and the biological sciences that deal with the living world.
2. The social sciences or the humanistic sciences of psychology, sociology, economics, government, and history.
3. The metaphysical sciences of philosophy and theology that deal with God, man, and the physical world.
4. The language arts through which man expresses his thoughts by means of symbols.
5. The fine arts.

Such an analysis of the content or scope of the curriculum in terms of branches of knowledge and subjects is only a starting point for authoritative Catholic students of education as it may be for other students of education. It indicates only in broad outline the kinds of content that should be included in the curriculum on all educational levels from the kindergarten through the university. The scope of each is so comprehensive that all the topics, questions, issues, problems, or activities comprising any one of them cannot be included as a requirement for any school level although each contributes to the enrichment of life in one or more fields of social life constituting the content aims of education defined above in terms of universal needs of man. They must promote the acquisition of knowledge, the development of abilities, and the formation of atti-

tudes in one of these fields. But just any such knowledge, abilities, and attitudes are not in themselves sufficient. The quality of these products must be such as to contribute to one or more of the recognized values, which have been variously designated as the cultural or interest value, the utilitarian or content value, and the method or disciplinary value.

The cultural or interest values are the primary consideration in the fine arts; the utilitarian or content values, in the sciences; and the disciplinary or method values, in the practical arts. Although some Catholic students of education still seem to think of disciplinary values in terms of the general training of the faculties of the mind, others, like Father Cunningham, emphasize different kinds of disciplinary values. For instance, Cunningham recognizes precision as the distinctive disciplinary value of the natural sciences, intellectual tolerance as the disciplinary value of history and the social sciences, and unification as the disciplinary value of the spiritual world of man and the metaphysical sciences of theology and philosophy. Apparently the disciplinary values thus conceived are to be considered in the selection and development of every curriculum activity, whatever the primary value it is designed to cultivate.

Finally, like other students of education, the educational proponents of the supernatural-development theory recognize placement as a feature of curriculum development. They recognize the social needs as the criterion in the selection of content, ability as the criterion of complexity of content, and interest as the criterion of method—that is, the selection and development of specific curriculum activities.

Such a logical analysis of the Catholic theory of curriculum requires some qualification for adequate understanding. In the first place, in actual practice there is no such isolation of the different kinds of formal or psychological aims, the different kinds of content aims, and the different kinds of values as the foregoing analyses seem to suggest. Although the primary emphasis may be on one kind of psychological outcome, the satisfaction of one kind of need, or the realization of one kind of value, other psychological, sociological, and axiological ends may be consciously and deliberately considered, even if cultivated only indirectly. Moreover, the promotion of Christian perfection and eternal salvation as an aspect of the whole

school program must be given consideration in all subjects and all courses at all educational levels whenever it may be relevant, as well as through systematic instruction, devotional exercises, and practical activities.

METHODS OF TEACHING

Proponents of the theory of supernatural-development recognize four aspects of the problem of method in teaching—principles of method, general method, general techniques, and special methods. They all emphasize the importance of certain general principles of learning and teaching. Those to which they all apparently subscribe are self-activity, motivation, apperception, individualization, and socialization. Cunningham does not include the last two among the fundamental principles of learning as he does the first three. But in his discussion of learning, after defining self-activity, motivation, and apperception as principles of learning, he then proceeds to emphasize the importance of individual and group differences. Moreover, throughout the remainder of the book he stresses the importance of providing for individual differences and of cultivating those social virtues and qualities of personality which, in the last analysis, are functions of the qualities of learning experiences.

Redden and Ryan formulate eight learning-teaching principles, but specifically state that, in the last analysis,

These eight principles may be reduced to: the principle of self-activity; the principle of motivation (interest); the principle of apperception (preparation and mental set); the principle of individualization; and the principle of socialization. They are applicable to all types of teaching. Regardless of what the teacher's objective may be, whether it be concerned with the acquisition of factual knowledge, skills, appreciations, or the formulation of rational conclusions, these principles are the psychological and sociological bases of method.⁴

Apparently no Catholic educational philosopher has proposed the adoption of an all-inclusive pattern of learning or teaching such as the five formal steps, the problem method, the project method, or the unit method. They all seem, however, to consider desirable

⁴ John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, *A Catholic Philosophy of Education*, Milwaukee, Bruce (1942) 1946, p. 339.

under certain conditions the preliminary preparation of a course of instruction or syllabus, including a statement of aims, an analysis of content, and suggested methods of procedure. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that any of the Catholic philosophers would find objectionable Cunningham's statement that "Since all learning is through self-activity, the teacher's task is threefold: first, to provide and explain to the pupil a pattern for his study and imitation (instruction); second, to arouse him to activity (motivation); and third, to demand a high quality of achievement giving him guidance so that his activity may carry him forward to the realization of the fullest development of which he is capable (discipline)." ⁵

At least some of them would recognize the importance of different types of teaching procedure corresponding to the different types of mental functions. Just as they classify the outcomes to be sought as knowledge, abilities, and attitudes, so they classify the procedures by which the outcomes are to be achieved as the problem technique, the practice technique, and the participation technique. In other words, each end to be sought or each activity through which it is to be achieved has its own special technique.⁶

For the most part Catholic philosophers of education do not consider any of the traditional techniques, such as the lecture method, the question method, the book method, the demonstration method, or any of the so-called progressive or activity methods, as either good or bad in and of themselves. There is a place for lecturing, for questioning, for discussing, and for using books. One is good for some things and another is good for other things: all depends upon the circumstances, including the capacity of the teacher.

The same is true in the case of the activity method, the unit method, or any other so-called modern procedure. The "activity" procedures are more useful in the lower grades than in high school or college, and the lecture method is more useful in the latter than in the elementary school. The usefulness of any authoritative technique, whether traditional or modern, depends upon the ends to be sought and the practical conditions, including the abilities and interests of the pupils, the availability of materials and equipment, and the capacity of the teacher.

⁵ Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 434-455 for a more detailed analysis of these psychological techniques of teaching.

The attitude of Catholic students of education toward special methods is not essentially different from that of other students of education. They are inclined to think that some subject matter courses in the fields in which students are preparing to teach should be professionalized. They will utilize any findings of research, sociological, psychological, or educational, that indicate specifically what should be taught and how it should be taught. But the particular uses that should be made of the findings of research at any particular time and place would depend upon the more inclusive principles of method, such as self-activity, motivation, apperception, individualization, and socialization.

Finally, the Catholic educational philosophers consider no formal procedures of any kind sufficient in and of themselves. The personality of the teacher is always a primary consideration. In the broadest sense the method of the teacher is his personality in operation. The quality of his personality reflects itself directly in the quality of the pupils' experiences, and indirectly in the personality traits which they acquire.

SCHOOL ORGANIZATION

Catholic students of education recognize the various features of educational organization as conditioning factors of the educative process. The organization of the Catholic schools depends somewhat on the organization of the public schools as well as upon the ages, the capacities, and the interests of pupils. For instance, the public school system includes the elementary school, the secondary school, the college, and the university. If the Catholic school system is to meet the standards set by the public school system, it, too, must provide elementary schools, secondary schools, colleges, and universities. It must also face such problems of adjustment as those which have been responsible for the organization of junior high schools and junior colleges. With respect to content or scope, the general instructional program at all educational levels should be the same as in the public school, with the exception of religion. The attention of pupils and students at all levels should be directed to the physical world, the social or human world, the spiritual world, the language arts, and the fine and practical arts. But the organization of materials from these different fields varies widely on different levels.

According to Cunningham, the elementary school is provided for children from six to twelve years of age, inclusive. The curriculum activities for them should be organized psychologically rather than logically. As a basis of such psychological organization, he suggests four types of experience as follows: sense experience, vicarious experience, experience with tools, and experiences of group life.⁷ Although the Catholic elementary school must conform to this general curriculum pattern, it will emphasize in all grades the instructional, the devotional, and the practical phases of religion in a way that is legally impossible for the public elementary school.

Since the American public secondary school has assumed a variety of forms because of varying conditions in different parts of the country, in Catholic schools there is no uniformity with respect to grades included or specific purposes to be realized. For instance, there are four-year high schools, five-year high schools, six-year high schools, three-year senior high schools, and three-year junior high schools. Most of the secondary schools are both cosmopolitan and comprehensive in that they are open to all who have completed the elementary school and undertake to meet the needs of individuals and groups of varying interests and capacities.

There are, however, a few specialized schools, some of which concentrate on liberal subjects and some on vocational subjects. Cunningham suggests the development of a six-year comprehensive high school composed of two three-year cycles. The curriculum of the first cycle includes constant and variable subjects and emphasizes integrated education. The second cycle provides differentiated curricula to meet the needs of varying interests and abilities. For example, there may be one curriculum for the academic-minded, one for the nonacademic-minded, and one strictly vocational. The six-year comprehensive integrated high school thus developed provides for social solidarity, but it has not yet solved the problem of providing an adequate liberal education for superior students. The specialized school, therefore, has a place in both the public school system and the Catholic school system, especially to meet the needs of the superior academic-minded students.

Because of certain fundamental principles and practical conditions, the organization that seems most satisfactory for the church is a

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 373-384.

kind of compromise. On the basis of principle, coeducation ceases in the Catholic upper schools. There must be separate high schools and colleges for girls and boys. Since it is impossible to provide two comprehensive high schools in each parish—one for boys and another for girls—it has been suggested that another year be added to the present 8-year parochial school, whose last three years would then constitute the first cycle of the six-year secondary school. Each diocese provides a central high school for boys and a similar one for girls, which in many instances will be a six-year high school. Students who complete the parochial school may enter a vocational program in a public high school, some community school of the church, or a central high school. In this way all pupils will have at least one more year in the church school and thus benefit from the instructional and practical phases of religious education.

Along with other Catholic educators, Cunningham sees in the junior college a desirable innovation. It could provide terminal education for many students and preparatory education for those who continue for the next two years in another institution. The junior college idea might lead to the establishment of eight- and six-year secondary schools in the educational system of the church. The teaching orders of the church might look with favor upon such a return to the traditional European organization with which they are quite familiar.

Elements of higher education in the Catholic school system include the liberal college and the university. The college is a four-year institution, but not coeducational. The university proper consists of the graduate and the professional schools. Just as in the public school system, some liberal colleges are generally included in the university organization and others are separate and distinct institutions. But whether for men or for women, whether in a university organization or not, the liberal college is the heart of the university because it prepares the students for the graduate schools. The acknowledged function of the liberal college has always been to "preserve and propagate the intellectual tradition."

Although the liberal college may have capitulated to the *Zeitgeist* of vocationalism, it may still be reprieved if it applies sound principles. Its students must be limited to a very select group of high school graduates. The intellectual tradition to be preserved and propagated is to be found in the natural sciences, the social sciences,

the metaphysical sciences, the language arts, and the fine arts, which together determine the content for educational institutions at all age levels. But in the liberal college they are logically organized into five academic groups of subjects, each of which is a depository of the five great bodies of knowledge.

The curriculum organization of the liberal college is characterized by distribution and concentration. Distribution is emphasized in the first two years and concentration in the last two years. But if the liberal college is to provide a transition from the secondary to the graduate schools, responsibility for independent study must be placed on the student, whether by the use of the comprehensive examination or of some other device.

There are two recognized methods of securing distribution during the first two years, each of which has its advocates. The survey courses have been introduced in some institutions for the purpose of enabling the student to secure from the various fields the knowledge that an educated person ought to have. A second procedure is to require the student to take one or more courses in each of the five fields during the first two years. From the standpoint of the Catholic philosophers of education, preference should usually be given to separate courses in each group rather than to survey courses corresponding to each group. For instance, a separate course in one of the physical sciences involving firsthand use of the scientific method would contribute more to the disciplinary value of precision, which is the primary function of the natural sciences, than would a survey course. Still, some general courses running throughout the year would be helpful in enabling students to make up shortages in their previous education.

The concentration usually emphasized in the last two years is designed to provide for the student the experience of "going to the bottom" of a subject. Such concentration should provide a severe intellectual discipline in one field of knowledge. About three-fourths of a student's time during the last two years should be devoted to such concentration. But course requirements are not sufficient; a comprehensive examination should be required at the end of the senior year.

Up to this point, there would not be much difference between a liberal Catholic college and a liberal state college. Distribution

and concentration are as desirable in one as in the other. As to organization, it takes the same kind of courses to provide the discipline of precision, the discipline of tolerance, the discipline of unification, or the discipline of appreciation in any liberal college. But in one respect the Catholic liberal college has a distinct advantage over the liberal state college. The development of worthy personalities is as much a function of the Catholic liberal college as it is of the elementary school or the high school. The development of such personalities requires a development of a philosophy of life.

Whereas the state institution is limited in this respect in terms of social purpose, the church-related college stands for a definite philosophy of life which it must endeavor to transmit to its students. For this purpose, it will select teachers and administrators with worthy personalities who live their philosophy in their daily lives. It will arouse the religious impulses through programs of worship and action. But as an intellectual agency it will present the truth of religious faith as well as the truths of philosophy. A reasonable procedure for the Catholic college is to require formal religious training during the first two years and formal training in philosophy during the last two years. A comprehensive examination is just as important for religious education as for the distribution and the concentration, just as other kinds of activity are designed to promote the disciplinary values of unification.

Finally, selection in the Catholic liberal college involves more than deciding which applicants to admit. The college itself has the further function of selecting from those enrolled the especially qualified students who become the intellectual leaders of the future. Since the Catholics have a real educational and intellectual tradition, the liberal colleges can do much more in the way of selecting leaders than they are now doing. Certainly in the larger Catholic liberal colleges, it is possible to select the very best students from the freshman class, provide for them a study program commensurate with their capacities, and assign to them superior instructors and advisors. In some such way the liberal Catholic college can provide intellectual leadership for the various professions. It has an opportunity and an obligation to find its superior students and provide for their fullest development.

Just as the university is the capstone of the American educational

ladder, so it is the capstone of the Catholic educational system. The function of the university proper, consisting of the graduate and the professional schools, is to conserve and interpret knowledge and ideas, to search for truth, and to prepare students to do the same. The realization of such ends involves training students as specialists in research and in the professions. It is the specific function of the university to develop the intellectual virtues of science, understanding, wisdom, art, and prudence. Such virtues are developed only through dealing with intellectual content.

The fivefold analysis of the curriculum prepared by Cunningham formally includes all the intellectual content for whose preservation, interpretation, and extension the university is responsible. The subject matter of the practical arts, which are not included in this analysis, may be essential but it belongs in the technical schools and "institutes," as President Hutchins called them, for it has no place in the university.

But content or scope is not the only problem facing the university. It must solve the problem of unity. Under present conditions, compartmentalization is excessive. As a solution to this problem of isolation and separation, President Hutchins has proposed an integration of the whole university by the establishment of three faculties—the faculties of metaphysics, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. According to Hutchins, all students would be required to take basic courses in metaphysics, though they might major in the natural sciences, the social sciences, or metaphysics.

Cunningham in speaking for the Catholic university recognizes the challenge of the Hutchins proposal. He thinks the development of the Catholic liberal college in the direction he proposes would be a sufficient safeguard against such a chaotic condition as Hutchins deplors in the case of the university in general. He thinks also that students who have completed the program at a Catholic liberal college will already have received the integration or unity which Hutchins wished to secure by administrative reorganization. In the Catholic liberal college as Cunningham sees it, all students would have theology during the first two years and the metaphysical sciences during the last two years. In this connection he says: "With students so trained on the undergraduate level the university proper

is prepared to play its role in the conservation and interpretation of knowledge and the search for truth.”⁸

Cultural Conditions *

The supernatural-development theory as defined and applied by contemporary Catholic educational philosophers in the United States reflects the interaction of the neo-scholastic theology and philosophy with a particular set of cultural conditions. But this theology and philosophy has a long historical background. Since neo-scholasticism is continuous with the philosophy of St. Thomas, which is itself continuous with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the supernatural-development theory indirectly reflects the cultural conditions of ancient Greece and the Middle Ages as well as of the modern world.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The scholastic theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages, with which neo-scholasticism is continuous, are products of the development of the idea of the church as a universal institution. Even during the life of St. Paul, controversies arose among the early Christians as to the criterion by which authoritative doctrines could be determined. St. Paul himself relied on his own mystical insight for assurance. But with the establishment of many Christian groups subject to widely different cultural influences, even the leaders among them disagreed on important points. Still, in a hostile world, unity in belief and organization was necessary to maintain a solid front in the extension of Christianity. Practical minded leaders of the various groups gradually came to see that some kind of objective criterion would have to be found.

One alternative to the subjectivism and dogmatism of St. Paul was an appeal to the words of Jesus, available in oral tradition and written records, both of which were ambiguous in that they were not uniform. But the appeal to Jesus' teachings raised the question

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

* This section, like corresponding sections in other chapters, is only the author's cultural estimate and not the expressed beliefs of advocates of the theory.

of the reliability of different versions. As a way out of the difficulty, Christian leaders used as tests of the written documents the apostolicity of their authors, their conformity to recognized Christian practices, and their authentication by one or more of the stronger churches. Through these tests certain documents were officially approved as the body of early Christian writings, divinely inspired—the New Testament. But since the interpretations of the canon of the New Testament were controversial, an appeal was made to the bishop in each community for an official meaning of both oral and written Christian tradition; and although the voice of the bishop was final within his own jurisdiction, bishops in the various communities often disagreed. Consequently, appeals were made to councils of bishops, and the ecumenical council of bishops became the recognized authority in moral and religious as well as administrative matters.

In the formulation of the conciliar theory of the church, the search for a criterion had reached a *de facto* solution, which eventually led to the formulation of the Catholic idea of the Church. The Catholic idea emerged from the controversy over the readmission of the Christians who conformed to the decree of the Emperor Decius in A.D. 251—commanding all residents of the Roman provinces to make sacrifices to the imperial deities and to the Emperor himself—and over the reinvestiture of priests who yielded to the imperial order to worship the Emperor Diocletian in A.D. 301. The lapsed members were readmitted and the lapsed priests were reinstated. In each case the council of bishops had not only asserted its authority but had declared the strict-interpretation party heretical.

The controversy in regard to the lapsed, both members and priests, led to a careful formulation of the official idea of the church. In the first case, Novatian, the leading advocate of strict interpretation, denied readmission of lapsed members on the grounds that the church was a body of faithful and righteous Christians. In the second case the strict-interpretation party led by Donatus claimed that a priest of imperfect character—like the lapsed—could not administer valid sacraments. But in each case the liberal party rejected the conception of the church on which the strict party based its argument.

The liberals considered the church not as a community of the saved but as the ark of salvation through which some might be saved. The church as an ark of salvation was independent of the priests who administered the sacrament. In a word, the church was a universal idea exemplified in particular churches, but it was a reality independent of and prior to churches, priests, and members. As a result, the church which had historically become universal or catholic *de facto* had now become universal *de jure*. Such an idea of the church was an intellectual counterpart and justification of the administrative unity of the church that had already been achieved. Henceforth the church, "independently of the fluctuating contingencies of time and circumstance," was conceived as the repository of divine power, holiness, and grace, and divinely established means of salvation—"the holy Catholic Church."

This idea has meant and still means that Catholic intellectual life and all philosophical speculations are subject to the control of the church. As Lamprecht says: "It [the intellectual life] became subordinate to the dogmatic position of the established faith. The faith contained many problems . . . which the human intellect might well investigate; but the investigation of the problems of the faith could not properly end in rejection of that faith." Furthermore, Lamprecht adds, the Catholic idea meant "the rise of a new kind of rationalism. For the dogmas of the faith, certified by the Church, were capable of becoming the premises of sheerly deductive reasoning."⁹ Recognition of the church as "the holy Catholic Church" is a part of the cultural background of the philosophical and theological foundations of the Catholic supernatural-development theory of education and the good life.

ARISTOCRATIC BACKGROUND

The cultural background of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and of St. Thomas, with which the neo-scholastic philosophy of the supernatural-development theory is continuous, is aristocratic in character. In Athens during the democratic age of Pericles and the Peloponnesian War the aristocratic class had been on the defensive. But from the aristocratic viewpoint of Plato and Aristotle the failure of democracy under the conditions of civil war had

⁹ Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

been demonstrated. To Plato and Aristotle, who, as active citizens, represented the aristocracy, the only hope for the future seemed to lie in the establishment of a social order in which the artistic, scientific, and economic achievements of the Athenians and the administrative and military efficiency of the Spartans would be combined.

The three-level social order of artisans, soldiers, and philosopher-kings that Plato proposed in *The Republic* was at least consistent with his aristocratic bias. According to his plan justice would emerge to restore unity and peace when each member of the respective classes functioned according to his nature, and all classes accepted the hierarchical political order as delineated in *The Republic*. However different in detail Aristotle's proposal in *The Politics* may have been, it was consistent in principle with the Platonic ideal. Moreover, Aristotle's philosophical realism, with its conception of continuous levels of reality, no less than Plato's idealism, with its separate ideas or forms, lent philosophic support to such an aristocratic order.

The pyramidal arrangement of the economic, political, and religious institutions achieved in the Middle Ages was analogous to the hierarchical order envisioned by Plato. In both the church and the state a superior ruling class was firmly in control of the dependent masses. This was the system to which St. Thomas' great synthesis of the Grecian philosophy and the tradition of the Catholic church lent intellectual support. According to St. Thomas, each particular constituent of reality was related to every other constituent through common substances after the manner of Aristotelian realism rather than after the manner of Platonic idealism. The various substances were in the process of continuous actualization from the more material and potential to the more spiritual and actual, from the less pure to the more pure. Such a dynamic order of ascending levels was acceptable and desirable because it was in the nature of reality inevitable. In such a system the things of each lower level existed for the next higher level in an integrated order to which all belonged.

Such an ontological system justified the established pyramidal system of the Middle Ages just as Plato and Aristotle justified the social system they had proposed. In both cases the aristocratic superior class was inevitable in the nature of things. But no less so

was the dependent status of the lower classes. Nevertheless, whereas for Plato and Aristotle the proposed social arrangements reflected the cultural conditions of the past when artisans, sailors, and farmers shared in the Athenian democracy, for St. Thomas they reflected the cultural conditions of the inevitable future when the rising merchant class would be bidding for power.

THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

Beginning with the Renaissance, those traders and merchants who had appeared in the expanding cities of Europe during the days of St. Thomas had now come to be the middle classes. They had engaged extensively in exploration and discovery, built great cities, and transformed a feudalistic into a capitalistic economy. Indispensable to such achievement was the new technology, which only the development of modern science made possible. The new middle class transformed the character of Europe and America in order to achieve its ends. The changed conditions were reflected in new habits, beliefs, and attitudes. To the new cultural conditions scholasticism was irrelevant. Therefore, while some scientists were analyzing the natural processes of the physical world and others were analyzing the intellectual and social world, some thinkers were developing new systems of beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value consistent with the requirements of science. These systems of belief about the world of nature and man tended to lend support to the new cultural demands even as the Thomistic system favored the established culture of the Middle Ages.

The nineteenth century brought important cultural changes. For more than a century the scholastics had been on the defensive. The social, economic, political, moral, and religious situation to which this philosophy and theology were applicable had all but disappeared; the new capitalistic economy and a middle-class political democracy had come of age; and the great masses of laboring people were beginning to organize and bid for power. Philosophical idealism and philosophical realism which lent support to the aspirations of the middle classes were also on the defensive.

After the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas came to be known as neo-scholasticism. His directive came to mean a purification of St. Thomas' doctrines,

their adjustment to the advancement of science, and their reformulation in terms that would render them meaningful and convincing to the modern mind.

The immediate historical background of the supernatural-development theory conceived as the educational equivalent of neo-scholasticism is the same as that of some other theories considered in this book. The advancement of science which Pope Leo XIII anticipated has been spectacular. The industrial revolution which the new science and technology made possible has replaced an economy of scarcity with an economy of abundance. The improvements in transportation and communication have made men everywhere interdependent. Changes in political, economic, and social arrangements have not kept pace with the physical sciences, technology, and communication. Wars have become more frequent, more extensive, and more destructive. Nations, groups within nations, and individuals are in conflict with one another and are "houses divided against themselves." People are becoming more and more confused, disturbed, and restless.

As the official philosophy of the powerful and influential Roman Catholic Church, neo-scholasticism, regardless of changed conditions, is a stabilizing force in the lives of men. In this philosophy and theology sanctified by religious faith many people find conviction, certainty, and assurance in the midst of confusion, uncertainty, and bewilderment. Through this philosophy and theology they may also find a feeling of security in the realm of perfection that transcends the evils and struggles of the world. Through this philosophy and theology they may also share in a rich social experience hallowed by religious faith. The problem, therefore, that confronts the proponents of neo-scholasticism and its correlative supernatural-development theory of education is not only to generate this *feeling* of security but to increase *security* itself through modifying their policies and programs as changing conditions require.

Concluding Comments

As Catholic educational philosophers distinguish between the natural and the supernatural man, so they distinguish between na-

tural and supernatural education. But salvation and eternal happiness with God, which is the ultimate supernatural aim of education and the good life, is also the ultimate aim of even natural education, which is necessary and contributory. Hence, the Catholic educational theory has been called the supernatural-development theory. Historically, its philosophical and theological foundations were established during the Middle Ages. But in their contemporary form and application they are of very recent origin. In fact, Catholic educational philosophers in their courses and textbooks give considerable attention to experimentalist and idealist theories of education. These facts explain why our account of the supernatural-development theory follows rather than precedes the experimentalist theories and the theory of spiritual self-realization.

Just as Catholic educational philosophers raise serious objections to what they consider primary mundane and secular educational theories, so the advocates of these theories raise serious objections to the supernatural-development theory. Of all the criticisms of the Catholic theory those of the experimentalists and the reconstructionists are perhaps the most striking.

In behalf of the experimentalists, Professor Childs says that supernaturalists agree with experimentalists that education "is a deliberate effort to shape the development of the young, and is therefore, by nature, a moral undertaking," but he adds that "they demand a more universal and permanent foundation for an undertaking that has to do with the destinies of human beings." He finds, however, that supernaturalists differ among themselves "about the nature of this substitute source, or plan, for the development of educational aims and materials."¹⁰

This reliance on revelation for the standards of direction in education and life Professor Childs questions for what he deems very good reasons. First, there are several systems of supernaturalism and no recognized criterion for choosing among them. Second, adherents of revealed systems have no "common mind" about the implications of religious doctrines for practical affairs, and tend to remove these "secondary problems" related to means from direct supernatural regulation. In doing so they separate means and ends and shirk

¹⁰ John L. Childs, *Education and Morals, An Experimentalist Philosophy of Education*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, pp. 39-40.

responsibility for the "sphere of the institutionalized practices of man" in which "many of the most crucial moral and educational problems of our times arise." Third, supernaturalists tend to "maintain the 'prestige' and 'purity' of their 'first' principles by refraining from defining their specific implications for changing life conditions." This failure to indicate the practical significance of "first" principles leaves supernaturalism too abstract and too vague to help teachers with their practical problems. Fourth, the message from religion is one form of human experience. Although not to be neglected on the ground that it is eternally relative to time and circumstance, it is not to be accepted on mere faith without critical examination along with other messages that also come from human experience. Any general theory of education of which supernaturalism is a presupposition is thus empirically indefensible.¹¹

In behalf of the reconstructionists Professor Brameld distinguishes two forms of what he calls the philosophy of perennialism—the secular and the clerical. For the reconstructionists, perennialism in both forms is culturally obsolete in that it "supports those political and economic arrangements in which the common people find guidance in an aristocracy of presumably wise and virtuous leaders;" in that "the supreme authority of these leaders centers in the finality of their own wisdom and virtue," which "depends above all upon the self-evidence of inner speculative principles and of outer universal cultural purposes, both encompassed under the one absolute of knowledge, reality, and value;" and in that it implies a serious challenge to democracy.¹²

From the standpoint of the mere reporter, if there be such, no settlement of the controversy once and for all is possible. From the standpoint of the advancement of educational theory it is well for the controversy to continue because through such criticism and counter criticism ideas are sharpened and refined and new meanings are generated. From the standpoint of the Catholic Church in a society that permits religious freedom for groups of all faiths, the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹² Theodore Brameld, *Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education*, New York, Dryden Press, 1956, p. 12.

Theodore Brameld, *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective*, New York, Dryden Press, 1955, p. 365.

supernatural-development theory may be indispensable. So long as its advocates have in mind the framework of the church they are on solid ground. But the supernatural-development theory of the Catholic educational philosophers or those of any other religious group cannot be convincing from the standpoint of a general educational policy and program for the whole society. Nevertheless, the Catholic supernatural-development theory, like other theories of education and the good life, deserves the attention of the philosophic student of education, whatever his religious faith or philosophic orientation may be.

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The Great-Classics Theories

10

Some recent versions of an old way of thinking about education and the good life, one that has its roots in the distant past, merit attention. They are sufficiently unlike to justify separate discussion, but to give each one the emphasis of a separate chapter might seem to attach relatively undue importance to one general way of thinking. To encompass them all under the theory of self-perfection seems historically and logically warranted.¹ Professor Broudy, however, has already used this term to designate his own version. Then, too, historically some of these versions precede and some follow the reconstructionist social-self-realization theory. Consequently, this chapter, entitled "The Great-Classics Theories" and devoted to the first two versions, precedes the one on the social-self-realization theory, which in turn is followed by "The Basic-Subjects Theories," dealing with two other versions. The new-humanist and the new-intellectualist theories we call the great-classics theories because both place special emphasis on the classics as the main core of the school curriculum. The new-humanist theory, however, is here designated

¹ Boyd H. Bode, *How We Learn*, New York, Heath, 1940, p. 44.

technically as the superrational-perfection theory because it places primary emphasis on a power above reason, and the new-intellectualist theory is here designated technically as the rational-development theory because it places primary emphasis on reason itself.

THE SUPERRATIONAL-PERFECTION THEORY

After the sputnik scare, our public schools were subjected to much criticism for neglecting science and mathematics, and a concerted movement has been inaugurated for extension of offerings and requirements in these fields. But as every educational historian knows, there has been an increasing emphasis on science at all school levels in the United States as well as in other countries for more than a century. He knows, too, that recognition of science in the development of educational theory has also been equally striking since the publication of Rousseau's *Emile* in 1762.

But the increase of science as represented in the curriculum and of its influence on educational theory has faced constant opposition during the whole history of public education. From the Renaissance until the recent past, this opposition was mainly a reflection of uncriticized attitudes and beliefs established prior to the development of modern science. But for some time now, certain critics have looked to philosophy for support in resisting what they considered an unwarranted emphasis on science in the field of education.

The development of new humanism and its application to education were in part an answer to the extension of science in the schools and colleges at the expense of the humanities, and in part a critical and constructive effort to moderate many extremes in education, morals, manners, politics, and the fine arts that had stemmed from the romantic reaction to eclectic rationalism of the eighteenth century. The new American humanism was proclaimed as a separate and distinct movement in response to the conditions prevailing in this country during the 1920's. The young people who reached maturity during the 1920's or thereabouts, after asserting their independence of all traditional standards, gradually

became disillusioned with their new freedom. The new humanists sought to exert a stabilizing effect in all these fields and to reestablish the traditional values that could be intellectually justified. They found their standards of direction not in the disclosure of natural reason but in the disclosure of what they called the higher imagination or rational intuition. Such values were in a sense supernatural, though not in the Christian sense of revelation. Therefore, to call the new-humanist theory of education and the good life supernatural development or supernatural perfection might cause it to be confused with Catholic theory. For convenience of reference, therefore, it may properly be called the superrational-perfection theory.

The rise and decline of new humanism, sometimes called critical humanism to distinguish it from other new kinds of humanism, covers a period of not more than 40 years. It dates roughly from the meeting of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More at Harvard University in 1894 to the death of Babbitt in 1935. Its beginning was signified in Babbitt's address at the University of Wisconsin in 1895 on "the Rational Study of the Classics."

Babbitt was nominally a professor of French, though in reality a teacher of teachers and a critic of literature in general for 35 years. More, after a try at teaching Sanskrit and classical literature, was literary editor of *The Independent* and also of the *New York Evening Post* and later editor of *The Nation*. The two men continued to work actively together until about 1914, when More became a Platonist and later an avowed Christian theist. They drew inspiration from Matthew Arnold, the great nineteenth-century British literary critic, as well as from their older American contemporary, W. C. Brownell. Associated with them were some younger men, including T. S. Eliot, Stuart Sherman, and Norman Foerster, who considered themselves new humanists. They adopted Babbitt's general position that adequate standards of direction were to be found in man's human nature as distinct from his religious nature on the one hand, and his animal nature on the other.

In the beginning, new humanism was independent of both religion and naturalism, but after More gave priority to religious faith most of the others eventually followed him or, like Stuart Sherman, drifted toward naturalism. Our study is confined to new humanism as an independent movement and its educational equivalent. Con-

sequently, clearness and brevity require that our discussion be limited mainly to Babbitt, More, and Foerster, the latter perhaps the most consistent and influential of Babbitt's followers.

In the minds of its leaders new humanism was not fundamentally different from classical humanism, which dates back to the Renaissance and even to the ancients. But it was a challenge to the naturalism that had developed since the nineteenth century rather than to the supernaturalism of the Middle Ages, to which the earlier humanism was partly a protest. In emphasis it is therefore somewhat different. Our discussion is limited to this later development, which Babbitt and More initiated in the United States. According to Babbitt, "The word 'humanism' has two distinct meanings—an historical meaning in its application to the scholar who turned away from the Middle Ages to the Greeks and Romans, and a psychological meaning, as one may say, that derives directly from the historical one: humanists in this latter sense are those who, in any age, aim at proportionateness through a cultivation of the law of Measure."²

The fact that our account of the superrational-perfection theory, or the new-humanist theory, must be very brief does not mean that it should be neglected by students of the foundations of education. This theory and its underlying philosophy, like Rousseau's theory of natural perfection and its underlying philosophy, are applicable not only to education but to politics, religion, and the fine arts. The fact that it undertakes to mediate between supernaturalism on the one hand and naturalism on the other should be of special interest to some students. They can find a fuller account in Louis Mercier's *Challenge of Humanism* and Norman Foerster's compilation, *Humanism and America*.

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical presuppositions which the new humanists explicitly avow or clearly assume constitute the philosophical foundations of the superrational-perfection theory. The humanists openly acknowledge psychological dualism and imply a belief in meta-

² Norman Foerster, ed., *Humanism and America*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1930, p. 30.

physical dualism. Their central assumption is a belief in a dualism of man and nature, as opposed to the monism of naturalism. For them, the working philosophy of the majority of mankind as well as the classical and Christian traditions lend support to this position. Through introspection they find that the individual is a house divided against itself, and through historical studies they find that the spokesmen for the different cultures of the past in both East and West bear testimony to the conflict between the higher and the lower self. In the spirit of Babbitt, Foerster says: "It is still the belief of most men . . . that perfection is a worthy end, that it depends upon the control of the natural by the human and that it necessitates loyalty to standards of truth and justice which cannot be conceived as natural but which are none the less binding. . . . Humanism assumes the freedom of the will to conform to a standard of values, as opposed to the deterministic assumption of naturalism." ³

On the psychological side Babbitt's distinction of the higher from the lower mental processes seems to be acceptable to Foerster and other new humanists. On the lower or naturalistic level he recognizes the sensuous appetites, the lower imagination, the lower will, and the lower reason. On the other hand, he recognizes the higher imagination, the higher will, and the higher reason. While apparently neglecting the divine grace of the Christian tradition as a free gift of God, he means to include it in the *freien vital*, the highest will, that all men possess and may recognize whether they be Christians or believers in other faiths, or whatever their attitude toward religion may be.

For Babbitt, as for the scholastics, the lower nature of man is inclined to evil. Human civilization depends upon the subjection of the powers of the lower nature to the control and direction of the powers of the higher nature. Stated somewhat differently, the powers of the higher nature are to provide the standards of direction and enforce their observance. The appetites, including impulse and feeling, are blind and, if left uncontrolled and uncultivated, they will destroy both the individual and civilization. They, together with all the other powers, may be harmonized and balanced, each

³ Norman Foerster, *Toward Standards*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1930, pp. 162-163.

serving its appropriate role in the integrated individual. All the substantial powers are subject to the restraint imposed by the inner check or *freien vital*, which is the function of the higher will. It is the superrational power that corresponds to the divine grace of the Christian tradition and is available to every normal individual. But this *freien vital* as a power puts into effect the standards which the higher imagination in cooperation with reason is able to supply. Such cooperative activity, in which reason analyzes and imagination visualizes and synthesizes, may properly be called rational intuition. It supplies the standards of direction in deciding on the proper weight of every impulse and desire and the proper exercise of every mental function: and the *freien vital* is the power of restraint and of execution.

By thus including the power of divine grace in the *freien vital* of the highest imagination, Babbitt and the pure humanists avoid theological controversy and metaphysical entanglements. But they do not deny the importance of religion or even theology and metaphysics. As a matter of fact, they usually affirm the need of revealed religion. Although their analysis points to a beyond, they do not attempt to define the nature of its ultimate structure. This they leave to the theologians and the metaphysicians. They simply assume that dualism as a fact of human experience, whatever its ultimate nature is, must be squarely faced in dealing with one's self and in developing practical programs in education, politics, and the fine arts.

On the side of logic and epistemology, the new humanists adopt as their method of investigation what Babbitt calls the "experimental method." It involves two phases or stages: the investigator makes an introspective analysis of his own consciousness, and then compares it with the analyses made by recognized representatives of other cultures. Through a study of his own experience he finds that his higher and lower natures are in constant and continuous conflict. Through his historical studies he finds the reality of such a conflict confirmed.

In general, the new humanists recognize the importance of two methods of knowing: the scientific method and the method of the higher imagination or rational intuition. To secure reliable knowledge about the physical and mechanical world the scientific method

is to be used, and in securing knowledge about the standards that control the lives of men the method of the higher intuitive imagination is to be used with the assistance of reason. The knowledge supplied by the scientific method is fixed and guaranteed and that which the higher reason supplies is flexible. Scientific knowledge includes all the reliable knowledge of the physical world. Intuitive knowledge provided by the higher imagination and reason is the knowledge of symbols of ethical entities. Such symbols include decorum, measure, proportion, and restraint—a knowledge of the higher imagination and the *freien vital* which makes a knowledge of virtue possible.

From the standpoint of new humanism, the scientific method takes as its point of departure the data which the senses supply, while higher imagination in cooperation with reason takes as its point of departure the immediate precepts of the spiritual world. The immediate knowledge which constitutes the starting point of scientific knowing consists of the data which external perception supplies; the immediate knowledge which constitutes the starting point of spiritual knowing consists of the data which internal perception supplies. Scientific knowledge has reference to the particular, changing, and pluralistic phenomenal world. Intuitive knowledge refers to spiritual principles and ideas that are eternal in the heavens.

Both kinds of knowledge are exceedingly important, but scientific knowledge is subsidiary, auxiliary, conditional, and secondary. It supplies an essential means for the realization of ends which intuitive knowledge discloses. It is very important that the method of science be limited in use to the particular kind of subject matter in the physical world with which it is qualified to deal. It is incapable of providing reliable knowledge about ends or values—a kind of knowledge which only rational intuition is able to supply.

On the axiological side the standards that direct our lives are flexible and can be revealed only by intuitive imagination assisted by analytical reason. The feelings, inclinations, and impulses in which native dispositions and propensities manifest themselves are evil rather than good. Their expression provides sensory pleasure and satisfaction. But only conformity to the higher standards which rational intuitive power discloses brings true happiness and human

welfare. The native dispositions, propensities, or instincts—as reflected in direct response of idyllic imagination which the romantic naturalists idealize—are not reliable standards of direction. They themselves require evaluation, direction, and modification in the light of the truly human standards which only the higher imagination assisted by analytical reason is able to supply. Whereas the disclosures of sensory perception are fleeting, multiple, and perishing, the disclosures of intuitive imagination are persistent, simple, and eternal. Whereas natural needs, interests, and desires are inclined to evil, the decorum, measure, proportion, and restraint disclosed by the intuitive imagination are good and thus constitute the primary standards of direction. They reflect the standards of man as man throughout the ages rather than of individual men in particular situations.

Such standards defy adequate definition. Only by a study of the works of such modern humanists as Matthew Arnold, Babbitt, More, and Foerster can one catch their significance. Still, a few comments may be helpful in clarifying them.

The new humanist, like all humanists, believes that any man can find within himself a center that is common to all men. It is the standard of value, the center of reference in dealing with concrete situations. It is the law of measure, permanent in the heavens. Decorum is the application of the law of measure through imitation of the models which the higher imagination supplies. In general, the law of measure means cultivating all the faculties in due proportion without underemphasizing or overemphasizing any one of them. The exercise of decorum involves self-control, restraint, and moderation.

For the humanist the ideal is perhaps best defined by the term "gentleman." The adult individual must like and dislike the right things. If he is ever to do so, in the words of Babbitt, "He must be trained in appropriate habits almost from infancy." The conditions in America, he thought, were more favorable than elsewhere for the development of "a truly liberal conception of education." He felt safe in affirming, therefore, that "the battle that is to determine the fate of American civilization will be fought out first of all in the field of education."⁴ To an account of the educational

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

application of the superrational-perfection theory of the new humanism we now turn.

Implications and Applications

The superrational-perfection—or new-humanist—theory of education, like the theory of formal discipline, formally conceives the good life and education as a process of development from within rather than a process of formation from without. But whereas in the formal-discipline theory this process is only the development of the metaphysical faculties of the mind or rational soul through formal exercise, in the superrational-perfection theory it is such cultivation and exercise of the mental faculties as are required for the perfection of the nature of man and the objective standards revealed through rational intuition. The latter theory assumes that man has the capacity for truth, for beauty, for conduct, and for social life, including manners. It recognizes the empirical fact that people vary widely with regard to their standards. Ideas which some people consider true others consider false; things which some consider beautiful others consider ugly; activities which some consider right or good others consider wrong or bad; things which some consider socially desirable others consider socially undesirable; and manners which some consider proper others consider improper.

How, then, are acceptable and adequate standards, on the basis of which things are approved or disapproved, to be found? According to the superrational-perfection theory, the eternal flexible standards, such as decorum, measure, proportion, and balance which intuitive imagination discloses constitute the ultimate models and standards of direction. The three fundamental aims or purposes of education and the good life thus become: cultivating the rational powers with which all men are endowed in accord with humanistic standards; strengthening the rational powers through exercise; and directing the lower powers in accord with recognized standards.

The perfection of the various human capacities necessitates the harmonious development of all the mental powers, which in turn requires that every power be exercised just enough but not too much. But the individual has no way of telling what is too much

or what is too little. Should he give priority to logical, aesthetic, moral, or social considerations in any given particular situation? His aesthetic perceptions may seem to be in conflict with his moral perceptions, as when an object or act is considered both beautiful and immoral. Likewise what he perceives as true may conflict with his sympathy for others, as when one has to choose between the truth and some humanitarian act. Furthermore, what seems to contribute to one's own perfection may conflict with what seem to be the needs of others, as when, to use Bode's illustration, a father has to choose between buying a book for his own edification and purchasing other things for the welfare of his children.

There are no reliable signs on the basis of which the individual can tell when a given power needs exercise as compared with other powers. No red and green lights flash on and off to indicate whether a faculty is too weak or too strong and thus automatically to direct him from one kind of activity to another. Consequently, he cannot tell by the inspection of his own consciousness what should be done in any given situation. Any solution of such problems, which constantly occur, depends upon the special insight of a higher power which proponents of the superrational-perfection theory call the higher imagination or rational intuition. In some mystical way that one person can never explain to another this inner sense indicates what should be done in justice to all the demands of each situation as it arises. Higher imagination, however, varies in strength from one person to another just as do all the mental powers. Consequently, just as other mental powers require perfection through exercise, so does the higher imagination. The only way it can be properly directed is through contemplating or meditating on perfect models. These models are to be found in the cultural products with which only the specially gifted have provided us.

The problem of those who wish to live the good life of real happiness as contrasted with mere pleasure, and want to guide others in doing so, is to locate the right models through whose contemplation and discrimination the powers of the mind may be cultivated while they are being exercised. The location of such models is the function of the superrational power of intuitive imagination. It alone is able to distinguish the proper models by means of which the other powers of the mind may be properly cultivated.

Logically, individuals whose native power of rational intuition is unusually strong are able to perceive these models almost anywhere and under almost any circumstances. These specially gifted persons have represented in symbols such ideal objects in the great cultural tradition of the past. Such symbols are embodied in social institutions, such as the state and the church, and in the fine arts including music, architecture, poetry, sculpture, and literature. The subject matter content which is most conducive to the cultivation of all human capacities is to be found in the great cultural tradition. But these ideal objects are not equally and uniformly distributed in human culture. Some kind of selection must be made in the interest of economy and efficiency.

The question therefore naturally arises as to who is to be responsible for the selection and arrangement of the models to be contemplated, studied, or investigated. The answer is that in our time, as in any other time, there are certain persons who possess this superrational insight or intuition to a high degree. Only a very select few are capable of embodying ideal objects in intelligible forms. They are the sort of people who have produced the great cultures of the past and should by all means continue their work of discovery and modeling. Only as they do so can the confines of civilization be constantly extended. But there are others who are not so specially gifted with spiritual insight and yet are sufficiently gifted to perceive and discriminate the cultural models which the members of the first group have perceived and provided during the whole history of civilization. It is the peculiar function of this group, consisting of philosophers and other critics of human culture, to make such selections and organizations of these models of human culture as will render them most available for those who assume responsibility for the development of specific programs and activities.

Proponents of the new-humanist theory—technically designated as the superrational-perfection theory of education and the good life—recognize the distinction between liberal or general education and utilitarian or technical education, and give attention primarily to the former. They recognize such distinctions as elementary education, secondary education, college education, and university education, and devote their attention almost exclusively to general education (liberal education) on the college level. But in order to indicate their

conception of college education they have made some reference to education on the higher and lower levels.

According to them, university education is designed primarily for a very gifted and select group interested in research, both specialized and general; the lower schools—both the elementary and the secondary—are designed for all the people; and the college is designed primarily for the development of an intellectual aristocracy. The powers of children on the lower level are conceived as relatively passive. They are capable only of passively absorbing the subject matter with which they are confronted. Only individuals who are capable of reflection and intellectual discrimination are capable of a general or liberal education. Such an education is the sole function of the college.

Since only a limited number of those who complete the requirements of the lower schools are capable of such reflection and intellectual discrimination, the college program in a very significant sense should be a selective agency. It should not be modified in any way so as to adapt it to the needs, interests, and capacities of the rank and file of people who simply are not capable of dealing effectively with the materials which constitute the only proper basis of a general (liberal) education. The subjects to be required consist primarily of those materials, artistic and literary, which embody humanistic rather than naturalistic standards. Humanistic standards are ideas, principles, or models corresponding to realities of the super-rational world. They are products of the specially gifted individuals who by their special powers of analytical reason and higher imagination have grasped reality and communicated their visions to those who have highly developed powers of reason and imagination.

The standards which these materials supply are humane rather than scientific or technical. Although they have been provided by particular men in particular situations, they are not merely ideals of particular men in any particular time and place. They are the ideals of man as such, the universal man, rather than of particular men, the representative man rather than particular individuals. Only the materials embodying the ideals, of which measure, proportion, restraint, and control are examples, are adequate subject matter in liberal education. Although such standards of direction may be found in the fine arts and even in science, history, and philosophy, they are most

frequently available in humane literature.⁴

As to what subjects should be required in the college program and as to how they should be related, proponents of the superrational-perfection theory have said very little. They have made, however, certain fairly concrete suggestions. For instance, More says that one group of studies should be made the core of the curriculum for the general mass of undergraduates; that provision for considerable choice should be made in the outstanding fields; and that the most practical group of subjects is the classics with the accompaniment of philosophy and the mathematical sciences.⁵ According to Babbitt the spirit of the college program should be neither humanistic nor scientific but humane, and, in the right sense of the word, aristocratic; also the core of the curriculum should consist of classical literature, the heart of which is the ancient classics; and the humanities and sciences should be largely represented.⁶

Although spokesmen for this point of view do not say much about specific requirements, it is quite clear that all of them would make classical literature, properly understood, the core of the curriculum. But they do not have in mind any specific set of books, as has been proposed by the so-called Hutchins group, the next to be considered. The classical literature they propose for the core curriculum consists of productions in the original; translations are not to be included. The literature to be provided contains both ancient and modern classics to be studied in the language of the authors and not in the native language of the student unless his is the same as that of the author. The classical literature constituting the core of the curriculum is largely in foreign languages, mainly ancient. Selections from other fields such as science and mathematics are to be included in the total program, as well as the fine arts and philosophy.

The classical college program the new humanists advocate emphasizes universal human values as contrasted with technical research. It is broadly human as contrasted with the niceties of the

⁴ As used by the new humanists the term "humane" signifies measure, proportion, decorum, etc., rather than the humanitarian virtues, such as sympathy and service to others.

⁵ Paul Elmer More, "Aristocracy and Justice," *Shelburne Essays*, Vol. 9, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915, pp. 50-52.

⁶ Irving Babbitt, *Literature and the American College*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1908, pp. 106 *et passim*.

dilettante or the technicalities of the philologist. Liberal education on the college level is to be truly general in that it appeals to the common human interests that in all times and places have contributed to happiness in the classical sense of human welfare. The humanists recognize, too, the importance of the practical. According to them a classical education should be yet more practical than a liberal arts; and a liberal education is not intended to provide technical and professional efficiency, but it is not on that account to be impractical and irrelevant. A study of classical literature supplemented with other selected subjects is both practical and relevant, broadly conceived. Any study of classical literature that provides a narrow training of specialists is no less to be condemned. But the new humanists do not doubt that a general education based primarily on classical literature contributes even more effectively to the development of practical pursuits and the actual demands of everyday life than does a general education based primarily on scientific or utilitarian subjects.

The application of the foregoing principles has not been so definitely stated with respect to organized education that it may be easily documented with authoritative references. Nevertheless, with the assistance of scattered suggestions a few logical inferences seem to be warranted. The purely elective system from the kindergarten through college is to be abandoned. Pupils in the lower schools are not to be given any choice in selecting the activities in which they will engage. On the college level the core curriculum of the literary classics is to be definitely prescribed, and electives are to be chosen only from a limited number of courses in other fields. Courses in what the humanists call pseudo-science, such as psychology and the social sciences, are to be eliminated from the program of liberal or general education. On the lower levels—that is, in the elementary and secondary schools—pupils are to accept the facts and principles just as they are presented for they are preparatory to the assimilation program on the college level.

For such preparation those in control of the schools select the subject matter and procedures that will discipline the lower powers of the mind and thus pave the way for the effective operation of reason and imagination on the higher level and that will provide pupils with the essential tools in assimilating the subject matter prescribed as a basis of a liberal education on the college level. The

liberal arts program is to be confined primarily to reflective analysis and assimilation of humanistic standards, and professional education is to be discouraged. Only on the graduate level is original research work to be encouraged, and for students preparing for teaching positions in the liberal arts college the character of the research standards is to be so modified as to secure breadth in humanistic studies rather than technical efficiency in problems of narrow range or scope after the manner of philologists.

THE RATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT THEORY

In 1925 Robert Maynard Hutchins sought advice from Mortimer Adler in regard to the difficulties he was having in teaching law by the case method. Hutchins was a young instructor in the law school of Yale University, and Adler was a young instructor in the English Department of Columbia University and was associated with Professor John Erskine in teaching an honors course for a select group of juniors and seniors. "It consisted in nothing but 'reading' the great books, from the Greek classics through the Latin and Mediaeval masterpieces right down to the best books of yesterday, William James, Einstein, and Freud. The books were in all fields; they were histories and books of science, philosophy, dramatic poetry, and novels." ⁷

Although Hutchins was deeply impressed with the case method of teaching law, he felt confused because he did not have the background in general education essential to an understanding of the questions that often confronted him. Apparently Adler convinced him that the difficulty he experienced was due to the inadequacy of his college education, and that the whole liberal arts program of the American college should be reconstructed along the lines which the idea of the great books suggested. In 1929 they both went to the University of Chicago—Hutchins as president and Adler as a member of the faculty.

They and a number of likeminded persons for some twenty-odd years promoted what is called the great books idea, which meant

⁷ Mortimer J. Adler, *How to Read a Book*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1940, p. 7.

reconstructing the whole curriculum and revising the institutional organization of the whole school system. Both Hutchins and Adler were convinced that the whole scheme of secondary and higher education should be so modified that the four-year liberal arts college would be extended downward to begin with the traditional eleventh grade in the high school and end with the traditional sophomore year in college. They would then have a 6-4-4-3 plan of organization: a 6-year elementary school, a 4-year high school, a 4-year college, and a 3-year university. The 4-year college would consist of a systematic study of the great books.

As indicated in the proposed reorganization, the new conception of general education had its implications not only for the college but for the whole educational system. It also had its implications for an adult education program consisting of reading the great books. In this program provision could be made for the thousands of people who had completed college without a liberal education, and thousands of others who had never attended college could get a liberal education.

Modifications were made in the requirements for the bachelor's degree at the University of Chicago in line with the projected replacement of the traditional 6-3-3-4 plan with a 6-4-4-3 plan. At St. John's College, Maryland, of which Stringfellow Barr was president and Hutchins a member of the board of trustees, the whole 4-year course was organized around a study of the great books, and a systematic effort was made to popularize the study of the great books by adult groups throughout the country. The theory underlying the proposed program as well as its practical implications has been condemned by some and approved by others for some 30 years. In the meantime, Hutchins and Adler, as well as other members of what has become known as the Hutchins group, showed that unsatisfactory cultural and educational conditions required the development and application of a theory of education and the good life different from that exemplified in current practice. Because of the special emphasis which this group placed on reason, this theory may, for convenience, be designated as either the rational-development or the new-intellectualist theory.

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical assumptions of this theory have been called the new intellectualism to distinguish it from the classical rationalism of the seventeenth century represented by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and the hybrid rationalism of the eighteenth century adopted by Diderot and other philosophers of the French Enlightenment. Strictly speaking, it seems to be a restatement of Aristotle's interpretation and elaboration of Plato's philosophy. The most systematic formulation of the philosophy of the Hutchins group was made by Professor Adler in 1941. It consists of the following 18 propositions:

1. Corporeal substances exist.
2. Corporeal substances are constituted as compositions of matter and form.
3. Corporeal substances differ essentially or accidentally, according as they are individuals of different species (have diverse specific natures) or as they are numerically distinct individuals having the same specific nature.
4. The essential distinction of substances is an absolute distinction in kind, without intermediates.
5. The distinction between living and nonliving substances is an essential distinction.
6. Living substances have vital powers which are essentially distinct from the potencies of inanimate things.
7. Man is essentially distinct from all other living things.
8. The essential distinction between man and brute as species in the genus animal is that man is rational and brute is irrational.
9. Only man can know intellectually and only man has free will.
10. Man has all the vital powers possessed by other living things (plants and brutes), and in addition has powers not possessed by them, i.e., intellect or reason, and will.
11. The vital powers of animals can be developed by the modification of instinctive determinations, but only human powers can be habituated.

12. Habit is the modification of a human power resulting from its rational free exercise.
13. All men are of the same species, i.e., they have essentially the same nature, and differ *inter se* only in such accidental respects, i.e., in such traits as complexion, weight, height, etc., or in the *degree* to which they possess characteristically human abilities, abilities common, *in some degree*, to all.
14. All men have the same vital powers, for the vital powers any living thing possesses are determined by its specific nature.
15. A vital power is a determinate potency and as such is a nature having a tendency toward a certain definite actualization.
16. The good is convertible with being.
17. The good of any imperfect thing (anything composite of potency and actuality, or matter and form) consists in the actualization of its potencies.
18. In the case of human powers, the actualization of potency is good only if it conforms to the natural tendency of that power to its own perfection.⁸

Of these propositions, he said the third and seventeenth were self-evident; the first, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth were inductively demonstrable; and the other twelve were logical deductions from the two self-evident and the four inductively demonstrable. The self-evident propositions hark back to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages and to Aristotle. To them, as to Adler, substantial things of one species were essentially different from those of other species, and substantial things of the same species were accidentally different from one another.

Adler's proposition that the good of any thing is convertible with its being would have been acceptable to Aristotle and probably to St. Thomas. The demonstrable propositions—the first, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth—were clearly acceptable to both Aristotle and St. Thomas. They both agreed on the reality of corporeal substances, the identification of the good with the real, the distinction of man from all other things, and rationality as the distinguishing charac-

⁸ Mortimer J. Adler, "In Defense of the Philosophy of Education," in *Philosophies of Education*, 41st Yearbook, Part 1. National Society for the Study of Education, 1941-1942, pp. 244-245.

teristic of man. They also agreed that the proposition that all men were members of the same species was demonstrable. Probably they would also have agreed that from the foregoing self-evident and demonstrable truths the other twelve of Adler's propositions could be derived through deductive logic.

For the convenience of the reader unfamiliar with the philosophy of Aristotle and the scholastics or even with Professor Adler's elaboration of the foregoing philosophical beliefs, a few comments seem necessary.

According to this general point of view, every corporeal existence consists of form and matter. The forms of all living things are souls as distinguished from the forms of inanimate objects. The soul of a man includes the irrational factors common to both plants and animals, together with certain rational factors which neither plants nor animals below man possess. In psychological terms sensation, feeling, and imagination were irrational powers, and reason and will were rational powers. From the standpoint of Adler and other members of the Hutchins group, it is the function of the rational part of the soul, often called mind, to control its irrational part.

The components of any corporeal body—matter and form—are also called potentiality and actuality. The form represents the actuality whereas matter represents the potentiality of the body. The final end of potentiality is actuality. The body is proceeding in the right direction when it is realizing or actualizing its potentialities. Thus, an acorn in becoming an oak is realizing its potentialities and actualizing itself. Any object is a good object insofar as it does what it is potentially capable of doing. The human being is actualizing himself when he is realizing his potentialities in becoming truly human. The human being is becoming truly human in proportion as he is actualizing his powers, the irrational as well as the rational, in accord with the demands of reason, which is the highest power. Reason is responsible for supplying not only its own standards of direction but also those for the rational will and the irrational instincts, sentiments, and feelings.

Whenever a power acts, it is modified or changed in some respect. In terms of current psychology, the act is turned into a habit. But for the Hutchins group, only the habits developed according to the directives of reason are virtues or even habits. Good habits and

virtues are one and the same thing. They are the habits the different powers develop through actualizing themselves in accord with right reason.

Since all men have the same faculties, the habits that are virtues for one are virtues for all. Although the minds of men differ in consequence of the variation in the strength of the different powers, they all, nevertheless, have the same powers. They may not all proceed at the same rate in the exercise of their powers, but they all must proceed in the same direction if they are to achieve the same ends—the virtues. Good habits, the specific ends of the good life, are thus contributory to the all-inclusive end of happiness. Each specific virtue or habit thus involves two factors: the strengthening of some power, which is generally known as formal discipline, and the cultivation of some power, which refers to the standard of direction that reason prescribes.

On the psychological side there is no problem of the relationship of mind and body. The mind is one aspect of the person that consists of a composite of both soul and body. The different powers or faculties are explanatory of the different mental processes which constitute the subject matter content of psychology.

On the logical side knowing is a function of the operation of the intellectual faculties on materials which the senses provide. There are certain self-evident truths: that is, ideas, which all men accept without question, such as that corporeal existences differ essentially or accidentally and that the good is convertible into being. These self-evident truths are fundamental and must be assumed in any effort to secure valid knowledge of things and events. These truths, together with those developed inductively through the use of the materials which the senses provide, are primary. Other secondary truths may be derived deductively from the primary truths according to the rules of formal logic.

On the axiological side the standards of value consist of certain features of antecedent fixed reality itself that reason discloses. They constitute the criteria to be used in evaluating every particular object or event whose worth may be considered. In other words, in deciding what is right or wrong, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, our empirical judgment must be checked against the standards that right reason provides before they can be accepted.

According to Hutchins, natural propensities and adaptation to

the environment are secondary and contributory as compared with the intellectual virtues, which are good in themselves and also good as means to happiness. By intellectual virtues he means good habits, and after the manner of the ancients and the scholastics he distinguishes five: "The three speculative virtues of intuitive knowledge, which is the habit of induction; of scientific knowledge, which is the habit of demonstration; and of philosophical wisdom, which is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of things highest by nature, first principles and first causes." To these he adds the two virtues of the practical intellect: "art, the capacity to make according to a true course of reasoning, and prudence, which is right reason with respect to action."⁹

On the metaphysical side, just as the intellectual processes are classified as sensory and rational, experience and reason, so the corresponding disclosures of these processes are classified, respectively, as nonbeing and being. The disclosures of experience are mere opinion subject to change, and constitute the realm of nonbeing. The disclosures of reason constitute objects of knowledge, and the objects of knowledge are features of reality. Such a metaphysical reality is rational through and through, lies beyond the realm of experience, and consists of forms accessible only to reason.

Implications and Applications

According to the theory of rational development the good life, or education as a *process*, consists of the development and cultivation of the faculty of reason; and the good life, or education as a *product*, consists of the acquisition of intellectual virtues. Since the faculties are metaphysical powers of a metaphysical soul, they may be developed through exercise on any subject matter with which they are capable of dealing. But just any exercise on any subject matter does not assure their cultivation. If they are to be cultivated, the faculties must deal with the right kind of subject matter. The use of the right kind of subject matter thus provides discipline and cultivation at one and the same time.

Cultivation is thus the primary end and discipline is the secondary

⁹ Robert M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936, p. 63.

end of the educative process and the good life. Subject matter content rather than method is therefore the primary consideration. Any subject may be disciplinary, but only the right kind may give cultivation. Only the subject matter which embodies the proper standards of direction is satisfactory. Theoretically they are the disclosures of reason wherever they may be found, but practically they are most readily available in the great books, historical, scientific, and literary. According to Adler, the great books have certain distinguishable characteristic qualities:

1. They are the most widely read.
2. They tend toward human rather than academic problems and are thus popular rather than pedantic.
3. They are always contemporary because they deal with fundamental human problems which always remain the same.
4. They are the most readable of books because they are the best written books and can be reread at different levels of understanding.
5. They are the most instructive and the most entertaining in that they contain what cannot be found in other books.
6. They deal with perennially unsolved problems of human life.¹⁰

There is thus no specific number of great books that must constitute the curriculum. There are, however, not more than four or five hundred that deserve consideration. Perhaps not even half of them would be included in any lists proposed by those who adopt the foregoing criteria of selection. Some books would be found common to all lists. But the theory of rational development does not depend upon the adequacy of any particular books or number of books any more than the theory of formal discipline depends upon any particular subjects. In fact, it may not even depend upon books at all. It so happens that the great books constitute the subject matter that is most readily available. But the content of the whole curriculum is not limited to the great books. They are proposed only for the four years of college in the traditional American 6-3-3-4 plan, or for the last two years of the secondary school and the first two years of college in the 6-4-4-3 revised plan proposed by Hutchins.

The basis of the curriculum in the first six years of schooling, the

¹⁰ Adler, *How to Read a Book*, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-335.

elementary school, is to be found mainly in the traditional three R's—reading, writing, and arithmetic; in grades 7 to 10 inclusive, it is to be found in grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, and mathematics; and in the university corresponding to the junior and senior years in college and an additional year, it is to be found in metaphysics. But the different prescriptions for the different levels are not considered the whole curriculum at any stage.

Although the three R's constitute the fundamental core on the lower level, their acquisition involves the use of other subject matter; although grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, and mathematics constitute the fundamental core on the next higher level, their development involves the use of other materials; although the great books constitute the fundamental core on the college level, their proper reading involves the use of many other things; although metaphysics constitutes the fundamental core on the university level, the social sciences, the humanities, and the natural sciences are recognized as avenues of specialization.

The members of the Hutchins group have confined their attention largely to the college and university levels. But the logic of their position as well as concrete suggestions they have made seem to indicate that each of the two lower levels is conceived as primarily preparatory to the next higher level with little or no regard for providing interesting experiences that are immediately desirable for their own sake. Only the reading of the great books is conceived as the kind of experience below the university level that is meaningful and significant on its own account. On the university level metaphysics as the core of the curriculum provides the integrating principles which constitute fundamental criteria or standards of direction that in the other fields constitute recognized instructional divisions.

As already indicated, the specific aims of the theory of rational development are of two types. On the disciplinary side each faculty is to be systematically exercised; on the cultivation side, habits or virtues, corresponding to the different faculties, are to be developed. On the two lower levels, the instructor who has read the great books apparently supplies the standards of selection. On the third or college level, reason is to discover the standards in the great books themselves. On the university level, right reason discovers the stand-

ards in metaphysics, which is to constitute the core of the curriculum.

Since the proponents of the rational-development theory consider the great books the fundamental basis of general education for everybody and the curriculum on the two lower levels as preparatory to reading the great books, all formal education below the university level is conceived as general education. But since the powers of individuals vary in strength because of native ability and past experience, considerable variation in procedure is necessary. For instance, students may be permitted to proceed at their own rates, and courses for adults in the study of the great books outside the organized school system are not to be conducted in quite the same way as college classes. Furthermore, procedure in reading the great books may vary with the nature of such books. But on the whole, books should be read in chronological order. For instance, in college, freshmen should read the oldest of the great books and seniors should read the latest of the great books.

As to the organization of the curriculum, the proponents of the rational development theory have made concrete proposals and developed specific programs on the college and university levels. At St. John's College, the so-called hundred great books are classified into four groups on the basis of the order of their publication. The youngest students, the freshmen, are allotted the older books and the older students, the seniors, are allotted the latest books. Those assigned to the sophomores are later publications than those assigned to the freshmen, and those allotted to the juniors are earlier publications than those allotted to the seniors. But the great books are also classified in another way. They are grouped under the heads of science and mathematics, history, and literature.

There are, then, three types of reading required of all students in each college class. Different techniques, such as lectures, discussion, laboratory experiments, and demonstrations are provided according to the demands of the different kinds of books. On the university level it has been proposed that all students pursue the different kinds of studies—metaphysics, science and mathematics, and history and social science. Any student may specialize in any of the three fields, but he must meet the minimum requirements in all fields, and the minimum requirements in the field of metaphysics is somewhat higher

than in either of the other fields. The importance of vocational and technical training is recognized, but it is isolated from the regular program in general education and is not conceived as the proper function of instruction that is educational. It is to be provided by special schools and institutions relatively distinct from those designed primarily for general education—education as conceived by the Hutchins group.

Cultural Conditions

For the sake of clarity the philosophical foundations and implications of the theories of the new humanists and the new intellectuals have been treated separately. But the cultural conditions within which both theories emerged, waxed, and waned have their historical setting mainly in the period between the two great World Wars. Although the special conditions that contributed to the decline of the one contributed to the rise of the other, the cultural backgrounds of both are sufficiently contemporary and continuous to be taken as earlier and later stages of the same general movement.

When Louis Mercier's *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats-Unis* was published in 1929, the cultural conditions seemed ripe for the renaissance of humanism. The closing of the frontiers, the high tide of immigration, and the Spanish-American War gave rise to rational criticism of literature and life in the United States—a thing that had not been possible before when men's minds were concentrated on conquest and acquisition.¹¹ Conservative critics held to the old standards which were everywhere under attack, and fought a battle royal with the radicals who condemned everything that was old simply because it was old. In such a situation an increasing number of critics gave more attention to the humanistic standards of measure, proportion, restraint, decorum, and poise, whose importance Babbitt and More had been emphasizing. But more important still, the belligerent youth of the 1920's, disillusioned with their new freedom and radical measures of reform, might now accept the values of the classical and humanistic tradition.

¹¹ Percy H. Boynton, *The Challenge of Modern Criticism*, New York, Rockwell, 1931, pp. 9-28.

In the period following World War I political nationalism and philosophical naturalism had come to maturity in the United States. A rampant Americanism was in the air. Many people thought of America as providing a model for Western civilization. The spirit of Emerson and Walt Whitman had come of age. Naturalism, too, was manifesting itself in many ways. Utilitarianism and the romantic sentiment of sympathy had been combined into humanitarianism whose watchword was service.

Many thought that the theory of evolution lent support to the earlier belief that social progress through the development of science was inevitable. Impressionism involving uniqueness, spontaneity, self-expansion, and direct self-expression dominated the fine arts. An extreme form of realism was competing with romanticism in the field of literature. Industrial workers and intellectual leaders, for different reasons, had become indifferent to traditional revealed religion, in spite of the widespread evangelical movement following the War. Some intellectuals were turning to what was called the religion of humanity, also called religious humanism.

In philosophy mechanical materialism and in psychology behaviorism had already reached their peak, and psychoanalysis was bidding for practical and scientific recognition. Both the Progressive and the scientific movements in education were still popular. Even before the economic depression of the 1930's people were disturbed and confused. They were losing faith in the Puritanism of their fathers and finding strict conformity to the Victorian standards of morality impractical and unpalatable. Neither educational scientists nor educational Progressives were very convincing as to the ultimate ends of education and the good life. Traditional liberalism, capitalism, and democracy were under attack from within and without, from the left and the right.

Conditions, therefore, seemed favorable for launching a full-scale reform of human values. The new humanists, taking as their starting point the work of Brownell, Babbitt, and More, proposed reconstruction over a wide front. Louis Mercier, in his account of what they had done (*Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats-Unis*, 1929), was one of the first to call new humanism a movement. This was followed the next year by Foerster's *Humanism and America*, a collection of essays by Babbitt, More, and some of the younger humanists. In this book the attack on naturalism was continued, and

humanism was proposed as a desirable alternative. The idea met with a favorable response within a limited circle. For a short time some literary critics, editorial writers, and newspaper columnists considered the proposal very seriously, but then came the Great Depression and World War II and most of them turned their attention again to more practical matters. The blatant nationalism, the development and application of science, and humanitarianism—to all of which the new humanism was a protest—became more pronounced than ever. Under the conditions that prevailed for the next 30 years new humanism soon lost much of its original appeal in literary and artistic criticism, religion, politics, and education. Like progressive education, it simply collapsed as a distinct and articulate movement. But, as Austin Warren says, although it has gone underground, it is not dead, and many of the younger humanists have joined forces with the proponents of new conservatism and the basic education theory.

The changed cultural conditions in the economic depression, the rise of Fascism, and World War II drove the new humanists underground and stimulated the “new intellectuals” to define and elaborate the rational-development theory and the great books program. The idea of developing an aristocratic leisure class, which seemed all-important to the new humanists, gave way to the idea of a better life for all classes. The New Deal and the Fair Deal reflected the increasing belief that none should go hungry and cold in the midst of plenty and that all should share in the good things of life made possible by the advancement of science and technology. The popular demand that the economic system provide an opportunity for everybody to earn a livelihood forced the Federal government to intervene to provide for many people not only the necessities of life but also a measure of security.

Under these conditions those who proposed an extension of vocational education were confronted with these two facts: (1) there were no jobs even for the technically qualified, and (2) very little specialized education was necessary for either semiskilled or common laborers. Consequently, the only alternative for the idle youth who roamed the highways was general education—education that is desirable for all, regardless of future occupations.

The members of the Hutchins group, unlike the Babbitt group, were concerned with general education for all because economic conditions required that all American youth should be kept in school

until the age of twenty. For the great majority who "could learn to read," they proposed the great books program, and what should be done for the others they were not quite sure. But they found the Civilian Conservation Corps program developed during the depression at least suggestive.

The great books program appealed to many whose perspective reached beyond the immediate situation which everyone deplored and expected to get better. They agreed with the Hutchins group that the prevailing confusion, insecurity, and fear were due in no small measure to the "love of money," the false notion of utility, the misconception of democracy, the belief in the inevitability of progress, overspecialization in education, and anti-intellectualism. Love of money certainly was at the root of many if not all the evils of the period that culminated with the Great Depression. No doubt utility, then as now, was too narrowly conceived to be the end of the good life. The old notion of democracy as equality in education, opportunity and everything else was as prevalent then as now. In the minds of many, then as now, the current theory of evolution lent support to the older belief that progress is inevitable. There was, then as now, much evidence to indicate that people generally were more interested in specific devices and techniques than in general principles for their own sake—an attitude which Hutchins called anti-intellectualism.

Overspecialization, which made it impossible for people to adapt themselves to changed conditions or to communicate with others outside their own group, was as obvious then as now. The rational-development theory of the new intellectuals differed from the super-rational-perfection theory of the new humanists, but the cultural conditions against which both theories were protests were in some respects the same. The proponents of the new-intellectualist theory continued the earlier attack on empirical science, the traditional conception of progress, and overspecialization. They had no higher regard for Progressive Education than did the new humanists, and discounted the importance of professional education as indicated in Hutchins' statement: "All there is to teaching can be learned through a good education and being a teacher."¹²

¹² Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

For two reasons the new intellectuals had considerable appeal for the public. First, their attack on the ideas of utility, democracy, progress, Progressive Education, and professional education met with hearty approval in some quarters. Second, they proposed to make available for the majority the great classical tradition that the new humanists proposed for only the select few.

Concluding Comments

Like the scientific and progressive education movements, new humanism and new intellectualism had disappeared as distinct movements by the close of World War II. After the 1930's the appeal of the new humanists made little impression on the lost and disillusioned generation of the 1920's, and after World War II the new intellectuals had little effect on the silent generation that came to maturity during the 1940's. The earlier generation failed in its constant efforts at reform, and even the new humanists turned to religion and eventually went underground. The later generation was so indifferent, irresponsible, and uncritical as to remain silent, and the new intellectuals turned their attention to more practical matters.

The new humanists and the new intellectuals failed to impress modern empirical philosophers and scientists with their restatement of traditional beliefs about mind, reality, knowledge, and value. Their acceptance of the mind-body relation as a mystery and of the faculties of the mind as explanatory of the mental processes was less defensible than in the days of Rousseau. Their adoption of the tradition of Greek science, according to which objects of primary knowledge are disclosures of an ultimate, antecedent, fixed reality, could not be justified in the light of actual practices of modern scientists in experimental investigation. Their identification of objects of knowledge with ultimate reality logically necessitated the adoption of some unscientific method for the disclosure of values, which, in line with the Greek philosophical tradition, was not amenable to the quantitative and empirical methods of modern science. But for both empirical philosophers and scientists, for whom objects of knowledge are only means of control, the scientific method is applicable in all fields.

On the historical side, however, it may be said that their criticism of naturalism, liberalism, rationalism, and progressive education perhaps hastened the general reaction against them and promoted further interpretations of the classical tradition. Their statements of beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value, and their implications for features of school practice had little appeal, and consequently, challenged Professor Broudy and others like him to reinterpret this old way of thinking in terms more meaningful to the modern mind. Their negative criticism of existing school practice and its supporting principles was the forerunner of the more irresponsible criticism on the part of new conservatives and proponents of the basic education theory. Whatever the reader may think about the philosophical foundations and practical applications of the great-classics theories, they represent an historical stage in the reinterpretation of a way of thinking about education and the good life that remains a part of our Western civilization.

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The Social-Self-Realization Theory

11

As previously pointed out in this study, theories of education in the broadest sense are identical with theories of the good life. The classical educational philosophers since the days of the ancient Greeks have found their supreme value in the objective environment apart from experience, and the so-called unorthodox educational philosophers like Rousseau and Bergson (as generally interpreted) have found theirs inherent in the nature of the human individual. But the reconstructionists, like the experimentalists, reject the theories of the good life correlative of the classical philosophies as authoritarian and those correlative of the traditional unorthodox philosophies as laissez faire. Like the experimentalists, too, they find their standard of direction in the process of human experience which involves both the individual and the environment.

Nevertheless, the reconstructionists do not see eye to eye with the experimentalists. The conception of experience in which they find their standard of direction differs somewhat from that developed by the experimentalists. They tend to place more weight on social or

cultural aspects, which they think the experimentalists have under-emphasized, and to stress a vision of a longer future in contrast to both the present, which they think the experimentalists have over-emphasized, and the past, which they think the conservative and reactionary classical philosophers have overemphasized.

The specific values idealized by the reconstructionists are not mere process values, such as general attitudes, ideals, and personality traits, without reference to content. They are the universal goals conceived as the wants of man, with respect to which a nearly universal consensus can be reached. For instance, such wants include sufficient nourishment, adequate dress, and the like, that are no mere personality traits. Moreover, the individual is not only social as conceived by the experimentalists; he is always a part of some group. Therefore, the cultural end of education and the good life must idealize not only the process aims of experimentalists but the content aims included in the wants of man as a goal-seeking animal. Furthermore, the nature of individuals and groups that achieve these content aims is determined primarily by the culture of which they are constituent parts. Besides, the achievement of general human goals requires a reconstruction of the culture in a sense that can be explicitly stated only in long-term cultural designs as contrasted with the gradual and incidental reconstruction of the social order vaguely implicit in experimentalist theories of education. This ideal of maximum achievement of individual and group goals or values, and the long-term cultural designs or purposes which condition them, have been explicitly designated by Brameld, the recognized leader of the reconstructionists, as social-self-realization or expansion of freedom.

The theory of social-self-realization is thus proposed as the criterion of all educative experiences and school programs. Through an analysis of the cultural conditions, philosophical foundations, and practical implications concerned in this theory of education, Brameld makes a heroic effort to revise and expand the philosophy of experimentalism and its educational equivalent, which reconstructionists believe the current rapid changes in human culture require. In the light of cultural conditions in America and throughout the world and of current criticism of the philosophy of experimentalism and its educational applications, the theory of social-self-realization must be included in any systematic treatment of educational theories.

Philosophical Foundations

Whether the philosopher begins his study with problems of reality as did the Ionian Greeks, or with problems of knowledge as do modern thinkers, or with problems of value as did Socrates and Plato, they all give considerable attention to the other two topics. Moreover, they seem to consider one of these topics primary in relation to the others. Those who place emphasis on value, whatever the topic with which they begin, may properly be considered educational philosophers, for any general theory of value or the good life is the ultimate end of education when most broadly conceived to include both formal and informal education. Therefore, reconstructionism, which Brameld has more definitely distinguished, more clearly defined, and more fully elaborated than anyone else, is an educational philosophy.

He begins with an analysis of cultural reality whose reconstruction he considers imperative. Still he recognizes the necessity for establishing a general philosophy on the basis of which the theory of social-self-realization can be justified as the standard of direction for all who participate in such a comprehensive educational program. He calls this philosophy reconstructionism to distinguish it from "progressivism," which he considers a combination of the philosophy of experimentalism, political liberalism, and progressive education; to distinguish it from "essentialism," which he considers a combination of realism and idealism; and to distinguish it from "perennialism," which he considers a combination of various scholastic philosophies.

From the standpoint of the reconstructionists, any philosophy is an expression of beliefs about reality—ontology, involving both metaphysics and cosmology; about knowledge—epistemology, including logic and semantics; and about value—axiology, including ethics, aesthetics, and sociopolitical philosophy. The adequacy of any such philosophy in the last analysis depends upon the critical establishment of such beliefs.

BELIEFS ABOUT REALITY

On the ontological side the philosophy of reconstructionism overlaps the philosophy of experimentalism. For instance, both adopt

the method of experience, conceive existences as events, and recognize the continuity of varying levels of nature. It is sufficient, therefore, only to refer the reader to the discussion of these topics in Chapters 6 and 7.

The reconstructionist's conception of philosophy as "the product of man's supreme effort to express his beliefs with utmost clarity" is taken as the point of departure in stating his beliefs about reality, which he considers different in important respects from those of experimentalism as well as other philosophies. According to this conception of philosophy, beliefs about reality as well as about knowledge and value are "inextricably bound to the manmade environment in which one lives."¹ The universal characteristics of reality are included in the ontology of reconstructionism just as they are in other philosophies. But to be most meaningful they must be considered in terms of the culture out of which they have emerged. Like Dewey, Brameld recognizes the continuity of the levels of existence, such as the physical, the vital, the mental, and the social. For him as for Dewey, the social or cultural is the supreme philosophical category. However, he gives a fuller account of cultural reality than is customary among philosophers, even experimentalists. He therefore focuses attention on the political, economic, social, and moral experiences of men. He organizes his discussion of cultural reality under two main headings: cultural determinants and the reality of history.

Three of the more important cultural determinants of human experience are (1) group conflicts; (2) group allegiances; and (3) group conditioners.

Group conflicts are of many kinds. They involve both international and civil wars, representing the clash of interests, especially economic, as well as intercultural conflict, whether racial, national, or religious. These conflicts are real universal phenomena on the social level of existence. Group allegiances, which seem to be correlative of group conflicts, are also universal phenomena. Group conditioners, like group conflicts and group allegiances, are universal features of human culture. They include such conceptions as behaviorism and evolutionism; the democratic and the autocratic ideals;

¹ Theodore Brameld, *Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education*, New York, Dryden, 1956, p. 42.

competition, insecurity, and war as these affect class hostilities and loyalties, and group status; and the contradictions between the behavior of the individual and that of the group. Such analysis of group conflicts, group allegiances, and group conditioners is fundamental in the development of the social and educational programs which the theory of social-self-realization implies.

History, no less than cultural determinants of human experience, is a reality that must be taken into account in the development of a theory of education for our time. Every philosophy is historical in that it is the expression of the culture of some particular historical period. History is thus a basic factor of cultural reality.

Any adequate analysis of history involves consideration of such factors as social struggle, contraction and expansion of freedom, the tendency toward organic unity of human culture, and reference to the future as well as to the past and the present. The educational ideal of social-self-realization not only recognizes the reality of social struggle as characteristic of human history but places special emphasis on the crisis induced by one constellation of forces dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo and another dedicated to the development of new cultural arrangements. It not only recognizes the contraction and expansion of freedom as a reality of history, but stresses the current effort on the part of many groups to extend to all people equal participation in policy-making, and equal access to economic and cultural resources, including recreation, art, and education. It not only recognizes instances of organic unity as a feature of cultural history but envisions the possibility of new organic unities in the future that will be both necessary and desirable. It not only recognizes the future as well as the past and present as phases of human history, but it emphasizes the fact that projected foreseen ends in the distant future do and should give direction to present policies, programs, and activities.

BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

For a more detailed account of the reconstructionist theory of knowledge the reader is referred to Brameld's analysis, which is here briefly summarized.² For purposes of economizing space and fa-

² *Ibid.*, pp. 73-110.

cilitating comparison with other theories, we are organizing our discussion of this topic around four features of the problem of knowledge common to many other philosophies. These are (1) the knowing situation; (2) the subject matter of knowing; (3) objects of knowledge; and (4) the meaning of truth.

1. For the reconstructionists the knowing situation is much broader than the conception of the human individual confronted by a confused and indeterminate situation which experimentalists usually take as their point of departure in the discussion of the theory of knowledge. In the broadest sense the situation arises whenever social groups or individuals raise the question of the nature of the particular goals which goal-seeking man does actually seek and should seek, and the means by which he does seek and should seek them. The knowing situation described by the experimentalists is thus only one, although a very important, aspect of the problem of determining the ends of human life and the means of realizing them. Since goal-seeking activities in which individuals and groups may engage are all-inclusive, the knowing situation includes reflective thinking. Since the role of reflective thinking has already been indicated in preceding theories, the discussion here is limited to the other factors.

Prehension is conceived as a kind of undifferentiated unity or awareness as defined by Whitehead, immediate experience as defined by Dewey, and intuition as conceived by Bergson. Such an awareness precedes and succeeds apprehension conceived as the analysis of events involving recognition of their component parts. Through prehension we are vaguely aware not only of the basic goals of man, such as food, clothing, and shelter in their undifferentiated unity, but also of the less definite needs such as recognition, belongingness, adventure, and creativeness. In grasping single unities such as time and hunger and binding them together, prehension thus supplements apprehension, which perceives and analyzes them.

Prehension is therefore not only a method of knowing in general but it is also especially significant in knowing the drives that are essential aspects of human goals, however defined and designated. It also lends support to the belief that the goal-seeking of individuals and groups "is an expression of the goal-seeking of a culture, which can be prehended as an organic field or pattern." Like prehension,

the unrational which refers to forces that lie beyond the threshold of conscious awareness, is a supplement to rather than a substitute for apprehension in the attainment of knowledge. Nevertheless, recognition of this form of knowing contributes to our understanding of the goal-seeking process "by showing how deeply human goals are rooted in unrational strivings, and at the same time how easily we may misinterpret these strivings because of their distortion by rationalization, suppression, or temporary gratification."³ From the cultural perspective this is more significant than the "effect of the individual's behavior upon that of the group." The unrational as well as conscious awareness operates on the group level.

Social consensus, like the prehensive and the unrational, plays an essential role in the acquisition of reliable knowledge, especially of truth regarding the most vital experiences in group life within any culture. Although the method of reflective thinking is indispensable, social consensus should be given more emphasis, especially for the crucial functions of goal-seeking and future-making. The method of social consensus in defining or seeking human goals involves these four phases: (a) submitting all the evidence about goals secured and defined by other procedures; (b) communicating through the use of symbols in public and open discussion; (c) developing agreements on ends and means; and (d) testing agreements in action.

2. In the account of the philosophy of experimentalism two types of subject matter were involved in the production of new knowledge—suggestions or ideas derived from past experience, and facts or data derived from the observation of the actual situation under consideration. Such a classification apparently would be acceptable to the reconstructionists, but only provided the conceptions of both kinds of material are sufficiently extended. The conceptual subject matter of past experience should include authoritative conceptions in regard to the nature of goal-seeking, the prehensive, and the unrational factors, and group processes. The data of observation should include reports of individuals on their own prehensive and unrational experiences.

Since the knowledge that is of primary concern to the reconstructionist has to do with goal-seeking, it is necessary for him to take

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-86.

into account authoritative evidence in regard to the prehensive, the unrational, and the social processes; but in many practical knowing situations the data to be used as evidence must be derived through reporting both the prehensive and the unrational. It is often as important to report how one feels and what one wishes or desires as it is to report how and what one thinks, for these other forms of experiencing are also aspects of the knowing process.

3. Whereas, in the philosophy of experimentalism, objects of knowledge consist of assertions produced in the process of reflective thinking and are warranted because of the method through which they are derived, in the philosophy of reconstructionism they consist of agreements as to the dominant goals of culture and the means of attaining them derived through social consensus. As with the experimentalists, they include certain assertions warranted by virtue of the scientific method. But they include much more besides. They include also agreements with respect to means by which such goals can be and should be achieved.

4. In the philosophy of reconstructionism, truth is distinguished from the validity of propositions derived through the operation of the scientific method broadly conceived. Whereas warranted assertions established through the scientific method may properly be considered funded knowledge, only agreements with respect to future ends and means may properly be considered truths. In the philosophy of reconstructionism, knowledge, corresponding to the funded knowledge of the experimentalists, consists of "the body of agreed-upon experiences which have been utilized by past and present cultures." Such knowledge constitutes the "group mind" ideologically conceived. But ideological knowledge tends to lag behind the changes in the culture and therefore often misrepresents it. On the other hand, true knowledge is the utopian content of the group mind. It consists of "truths recurrently established through social consensus and then tried in action."⁴ Truth is thus distinguished from mere knowledge, which is the result of past experience.

In Brameld's account, "Truth as social consensus then becomes, we might say, the utopian content of the 'group mind.' This truth

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

is any active agreement about the dominant goals, and means for achieving them, of the culture. Such a social consensus is neither merely verbal nor static; it involves action and hence involves application of the utopian content of the 'group mind' to reconstructing institutions, practices, habits, and attitudes. Although it also involves continuous use of the canons of logic and experimentation, its ultimate truth is tested in the cultural demonstration, made possible with the aid of logic and experiment, that it produces the cultural design that it sets out to produce."⁵

The nature of the reconstructionist social consensus and the conditions for attaining it are described by Brameld as follows:

It is important to repeat that a valid consensus can be reached only when the necessary techniques are employed—that is, when proper use is made of the techniques of gathering sufficient evidence about the goals we seek, when this evidence is communicated clearly, and when maximum agreement is reached on the significance of the evidence as well as the action that should be taken. If, for example, the consensus is reached that perpetuation of power in the hands of forces dedicated to the restriction of freedom means that such needs as those for food, security, and recognition will no longer be satisfied, it follows that only a program and cultural design constructed in behalf of the forces of expansion of freedom will suffice for the future. It is possible, and surely imperative, to build a utopian consensus, of a breadth and unanimity never so far known, about fundamental goals and the means to be used to reach them.⁶

According to the reconstructionists, only agreements thus reached with respect to future ends and means may properly be considered true and reliable knowledge. Other knowledge does supply indispensable sources of information useful in their development; but such agreements with respect to the future, constitute the true knowledge that is of primary concern in the philosophy of reconstructionism.

BELIEFS ABOUT VALUE

The belief of the reconstructionist about value is so inextricably intertwined with his discussion of reality and knowledge that all we have to do to explain his axiology is to render explicit assump-

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

tions clearly implicit in his ontology and epistemology. The reconstructionist, like the experimentalist, rejects any conception of values as absolute or separate from other features of philosophy. According to his view, "values are want-satisfactions and are therefore rooted in the proclivities of individuals and groups to seek and achieve goals." Like other propositions whose validity the social consensus determines, the truth in regard to values is determined "according to the principles of evidence, communication, agreement, and action." Like any other truths established through social consensus, values are neither fixed nor final. Although the reconstructionist advocates strong commitment to the values of the largest possible number of people in the widest range of culture, any consensus is only tentative, subject to criticism and constant modification.⁷

In the philosophy of reconstructionism value is recognized as a normative conception. More than do other philosophies, reconstructionism insists on the recognition of cultural realities that affect values. These realities, when normatively considered, may be described as either positive or negative: that is, either desirable or undesirable. Consequently, in stating as values the human goals to which "many individuals and groups throughout the world are attaining increasing agreement," the reconstructionist distinguishes between what people do not want and what they want. Negatively stated, many people do not want hunger, discomfort, prolonged exposure, celibacy, illness, chronic economic insecurity, loneliness, indifference, monotony, ignorance, continual domination, and bewilderment. Positively stated, they want sufficient nourishment; adequate dress; shelter and privacy; sexual expression; physical and mental health; work and steady income; companionship, mutual devotion, belongingness; recognition, appreciation, status; novelty, curiosity, variation, recreation, adventure, growth, creativity; literacy, skill, information; participation, sharing; and fairly immediate meaning, significance, order, direction.⁸

The delineation of such values, according to the reconstructionist, raises several important problems. First, since values are inseparable from the cultural and psychological reality of goal-seeking, the

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

problem of value involves not only what our values are and should be, but also the elimination of the cultural conditions that prevent their realization. Second, since the values in any list such as that indicated not only overlap one another but also suggest others not listed, there cannot be any single final set of values, and any hierarchical arrangement is as objectionable to the reconstructionist as to the experimentalist. Third, values may be inconsistent with one another not only because of the complexity of human nature but also because of cultural conditions. It is therefore not the rich variety of values that is primarily to blame for the inconsistency or for the existence of competing values among which men must choose, but rather the incompatibility of the various aspects of the culture. The implication is that the problem of values thus involves a cultural reconstruction.

For purposes of general orientation a supreme all-inclusive value is required, of which all specific values are constituent elements. This supreme value, which the reconstructionist designates as social-self-realization (also called the expansion of freedom), "symbolizes a human experience that is both social-centered and self-centered at once. The value it connotes is the maximum satisfaction of the wants of individuals and of groups, not of either individuals or groups. Its locus is in the culture—a normative and utopian and international culture."⁹

Such an all-embracing value thus becomes for the reconstructionist the good life for man. It is therefore the inclusive and ultimate aim of education which, as distinguished from the formal school, is as broad as life itself. Education in this broad sense when normatively considered is a process of social-self-realization that has implications for individuals who assume any educational responsibility and for other social institutions as well as the school.

The educative process conceived as social-self-realization connotes not only the maximum satisfaction of the wants of individuals and groups but also the cultural designs which implement its practical application. Such designs are the cultural aims or objectives of the good life that render the human goals more explicit as working objectives under specific cultural conditions. Agreements are

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

reached with regard to them through social consensus, just as in the case of the human goals that are the constituent values of social-self-realization. Although such cultural designs are no less aims, purposes, or objectives of social institutions than are those values they implement in cultural terms, they are less general and less enduring. They are to be subjected to constant criticism and reconstruction through the process of social consensus just as are the constituent values of social-self-realization. But from the standpoint of the reconstructionist, they may nevertheless be specifically stated in terms of human culture either on a worldwide basis or in terms of a given country such as the United States.

Brameld considers it "our great educational and political task to present that evidence, to communicate it and seek testimony about it, and to test it."¹⁰ The cultural designs to which he refers as educational and political ends include:

1. An economy of abundance that will satisfy maximum wants of the consumer, assure full employment of all citizens, guarantee sufficient income for all families, utilize natural resources and large-scale enterprises in the interest of the majority.
2. A political system that will be responsible for placing major economic enterprises under majority control, for integrating and supervising utilities and public services, for maintaining a dynamic balance of centralized and local authority, and for providing political representation of the chief occupations, interests, and purposes of the citizens.
3. A scientific order committed to subsidizing scientific research, making use of scientific discoveries for the economy of abundance, assuring freedom of the scientist, and utilizing as many social scientists as possible in government.
4. An aesthetic pattern that will allow for participation of creative individuals and groups in remaking the culture, that will integrate planning and reconstructing homes, cities, regions, and recreation centers; that will encourage artistic talent, freedom of artistic expression, and the reward of creative achievement; and that will provide at public expense access to works of fine and applied arts.
5. An educational system in which there are majority control and Federal support, facilities are free and instruction universal from the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

nursery school through the university and adult levels, school practices are geared to the purposes indicated in one through four above, and the mass instruments of public enlightenment cooperate with education and are under similar control.

6. A human order which regards sexual expression positively, protects and encourages family life as a medium of devotion, belongingness, and sharing, provides complete security and rich companionship to the aged and helpless, and guarantees to all full participation in cultural life.

7. A world democracy dedicated to agreements among nations that national authority be subordinated to international authority; to the inclusion of exploited peoples within the social consensus of those committed to cultural reconstruction; to the provision, under democratic controls and safeguards, of assistance to underdeveloped regions; to maximum intercourse among nations; and to the international application of all the principles indicated.¹¹

Although such a summary seems sufficient to indicate the kind of cultural purposes that Brameld challenges individuals and groups everywhere to consider, the reader should by all means consult his original statement. As he says of his own list, no such formulation of cultural objectives in and of itself can be very magnetic; to be rendered appealing they must somehow be glamorized. He therefore urges those committed to such objectives to use the symbolizations characteristic of the myths of art and religion which appeal to the feelings and emotions as well as to the intellect. Although "the reconstructionist is concerned with guarding against the influence of their unscientific and often dogmatic character," he nevertheless appreciates the "creative role of myth in culture" and feels justified in using it as a means of imbuing his designs with the spirit of commitment, zest, and emotion that is lacking in some philosophies.¹²

Implications and Applications: Political

As was the case with the educational theories already considered, we are primarily interested in the implications and applications of the theory of social self-realization to school education. Neverthe-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-140.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

less, we must not forget that this theory as well as others has implications for all other institutions that exert any educational influence on their members. Furthermore, the reconstructionists themselves emphasize the interrelationship of politics and organized education. As already indicated, Brameld considers the cultural designs that he proposes the objectives of both. Prior to his more detailed discussion of the educational implications of social self-realization, he states its implications for politics. These implications may be summarized as six principles.

The first is that of majority rule based upon "the belief that the best long-run decisions affecting the common welfare are reached when the widest possible consensus of citizens is sought." Majorities are the supreme judge of value and their decisions are binding on all members, including minority groups. But decisions are not to be judged adequate merely by counting noses. They must be derived through the full process of testimony, communication, and action. "A majority decision is primarily a judgment about something shared qualitatively—namely, about prehended and apprehended values held in common." The normative test of majority rule is, therefore, the "degree to which its policies approximate social self-realization in its fullest meaning." From the standpoint of this supreme value, majorities are often misled and the most important task of our time is to make sure that majority rule is so "exercised that the values upon which most men agree are publicly recognized and publicly consented to."¹³

The second principle is that of minority rights. The reconstructionist agrees with other philosophers that the majority is not infallible and that minority rights should be safeguarded, and not only for the sake of the minority groups but also for the sake of the majorities. For Brameld, however, "the prime political function of the minority is to criticise, through communication of additional or corrective evidence, whatever social consensus is reached by any majority." When such communication is firm and unsuppressed, the membership of both majorities and minorities is subject to constant change. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion is indispensable. This means to the reconstruction-

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126.

ist "the privilege of advocating beliefs radically different from, or even inimical to, those of a given majority . . . the right to challenge the most ancient moral, political, religious, and economic practices, institutions, attitudes, or customs."¹⁴ The minority, however, is not given the right to implement its critical views through recourse to violence or to policies or practices in conflict with those that have been "politically authorized by the majority." Except for purposes of testing laws in the courts, overt action on the part of the minority against the policy of the majority is unwarranted.

The third principle is that of the obligation of the reconstructionists. Since at present they constitute a minority, their privileges and obligations may be taken as a corollary of the principle of minority groups in general. It is this critical minority's present privilege and obligation to communicate its own utopian patterns and "insofar as not prohibited by legal action, to test them in action."¹⁵

The fourth principle is that of the utopian minority as spokesmen for the majority. Although the reconstructionist welcomes continual analysis and criticism of his own proposals, "he is prepared to commit himself now to the value of social self-realization." Such commitment is justified because of the present cultural crisis and because of the degree of consensus already achieved with respect to social self-realization as the all-inclusive value and end of the good life.¹⁶ It has considerable foundation in the psychological and social sciences, the arts, and the practices of individuals and organized groups in our culture.

Since the average man under present confused cultural conditions may not be able to know his own mind, the reconstructionist has a special opportunity and obligation to assist him in becoming aware of the supreme value and its constituent values. Thus the reconstructionist proponents of the utopian values of social self-realization not only are spokesmen for the majority of the people, but also show how the current dominant majority often leads them to support, even through the secret ballot, the forces that restrict free-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 127.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

dom and maintain the current system of "continued scarcity, chronic insecurity, frustration, and war."

The fifth principle is therefore that of public policy. The majority should determine policies because it "is in a better position than any minority to decide what is true and what is good about the goal-seeking interests of a culture."¹⁷

The widest possible majority should therefore decide the central purposes of every policy. If we could assume full acknowledgment of the ideal of social self-realization, it would be the overall policy of democracy everywhere on earth to guarantee all its constituent values. Such an overall policy is not, however, in and of itself sufficient. It requires implementation by many contributory policies. Such implementation is the function of legislation. It is the role of the critical minority to demonstrate to the majority the meaning of social self-realization, to struggle with the opposing minority that prevents its acceptance, to work for a majority consensus on political policies based upon the constituent values, to criticize and expose failures to implement policies by effective legislation, and to formulate and advocate effective legislation.

The sixth principle is that of the expert in a democracy. It is the function of the expert to formulate, interpret, and implement the policy of the majority, to point out mistakes that have been made and the changes that are needed. The expert, like every member of the government, should find his standard of direction not in the reconciliation of incompatible ends but in the "agreements about an organic community of values that has been built by open examination of evidence, testimony, open agreement, and open action."¹⁸

Implications and Applications: Educational

The supreme value of social self-realization, of which all human goals and cultural designs justified through social consensus are constituent values, is the ultimate aim of all education broadly conceived and therefore of all social institutions. Since this book, however, is designed primarily for use in the professional education of teachers, our consideration of such practical implications and ap-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-135.

plications should be confined to the school as the chief educational institution. The brief consideration of political implications in the preceding section can therefore be justified only on the ground that politics is so intimately associated with educational policies and programs in the philosophy of reconstructionism that some understanding of its meaning for certain features of government is prerequisite to an adequate understanding of its implications for school practice.

Our further consideration of the implications and applications of the theory of social self-realization will be limited to a brief analysis of Brameld's detailed discussion of these five features of school practice usually included in professional courses in the field of teacher education: educational aims; general method; structural organization; school curriculum; and school control.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

All that seems to be required in the consideration of aims is to point up the responsibility of the school with respect to values that have already been discussed. The all-inclusive, supreme value to the realization of which the school should make a significant contribution is that of social self-realization. The constituent values of this all-inclusive value and aim are the twelve individual and group goals and the first six of the cultural designs stated in the preceding discussion of value. No one of the twelve goals is to be neglected at any level in the total school program. The six cultural designs implicit in the twelve goals are also aims, objectives, or purposes of education in a democratic country such as America, for they are conditions indispensable to the fullest possible realization of the individual and group goals. The educational program from nursery school through the university and adult levels should find its standard of direction in these human goals and the cultural designs which facilitate their realization. The specific aims, objectives, or purposes for each educational level and for each subject or activity are to be consistent with and contributory to these more inclusive goals and designs. The same standards of direction are to be observed in designing the curriculum as in planning, developing, and evaluating programs and activities of all kinds on all educational levels.

GENERAL METHOD

As an important feature of school practice, general method in learning and teaching may be conceived in a number of ways. According to some school people, it consists merely of the implications of more inclusive principles for whose application teachers themselves assume responsibility. According to others, it consists of a set of general devices and techniques, of which some are useful for some things and others for other things. According to some, it consists of the special procedures or methods of teaching the various school subjects. According to still others, it consists of some pattern of procedure of general application. From the standpoint of the philosophy of reconstructionism as analyzed by Brameld, it consists of two general patterns—(a) the problem method as developed by Dewey and other experimentalists, and (b) the consensus method consisting of the interpretation of the different aspects of group dynamics in the light of the theory of social-self-realization.

The problem method is a set of steps or stages involved in reflective thinking. It is thus analogous to the five formal steps developed by Herbart and the Herbartians through a logical analysis of the educative process conceived as the organization of ideas, and to the so-called "project method" derived by Kilpatrick through a logical analysis of the educative process conceived as purposeful activity.

Brameld, at least by implication, rejects all other historical patterns of general method except that of reflective thinking. The steps of the problem method or reflective thinking Dewey derived from an analysis of the activities involved in the clarification of indeterminate, incomplete, and confused situations. They consist of five logical steps designated as difficulty, definition, suggestion, reasoning, and testing. In the first step the individual feels some difficulty. In the second, he locates and defines the difficulty. In the third, he entertains suggestions as to ways of overcoming it. In the fourth, he develops tentative hypotheses for dealing with it. And in the fifth, he determines through overt action, imaginary, practical, or experimental, the validity or invalidity of his hypotheses.

The method of social consensus consists of a logical analysis of

the activities of learning conceived as a process of social self-realization. This analysis includes four aspects, phases, or activities, which are designated as evidence, communication, agreement, and action.

The first phase, learning through evidence, involves the use of direct evidence supplied by the learner from his own experiences. This includes the prehensive and unrational, as well as the intellectual aspects, and also the use of indirect evidence secured through study of authoritative sources and association with others. The second phase, learning through communication, includes reporting evidence involving the utilization of such common procedures as reading, writing, the fine arts, semantics, and direct observation and analysis of practice as well as the new techniques of group dynamics. The third phase, learning through agreement, involves developing a unanimous, or at least a partial, agreement while recognizing the supremacy of empirical and temporal standards, respecting differences of belief on the part of the majority, and accepting majority decisions on the part of the minority. The fourth phase, learning through action, involves testing majority agreements through immediate or delayed, direct or indirect applications in practical situations.

For Brameld, the methods of both problem-solving and social consensus are indispensable general methods of learning and teaching. Although problem-solving in the last analysis involves, by implication at least, social consensus, it should be applied without explicit use of the phases of this method in such fields as mathematics and the physical sciences. On the other hand, whenever the question of defining goals and policies and choosing means of implementing them arises, then the consensus method should be used. Moreover, the problem method itself may perhaps be best conceived as subsidiary and contributory to the method of social consensus—as the method phase of the theory of social self-realization. Only in this way can the need for cultural direction be solved.

The subject matter and generalizations to be derived are never incidental to mere problem-solving as they often seem to be in the philosophy of experimentalism. The problems selected are to be limited to those dealing with subject matter chosen on the basis of the supreme value of social-self-realization and its constituent values. Only those problems are selected whose solutions furnish

generalizations that contribute to the constituent values of social-self-realization. In fact, the conceptualization of this supreme value should begin in the lowest primary grades and continue through the secondary school and institutions of higher learning. At no point should the method of problem-solving be adopted in and of itself as a general method without reference to the results of social consensus and the ends of social-self-realization.

STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION

The organization of the school system below the university Brameld calls the 4-6-5-4 plan. The nursery school spans ages two through five; the lower elementary school, six through eleven; the upper elementary school, twelve through sixteen; and the secondary school, seventeen through twenty-one. Attendance is to be compulsory throughout with one exception. When mothers remain at home with their children throughout the day, attendance is to be optional until about the age of three and one-half years.

Although the different school levels are designed to promote the individual and group goals of social self-realization, the primary purpose of each differs somewhat from that of the others. The nursery school supplements the mothers' care with expert guidance, especially in habit forming. The lower elementary school provides an activity program essentially the same as that in certain progressive schools that emphasize the self-reliance qualities of personality—except that the reconstructionist program is anticipatory and preparatory to the more systematic practices which the application of the ideal of social self-realization requires in the secondary school. The secondary school is to include approximately the last two years of the traditional high school and the two years of junior college.

To be specific, Brameld assumes that the school year is co-terminous with the calendar year, and holidays and vacations are replaced by summer and winter recesses of one month each and fall and spring recesses of one week each. For the secondary school he assumes still further an enrollment of not more than 150 students in each of the four years with the qualification that more than one school may be organized in the same plant. He also further assumes that the schools will be open even during periods of recess to provide expert assistance and recreational activities.

The daily schedule proposed for the secondary school is for seven and one-half hours, beginning at 8:30 A.M. and closing at 4:00 P.M. Beyond the formal schedule, however, this school will provide for recreational activities related to the whole plan, and also provide adult education during the late afternoons and evenings, and even on Saturdays and Sundays. The daily schedule for the first two years, with some modification during the last two years, would be:

8:30 to 10:00 A.M.	Discussion of group study of certain areas 15-minute rest period
10:15 to 11:45 A.M.	Skill, content, or vocational study One-hour lunch period
12:45 to 2:15 P.M.	General assembly, study of certain areas 15-minute rest period
2:30 to 4:00 P.M.	Skill, content, or vocational study

The extracurricular activities, including intramural athletics that is functionally related to the subject matter content and general theme of the four-year curriculum to be indicated later, are to be scheduled as seems desirable in the afternoons and evenings.

Programs of the elementary school, the institutions of higher learning, and adult education are peripheral to that of the secondary school. In the lower elementary school the activity program is functionally related to that of the secondary school, and at least in part consciously anticipates it. Programs of the college and university are determined in large measure by the need for research, which the adequate development of the secondary school program requires; and the levels of adult education correspond roughly to the programs of the lower schools.

SCHOOL CURRICULUM

Our discussion of the structure of the school system has already indicated the scope and character of the elementary school. Pre-requisite to an adequate analysis of education on the higher and adult levels is an understanding of the secondary program, so that the program for this school must first be analyzed.

If it is understood that each four-year curriculum is different from the preceding one, the various aspects of the program for which the

above schedule is designed are analogous to a wheel. "The core proper, analogous to the hub of the wheel, is a study of the central theme of the year in general assemblies. The spokes are the related studies—discussion groups, content and skill studies, and vocational training; they support the hub as it, in turn, supports them. The rim, which is the synthesizing and unifying function of the general assemblies, binds the whole."¹⁹

The four years are analogous to the four wheels which are held together by a central theme analogous to the "carriage." Whatever the subject matter or activities may be, this theme for the reconstructionists is always, "Where do we as a people want to go?" According to the reconstructionists, the curriculum consists of all the activities of the pupils under the direction of the school. Therefore, it includes the extracurricular as well as the curricular activities. If we keep this fact in mind together with the analogy of the wheel, we may organize our discussion of Brameld's design for the secondary school like this around these four topics: (1) scope or content; (2) grade placement; (3) special methods; and (4) subject matter organization.

1. As spokesman for the philosophy of reconstructionism and the correlative educational theory of social-self-realization, Brameld is rather more explicit and definite in regard to the scope or subject matter content of the school curriculum than most educational experimentalists. He recognizes the importance of method not in the absolute sense in isolation but in reference to certain general types of subject matter, for he emphasizes the importance of learning about the different kinds of subject matter and of having direct experience in dealing with them. As a basis of orientation in the projection of the subject-matter content or scope of normative curriculum designs, he distinguishes four categories of scope of subject-matter content: (a) *Cultural reality* consisting of those aspects already defined under the philosophical discussion of reality, and the social sciences that are useful in dealing with them; (b) *Proposals for cultural reconstruction* ranging all the way from the extreme left to the extreme right with emphasis on the problematic aspects of their implications for the various social institutions; (c) *Means of*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 213.

achievement involving the use of history, science, art, and other fields of knowledge; (d) *Goal-seeking interests* including direct and indirect evidence about wants to be found in all the sciences and arts of man.²⁰

The significance of such an outline of subject-matter scope is indicated by Brameld in these words:

These four categories of knowledge-experience . . . are a basis for the selection and organization of the subject matters that are imperative for the schools of our age. That curriculum content in individual schools will vary follows from the fact that each category is a generalized one, that constant flexibility is necessary in inductive, cooperative learning, and that the maturity and shifting interests of students must be taken into account. It is obvious that the elementary school would not deal with these subject matters in the same manner as the secondary school or college.

It also follows that much of the subject matter now included in the typical curriculum should be discarded as obsolete and irrelevant to the new purposes of education. Other subject matters would, then, receive adequate attention for the first time.²¹

2. The reconstructionist also has definite ideas about the placement of subject matter. Even in the lower elementary school where the so-called activity curriculum is to be adopted, the activities to be selected are to be limited to the scope of the subject matter suggested in the four categories as well as the interests and abilities of the pupils. The same is true in the upper elementary school, which consists partly of an activity program and partly of types of study that anticipate the program of the secondary school.

Beginning with the secondary school, the center from which the reconstructionist curriculum-maker is to work, Brameld is more explicit and definite in regard to grade placement. Here definite themes are indicated for each of the four years. These themes constitute the criteria or standards for use in selecting the subject matter in the four general categories outlined above for the curriculum of the whole school system.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-199.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

For the first year:

- A. Motivation and orientation to the entire program of the secondary school
 - 1. Consisting of more explicit conceptualization of
 - a. The governing task of goal-seeking
 - b. The crucial ontological realities in economic-political experience
 - c. The necessity for understanding as much of these realities as possible
 - 2. And organizing the process by
 - a. Beginning with the student in actual life in the local community
 - b. Moving outward
 - c. Initiating the quest for a normative synthesis
 - d. Looking backward and forward at the curriculum
- B. Need and character of the goals of economic-political reconstruction involving a consideration of
 - 1. The local community
 - 2. The interlocking economy
 - 3. The fusion of the economic and the political
 - 4. Routine critiques of practice and proposals for change
 - 5. Evaluation of co-operating programs

For the second year:

- A. Survey of science in relation to the guiding themes of the curriculum consisting of
 - 1. Recapitulation and anticipation
 - 2. Meaning of science
 - 3. Social function of science
 - 4. Science of human welfare
- B. Survey of art in relation to the guiding themes of the curriculum
 - 1. Recapitulation and anticipation
 - 2. Meaning of art
 - 3. Social function of art
 - 4. Art for human welfare

For the third year:

- A. Organization and practice of education
 - 1. Meaning of education
 - 2. Support and control of education
- B. Organization and practice of human relations
 - 1. Recapitulation of value theory

2. Personal and family relations
3. Relations between sexes
4. Relations of races
5. Relations of nationalities
6. Relations of classes
7. Relations of religions

For the fourth year:

- A. Techniques and strategies for attaining goals
 1. Relation of means and ends
 2. Reconstruction of means
 3. Need for aggressiveness
- B. Normative synthesis
 1. Revision of earlier designs
 2. Reconsideration of value patterns
 3. Omissions and disagreements

3. One of the more distinctive features of the curriculum designs proposed by reconstructionists for the secondary school is the re-interpretation of the idea of special methods. In the past, special methods have usually been conceived as either a substitute for general method or separate and isolated from it. According to Brameld's analysis of the curriculum for the secondary school, special methods are the adaptation and application of general method to specific situations. In his discussion of the subject matter for each year he introduces qualifications that the principles of problem-solving and social consensus imply in regard (a) to the relationship of general core area activities and the more specialized activities involved in the acquisition of content and skills, and (b) to the relationship of activities that have preceded and those that are to follow. In so doing he provides for flexibility in actual curriculum development and leaves a place for the specialized activities of individuals not specifically required in the development of the general program.

Furthermore, under a separate topic—method of learning—and in the discussion of the program for each year, he indicates how the more general patterns of method that we have considered in Chapters 6 and 7 may be applied in dealing with different kinds of subject matter at different educational levels in the secondary school. For purposes of this study it will suffice to indicate the general implica-

tions of the philosophy of reconstructionism and the theory of social-self-realization for special methods. The reader who is interested in further details should consult Brameld's more elaborate discussion of which our analysis is only a brief summary.²²

4. Although Brameld does not explicitly state the implications of the social-self-realization theory for the psychological and logical organization of subject matter to which proponents of the experimentalist theories give special attention, implicitly he does indicate his attitude toward them. On the psychological side, the themes selected and the procedures used in developing them take into account the educational and experiential background of the students. The approach is always based on their experiences and interests. On the logical side, not only are the various themes related to the four categories constituting the scope of the entire curriculum; but by constant reviews and recapitulations the subject matter learned is to be so organized in the experiences of the students as to lead in the direction of the four categories constituting these integrating centers of general education and the whole school program and also in the direction of the contributory school subjects which the specialists in different fields have developed.

For Brameld the curriculum of the elementary school as well as of the college and university is peripheral to that of the secondary school in the more general program of remaking human culture in which they are now engaged. Various aspects of the elementary school program have been given some attention throughout this section and other aspects will be considered in connection with the problem of school control. It need therefore not be given the emphasis of separate discussion here.

In his brief analysis of the proposed program for the college and university, Brameld clearly points out that the methods, content, and goals are similar on all educational levels. Institutions of higher learning have two such fields: auxiliary research and "disinterested learning" or pure research. With respect to the first, the function of the college and university is to provide such research in the fields of psychology, economics, politics, science, aesthetics, education, human relations, and philosophy as will be most useful in under-

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 112-230.

standing the method, content, and goals of the secondary school curriculum. With such an orientation the research of the university may find a standard of direction. With respect to the second area of research, "the college and university should provide opportunity to make scientific investigations and scholarly studies and to exercise creativity along lines that promise no reward in terms of practical values or applications."²³

The implications for the professional schools are also logically implicit in the reconstructionist program for the secondary school. In courses of study leading to the professions more emphasis will be given to their historical background, social responsibility, and utopian projections. More specifically, in the study of medicine much more attention than at present should be given to sociological problems of health; in the study of law much more attention should be given to the broader functions of law in a social democracy; and in teacher education the primary emphasis should be placed on "the inter-relations of the philosophic, cultural, and psychological aspects of education, which is treated always in the context of our revolutionary culture."²⁴ Moreover, many different new positions will be created in such fields as world government, labor leadership, consumer cooperatives, and general education. In the preparation for these new positions there is a place for both types of research.

The fact that the reconstructionist has little to say about the program of adult education does not mean that he considers it less important than the other branches. It means merely that the subject matter of adult education must correspond to that already indicated for the various educational levels. Two forms of adult education, however, will require special emphasis: parent education and workers' education. Parent education is related to marriage, homemaking, and cooperation with programs of public education at all levels. It operates throughout the year, but it is not restricted to the formal activities of the school.

Realization of the projected cultural reconstruction depends primarily on the workers. Since the majority of the people of the world are workers, adult education may be identified with workers' education. The specific function of workers' education is to help the

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

"organized worker or farmer determine and enunciate his values; to guide his development from the inarticulate level, where too often he now finds himself, to the articulate level, where he can actually express what he most deeply knows that he wants; to help him recognize when he is under the deceptive influence of ideologists or of demagogic utopians; and to help him develop means whereby he can implement organized consensuses that equate majority interest with majority rule." ²⁵

SCHOOL CONTROL

Establishment of the kind of school control which the system of organized education projected by Brameld requires depends upon the achievement of democratic power by the majority. But this achievement depends in turn upon the commitment of the teaching profession to the theory of social self-realization and enlistment of the cooperation of the working peoples of the world, especially organized labor. Our preceding brief analysis of the political implications of this supreme value, however, supplies a basis for indicating the general principles of control. For convenience of discussion, they will here be organized about these four topics: (1) school boards; (2) school councils; (3) school discipline; and (4) educational leadership.

1. In the structure, membership, and procedures of school boards, the principle of majority rule theoretically recognized in American education should now become a reality. School board members should be truly representatives of the people, not merely some narrow segment of the population as they now usually are. They ought to have an adequate opportunity to select the school staff; and other members of the community need also to express themselves freely on school matters, rather than to listen almost exclusively to patriotic or business pressure groups, as is too often true in current practice. Various interest groups should be represented on school boards and boards of trustees in higher education, just as they should be in the legislative branch of the government. In order to assure that all interests are adequately represented, majority consensus on them is

²⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 258.

always the ideal. Reducing the number of members on school boards often makes them more representative, but there is also an important place in the new school system projected for national and international Federal boards that are also truly representative of all interests.

The primary function of all boards is to formulate the policies that serve values through education. Boards on the local and state levels should be elected by the people. Their power should end with policy-making, thus leaving in more expert hands educational planning and the translating of policies into practice. Their obligations are to formulate only such policies as reflect values agreed upon by the majority. In order to reflect the real convictions of the majority, continuous opportunity must be provided for every phase of social consensus to operate. Therefore, real forums in which board members and groups exchange ideas and opinions should replace the usual conferences devoted to the passive hearing of criticisms and requests.

2. Within the school itself, several councils should be organized. A citizens' council in which all school and community groups are represented should meet once a month and serve in an advisory capacity to the board. In addition to the citizens' council, there should be at least six other school councils: a student council, teachers' council, council of administrators, council of service employees, council of parents, and an all-school council made up of elected delegates from the other five. The primary function of the all-school council is to crystallize plans and rules affecting the whole school system. On matters of policy, it presents its recommendations to the school board, which translates them into a working program. On many matters the council may operate through committees selected on the basis of their particular qualifications for dealing with specific problems. Proposals may emanate from any group member of the six councils or from any other council that may be organized in any particular school system. After due consideration by the council in which the proposal originates, it is submitted to other councils or sent to the school board, depending upon the character of its implications.

3. The problem of discipline usually recognized as a feature of school practice is not neglected by the reconstructionists. From their

point of view as indicated by Brameld, discipline is to be based upon certain fundamental beliefs. First, the collective character of our age conditions the status of every citizen. Second, any action effective in our social age must be socialized. Third, the cooperative means of seeking truth and values that are sufficiently specifiable is a necessity. In the light of such beliefs "discipline becomes the agreed-upon acceptance of orderly procedures through which the members of the group unite in a systematic effort to articulate and attain their goals."²⁶

Like other ends and means, discipline is imposed on all by the majority. As in politics, the minority may advocate, criticize, and persuade, but it must accept the rules of action established by the majority. Teachers and pupils in the practice of social consensus thus "establish together whatever common regulations will best enhance such learning." Both punishment and reward have special meaning: the one is imposed for noncooperation with or violation of group regulations; and the other means group-determined appreciation for contributions of members in carrying out cooperative ends. The same sort of discipline is applicable to the various councils of control and to the learning-teaching relationship on all educational levels.

For the younger pupils, especially in the lowest grades, some inculcation or propaganda is necessary in the matter of discipline just as in the case of instruction. Some pupils, especially young children, must be required to obey certain rules and regulations which they have had no part in establishing and do not at the time understand, just as they may be required to accept some beliefs which they have not developed and which at the time have little or no meaning for them. But such apparent imposition loses its sting because the rules, regulations, and beliefs to be inculcated must be critically considered before they are finally accepted or rejected. Discipline thus conceived as an aspect of the group process becomes itself an educational goal and contributes to the kind of order which the realization of the constituent values of social self-realization requires. When educational goals, including discipline, are incorpo-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283.

rated into cultural designs, we are then in a position to encourage individual variations of disciplinary rules and regulations just as in the case of subject matter and procedure.

4. Finally, educational leadership, primarily of school administrators, and for some things teachers and even students, serves an essential function in the control of the school system which the reconstructionists project. Administrators—superintendents and principals in public schools and administrators of colleges and universities—are elected by the councils whose policies they advocate rather than by the board, and are relieved of personal responsibility for policy-making. Nevertheless, they are assigned adequate power to supply the leadership for which they are responsible. They have their own administrators' council, which elects delegates to the all-school council. They are advisors in the citizens' council and in the school board's public sessions. This council has final authority in professional matters of chief concern to those within the limits of school policy. Their representation on the subcommittees of the all-school council is, however, more than that of other groups, and they serve on subcommittees in an advisory capacity. Although they make no general policies or rules, they direct and are responsible for carrying out the policies authorized by councils of the majority and by the board.

The nature of the decisions to be made by the administrators is determined through a consideration of the four levels of authority recognized in the reconstructed designs for educational control. In the determination of educational values authority is derived from the social consensus and the ideal of social self-realization. In policy formulation authority is vested chiefly in the council. In the specific operations required by decisions on the first three levels the administrators have final jurisdiction. The function of educational leaders, whether administrators or teachers or students acting in an administrative capacity, is to implement and interpret policies and to suggest goals toward which the school should move. The function of the educational leader, therefore, is to be analogous to that of the expert in a political democracy. They are both specialists because of education and experience and serve best in the capacity of specialists.

Cultural Conditions

As the chief spokesman for the theory of social-self-realization and its underlying philosophy of reconstructionism, Brameld is committed to the sure belief that any philosophy and its correlative theory of education and the good life are the reflection of some historical cultural situation. In defining, explaining, and applying his philosophy of education he gives much more attention to its cultural conditions than do other educational philosophers. He declares that "the culture of America and the world is passing through one of the greatest periods of transformation in the history of mankind;" that "education, broadly understood, is a fundamental agency of culture;" that therefore "education will be transformed no less thoroughly than the culture which sustains it and upon which it exerts an enormous influence;" and that "the most serious issue emerging from this confusion is: 'What kind of education shall we advocate and support in the course of this transformation?'" ²⁷

A brief analysis of the cultural background of the philosophy of reconstructionism and its correlative theory of social self-realization is now in order. Historically, the period extends from the beginning of the depression and the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930's to the close of the Korean War in the 1950's. It includes the breakdown in the traditional economic and political systems that culminated in the 1920's following World War I, the New Deal with its various measures of economic and political reform, World War II, the emergence of the cold war between East and West, the Korean War, and the aftermath of reconstruction. The scientific, technological, economic, and political developments have been so extensive that it is practically impossible to do more than suggest the cultural factors of which the philosophy of reconstructionism and the social-self-realization theory are intellectual reflections.

Even after the market crash in 1929 our leaders informed us that "conditions were fundamentally sound." The American people were inclined to accept on faith this optimistic slogan, but the financial breakdown was worldwide and things soon grew steadily worse. The

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

"little bull market" that followed the new wave of hope soon came to an end. The members of the generation that came to maturity during and after World War I were disillusioned. They and their children soon lost interest in the revolution in morals and manners that had been under way for more than a decade. The intellectuals of the left wing in manners, morals, or politics had been disillusioned during the stormy 1920's, and those of the right wing had lost faith in conservative secular humanism and turned to religion. The abortive effort of President Hoover and his advisors to stem the tide by bold financial measures, such as the moratorium on international debts, the formation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the alterations in Federal Reserve requirements, were of no avail. These ventures meant that the government itself, contrary to the hallowed American tradition, had entered the field of business. But its participation was "too little and too late." As the stock market went down so did the faith of the people in their leaders. In fact, the men to whom they had looked were losing faith in themselves and admitted that the problems to be faced were "too much for them." Some ten or fifteen million workers were idle, banks were closing, and farmers and tenants were resisting the foreclosure and eviction orders of the courts. Thousands and thousands of young people were on the highways searching for work, food, and shelter.

The people turned away from rugged individualism, which they identified with President Hoover and the Republicans and which they blamed for their hopeless situation, and looked to the Democratic Party for relief. In the election of 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt carried forty-one states with 472 electoral votes, while Hoover carried seven states with 59 electoral votes. Nobody had a very clear idea of what to expect, not even the new President himself. But one thing was clear: the people demanded action on the part of their government.

The new administration moved swiftly and decisively in many directions. In a short time, in the name of the New Deal came currency devaluation, crop control, stimulation of employment, Federal relief, the Tennessee Valley experiment, alleviation of the burden of debt, financial reforms, and the National Recovery Act which provided for "fair practices" in wages, working conditions, competition, and collective bargaining. Before the end of the fiscal year,

these goals and cooperate with the working class in building the new social order thus envisioned. Many of this group joined locals of the American Federation of Teachers, which was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and for several years some of them carried on a running debate in *The Social Frontier*, a newly established medium, with those who, under the leadership of Boyd H. Bode, favored a more indirect policy. Moreover, they maintained, as did the communists, that immediate emphasis in practice should be on the economic factors of the culture.

Bode, and most recognized philosophical experimentalists who advocated a policy of indirect action, admitted the breakdown of laissez-faire individualism and the trend toward some form of collectivism. Some of them even admitted that teachers actually belonged to the working class and should join the American Federation of Teachers; but they rejected the underlying premises of the direct action group. They were convinced that neither teachers nor their leaders were able to define what the new social order should or would be; they denied the assumption that any new social order could be perceived and defined in advance; they opposed the belief of the direct actionists in the theoretical priority due the economic factor in educational policies or programs; they rejected the class struggle as a permanent and enduring feature of the social order; and they condemned the apparent belief of the opposition in the indoctrination of students with particular ideas, beliefs and attitudes.

On the positive side, as the ultimate standard of direction, they emphasized democracy not merely as the principle of majority rule but as regard "for personality and for the rights of minority groups so as to secure liberty and equality of opportunity for every one."²⁸ Bode pointed out that the assumption back of this clumsy definition "is, in brief, that *the supreme test of progress lies in the development of individual capacity and not in conformity to authoritarian standards.*"²⁹

This was a revolutionary hypothesis, he said, that could not be made to harmonize with any other traditional beliefs, economic, ethical, political, and social—absolutes—which "are often referred to

²⁸ Boyd H. Bode, "Democratic Education and Conflicting Cultural Values," *The Social Frontier*, 5:104-107, January 1939.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

collectively as our American way of life." The American culture as he conceived it is a mixture of these conflicting presuppositions. Such confusion is not only reflected objectively in the social order but is embodied deeply in the minds and hearts of the people as a whole rather than in any one particular class. Bode then concluded that "a genuine democracy recognizes this conflict of standards and gives the democratic standards the right of way."³⁰

In educational terms, he continued: "The principle of 'maximum development' requires that the aforesaid individual be given the opportunity to discover the nature of the conflicts or cleavages in our cultural heritage in order that he may be in a position to set his own house in order. This gives a concrete meaning to the principle of 'growth' and the 'reconstruction of experience' by suggesting that the reconstruction be directed toward those focal points where it will do some good. From the standpoint of the social order, the school becomes the institution or agency which has the special obligation of providing for the continuous re-interpretation of democracy."³¹

As Bode went on to explain:

In this setup it is not the teacher's function to predetermine this re-interpretation. . . . This, however, does not mean a cold neutrality. The loyalties of the teacher are indicated by the way in which he formulates the meaning of democracy for himself and translates this meaning into actual procedures. . . . No authoritarian can consistently bring to light this conflict of standards and leave the re-interpretation to the individual student. The adherent of democracy can afford to do this for a two-fold reason. The first is that the 'growth' of the student is of more consequence to him than conformity to a selected standard. The second is that *his belief in democracy commits him to the faith that the democratic ideal will prevail in the long run if it can be given a decent chance to be heard.*³²

This statement is cited not because it was unique in meaning. Professor Bode had said similar things in *The Social Frontier* before. Moreover, he did not stand alone, for three years earlier Dewey, Kilpatrick, and Raup had written in the same vein for the same publication. In the course of his rejection of High Marxism, Kil-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

patrick had written that it was not the function of *The Social Frontier* to promote any particular pattern of social reform but to promote educational criticism.³³

In 1937 Professor Counts was succeeded by George W. Hartman as editor of *The Social Frontier*. Whether Kilpatrick's statement had anything to do with the change in editors is not clear, but we know that Counts had written, "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" and in his editorials had continued to advocate that the school program be based on a vision of the future. In explaining his resignation from the American Federation of Teachers, H. Gordon Hullfish implied his concurrence with the position taken by Bode, Dewey, and Kilpatrick.³⁴ About the same time both Childs and Raup resigned from the American Federation of Teachers, but Counts retained his membership for several years.³⁵

The foregoing development indicates that most of the leading experimentalists approved the position summarized by Bode in 1939 and were disappointed in the effort to cooperate with organized labor in the development of a constructive program. Although in his *Education and Morals*, published in 1950, Childs seems to have maintained the essentials of his original position, nevertheless two years later, in his review of William O. Stanley's "Education and Social Integration," in *Progressive Education*, he called himself an "unreconstructed experimentalist." He doubtless was referring to the philosophy of reconstructionism, a systematic development of a position he had assumed in the controversy with Bode in the 1930's.³⁶ By this time Counts, too, seemed to have lost his interest in the issue.

But at least one serious philosophic student of education continued the fight which Childs and Counts had begun. When the controversy between the direct and the indirect action groups was raging in the 1930's, Theodore Brameld was just beginning his career as a college professor and was an interested observer of the debate as reported in

³³ William H. Kilpatrick, "High Marxism Defined and Rejected," *The Social Frontier*, 2:272-274, June 1936.

³⁴ H. Gordon Hullfish, "Why I Am Resigning from the Teachers' Union," *The Social Frontier*, 3:110-112, January 1937.

³⁵ George S. Counts, "Whose Twilight?" *The Social Frontier*, 5:135-140, February 1939.

³⁶ John L. Childs, "Education and the Crisis in American Democracy," *Progressive Education*, 3:91-94, January, 1951.

The Social Frontier. With the third issue in 1934, he began to contribute some articles not unrelated to the controversy. As one of T. V. Smith's students he had acquired an orientation in the philosophy of experimentalism, and in writing his dissertation he had developed an understanding of the philosophy of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. He saw, or thought he saw, the weaknesses in both experimentalism and Marxism and apparently undertook to synthesize these philosophies with other elements into a new system which he called the philosophy of reconstructionism. Like Childs, Counts, and others, he joined the American Federation of Teachers.

But prior to the publication of his *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* (1950) in which Brameld first systematically defined and elaborated the philosophy of reconstructionism and the social-self-realization theory of education and the good life, many changes had occurred in the cultural conditions of America and throughout the civilized world. The vast majority of the American people had approved the New Deal because neither of the opposing groups on the right or left had a positive program to offer that was acceptable to farmers, factory workers, Negroes, and other underprivileged minorities. The New Deal conformed to no definable theory, and in practice it was full of inconsistencies. It was not as radical as the left-wing radicals had hoped and not as conservative as the survivors of laissez-faire individualism had feared. In spite of all its defects its achievements were significant. It gave to underprivileged groups in all parts of the country a feeling that they had a stake in America, which was also their country. The evidence of an increase in social justice could not be denied. The social peace and unity that prevailed were sufficient to defeat the fascists in World War II and to maintain a solid front in the cold war against Communism.³⁷ Both major political parties have adopted many social reform measures introduced by the New Deal and the Fair Deal. In spite of higher taxes and the higher cost of living, the rank and file are better off economically than ever before, and the phenomenal growth of the middle class has blurred the distinction between owners and workers. The class struggle in the United States, so patent to the intellectuals during the 1930's, is now far from obvious.

Brameld, nonetheless, has continued to maintain his original posi-

³⁷ Peter Viereck, *The Shame and Glory of the Conservatives*, Boston, Beacon, 1953, pp. 268-277.

tion that nothing short of a thoroughgoing cultural reconstruction is sufficient, and that it is the function and responsibility of the teaching profession to assume leadership in remaking the social order. As he sees the situation, the cultural crisis which the depression of the 1930's revealed continues today. The increasing prosperity and social peace, justice, and unity in the United States and some of the Western nations he frankly admits. But he considers these improvements temporary because they are the results of war and preparation for future wars and cites disturbances that are worldwide. According to his analysis, as late as 1953 the same cultural crisis, though less obvious than in the 1930's, still existed.³⁸ He is convinced even now that the fate of mankind depends upon a fundamental reconstruction and time is running short. Primary responsibility for supplying leadership in the cultural revolution rests with teachers and the teaching profession. For some 20 years he has courageously endeavored to formulate a policy and program of direct action for the teaching profession.

Concluding Comments

Among "reconstructionists" in philosophy Brameld is the most articulate. He calls this philosophy in its educational aspects the social-self-realization theory, which we chose as the title of this chapter. Since he refers to reconstructionism as a form of neo-experimentalism, this account of the social-self-realization theory follows those of Dewey, Kilpatrick, and Bode. Likewise, the fact that, in laying the foundation for his theory of education, Brameld analyzes and criticizes the educational theories of the idealists, the realists, the neo-scholastics, and the experimentalists implies that the account of the social-self-realization theory should follow rather than precede them.

No doubt the reader familiar with other theories considered in this book has already anticipated certain objections that could be raised here to the philosophical foundations and practical implications of the social-self-realization theory. The incompatibility of

³⁸ Theodore Brameld, "Economic Goals and Democratic Education," *Progressive Education*, 30:66-69, January 1959.

this theory with these older theories need not therefore be specifically considered now. It does seem appropriate, however, to indicate the reaction of later proponents of these theories to reconstructionism. They raise objections to the reconstructionist's positive proposals as well as to his cultural evaluation of other theories and their philosophical foundations. They find Brameld's classification of educational philosophies—progressivism, essentialism, perennialism, and reconstructionism—unsatisfactory. The avowed philosophical foundations of his theory of social self-realization they deem questionable. His acknowledged partiality they find objectionable, and some of his educational doctrines they consider indefensible.

Because of space limitations, it is practical here to cite only the more striking criticisms. Among the comments on Brameld's four-fold classification of philosophies Professor Robert Ulich speaks as an idealist,³⁹ and Professor George F. Kneller as a realist.⁴⁰ Of the comments on his cultural evaluation of philosophies and theories of education, that of Professor Kneller is especially striking. As to Brameld's beliefs about reality, Professor Frank C. Wegener, author of *The Organic Philosophy of Education*, makes an elaborate statement.⁴¹ As to his beliefs about knowledge, Professor Adrian Dupuis writes from the standpoint of neo-scholasticism,⁴² and Professor Foster McMurray from the standpoint of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy.⁴³ With regard to the political and practical difficulties involved in the application of social reconstructionism, Professor Sidney Hook and Professor E. V. Sayers perhaps make the most pronounced statements.⁴⁴

The reaction of the reader to reconstructionism and the social-

³⁹ Robert Ulich, "With Strong Convictions," *Saturday Review of Literature*, 34:13, September 8, 1951.

⁴⁰ George F. Kneller, "Philosophy and Culture," *The Educational Forum*, 22:153-154, January 1958, p. 156.

⁴¹ Frank C. Wegener, "The Ontology of Reconstructionism," *Educational Theory*, 2:47-57, 64, January 1952, p. 47.

⁴² Adrian Dupuis, "Social Consensus and the Scientific Method," *Educational Theory*, 5:242-248, October 1955, p. 243.

⁴³ Foster McMurray, "The Present Status of Pragmatism in Education," *The School and Society*, 87:14-17, January 17, 1959, p. 14.

⁴⁴ Sidney Hook, "The Danger of Authoritarian Attitudes in Teaching Today," *The School and Society*, 73:33-39, January 20, 1951, p. 38.

E. V. Sayers, "The American Education Fellowship and the Reconstruction of Social Method," *Progressive Education*, 30:65-68, pp. 65-66.

self-realization theory will no doubt depend somewhat on his own interests. If he is committed to established educational programs, they will doubtless disturb him. If he is committed to some particular radical innovation in current practice, they may or may not be convincing in their philosophical assumptions and implications. If he is primarily concerned in the development of a more general theory that will be superior to all others, they will likely prove disappointing to him because of the criticisms leveled against them. But if he is primarily interested in the study of educational theory as a source of new meanings, he is likely to rate reconstructionism and the social-self-realization theory very high, because they emphasize factors that are usually neglected in other educational theories and their supporting philosophies.

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The Basic-Subjects Theories

12

The two attitudes toward education and the good life of which this chapter is a summary account are called the self-perfection theory and the basic-education theory because that is what their main advocates call them. Both may properly be termed basic-subjects theories because they emphasize some subjects as fundamental and therefore basic, to the exclusion of others that are not fundamental. The two theories are alike also in that they are recent versions of old ways of thinking and have been developed under the same cultural conditions. For the conservation of space they are therefore here considered together. Yet the ways in which their proponents have stated their philosophical assumptions and their implications and applications are so different that the two theories are treated in separate sections.

THE SELF-PERFECTION THEORY

The self-perfection theory is defined and explained by Broudy as the educational equivalent of certain aspects of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle which he calls classical realism. Although we

have considered other recent versions of these educational doctrines in our account of other theories, the self-perfection theory deserves special attention because Broudy has so clearly defined and applied it. No other version of this old way of thinking about education and the good life is more meaningful and significant to the modern reader.

As a basis of orientation Broudy defines education in the broadest sense as "the process or product of a deliberate attempt to fashion experience by the direction and control of learning."¹ In this sense education is conceived as formal rather than informal in that it consists of learning consciously directed by some aim and not merely incidental to other activities. The ultimate aim of such deliberate education is identical with the good life, which is conceived as self-perfection.

The essential aspects, forms, principles, or dimensions of self-perfection are self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration. The educational significance of activities and programs depends upon their contribution to these forms of self-perfection. To determine one's self is to choose on rational grounds among alternative values. Such choices involve the use of symbols and intelligent discrimination. To realize one's self is to choose from among one's potentialities the values to be pursued; and to integrate one's self is to exclude conflicts as far as possible from among one's choices.

All social institutions have a contribution to make to the three principles or forms of the good life conceived as self-perfection. But just as the structure of the individual determines the nature of the good life for man, the structures of social institutions in a rational social order determine their respective functions. The home is primarily responsible for the rearing of children; the state is primarily responsible for the coordination of the activities of other institutions; and the school is primarily responsible for the development of habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge.

These various institutions are to a considerable extent interdependent and therefore have as a secondary function the responsibility

¹ Harry S. Broudy, *Building a Philosophy of Education*, 2nd edition. © 1961. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., p. 8.

Ibid. 1st edition, 1954, p. 9.

education, the character of the curriculum, the methods of learning and teaching, and the organization of the school system.

The theory of knowledge—that is, epistemology and logic—on which philosophers rely for the intellectual support of their beliefs about reality—that is, metaphysics—seems especially important to the self-perfectionist in education. If such beliefs about the world of nature and of man as we have been considering are to be convincing, reasons for holding them must be given. Here the self-perfectionist follows Aristotle just as he does in the case of metaphysics. There are four principles of knowledge in which Broudy finds the reasons required. In commenting on this point, he says: "I am doubtful that this emphasis on self-evidence is warranted by me or Aristotle. Do you mean immediate intuition or logical analysis by self-evidence?"

Referring to the four principles we shall consider below he says: "Some of them are inferences from empirical observation; some, e.g., change and permanence, are products of logical analysis as is cause-effect." Insofar as possible this comment is taken into account in the revision of the following paragraph by substituting for the terms "self-evident" and "self-evidence" some such terms as "logical operations" or "logical analyses."

First of all, the objects of knowledge consist of intellectual abstractions derived through operations in which sensation, perception, memory, and reason cooperate. From the laws of evidence and direct experience we know that the world of nature consists of a multitude of objects that are constantly interacting in various ways. We know through logical analysis also that there are two kinds of such objects, the physical and the mental. That there are these two kinds of being is taken to be a fact established through logical operations. The experience of change warrants the belief that there must be something permanent that never changes and the further fact that specific changes all have causes. The nature of matter explains continuity through change, and the nature of form explains the process of change, which is conceived as the coming and going of forms. Such logically established principles supply a basis of orientation for an analysis of the procedure involved in acquiring reliable knowledge of the objective world.

The self-perfectionist proponent of classical realism begins with

the secondary qualities that make up the surface of objects directly experienced.³ The sense organs directly furnish such qualities as sound, touch, odor, and color—that is, the secondary qualities. The mind infallibly abstracts these secondary qualities from the complex of physical processes going on in the sense organs and nervous system in their interaction with physical objects. Such qualities are not supplied by the sense organs and the nervous system, but by the different energy patterns that affect the sense organs. The primary qualities of size, distance, position, shape, motion, and weight are apprehended only indirectly. But the direct apprehension of the secondary qualities supplies clues as to the primary qualities, which we correct through comparing reports of the different senses, as when we use touch to correct the visual report on a stick that is partly submerged in water and looks bent.

We are therefore compelled to grant that since we do have such reliable knowledge the secondary qualities do exist in the objects “as we judge them to exist under certain conditions,” and are “abstracted through certain energy patterns that bring them to the brain.” When objects are perceived as they are, the perceptions are true; when they are not so perceived, the perceptions are false. Since past experience and judgment enter into perception, our perceptions involve judgment as well as sensation. Our judgment involves forms that are preserved in memory and reinstated into consciousness by imagination, thus enabling us to compare one sensation with another. For instance, “the visible structure of a thing means little unless we have its invisible structure as a guide to our perception.” These invisible structures are thus fundamental in all apprehension of observed things. Such structures are the common meanings, usually known as conceptions, which make communication possible. Whatever the symbols for these conceptions may be, they are common meanings without which communication would be impossible.

Such conceptions or meanings are rooted in perception. We “abstract from the perceptual images those qualities and characteristics that are relevant to the object’s doings.” To say the same thing in another way, “We perceive the changes that an object undergoes

³ *Ibid.* (1st edition), pp. 136-143; (2nd edition), pp. 115-121.

and then ask about the kind of structure it must have that will permit us to tie these changes together in terms of cause and effect." "By reflecting upon the various forms that an object assumes in our experience we approach its essence or its fundamental nature." Such concepts, of which whiteness, truth, and justice are examples, are known in the history of philosophy as universals. Without them not only would communication be impossible but science also would be impossible. As to the status of such conceptions in the nature of things, the classical realist and the self-perfectionist reject the physical-process theory of the materialist, the individual-image theory of the nominalist, the mental-creation theory of the conceptionalist, and the subsistence theory of Plato, and subscribe to the moderate realism of Aristotle and St. Thomas, according to which concepts of real things are the forms of individual things.

Second, the immediate and direct apprehension of certain qualities and relations is infallible. Such knowledge constitutes the starting point for the apprehension of the forms that constitute the structure of things. Without it, the scientific method and the method of reflective thinking would be impossible. Such a grasp, through reflection, of the fundamental structure of objects enables us to distinguish the substantial or essential, the necessary accidental, and the contingent accidental features of things.

Third, consistent with the conception of the so-called moderate realism is the distinction which Aristotle makes between primary principles and secondary or inferred knowledge. This inferred knowledge is derived through deductive operations, the method of which is exemplified in the syllogism involving a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. Unless the major premise is true, the conclusion cannot possibly be true. The validity of first principles is thus a fundamental consideration. In the Aristotelian logic to which the self-perfectionist subscribes the fundamental principles that constitute the major premises in any field are directly grasped through intuition by those who are familiar with the subject matter of the field.

Fourth, since the self-perfectionist admits that we do, as a matter of fact, "speak of one concept being more useful or truer than another," he accepts the obligation for indicating "the criterion of the truth claims of propositions." In the first edition of his book

Broudy says in this connection, "What is the standard for such a judgment except that one way of conceiving an object fits more logically into the whole system of knowledge than another?" In the same connection in the second edition he says: "What is the standard for such a judgment except that one way of conceiving an object discloses its meaning more adequately than another?"⁴

On the basis of such epistemological and logical principles as these, the self-perfectionist rests the case for his metaphysical beliefs and finds support for his conceptions of the structure and dynamics of personality and the structure of the rational social order. These conceptions are basic to the principles of self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration that reflect the structure ascribed to the self and to the specialization of functions attributed to social institutions.

On the psychological side it remains necessary only to render a little more explicit the conceptions already considered. Like the progressive wing of the neo-scholastics, the self-perfectionist observes the more familiar analysis of the mental processes, such as cognition or thinking, including perception, memory, imagination, and reasoning; affection, including both simple feeling and emotions; and conation, including both impulsive actions and willing. Like them, too, he recognizes forms of the soul's activities, whether called faculties, powers, or capacities, as indispensable explanatory principles of the mental processes; but he denies their isolation from one another, which he attributes to the proponents of formal discipline.

The rational soul, the forms of whose activities explain the mental processes, may be compared to the vegetative soul of plants and the sensitive soul of the lower animals, both of which, like the soul of man, are forms. Just as the soul or form of plants differs from the form of inorganic objects in that it is vegetative, and just as the soul of the lower animals differs from the soul of plants in that it is sensitive, so the soul of man differs from the soul of the lower animals in that it is rational. In man is found the highest level of nature, which is continuous with other kinds of existence. There is no mind-body problem because the human soul and body are the

⁴ *Ibid.*

constituent elements of a composite substance in which both factors are so integrated as to constitute a single unity, just as the forms of inanimate objects, plants, and the lower animals are combined with matter or body.

The theory of value or axiology, like the theory of mental processes or psychology to which the self-perfectionist subscribes, has its foundation in his metaphysics and epistemology. Values, like other things, are embedded in the structure of value objects in their relationship to man. They are just as objective as are other forms. Like other structures, too, they are available to all who are qualified to apprehend them. The source of value experience resides in the structural patterns of certain objects in their interaction with human nature. The realization of value depends upon the capacity of the individual to apprehend the values that are embedded in the objective world. Although exploration and experimentation are necessary to discover the structures that underlie value potentialities, the apprehension of these structures requires insight into the nature of things.⁵

Like other philosophers, the self-perfectionist distinguishes such different kinds of value as economic, health, bodily, recreational, social, aesthetic, intellectual, and religious. In all these areas some values are positive and others are negative; some are intrinsic and others instrumental. Whereas positive value objects yield liking or satisfaction, negative value objects yield disliking or dissatisfaction. All values have an intrinsic aspect except perhaps economic values. The various types of value may be arranged in ascending or descending hierarchies that vary somewhat with the criteria on which their significance is judged. Such criteria are the nature of the faculties exercised in the process of apprehending these objects, their social significance, their self-sufficiency, and their pervasiveness.

Nevertheless, the distinction between higher and lower areas of value as well as between levels of value in each area is valid. Everyone realizes some value in each area, but the level of value which an individual realizes in any area depends upon his knowledge of the area. The increase in the capacity to realize value in any field consists in making finer discriminations, which in turn depends upon

⁵ *Ibid.* (1st edition), pp. 273-287; (2nd edition), pp. 125-136.

the increase in knowledge. The provision of such knowledge is the primary problem of value in education. The criteria for discriminating among values of all kinds in the case of any individual are always the principles of self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration. These forms of self-perfection are the standards of evaluation in all fields. These three modes of self-perfection, which characterize the good life, are therefore the supreme values.⁶

Implications and Applications

Unlike other theories of education stemming from different interpretations of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the systematic application of the theory of self-perfection as conceived by Broudy still lies in the future. Nevertheless, he has indicated its logical implications quite clearly with respect to certain aspects of aims, curriculum, and administration—features of school practice to which proponents of other theories of education give attention in one way or another. Although it is impossible to supply complete details in such a brief account, it may be possible to indicate here the nature of the interpretation placed upon each of these factors and to stimulate the reader to study for himself Broudy's complete statement of the practical implications of this philosophy of education.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS

As has been pointed out, the inclusive and ultimate aim of education is identified with the good life conceived as self-perfection. The three aspects of self-perfection designated as self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration are thus recognized as the three forms or dimensions of self-perfection, and serve as guiding principles or criteria in the interpretation of features of school practice. All social institutions have some responsibility for the promotion of the three aspects of self-perfection, but they all have different primary functions. The function of the school as the main educational agency is definitely limited and clearly definable.

⁶ *Ibid.* (1st edition), pp. 273-457; (2nd edition), pp. 125-279.

In the rational social order the school, like other social institutions, has certain claims. It has a body of tested knowledge on which to base its procedures and can therefore claim autonomy in deciding the subject matter to be taught, the methods of teaching it, the organization of the school system, and the personnel of the teaching staff. Although such autonomy is a rightful claim, the conditions on which it rests are not fully met and it is not fully recognized either by the school itself or by the community. With respect to health, it is the rational function of the school to provide knowledge about the principles of physical and mental health and to exemplify them in its operation and procedures in an atmosphere conducive to both. The same applies in the case of character education. It is the function of the school to provide "the cognitive skills and materials by which these are worked up into the possibilities of self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration."⁷

It is the function of the school also to provide knowledge about religion as a part of human culture. Other aspects of physical health, mental health, character, and religion are functions of other institutions, such as government, the home, and the church. The responsibility of the school in a rational social order is limited to the function it is prepared to serve; that is, the deliberate development of those intellectual habits which the principles of self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration require. The function the school is expected to serve as an agency of general education is the perfection of individuals through the control of learning conceived as the formation of three kinds of intellectual habits: the habits and skills of acquiring knowledge, of using knowledge, and of enjoying knowledge.

THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

The technical definition of the curriculum as all the activities of the student under the direction of the school would not be acceptable to Broudy. Apparently for him the curriculum is limited to classroom activities and experiences. "Controversies over the curriculum are arguments about the kinds of experience the pupil shall have in the classroom during his school life."⁸ For this reason in our account

⁷ *Ibid.* (2nd edition), p. 85.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

of the self-perfectionist's conception of the curriculum, not only subject matter but methods of teaching as well are considered a feature of the curriculum rather than a general feature of school practice coordinate with curriculum development and school administration.

From the standpoint of the self-perfection theory of education, the desirable curriculum is properly conceived as the experiences which provide for the development of the three foregoing kinds of habits. The noetic learning consists of the habits and skills of acquiring knowledge that involve the ability to use symbols, to study, and to do research. They are tools for learning facts and principles, rather than the facts and principles themselves, that constitute systematic bodies of knowledge.

There are two kinds of habits and skills of using knowledge—the theoretical, in which knowledge from many sources is used to understand a social problem, and the practical, in which personal discussions must be engaged in. The habits and skills of enjoyment consist in the ability to realize on the high level such positive values as the tendency to enjoy literature, art, music, friendship, and recreation.

In designing a curriculum for the purpose of fostering these three types of intellectual habits, neither the traditional subject organization nor the problem-centered organization is adequate. The subject matter as organized into systematic patterns constituting the school subjects is irrelevant to the interests and needs of the pupils. Learning is not adequately retained under the conditions of poor motivation that prevail. The hope of the proponents of subject organization that mere memory skills are transformed in the light of thought has not been realized. Furthermore, the subjects are compartmentalized and isolated from one another, the logical organization required in learning is psychologically unsound, and problems recognized as socially important do not fit into the system of fixed subjects.

The problem-centered curricular organization is rejected because the problems selected need not require adequate knowledge or the use of scientific method. Moreover, what is learned in such problems could just as well be learned outside the school. Furthermore, it is practically impossible for pupils without a background in the various branches of knowledge to secure the facts and principles required

in the solution of problems (those properly considered school problems) when they are needed by raiding authoritative sources in the various fields.⁹

In indicating the practical implications of the self-perfection theory, Broudy is primarily interested in general rather than specialized education. For him "general education is that education which presumably every man *as man* should have, as distinguished from specialized education which some men need by virtue of some function that they, but not all individuals, perform." He distinguishes three meanings of general education: "(1) a common program of studies, or (2) a program of studies that are widely applicable because of their general or abstract nature, or (3) a program of studies or activities that all the citizens will find useful." For him it is impossible to find "any set of studies that everybody both ought to know and can master."¹⁰

As a more promising approach he proposes "to seek out three forms of intelligent behavior that are found in all men." For him general education consists of these forms "rather than any particular set of studies." To be adequate, general education "has to be translated into the most universal elements of human behavior" that "we can recognize in the classroom." The elements that meet both these requirements are "habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge." Habit as conceived in any of these three categories is highly flexible but at the same time "has an element of fixity that distinguishes it from rational reflection."¹¹ It is a unity of form which is general and of content which is particular.

Only the more important habits of each type can here be mentioned. Of those that have to do with acquiring knowledge Broudy emphasizes linguistic symbols and skills, mathematical symbols, artistic symbols, habits of study, and research skills. Of those that have to do with using knowledge to solve problems, he emphasizes analytical thinking, deliberative skills, and evaluational habits. Of those that have to do with enjoying or using knowledge imaginatively for creative and appreciative activities, he emphasizes imagination, appreciation, and creativity.¹²

⁹ *Ibid.* (1st edition), pp. 147-156; (2nd edition), pp. 285-291.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* (2nd edition), pp. 292-294.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 295-309.

SUBJECT MATTER. Broudy's conception of the curriculum as classroom activities devoted to the formation of habits of acquiring and using knowledge reflectively and imaginatively, and the fact that such habits involve particular content as well as general form raise the problem of selecting and organizing subject matter. Through a technical analysis too detailed to be repeated here, Broudy concludes that three kinds of subject matter are desirable at each educational level from the first grade through the secondary school: the natural sciences, including chemistry, physics, and mathematics; the social sciences, including history, political science, economics, and social philosophy; and the classics, including samples of philosophy, religion, and the fine arts. In order to perfect the skills and habits of "using knowledge instrumentally," problem courses are provided. In order to provide for the personal interests of students, guidance is included not as a form of therapy but as a means of keeping the healthy soul healthy.

Any apparent neglect of such matters as physical, safety, and character education, clubs, athletics, orchestras, and bands does not mean that they are unimportant. It means only "that insofar as health, safety, and character are affected by knowledge and the habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying it are concerned, they are in the curriculum." Athletics, games, band performances, and the like may be carried on at the school, but they are considered a part of the informal rather than formal education. Some provision for the study of foreign languages is made in symbolic skills, but its place in general education remains an unsolved problem.¹³

As for special education, it seems fair to say that, with the probable advance in technology and the apparent economy of abundance, "general education conceived as the habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying truth—if really formed—constitutes a surprising proportion of what is prescribed for specialized training even on the upper levels of professional schools." Although special education is indispensable in our society, "it need not be begun so early or emphasized so much in secondary schooling as has been thought necessary."¹⁴

GENERAL METHOD. As to method as a feature of curriculum development, the self-perfectionist, like proponents of other educational theories, makes a distinction between the general method of

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 320-332.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

learning and the general method of teaching, which latter he calls the "strategy of teaching." In keeping with the theory of knowledge developed by the classical realists, the self-perfectionist emphasizes four aspects of the learning process: perceptual reorganization, conceptual attainment, abstraction, and insight. For more detailed consideration of these different aspects of learning conceived as acquiring knowledge, the reader should consult the method of knowing as defined by Broudy and John Wild. (See References on pp. 514-515). Broudy distinguishes six phases of the teaching-learning process: motivation, presentation, trial response, insight, mastery, and testing.¹⁵

1. Motivation is dependent on the interests and concerns of the student, which in the last analysis are symptoms of his deeper and more pervasive tendencies toward self-determination, self-realization, and self-integration. Motivation may be either intrinsic or extrinsic: both are necessary and desirable. Intrinsic motivation facilitates learning but is not always sufficient, and extrinsic motivation, without which self-discipline is impossible, is a necessity.

2. Presentation means presenting the learning task in whatever way seems most promising, considering the outcomes expected. Since the main objective of the presentation is "to make the pupil *ready* to carry out instructions," it is essential that he understand what is asked of him and what a satisfactory response will be like. The presentation should be continued "until the pupil has understood the requirements of the task."

3. Through trial response, which may take many forms, the pupil, with the help of the teacher, acquires "a model of the correct response. He not only knows that it is right, but he has the *feeling* of the rightness as well, or what may be called insight." Trial performance under the direction of the teacher continues until the pupil acquires this knowledge and insight.

4. In insight the learner forms a judgment "as to whether the response has been adequate." Conscious learning requires that the pupil "become aware of the pattern that constitutes the right response." To assist in thus becoming aware is the function of instruction. Teaching is partly "the disclosure of complex and hidden

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 340-347.

patterns that are not easily accessible to the pupil," and partly the improvement of learning through helping him get "an insight into sub-patterns within a larger pattern already apprehended" or an insight into a "larger pattern that will include smaller patterns that have already been apprehended separately."

5. Mastery completes the dynamic tendency to incorporate a piece of learning into habit. It "makes the successful performance efficient and reliable" and thus leaves the learner "free to *think* about the variables in the situations that call for judgment."

6. In testing, which completes the teaching act, the pupil is asked to "perform the 'learned' task" without clues or aids. "This 'pay off' trial is more potent in shaping the pupil's learning than anything else" because through it he finds the reward of his efforts. Through its tests the true aims of the school are known.¹⁶

Commenting further on the problem of method, Broudy adds that insight and mastery as previously defined are the objectives of "teaching method." The means for achieving insight can be characterized as "matching learning readiness of the pupil with cognitive or noetic demands of the task." Consequently, "instruments for measuring learning readiness" and "cognitive demands for the learning tasks" are necessary.¹⁷

In the light of the principles of insight and mastery, the Socratic and the medieval disputation method, he says, are suited to the apprehension "of the pattern of meanings or the pattern that concepts and ideas fall into when connected by certain logical relations. . . . The dialectical or questioning method is, therefore, relevant and useful whenever the teaching task is to apprehend idea-patterns, relations among meanings, and concepts." The Jesuit method did very well what it set out to do: namely, "to perfect the symbolic skills and reinforce certain moral and religious attitudes." Even memorizing and lecturing have a place in learning and teaching when confined to their proper function. The same is true of the activity method, which is "suitable for the lower reaches of mental age, the beginning phases of all instruction," and particularly for general personality traits. It may be the most reliable means of motivation "even when noetic insights are the objective," but the "same

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 348-352.

cannot be said for it in the domain of mastery."

By way of conclusion Broudy points out that "methods must remain plural for the time being at least. The teacher should be able to use all of them as the objectives shift from one type of pattern to another." Roughly speaking, it may be said that "where a school is devoted to one type of method, it is probably neglecting certain types of pattern formation." Apparently such generalizations as the foregoing mean that not only specific devices and techniques but even competing general methods of learning and teaching are to be used in the six phases of the teaching-learning process as Broudy has defined them.¹⁸ The only other alternative seems to be that his methods analysis is to be taken as coordinate with other available patterns.

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

As in other educational theories, the function of school administration is to provide conditions that will promote the realization of the prescribed ends of education. Broudy is primarily concerned with the central problems of organization rather than with specific devices and techniques. For him, therefore, organization of the educational system includes most of what is important in school administration. In its various aspects it affects the curriculum conceived as the classroom experiences of the student, and thus affects the progress of the individual toward self-perfection. The problem of organization might be merely administrative in a completely integrated society with a completely integrated view of the good life, but in a divided culture such as ours "a philosophy of education must at least indicate the principles of organization."¹⁹

As a basis of orientation in the consideration of more detailed problems Broudy adopts three guiding principles. "In whatever way we finally decide to divide the task, certain principles will guide the division. First, that each part contribute to the final outcome. Second, that it does not duplicate the contribution of any other part. Third, that the contribution of one element does not frustrate or cancel out the contribution of any other."²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.* (1st edition), pp. 240-241; (2nd edition), p. 356.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

In the light of the foregoing principles of self-perfection, Broudy questions the adequacy of the school year as the unit of educational measurement and administration. Although it "is so much a part of our educational *mores* that it would take a revolution even to question it," it appears to be obsolete and a hindrance to educational progress.²¹ It is an unwarranted assumption that children of the same age are more or less homogeneous with respect to interests, ability to learn, and previous learning, and that "if they go through the grades together, their experience will develop at approximately the same rate and on about the same pattern." If the premise that "homogeneity is desirable for efficient information" is accepted, "then the one-year-one-grade formula is a sure way of not getting it."

When one recognizes the importance of providing for the upper and lower groups as well as for the middle group of pupils, and also recognizes the validity of the claims of individual differences, the problem seems clear. It "is to maintain group instruction and yet have groupings that are as homogeneous as possible." Any valid argument against homogeneous grouping can be "met by making learning readiness the base of our grouping," and by providing for flexibility of grouping with respect to both purpose and time. It is unnecessary, however, to limit in one respect the principle of homogeneity in scholastic ability. Regardless of achievement or ability, the child should enter the secondary school at the beginning of adolescence and not until then.²²

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL. The two major approaches to the problem of providing for individual differences in the elementary school through organization are what Broudy calls the method of the "socialized classroom," and the method of "diagnostic teaching." In spite of its recognized advantages, the first method without modification does not provide for the "learnings that each individual ought to acquire." In spite of its demonstrated effectiveness "in meeting individual needs and abilities," the second method tends to become "highly complicated for the teacher," and must be supplemented with "extensive collective activities." As a solution Broudy proposes either the "socialized approach with generous doses

²¹ *Ibid.* (2nd edition), pp. 357-359.

²² *Ibid.*

of remedial or supplementary work in the skills," or "some kind of homogeneous grouping so that diagnostic teaching can be applied to groups instead of to individuals."²³

He considers the latter method the more promising. Referring to it he says: "The relaxing of the grade system in the elementary school to enable the child to work with a group of his own ability at all times, regardless of the chronological age of his classmates, would accomplish this even in relatively small schools." If the pupil is shifted when he falls out of step with his group, "even conscientious parents" can be prevented from "comparing their heirs with other children." Broudy continues, "By this method of organization, the pupil could work in optimum groupings until he reaches adolescence." In a school thus organized "there would be no retardation, and acceleration would mean the kind of enriched program that schoolmen talk so frequently about but rarely manage to furnish the bright child. As the work of the school becomes more diversified into subjects, it would not be unusual for a pupil to work with different groups in art, spelling, reading, and arithmetic." Under such a plan of organization, "in effect, a child would enter the elementary school . . . whenever he was ready" and remain until the beginning of adolescence. "He would not have to be in any grade at any particular time, and in time the grades would disappear from sheer uselessness." In spite of the administrative difficulties involved, they are not beyond the ingenuity of the "American school administrator."

For Broudy, any particular kind of school organization is a means and not an end in itself. Whatever form it may take, "the outcomes of the elementary school should be a solid beginning in the habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge." It "can never abandon its central responsibility for the symbolic skills," but "modern curricula will look to it increasingly as the place where the cognitive and evaluational styles of life are shaped by instruction."²⁴

THE SECONDARY SCHOOL. According to Broudy, the secondary school, which may more accurately be called the adolescent school, ideally should commence with the beginning of adolescence and end with the completion of general education.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 360-362.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

General education, for which the secondary school is responsible, may vary in length in different communities and for different individuals. Much depends upon the support of the community, the ability of the student to profit from it, and the necessity for him to begin specialization. "A minimum of three or four years" and "a maximum of six years," though arbitrary figures, seem satisfactory from the angle of pupils and teachers as well as from the standpoint of the educational system. The secondary school has the task of perfecting the symbolic skills begun in the elementary school and of introducing the student "to ways in which human achievements in the arts and sciences can be *systematized, integrated, used, and enjoyed.*"

The secondary school and general education as conceived by the self-perfectionist can have only one curriculum (in the administrative sense) for all. Differentiation of curricula and schools and socialization have no place in secondary education. The only variation in the proposed single-track program is based on differences in pupil readiness. "If grouping pupils for instruction by their learning readiness for a given area of study is sound for the elementary pupil, it is no less so for the secondary school."²⁵

The curriculum design for the secondary school is a uniform one-track system based upon a six-year elementary school. For purposes of discussion, the program may be roughly divided into two parts which in practice are closely related. The first part consists of four general types of subjects, courses, or studies; those devoted to the acquisition of symbolic skills—language, mathematics, and arts; scientific subjects—physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology; developmental studies—the cosmos and man, societies and institutions, and mankind and culture; integrative and sustaining studies—classics, samples of literature, paintings, musical compositions, and dramas. The content of each subject in each general field would be organized on six levels of thinking. The second part consists of the problem courses, one for each level of thinking; and guidance at all levels.²⁶

Apparently this analysis means that a student would take at least one subject in each group each year, and one problem course de-

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.* (1st edition), p. 203; (2nd edition), pp. 362-364.

signed to provide for practical application of the knowledge acquired in the systematic subject-matter courses. The guidance program at each level serves both an administrative and a curricular function. In a sense it is the integrator of the whole curriculum insofar as it can be integrated. For the individual it provides an opportunity "to practice the habits of enlightened self-analysis and the use of knowledge in his value decisions."

Such a design, Broudy points out, "is at present out of the question" because it "presupposes a uniform curriculum and careful gradation of materials on some rational basis," and "neither of these conditions is satisfied in our present high school." But there is still hope that it can in time be applied. Success depends upon how well the six levels are graded with respect to both quantity of content and "the theoretical level at which a subject is studied." It also depends on the pupil's finding his appropriate achievement rate with the assistance of modern testing techniques. It further depends on the cooperation of testing and guidance in determining when an individual "can no longer profit from instruction on any level in any area."²⁷

The self-perfectionist does not expect his design for secondary education to satisfy the needs of all American adolescents. It does not attempt to provide for the "non-academic youth" to whom the conventional high school devotes considerable attention, or for the personal and social needs of the more scholarly and academic group. The self-perfectionist recognizes the importance of such personal and social concerns, but to provide for them is the function of other institutions.

For those youth who are not able to find what they need in existing institutions, Broudy proposes the establishment of a new institution which he calls the adjustatorium.²⁸ This would be a place where a youth who finds the subject-matter courses in the secondary school "too difficult to master and too far remote from his daily life to be interesting," might go when he could not profit further from the secondary school. Here he would receive a kind of practical citizenship training for which the faculty of the high school is no less ill prepared than the faculty of the reconstructed school would be. The faculty of the adjustatorium, on the other hand, "would

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.* (2nd edition), p. 366.

have the training and outlook of guidance counselors, social workers, psychiatrists," etc. They should be "gifted adults who like youth and are liked by them."

The adjustatorium would not be, therefore, a school as we know it. "Its objective would not be instruction, but rather to establish an adolescent community in which preliminary trials in the race of life can be run." The adjustatorium "certainly would do some adolescents a lot of good and all adolescents some good." But more important still is that "it would leave the secondary school to do its own job of general education. . . . Attendance at such an institution might be required of all youth before entering post-secondary education or the labor market." Civic work at the adjustatorium "could help to bridge the gap between adolescence and adulthood" without arousing economic resistance.²⁹

POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION. Under post-secondary education the self-perfectionist includes not only the college and the university, usually called higher education, but also provision for technical education, preparation of teachers, and adult education. All forms of post-secondary education are specialized and diversified in content as contrasted with secondary education. The post-secondary schools are designed to serve the interests or needs of three different groups: those preparing for one of the learned professions requiring further general education; those preparing for vocational and technical occupations not requiring further general education; and adults having one or more of these needs.³⁰

The college could be expected to meet the needs of the first group. Perhaps some colleges should serve as boarding schools rather than as institutions for research and scholarship. But most colleges should become preprofessional schools, most of which will be liberal arts divisions of universities. "This type of college should not give general education or practice in the habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge." The program should be confined to "studies, or organized bodies of knowledge," to be studied as specialties. From these studies "each professional school in the university should select the prerequisites for admission to its own program." The curricula of the professional schools would thus determine the curriculum of the college whose function is to provide preparation

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 367-371.

for admission to them. The trend toward a broader intellectual base of professional training already established would shape the trend of the preprofessional college. In these colleges "the degree of Bachelor of Arts or Science would be a preprofessional degree" qualifying its possessor to enter a professional school or department.

Another kind of post-secondary technical school would be designed to meet the needs of an increasing number of young people "who could profit from some kind of post-secondary schooling other than a preprofessional college." Any objection that this proposal is undemocratic is not convincing "since it is not limited by birth, class, or economic status."³¹

The function of the university as an aggregation of graduate schools is to provide instruction in "the most advanced and specialized phases of knowledge and skill" on the one hand, and "the discovery of knowledge" on the other. The problem to be faced by the university of the future is the proper relation between these functions. To combine them apparently means that one or the other will suffer, but to separate them raises a problem of where basic research would be done, for both business and government are interested primarily in their own problems and not in basic research itself. Therefore, "until our society is willing and able to support a special group of its citizens to conduct research in the genuine spirit of research," the best compromise is for the university to "include as part of its primary function the search for and dissemination of truth as such."³²

Since the educational design proposed in consistency with the self-perfection theory depends upon the quality of the teachers available, something must be said about teacher education. Broudy says, "the high-gradeness—so far as it can be deliberately produced—is a product of (1) general education; (2) the science of teaching as contained in educational theory, and (3) the skillful practice of the art in some kind of apprenticeship in actual teaching." The four-year teachers college is now standard and the five-year program is in the making. Teacher preparation may therefore properly be required as specialized education for a profession. Institutions

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 271-275.

for teacher education should therefore organize their work as do other specialized schools.

The program should include "prescribed selected preprofessional work in general areas of knowledge as prerequisites to educational theory and practice," and a body of professional knowledge that "is unique in its selection, organization, and application." The pre-professional work would not be concerned with general education but with specialized areas of knowledge. The professional work would be organized in terms of educational problems constituting educational theory. When broken down into the various dimensions in which they can be studied, four types of problems would result: those having to do with "aims and policy, curriculum, organization and administration, teaching-learning." Stated in another way, they would be "psychological, historical, sociological, philosophical, technical, and clinical."³³

If the general education of all the people were adequate, they would have "learned to learn," and adult education would be only self-education because they would be prepared to continue their own education. Since such an ideal lies in the distant future, the different kinds of adult education are now as diverse as the needs of the people. Little can be done aside from "making adult education compulsory," except to make present opportunities available to all adults.³⁴

THE BASIC-EDUCATION THEORY

The Council for Basic Education apparently best represents the principal educational doctrines of what is generally known as new conservatism. The most systematic statement of the educational beliefs of the Council, and apparently of the new conservatives, is found in a volume entitled *The Case for Basic Education*.³⁵ Therefore, their conception of education may properly be called the basic-education theory. It may be that, in the last analysis, the new conservatives have nothing significant to add to the philosophical beliefs and ed-

³³ *Ibid.*, 371-375.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 377, 378.

³⁵ From *The Case for Basic Education*, edited by James D. Koerner, Copyright © 1959, by the Council for Basic Education, by permission of Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company.

educational doctrines thus far systematically stated in explanation of the self-perfection theory.

Nevertheless, the so-called basic-education theory is included here as a recognition of an effort on the part of scholars outside the field of professional education to introduce some kind of order in the positive and constructive educational beliefs of academic specialists, who have said so much about the defects of current school practices and principles and offered so little in the way of constructive principles and concrete proposals for improvement. Its inclusion may bring to the attention of students of professional education the most constructive thinking of its proponents, who in turn may be stimulated to make systematic statements of their educational beliefs and their philosophical assumptions in order to render the basic-education theory comparable with others. It may pave the way for acquainting members and prospective members of the teaching profession with the foundations and implications of a way of thinking about education that enables it to be critically considered on its own merits.

Some of the most important educational beliefs recognized by proponents of the basic-education theory are stated by Clifton Fadiman as follows:

1. Men desire to know and to transmit almost all kinds of matters.
2. This chaos of matters they have organized into a hierarchy of studies.
3. They have selected certain areas of knowledge that can and should be taught to the exclusion of others.
4. There are two kinds of subjects—those that have generative power and those that do not.
5. The subjects with generative power consist of those matters which, when once learned, enable the student to learn all matters of the other kind.
6. These generative subjects constitute the content of basic education.
7. Among them are those subjects that deal with language, whether or not one's own; forms, figures, and numbers; the laws of nature; the past; and the shape and behavior of the earth.
8. A knowledge of the fundamental aspects of these subjects enables one to learn their more specialized aspects and also the minor, self-terminating subjects.³⁶

³⁶ Clifton Fadiman, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

Philosophical Foundations

Neither the authors of *The Case for Basic Education* nor any other of the new conservatives state their beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value systematically, as do the advocates of other educational theories. Consequently, our account of the philosophical foundations of the basic-education theory must rely on what can be gleaned from widely scattered literature dealing with a variety of subjects, what can be found in *The Case for Basic Education*, and in certain studies that have been made of conservative beliefs in general.

For the authors of *The Case for Basic Education*, any philosophy is only a basic faith by which men live rather than a system of demonstrable beliefs; but they acknowledge the necessity of philosophical assumptions in the development and application of any educational theory. They state their own assumptions in terms of beliefs about the power and nature of man. They reject the contention of those who assume that the nature of man "is essentially animal; that his powers lie largely in the area of social and biological adaptation; and that his reason for existence is either unknowable . . . or a form of self-delusion." They subscribe to the position "that man's nature is both animal *and* rational; and that his reason for existence is somehow bound up with the fullest possible evolution of his mental and spiritual capacities." Fadiman professes to live by this philosophy, and the other authors "proclaim" it as the faith by which they live and by which Western civilization itself lives.³⁷

In the literature of the new conservatives over the last ten years, including representative books, *The Bulletin of the Council for Basic Education*, and numerous articles in *The Modern Age* and *The National Review*, many statements of general belief may be found that supplement that of Fadiman. A survey of the literature reveals something about new conservatism as a movement and some of the avowed principles of its leaders.

The new conservatism embodies aspects of the new humanism, which has disappeared as a distinct and articulate movement, principles of the classical and Christian traditions, other related ideas not

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4.

previously classified, and presuppositions of the movement for basic education. The new conservatives look to Edmund Burke as their source of inspiration in much the same manner as the new humanists looked to Irving Babbitt. The new conservatives agree with the new humanists (the Babbitt group) and with the new intellectuals (the Hutchins group) in their rejection of naturalism, idealistic liberalism, and "Progressivism" in public education. The new conservatism consists of a body of general beliefs distinguishable from other movements to which it is historically and logically related.

Apparently many of the younger humanists, recent followers of Edmund Burke, and many others dissatisfied with the principles and practices of public education are engaged in a concerted movement, which in its more philosophical aspects may properly be designated as new conservatism and in its educational aspects as the basic-education theory. The evidence seems ample to justify associating the movement for basic education with new conservatism. Among the officers and directors of the Council for Basic Education are both new conservatives and new humanists. Whatever may be the difference between the new conservatives and the contemporary new humanists on the one hand and the Council for Basic Education on the other, they are all opposed to political liberalism, educational progressivism, and philosophical naturalism. Unlike the earlier humanists, most of the contemporary new humanists include religion as an indispensable factor of their theory of education and the good life. They are engaged in a cooperative effort to reestablish human culture, including education, on the basis of principles which for them our past civilization in the West has exemplified.

Although conservatives have always found support in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the new conservatives emphasize their allegiance to the principles developed by Edmund Burke. They find inspiration in Plato's threefold classification of men analogous to gold, silver, and iron and in Aristotle's distinction between men as those born to be rulers and those born to be subjects. But they find their main support in the writings of Burke, whom they quote with approval.

Some representative quotations are: "It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society than the position that

any body of men have a right to make what laws they please." "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confused views." "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages." ³⁸

Through a rather extended study of new conservatism, Herbert McClosky finds that its advocates are direct intellectual descendants of Burke. He says:

In spite of the differences, there is astonishing agreement among the disciples, and many disinterested scholars as well, that the following are characteristic, if not quintessential elements of the conservative outlook:

(1) Man is a creature of appetite and will, 'governed more by emotion than by reason' (Kirk), in whom 'wickedness, unreason, and the urge to violence lurk always behind the curtain of civilized behavior' (Rossiter). He is a fallen creature, doomed to imperfections, and inclined to license and anarchy.

(2) Society is ruled by 'divine intent' (Kirk) and made legitimate by Providence and prescription. Religion 'is the foundation of civil society' (Huntington) and is man's ultimate defense against his own evil impulses.

(3) Society is organic, plural, inordinately complex, the product of a long and painful evolution, embodying the accumulated wisdom of previous historical ages. There is a presumption in favor of whatever has survived the ordeal of history, and of any institution that has been tried and found to work.

(4) Man's traditional inheritance is rich, grand, endlessly proliferated and mysterious, deserving of veneration, and not to be cast away lightly in favor of the narrow uniformity preached by 'sophisters and calculators' (Burke). Theory is to be distrusted since reason, which gives rise to the theory, is a deceptive, shallow, and limited instrument.

(5) Change must therefore be resisted and the injunction heeded that 'Unless it is necessary to change, it is necessary not to change' (Hearnshaw). Innovation 'is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress' (Kirk).

³⁸ Robert Beck, "The Social and Educational Philosophy of New Humanism and New Conservatism," *Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, April 10-13, 1960, pp. 93-104.

(6) Men are naturally unequal, and society requires 'orders and classes' for the good of all. All efforts at levelling are futile and lead to despair (Kirk and Rossiter), for they violate the natural hierarchy and frustrate man's 'longing for leadership'. The superior classes must be allowed to differentiate themselves and to have a hand in the direction of the state, balancing the numerical superiority of the inferior classes.

(7) Order, authority, and community are the primary defense against the impulse to violence and anarchy. The superiority of duties over rights and the need to strengthen the stabilizing institutions of society, especially the church, the family, and above all, private property.³⁹

From the items culled from the writings of new conservatives supplemented by items from other scales, McClosky and his associates developed the following scale by which conservatives might be distinguished from liberals:⁴⁰

BELIEFS	PERCENT AGREE	
	Liberals (N=258)	Extreme Conservatives (N=282)
Duties are more important than rights.	32%	63%
The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but experts.	26	51
You can't change human nature.	30	73
People are getting soft and weak from so much coddling and babying.	31	68
The heart is as good a guide as the head.	22	58
We have to teach children that all men are created equal, but almost everyone knows that some are better than others.	35	74
No matter what the people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	33	63
Few people really know what is in their best interest in the long run.	43	77

³⁹ Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review*, 52:27-45, March 1958, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

On the basis of the foregoing analyses and evidence, a fair statement of the general beliefs of the new conservatives may be summarized as follows:

1. Human nature includes feeling, impulse, and desire as well as intellect, involving reason and will. It cannot be changed.
2. The world is so complicated and complex that it cannot be understood except by specialists in the different fields. Therefore, the rank and file should look to experts and research scholars for knowledge of the physical, biological, and cultural background of human experience.
3. The ends or values that control the lives of men are embodied in the cultural heritage rather than in the innate tendencies and dispositions of the individual. Embodied in the cultural heritage of our Western civilization are emotional, moral, and religious factors that are no less significant than scientific knowledge.
4. Psychologically, people are inherently different. Most of them are by nature capable of achieving the understanding, appreciation, and skill indispensable to the good life. But only a limited minority are naturally capable of discovery, creativity, and leadership. Most people are so constituted by nature that they have to rely on the especially endowed for their standards of direction.
5. The standards of direction are disclosures not only of the intellect and reason but also of feeling and other nonintellectual powers. Reliance on the scientific method is necessary in some fields and reliance on other methods is necessary in other fields.

Of course, some educational philosophers will find such a statement of philosophical assumptions inadequate, but this account as given here is only reportorial. No attempt has been made to analyze the philosophical presuppositions implicit in the foregoing statements of beliefs. The available evidence is not sufficient to justify such analysis. In the absence of the new conservatives' own formulation, any inference as to what their beliefs about reality, knowledge, and value might be would be highly speculative and probably misleading. It is the responsibility not of the reporter but of the proponents of the basic-education theory and the supporting new conservatism to render the philosophical foundations of their educational doctrines comparable to those of other educational theories.

Implications and Applications

The new conservatives, proponents of the basic-education theory, like proponents of other theories of education and the good life, are interested in the improvement of school practices. Also like proponents of other theories, in the early stages they have given more attention to exposing the alleged inadequacies of other theories, as exemplified in school policies and programs, than to implementing their own theory. Consequently, it is easier to determine what they definitely oppose than what they specifically advocate. Perhaps the best approach to an understanding of the implications and applications of their theory is to begin with their objections.

These objections are related to practically all features of school practice. With respect to curriculum development, they reject the implications of the "life adjustment conception." They also reject the idea of the comprehensive secondary school, which for them hinders rather than promotes the concentration of students on the basic subjects. They are opposed to the elective system at any educational level. They think students are not qualified to decide what subjects to study or how they should be studied. They do not believe in the equality of subjects because only certain ones provide for the development of "generative power" which basic education involves. They object to the practice of spending school time on sports and extracurricular activities. They condemn the great books idea as developed by the Hutchins group. They would disapprove of standards of achievement not challenging to good students. They do not condone the tendency to promote students merely on the basis of attendance. They do not, as a rule, approve of professional education as a requirement for teaching or educational leadership.

For an understanding of the positive and constructive implications of the basic-education theory for school practice, we must rely on the reports of projects sponsored by the Council for Basic Education and inferences from educational comments of new conservatives in various connections. *The Case for Basic Education*, which has already been published, is a report of one such project. Some of the new conservatives have published critical analyses of the educational situation and also expressed their views on education whenever they

seemed relevant in the discussion of other subjects.

The proponents of the basic-subjects theory of education recognize the importance of two kinds of educational values or aims—general personality traits and subject matter goals. The criteria of personality traits to be cultivated are to be found in the classical and Christian virtues of our Western civilization. The subject matter goals are to be found in the basic subjects. They are not only “the subjects that Western civilization has up to very recent times considered basic,” but they are the subjects that “are sanctioned by their own intrinsic value,” which lies primarily in their “generative power.” Only those subjects have this power whose content, once mastered, enables the student to learn all other matters that cannot primarily be considered school subjects. Although the school should share responsibility with other social institutions for the cultivation of general personality traits, its main function is to provide instruction in the basic subjects.

The authors of *The Case for Basic Education* have classified the basic subjects into two groups—the required and the elective; and they have discussed the twelve to be required and the four desirable as electives. The required subjects are citizenship, American history, European and world history, geography, composition, literature, classical languages, modern languages, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics. The illustrative elective subjects are art, music, philosophy, and speech. A recognized scholar has reviewed the content and goals of each subject considered in the light of the general principles to which he and other new conservatives subscribe. One chapter is devoted to each of the different subjects. As a rule, the author gives the reason for including the subject, the content, and the goals that should be reached by the end of the twelfth year. With the possible exception of philosophy and speech proposed as electives, the reader will probably find in the analysis of the subjects very little that is really different and new or to which the proponents of any theory would object. Still, in spite of occasional undocumented slurs at advocates of other theories, the book represents the proponents of the basic-education theory at their best and therefore merits at least a brief account of their proposals for the different subjects.

Speaking for citizenship, George C. S. Benson says that the function of the high school for all students is “to turn out graduates who

are capable of becoming humane persons as well as responsible, voting citizens." To achieve this goal he proposes (1) a sound knowledge of American governmental institutions and the basic pre-suppositions that underlie them; and (2) perspective and mental training which literature, composition, mathematics, science, foreign languages, and political science can give.⁴¹

In connection with history, Ray Allen Billington observes that "history is a compass that guides man into the future, and when the future is as troubled as that beyond our present horizons, such a compass is badly needed. . . . As a mental discipline the study of American history (1) trains students in analytical and objective thinking; (2) broadens their horizons by adding the time dimension; and (3) introduces them to a knowledge of a variety of academic subjects that expand their vistas and increase their social usefulness."⁴² With special reference to American history he says:

Its role . . . is fivefold: (1) it develops a sense of perspective that allows more intelligent political decision-making; (2) it creates a sense of identity with the past that deepens national loyalties; (3) it provides citizens with the practical knowledge necessary to function intelligently at the polls; (4) it endows them with a love for learning that continues to operate long after the schooling experience is over; and (5) it equips them with the information and tolerance necessary in a day when policy-making can no longer be viewed solely in national terms.⁴³

Of European world history Carlton J. H. Hayes says: ". . . the European past is our American past, the chief factor in our heritage and civilization." Therefore he believes that our schools should "teach and inculcate in American youth a knowledge and appreciation of Western civilization as a whole. . . . What is needful of the social sciences for the high school student should be integrated with courses in history."⁴⁴ There should be, Hayes thinks, three years of European and world history and one year of American history required in the high school.

According to Clyde F. Kohn writing on geography, "It is an incapable fact of our times that intelligent citizens must become ac-

⁴¹ George C. S. Benson, *The Case for Basic Education*, pp. 17-28.

⁴² R. A. Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 28.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ C. J. H. Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 52.

quainted with the character of peoples and places throughout the world. . . . Such knowledge is necessary not only because of our growing political interrelationships but also because of our worldwide business and social interests." Four of the major geographic ideas that should be mastered, he says, are: "I. A Knowledge of the Arrangement of Things Over the Face of the Earth. . . . II. A Knowledge of the Spatial Association of Things. . . . III. A Knowledge and Understanding of Spatial Interactions. . . . IV. A Knowledge and Understanding of Change." ⁴⁵ To be well prepared in the discipline of geography, he concludes, students should possess

a knowledge and understanding (1) of the distribution of significant physical and cultural phenomena over the face of the earth, (2) of their association within specific areas, and (3) of the vast and complex economic and political interrelations between parts of the earth's surface. They should be informed about the characteristics of the major parts of the world, the changes taking place within them, and the role played by relative location in their political and economic interrelationships. To accomplish these goals, students need to acquire certain map-reading and map-making abilities.⁴⁶

About composition Donald R. Tuttle says that, although all are agreed that English composition is an indispensable and basic course, few recognize its importance and complexity. He shows that writing well has practical advantages and that it involves more than mere skill. It includes the power of creative expression, an understanding of the minds of the readers and of the linguistic processes and rhetorical devices of communication. "A good course in English composition includes, in addition to practice in writing, much reading; instruction in grammar and usage; rhetoric; and spelling, punctuation, and mechanics." ⁴⁷ In conclusion he says:

We should like our young men and women to feel that writing is almost as natural for them as talking, and not to feel that to be asked to write a report or a letter was a traumatic experience. And why should we not? After providing them with twelve years of public education, we are entitled to expect that good high school graduates, the natural leaders of

⁴⁵ C. F. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 69, 72, 74.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

⁴⁷ D. R. Tuttle, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

the America that is to be, will feel rightly confident of their ability to express their thoughts, knowledge, experience, and emotions in language marked by order, clarity, dignity, and force.⁴⁸

In regard to literature Douglas Bush states that "The aim of the humanities, of literature, is not to adjust people to life, to the values of mass civilization, but to enlighten and disturb them, to inspire and strengthen them to adjust life and themselves to the traditional ideals of the best minds, the saving remnant of the human race . . ." ⁴⁹ Bush then goes on to say,

In literature, ethical and aesthetic values are inseparably bound up together. The great instrument of moral good, said Shelley, is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. In literature students find, as countless people have found before them, that their problems are not new; and they may find also that writers of an earlier day had answers that are not out of date but rightly worth pondering. Literature of the remote past as well as the present contains . . . the vision of human experience achieved by a great spirit and bodied forth by a great artist.⁵⁰

Gerald F. Else, speaking for the classical languages, says of Latin that "the qualities that made it *the* basic subject in the past are still sufficient to make it *a* basic subject now."⁵¹ As a basic subject Latin is "not merely linguistic *or* sociopolitical *or* literary but a fusion of the three. Latin has virtues of its own under each of these headings; what makes it unique among present-day school subjects is its depth and range as a whole."⁵² The student, therefore, should have two to four years of Latin.

As to Greek, Else thinks that what has been said in regard to Latin can also be said of Greek. Therefore, he concludes: "High schools which take the good student seriously—and there are going to be many more such schools in the next ten years than there were in the last ten—ought to consider the possibility of reviving Greek."⁵³

Speaking for modern languages, Hunter Keklenberger says:

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁹ D. Bush, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁵¹ G. F. Else, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

"Their first and most basic function is to release the student from the charmed circle of language and culture in which he has been confined from childhood and therefore help him to attain the intellectual perspective he needs to understand and judge objectively both his own language and culture and those of other nations. While study of languages is not the only way to achieve these ends, it is perhaps the most efficient."⁵⁴

The increasing importance of modern languages is obvious. Therefore instruction in at least one foreign language should be required for three or four years in a good high school. It is also desirable that a beginning in this language should already have been made in the elementary grades.

Steward Scott Cairns emphasizes the importance of mathematics as "a tool, a language, and a logical structure."⁵⁵ To be realistic he thinks

We should strive for a condition under which every capable student anywhere in the country shall have the opportunity, in the public schools, to pursue a course of study which will prepare him for a good beginning college course in analytic geometry and the calculus. . . . For the able student, even if he plans to terminate his formal education with high school, the program recommended for college preparation is far more desirable than a terminal course designed to meet the needs of the less capable. Even the latter group could well profit by topics selected from the same program, if the rate and manner of instruction are appropriately adjusted.⁵⁶

In regard to biology Sydney S. Greenfield says: "Biological science is an essential part of basic education." Therefore he insists that there should be a comprehensive program of instruction in biological science "throughout the grade and high school years."⁵⁷

Joel H. Hildebrand contends that chemistry is one of the basic subjects because familiarity with it can make one a better and a wiser person. In consequence of the different materials with which it deals, "there is a chemistry of the earth, a chemistry of the stars, and a chemistry of life."⁵⁸ Moreover, chemistry exemplifies the scientific

⁵⁴ H. Keklenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁵⁵ S. S. Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵⁷ S. S. Greenfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-187.

⁵⁸ J. H. Hildebrand, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

method. Therefore, everyone should have an elementary acquaintance with it.

M. H. Trytten says that the trend of the times requires increasing emphasis on science in public education especially on physics, and for the general as well as the college-bound student.⁵⁹ Physics is a way of thinking and should be taught as a sequence, making possible the inclusion of more than can be packed into a single course at the end of the high school program.⁶⁰

The authors of the chapters on the electives—art, music, philosophy, and speech—also emphasize the importance of their specialties. Oliver W. Larkin, deploring the sad plight of the visual arts, says: "There will be no improvement in this situation until we recognize that Rembrandt and Frank Lloyd Wright have been as necessary to human progress as Copernicus and Einstein. . . . The arts must be given a chance to play their part in the sharpening of our sensibilities, the stirring of our imaginations, the illumination of our situations and our dilemmas."⁶¹

Every high school graduate is thus entitled to have had some experience with the "great utterances in stone and pigment. . . . We need a curriculum in which art is no longer a frill, an extra, a fringe benefit." The high school student should have acquired "some ability to see and to relate what he sees to the rest of his experience."⁶² In summarizing, Larkin says:

. . . the sheer ability to see, to discriminate, to respond wholeheartedly, could make the study of art a happy venturesome experience for this hypothetical youth of eighteen. It could breed impatience with the visual ugliness of his environment and with the vulgarity purveyed at present by the manufacturers of mass titillation. It could establish that respect for artists the lack of which causes American philistines to reject the unfamiliar and the nonconforming. It could establish the place of art in our scheme of things, . . . as a mighty language in which man's finest thoughts, most compelling visions, most exquisite perceptions have been offered for the pleasure and benefit of all.⁶³

⁵⁹ M. H. Trytten, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁶¹ O. W. Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

Speaking for music, Joseph Kerman declares: "The first thing to make clear is that music, properly understood, is not a 'frill' but a 'basic' together with mathematics, languages, history, and literature. . . . The schools should do more than simply teach the student how to read, write, and reason. . . . The arts occupy a special, important area in what we loosely call our heritage." Kerman insists, however, that music as a subject of basic education is concerned with appreciation rather than performance. It can be taught at the secondary level in the same terms as imaginative literature. Like poetry and painting, the time for music is during adolescence.⁶⁴

Douglas N. Morgan considers current proposals for including philosophy in the high school program. Philosophy, as he conceives it, "is at least the rational, systematic inquiry into the meanings of certain complex and comprehensive ideas." Furthermore, since many high school students engage in some kind of philosophizing anyway, they should be taught to do it well. Just what the content of a course in philosophy for superior high school students might comprise should be subjected to "serious and intelligent experimentation."⁶⁵

Bower Aly's proposal for the inclusion of speech as a basic subject is unique. In his conception it is essentially different from most subjects of that name on either the college or high school level. He begins his discussion of the need for speech by distinguishing two kinds of intellectual problems: those that can and those that cannot be solved. Solutions to problems of the first type are demonstrable and include those of the experimental sciences as well as certain everyday problems like finding the shortest way from one place to another. Solutions to problems of the second type are not demonstrable: they would be those of preference, opinion, and judgment, such as levying a new tax, voting for acquittal, deciding to marry.

Problems of the second type constitute the subject-matter content of speech, which Aly considers a basic subject. For centuries the schools of the West assumed responsibility for preparing students to deal with those problems whose solutions were always contingent and relative. One of the recognized functions of the school was "to instruct young people in the uses of language, with a view to enabling them to manage as well as they could the pressing human

⁶⁴ J. Kerman, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

⁶⁵ D. N. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

problems of contingency, of probability.”⁶⁶ Speech was once the “core curriculum” of the Occident.

According to Aly, “the discipline of argument, of persuasion, of the systematic consideration of symbolic problems of thought” is becoming increasingly important in the modern world, and it is apparently taught incidentally in connection with other subjects. He is convinced, therefore, that speech so conceived should be explicitly included in the curriculum of the high school.⁶⁷

The foregoing abbreviated accounts of the systematic treatment of basic subjects is very inadequate. It does, however, suggest the approach of the proponents of the basic-education theory to the school curriculum and paves the way for a few tentative generalizations. All good students would be expected to meet authoritative standards in the basic subjects. No elective subject would be required of all good students. Nevertheless, in the mind of the specialist the elective subjects are no less desirable for all students than are the required subjects. Although requirements for the elementary school are not neglected, each author is primarily concerned with the high school curriculum. The aims for each subject are both theoretical and practical; that is, each subject is valuable on its own account and at the same time serves a directly useful end. Finally, scope and ends of the curriculum through the secondary school are fairly explicit.

Problems of course organization and grade placement are deferred for future consideration. But when evidence from other sources is also introduced, it may be tentatively concluded that courses or sequences of courses are to be designed in all subjects. Just how courses are to be organized, where placed, and how taught are matters to be worked out by teachers with the assistance of scholarly specialists in the different fields. Details of course organization, materials, and methods in the different subjects have not been indicated, but the evidence seems to show that there will be few, if any, integrated courses combining different subjects. The subject matter of study will be mainly systematic treatments by recognized authors in the various fields. Materials from direct experience will be introduced by the teacher for illustrative purposes. Systematic instruction will prevail in all subjects at all age levels.

⁶⁶ B. Aly, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

So far proponents of the basic-education theory have not proposed specific administrative changes. But from the criticism of the public schools which they and other new conservatives have made, we may draw some suggestions. On the side of school discipline students will apparently be expected to observe whatever regulations those in control consider necessary for the effective, systematic study of the basic subjects. The subject matter required will be arranged in logical sequence in the different fields throughout the school system. In other words, there will be only one curriculum in the secondary school as in the elementary. But some variation by way of electives will be provided in the high school although the distinction between the general and the college preparatory curriculum will be a thing of the past.

Specialized courses and specialized curricula, however, will be provided at the college level. Although courses in the basic subjects common to all curricula will be offered, specialization will be increasingly emphasized. The college rather than the secondary school will be a comprehensive educational institution. Probably there would be no specialized institution and no curricula for teacher education. The prospective teacher would enroll in the curriculum that he and his advisors think will best prepare him for teaching some particular basic subject. Courses in the principles and techniques of teaching would be provided for students in any curriculum and might be taught either by a subject specialist or by a professor of education.

For the purpose of emphasizing differences the statements in regard to probable implications and applications may be extreme, and therefore require some qualifications. At most, they indicate only a general tendency. Few proponents of the basic-education theory and its supporting philosophy of new conservatism would subscribe in detail to what has been said. Some of them might be willing to discard professional education and separate teacher education curricula and institutions, but they certainly would not do so immediately. They take a long-term view of things and recognize the fact that adjustment will require a long time. In the heat of controversy some of them speak and write in extreme terms. But many of them recognize the importance of professional education and special administrative arrangements for teacher education. On the whole, they are advocat-

ing larger participation of recognized scholars in the various subject fields in public education, including teacher education. The more moderate advocates of the basic-education theory of education would probably establish some kind of relationship with professors of education and thus cooperate with them in the development of overall plans for the improvement of public education at all levels.

Cultural Conditions

The philosophical beliefs of the basic-subjects theories that reflect the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have their cultural background in ancient Greece. But both theories are new versions of an old way of thinking about education and the good life and have been developed within our own time. Since in preceding chapters some attention has been given to ancient and medieval civilization, we shall confine our discussion here mainly to the contemporary scene in America. It is here and now that Broudy and Wild and the Council for Basic Education are developing their theories.

Cultural conditions of this period are vastly different from those prior to the development of modern science and the rise of the common man, or from those of even a generation ago. But they contain elements which have usually inspired intellectuals, whom we call philosophers, to renewed effort to adjust old values to new knowledge and new interests. Those who look to the past for standards of direction we usually call conservatives, and they often reinterpret old ways of thinking about education and the good life.

The confusion of the present cultural situation is no less a challenge to conservative than to other educational philosophers. The depression of the 1930's, World War II in the 1940's, and the wave of prosperity of the 1950's stimulated the desire and the effort of the common man to secure a larger share of the world's goods. The phenomenal development of science and technology scarcely dreamed of a generation ago has transformed the face of the earth and made the peoples of the world physically and economically interdependent. The rise of totalitarian states has seriously challenged political democracy which free peoples of the world only yesterday took for granted.

In a democratic country like the United States, which relies so heavily on education, the schools reflect the confusion, uncertainty, insecurity, and doubts of the people. As usual when things go wrong, many hold the schools responsible for the predicament in which we find ourselves. The conservatives who look to the past for their standards take the lead in pointing out the defects of the schools. To bring order out of chaos in the culture and the social order they propose new versions of old ways of thinking, and indicate their implications for school practice. This is what is now being done by proponents of the self-perfection theory, who find philosophical support in their reinterpretation of classical realism. This is what is being done by proponents of the basic-education theory, who find philosophical support in certain sayings of Plato and Aristotle and in principles selected from the new conservatives.

Another cultural factor affecting both the self-perfection theory and the basic-education theory is "naïve conservatism" which includes what Archie Bahm calls a "new idea of freedom—freedom from responsibility." This has been the attitude of a large segment of the population since World War II. It is a characteristic trait of many young people who came to maturity after 1939. For them, a man has no responsibility "except what he freely accepts, and the less he accepts, the fewer duties he has. I'll do my job and no more. More means meddling, and meddling means trouble."⁶⁸

This attitude may have its historical roots in the traditional religious doctrine that man is only a depraved sinner and the materialistic belief that he is only a "speck of stardust." But it also reflects "the social effect of population increase, industrialization, specialization, urbanization, and moral relativism." All these minimize the importance of the individual. The reaction of the individual in this younger generation is to accept conditions as he finds them. He has been trained not to work and to "expect something for nothing." "His reputation and security are bound up with his specialty. In all other areas he has little alternative but to take the easy way out: to conform." He leaves politics and even religion to the experts.

The young people who tend to exhibit this attitude literary critics call the "Silent Generation" and compare them with what they call

⁶⁸ Archie Bahm, "The New Conservatism," *The Colorado Quarterly*, 8:131-141, Autumn 1959, pp. 131-137.

the "Lost Generation" that came to maturity after World War I. The latter were rebels in morals, manners, government, religion, and everything else. They were "lost" because they had failed to shape coming events. But the young people of the Silent Generation are very different. Their experience of the fascists and the communists had increased their respect for America and American institutions, but they made little or no effort to maintain the status quo, to build a new social order, or to change morals and manners. They simply accepted the situation as they found it after the foray of their predecessors. They have no pronounced ideas about government, religion, education, or the fine arts. In this respect they are different from any other generation of modern times. Each new generation has been more radical than the preceding one, but apparently the members of this generation are concerned neither with maintaining the status quo nor with introducing measures of social reform.⁶⁹

However right they may be in their approval of the American system as opposed to others, there is, as Brandon says, "a legitimate complaint about the behavior . . . of the present generation and about America in the 50's. . . . There is no denying the malaise in both the great and lively arts, the conformity and complacency, the distrust of ideas and of the eggheads."⁷⁰ This naïve uncritical tendency toward irresponsibility and "letting well enough alone," to which both political and educational propagandists often appeal, is a fact of the present cultural situation, however it may be explained. Within these cultural conditions the new classical realism and the new conservatism with their correlative theories of education and the good life have emerged.

Of course, proponents of the basic-subjects theories no more approve the naïve and uncritical conservatism of our day than the new humanists and the new intellectualists approved the naïve radicalism of the earlier period. The former are convinced that something more is required than the naïve conservatism which is apparently on the increase in America today. Consciously or unconsciously they assume that this uncritical new conservatism of the rank and file must be transformed into a sophisticated and critical conservatism which

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Donald Brandon, "Conservatives, and the Lost and the Silent Generations," *The Modern Age*, 3:2-7, Winter 1958-1959, p. 6.

they have undertaken to define in terms of education and the good life.

In their appeal to the conservative temper of the times, the proponents of the basic-subjects theories have an advantage that proponents of more radical theories do not have in dealing with those who have discarded the extreme liberal and idealistic attitudes. The Silent Generation has already abandoned the radicalism of both the right and the left. The reasoned educational principles of the new classical realists and the new conservatives are probably more relevant to the requirements of the Silent Generation of the last two decades than are the reasoned principles of other philosophers.

But to reach the naïve conservatives of the present and the foreseeable future on whom the new classical realism and the new critical conservatism depend, spokesmen of these two points of view must make practical and constructive proposals and define their supporting philosophical beliefs in terms of empirical experience and the findings of modern science. In his systematic analysis of the self-perfection theory Broudy has set a pattern which other educational proponents of new classical realism and educational proponents of new conservatism may well use as a guide. In this respect the basic-subjects theories have an advantage over the earlier educational theories proposed by the new humanists and the new intellectualists.

Concluding Comments

The inclusion of the basic-subjects conceptions of education in our account of educational theories, to the exclusion of certain others may, in strict logic, seem questionable. Still there are certain extenuating circumstances which explain it. Sheer lack of space makes it impossible to include every educational theory into which philosophical beliefs may be translated under varying conditions. Then, too, most of those omitted have not been systematically defined in terms of the philosophical assumptions and implications so as to be clearly distinguishable from other theories that have thus been defined.

To be specific, individuals of the third and fourth generation of experimentalists have made important contributions to educational

theory but none of them has defined the philosophical foundations and practical implications of a clear-cut theory that could be distinguished from those developed by Dewey, Kilpatrick, Bode, and Brameld. There are, however, certain other theories in the process of development which have not been included because of difficulties involved in determining their implications for various features of school practice. Among these are Wegener's organic philosophy of education and the work of Kneller, Morris, and others on the educational applications of existentialism.

Of course, the same criticism may be made of the basic-education theory which seems to be the educational equivalent of the new critical conservatism. Neither its philosophical foundations nor its practical implications have been sufficiently defined to render it comparable to other theories. Furthermore, its proponents emphasize scholarship and constantly refer to specialists in the "basic subjects" as scholars. At the same time, in criticizing other educational reformers they make factual statements which would not be accepted by recognized scholars in either philosophy or education. Evidently, they do not recognize the same standards of scholarship as important in the field of education as in other fields.

Finally, they address their criticisms to the public as well as to educational reformers and specialists in the various fields. They find the irrationalism of professional educators intolerable. Yet with the public they often appeal to feeling and emotion rather than to reason, and hence are not themselves entirely immune to the irrationalism which they condemn in others. Consequently, they court the risk of being called educational politicians instead of educational statesmen.

In point of fact, any effort to collect the positive and constructive philosophic beliefs and educational doctrines and put them in any kind of order intelligible to students of education may smack of appeasement. Yet, professional educational philosophers evince interest in joining the new conservatives in responsible criticism of American education,⁷¹ and on the other hand, the new conservative proponents of the basic-education theory invite professors of education to cooperate with them in the development of a constructive

⁷¹ Arthur G. Wirth, *Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, April 10-13, 1960, p. 107.

educational policy and program. Consequently, their mutual interest in cooperating for the improvement of education is sufficient reason for including the basic-education theory.

Recognition of this theory in textbooks and in courses on foundations of education could stimulate these new conservatives to shift their efforts from fault-finding to defining their philosophical and educational beliefs so that they will be meaningful to professors of education, members of the teaching profession, and even the public. It is mainly for this reason that, in this account, time has been given to a consideration of the theoretical beliefs and educational doctrines of the basic-education theory.

Until advocates of this theory define more clearly its philosophical assumptions and practical implications, the self-perfection theory as developed by the new classical realists will be taken as the more meaningful formulation of conservative doctrines. But even so, some educational philosophers will doubtless find the self-perfection theory objectionable. They may question form and matter as the constituents of reality, and direct disclosure as a reliable method of knowing, both of which for them became obsolete with the development of modern science. They may question the belief that the main function of the school is to cultivate habits of acquiring, using, and enjoying knowledge, because for them the school is just as responsible as any other institution for cultivating desirable qualities of personality or desirable qualities of the process of experience. They may consider the self-perfection formulation of general method inadequate because the idea of any kind of formal pattern is obsolete, and the particular pattern proposed ends in pure eclecticism. Finally, they cannot be sure whether the three modes or dimensions of self-perfection are induced from empirical evidence or deduced from certain nonempirical premises of classical realism.

But regardless of objections to the self-perfection theory as developed by Broudy and Wild, it is intelligible and meaningful, and can be compared with other theories in its philosophical beliefs and applications. Perhaps the basic-education theory can also be thus defined. It should be added, however, that, even if the uncritical conservatives have so far remained silent, they are now on the verge of generating vocal leadership that may be embarrassing in both politics and education. It may embarrass not only proponents of

other theories but new conservatives themselves, especially those who have aroused to action—but have not enlightened—a rising tide of young people whom they now refuse to acknowledge.

The time is ripe for intellectuals of good will to forget their differences and cooperate in developing a policy and program that will reach a new generation that is neither “lost” nor “silent.” The important outcome in educational theory is not to convince students of the superiority of any system of beliefs but to provide conditions for comparing and criticizing conflicting systems in terms of their foundations and applications. Then advocates of all theories will be engaged in a common task.

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
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
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The Editor's Foreword, Ernest E. Bayles



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JOHN P. WYNNE (Ph.D., Columbia University) was for more than thirty years Chairman of the Department of Education and Philosophy, and Director of Teacher Education, at Longwood College in Virginia. Now Emeritus, he served early in his career both as teacher and principal in public schools, and as Professor of Education and Psychology at Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College (now Mississippi State University). Dr. Wynne has been President of the Virginia Philosophical Association; President of Region III, South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society; and Director of the Joint Study of Qualities of Experience, sponsored by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education and the Philosophy of Education Society. He is author of eight previous books.

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